THE  VALIDITY  OF  THE 
RELIGIOUS    EXPERIENCE 

A  PRELIMINARY  STUDY  IN  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION 


BY 
GEORGE  A.  BARROW,  PH.D.  (HAEV.) 


BOSTON 

SHERMAN,  FRENCH  &  COMPANY 
1917 


COPYHIGHT,   1917 

SHERMAN,  FRENCH  &  COMPANY 


TO 

MY  MOTHER 


NOTE 

Acknowledgment  is  due  the  Journal  of  Religious 
Psychology  for  kind  permission  to  reprint  as  the  lat- 
ter part  of  Lecture  II  an  article  which  appeared  in 
the  Journal  under  the  title  of  "  The  Reality  of  the 
Religious  Experience." 


CONTENTS 

LECTURE  I 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  A  PHILOSOPHY  OF 
RELIGION 

SECTION  PAOH 

I     THE   NEED  OF  ANALYSIS    ....       1 

A.  Official  Christianity  does  not  study 
the  experience  as  such  —  B.  Science  only 
describes  it  —  C.  Among  philosophers  lack 
of  agreement  forces  a  new  analysis. 

II     DEFINITION  OF  TERMS 4 

A.  There  is  a  consciousness  of  religion 
—  B.  Our  problem  is  with  the  form  or  con-  - 
cept  —  C.  Experience — (1)  Experience  is 
something  which  is  in  consciousness  and  not 
completely  controlled — (2)  First  question 
is  whether  religion  can  be  focal  in  con- 
sciousness — (3)  And  whether  it  is  com- 
pletely controllable  by  man  —  D.  Validity 
— (1)  It  is  a  question  of  a  true  indication 
of  the  source  of  the  experience  — (2)  Ques- 
tion first  the  existence  of  an  indication  as 
to  source — (3)  Second  question  is  of  the 
truth  of  this  indication. 

Ill     THE  POSSIBLE  RANGE  OF  THE  EX- 
PERIENCE     20 

A.     As  to  objective  detail — (1)   Is  there 
detail,  and  how  much  may  be  true  — (2) 
i 


ii  CONTENTS 

SECTION  PAGE 

That  is,  can  the  religious  consciousness  give 
objective  detail — (3)  And  how  does  it 
give  it. 

IV     THE  TEST  OF  THE  EXPERIENCE  .      .     23 

A.  Test  determines  method  —  B.  What 
is  the  test — (1)  Is  there  any — (2)  It 
must  be  sufficient  to  yield  the  maximum  re- 
sults— (3)  It  must  bring  an  explanation 
—  C.  The  effect  of  limitation— (1)  In 
general,  forces  us  to  a  conceptual  construc- 
tion — (2)  In  religion,  is  God  only  a  logical 
necessity. 

?  V  THE  PLACE  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  EX- 
PERIENCE IN  GENERAL  EXPERI- 
ENCE   .32 

A.  Analysis  of  the  exterior  relations  of 
the  experience — (l)  Necessary  to  tell  the 
relative  place  of  the  source  — (2)  In  re- 
ligion, ask  what  methods  to  use  —  B.  Is  it 
limited  to  humanity — (1)  Is  the  source  in- 
dividual— (2)  If  so,  no  revelation  of  a 
God  beyond  is  possible  —  C.  If  not  limited 
to  humanity — (1)  A  recourse  must  be  had 
to  powers  beyond — (2)  Only  so  can  God's 
existence  be  proven. 

VI     THE    RELATION    OF    THIS    EXPERI- 
ENCE TO  THE  WILL 41 

A.  Experience  normative  or  passive  — 
(1)  Definition  of  the  difference — (2) 
Must  ask  which  applies  to  religion  —  B. 
Result  of  the  passive  category — (1)  The 
passive  experiences  are  not  central  in  inter- 


CONTENTS  iii 

SECTION  PAGE 

est — (2)  It  would  mean  God  was  a  blind 
force  —  C.  Is  religion  normative — (1)  Is 
from  a  personality  — (2)  That  is,  God  is  a 
person. 

VII     SUMMARY  — The   Philosophy   of   Religion 

a   distinct   critique 51 

LECTURE  II     t>^C 
RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE 
I     IN  CONSCIOUSNESS 53 

A.  Definiteness — (1)  At  times  very 
definite  — (2)  So  open  to,  and  must  be 
tested  —  B.  As  conscious  impulse — (1) 
There  are  conscious  religious  impulses  — 
(2)  So  religion  is  so  far  real  —  C.  Can 
be  dated — (1)  When  mean  cessation  of  in- 
ner turmoil — (2)  Or  its  beginning — (3) 
So  has  a  real  place  in  time  —  D.  As  emo- 
tion— (1)  Emotions  are  in  consciousness 
— (2)  So  in  these  four  categories  some- 
where is  included  religion  as  an  experience. 

II     INDEFINITENESS 61 

A.  Of  content — (l)  Very  variable  — 
(2)  So  not  perception  of  objects  —  B.  Of 
direction — (l)  Often  directly  opposed  — 
(2)  So  not  the  same  as  morality  —  C.  Of 
date — (l)  The  more  normal  the  more  un- 
dated— (2)  So  not  a  perception  of  time  — 
D.  So  non-perceptual — (l)  Always  in  pos- 
sibility consciously  real — (2)  More  than 
perception. 


iv  CONTENTS 

SECTION  PAGE 

III  SUBJECT  TO  MAN 70 

A.  Can  seek  it — (1)  To  define  it  as  an 
experience  must  question  control — (2) 
Man  can  change  and  bring  about  in  himself 
the  religious  experience — (3)  So  like  other 
experiences  —  B.  Can  reject  it — (1)  By 
putting  other  interests  first — (2)  So  like 
other  experiences  —  C.  Can  modify — (1) 
By  effort  and  habit — (2)  So  real  as  ob- 
ject of  will. 

IV  NOT  COMPLETELY  CONTROLLABLE  78 

A.  It    comes    often    without    seeking  — 

(1)  As  in  the  family,  or  in  conversion  — 

(2)  So,  different  from  morality  —  B.  Felt 
even  when  rejected — (l)   It  requires  force 
to  reject  it — (2)   So  a  real  experience  — 
C.  Can    modify    man — (1)   Change    often 
marks  it — (2)   So   religion   a  true  experi- 
ence and  therefore  real. 

V     AN  UNIQUE  EXPERIENCE   ....     83 

A.  In  consciousness  but  very  change- 
able in  form,  so  stands  by  itself  —  B.  So 
with  relation  to  the  will,  simply  say,  it  is 
real. 


LECTURE  III 

THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION 
I     AN  UNIQUE  SOURCE 88 

A.  Need  of  a  guide — (1)  As  first  in- 
dications fail — (2)  Should  seek  an  unique 
source  —  B.  Need  of  further  analysis  — 
(l)  As  the  experience  may  not  be  pure. 


CONTENTS 

SECTION 

II     ALWAYS  CLAIM  A  SOURCE  OUTSIDE     92 

A.  Analyze  the  types  which  vary  —  B. 
In  contents — (l)  Mystic  denial  of  con- 
sciousness assert  something  behind — (2) 
Definite  experiences  only  called  religious  if 
thought  to  be  from  an  outside  source  —  C. 
In  direction — (1)  Mystic  passivity  im- 
plies direction  by  a  power  beyond  — (2) 
Active  impulses  imply  as  source  a  common 
ground  outside  —  D.  In  time — (1)  When 
uneventful  and  vague,  not  from  the  crea- 
tive will — (2)  When  date  uncertain,  so 
from  its  gradual  coming  into  conscious- 
ness—  E.  When  subject  to  man — (1) 
Consider  in  three  forms — (2)  Rejectance 
implies  objectivity — (3)  Modification  im- 
plies previous  existence — (4)  Searching 
implies  inability  to  create. 

III  THIS    CLAIM    SHOWS    THE    EXPERI- 

ENCE  INCOMPLETE   IN   ITSELF      .    104 

A.  It  does  not  explain  itself  to  itself  — 

(1)  Religious   state   always   implies    some- 
thing beyond — (2)   And  realizes  its  impli- 
cation —  B.  So    source    not    in    conscious- 
ness— (l)   Not    given    in    consciousness  — 

(2)  So  not  in  consciousness  —  C.  So  must 
look  beyond — (1)   For  it  is  incomplete  in 
itself — (2)   So  source  is  outside. 

IV  A   'FORMAL'   SOURCE Ill 

A.  Known  by  its  effect — (1)  An  un- 
known factor — (2)  Known  by  its  effect  — 
B.  So  its  existence  formal — (1)  Its  na- 


vi  CONTENTS 

SECTION  PAGE 

ture  unknown  but  adequate  to  explain  the 
religious  experience  — (2)  So,  formal  —  C. 
As  formal,  logically  necessary. 

V     SOURCE   REAL 116 

A.  The  experience  an  incomplete  real  — 

(1)  Incomplete  in  itself — (2)   Yet  real  — 
B.  The   source   then   real — (1)   Necessary 
to  the  experience  — (2)   So  real. 

VI  RELIGIOUS  CONSCIOUSNESS  THEN 
REVEALS  NATURE  OF  SOME- 
THING REAL 120 

A.  Religion   then  can   reveal  the   source 
— (l)  We  have  one  side  of,  the  relation  — 

(2)  And  know  there  is  something  real  at 
the  other — (3)   So  what  is  true  of  the  re- 
lation  applies   to   both  terms  —  B.  As   the 
religious    consciousness    reveals    something 
of  this  source — (l)   Can  study  the  experi- 
ence to  find  nature  of  the  source  or  object 
— (2)   The  experience  is  in  general  valid. 


LECTURE  IV 
/ 

THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION 
I     NO    OBJECTIVE    DETAIL      ....   125 

A.  Object  as  focus  of  experience — (1) 
Validity  implies  some  test — (2)  Objectiv- 
ity mean  a  focus  of  the  social  conscious- 
ness—  B.  Source  not  given  as  objective  — 
(l)  No  focus  of  agreement — (2)  So  no 
basis  for  a  test. 


CONTENTS  vii 

SECTION  PAGE 

II     CERTAIN   NECESSARY   QUALITIES    .   130 

A.  The  source,  as  source,  definite — (1) 
Has  determinate  character  — (2)  So,  defin- 
ite qualities  —  B.  Other  qualities  definitely 
excluded — (l)  Determination  implies  its 
denial  untrue — (2)  So  qualities  which 
will  deny  it,  to  be  excluded  —  C.  Neces- 
sary qualities — (1)  As  necessary,  basis 
for  true  statements  — (2)  Test  then  inde- 
pendent of  method  of  discovery. 

III  TEST  WITHIN  THE  EXPERIENCE      .   136 

A.  Truth  known  as  truth  by  reason  — 
(1)  Test  of  perception  is  agreement — (2) 
As  no  agreement  objectively  in  religion  no 
objective  validity — (3)  Only  test  is  by 
reason  —  B.  No  a  priori  truth  revealed  — 
(l)  A  priori  mean  universally  agreed  on, 
so  not  in  religion — (2)  Hence  dogma- 
tism useless  as  a  guarantee. 

IV  NO  EXTERIOR  STANDARD   ....   142 

A.  No  test  of  conformity — (l)  Agree- 
ment of  numbers  valid  for  objective  truth 
—(2)  But  not  for  derived  truth  —  B.  So 
no  exterior  test — (l)  The  test  is  within 
the  individual  experience. 

V     THE  TEST  IS  THE  TEST  OF  SOUND 

REASONING 147 

A.  Test  of  logical  adequacy — (l)  As 
test  scientific  theory — (2)  So  doctrine 
must  explain  religious  phenomena  —  B.  A 
test,  not  a  proof  —  C.  But  a  way  to  fuller 
knowledge. 


viii  CONTENTS 

LECTURE  V 
HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN 

SECTION  PAGE 

I     RELIGION    ASSERTS    SOURCE    OUT- 
SIDE   HUMANITY 152 

A.  Claim  in  outline  —  B.  Animism  —  C. 
Totemism  —  D.  Primitive  prayer  and  sac- 
rifice —  E.  Buddhism  --  F.  Theism  — (l) 
Deis  tic — (2)  Mystical. 

II     DEFINITION    OF    INDIVIDUAL      .      .   160 

A.  Concrete — (1)  The  logical  individ- 
ual— (2)  The  human  individual  —  B.  De- 
termined— (1)  Logically — (2)  For  the 
human  individual  —  C.  Limited  — (1) 
Logically  — (2)  In  the  human  individual 
—  D.  Temporal — (l)  Individual  experi- 
ence temporal — (2)  Also  experience  of  an- 
other human  individual. 

III.    DEFINITION  OF  SUPERINDIVIDUAL  168 

A.  General  —  B.  Determining  —  C.  Par- 
tially unlimited  —  D.  Non-temporal. 

IV     DEFINITION    OF    "HUMAN"    ...   173 

A.  Means  what  is  restricted  to  human  be- 
ings —  B.  Physical  characters  depend  on 
his  social  life  —  C.  Intellectual  characters 
depend  on  the  conflict  and  the  struggle  to 
control  emotions  —  D.  Intellect  limited  by 
physical  world  —  E.  Only  when  limitations 
present  is  assurance  of  human  character. 

V     DEFINITION   OF  SUPERHUMAN    .      .   179 

A.  Non-physical — (1)  Without  human 
physical  limitations — (2)  Or  limitations 


CONTENTS  ix 

SECTION  PAGE 

of  human  society  —  B.  No  inner  struggle 
of  will  and  emotion  —  C.  Intellect  super- 
physical. 

VI     SOURCE    OF    RELIGION    SUPERINDI- 

VIDUAL 184 

A.  General  —  B.  Logically  determina- 
tive —  C.  Not  completely  determined  — 
D.  Non-temporal. 

VII     SOURCE  OF  RELIGION  SUPERHUMAN  189 

A.  Super-physical — (l)  As  perceptive 
— (2)  As  social  —  B.  Lessens  human  in- 
ner conflict  —  C.  Refers  to  a  superhuman 
realm. 


LECTURE  VI 
PERSONALITY 

I     THE  HIDDEN  TERM 196 

A.  Object— (1)  The  alternatives —(2) 
Definition  —  B.  Source  — C.  Personality  — 
(l)  Interaction  in  general — (2)  Inter- 
action in  human  will. 

II     AS    OBJECT    .........   202 

A.  Passive — (1)  Not  exclusive  of  all 
activity — (2)  But  as  object,  passive- — 
B.  Without  influence  on  the  will  — C.  So 
not  a  sufficient  explanation. 

Ill     AS    SOURCE 207 

A.  Active  — B.  Affects  the  will  — C. 
Sufficient  explanation. 


x  CONTENTS 

SECTION 

IV     THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION      .      .      .211 

A.  As  object — (1)  Object,  yet  active 
— (2)  So  more  than  object  —  B.  As 
source — (1)  A  source,  yet  passive — (2) 
Both  source  and  object. 

V     PERSONALITY 219 

A.  Mutual  activity — (1)  On  religious 
object— (2)  On  the  will  — B.  Direct  in- 
teraction. 


LECTURE  VII 
A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY 

I     FOR   A   SCIENCE   THERE    IS   NECES- 
SARY         .221 

A.  A  field— (1)   Distinct— (2)   Real  — 

B.  A      method— (1)   Distinct— (2)   Valid 

C.  Limits  —  (l)     Presuppositions  —  (2) 
Purpose. 

II     THE   FIELD   OF   THEOLOGY      ...   228 

A.  Definite — (l)  Not  the  expression  — 
(2)  But  the  experience  itself  — B.  Real 
—(1)  Existent— (2)  Valid. 

Ill     THE  METHOD  OF  THEOLOGY  ...   233 

A.  Distinct  — (1)  Formal  — (2)  A 
postiori  — (3)  Explanatory  —  B.  Valid  — 
(1)  Because  the  object  has  personality. 

IV     THE   LIMITS   OF   THEOLOGY    ...   238 

A.  Presuppositions — (1)  A  religious  life 
—(2)  A  moral  life  —  B.  Purposes — (1) 
Teaching— (2)  Devotional. 


CONTENTS  xi 

SECTION  PAGE 

V     CONCLUSION 242 

A.  Building  from  the  foundation — (1) 
No  assumptions  — (2)  Valid  conclusions  — 
B.  A  foundation  for  further  study — (1) 
Definition  of  the  science  — (2)  Proof  of  its 
validity. 


LECTURE  I 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  A  PHILOSOPHY  OF 
RELIGION 

The  problem  of  the  validity  of  the  religious  ex- 
perience is  essentially  modern  and  recent.  Problems 
connected  with  what  we  call  the  religious  life  there 
have  always  been,  both  as  to  its  practice  and  its  im- 
plications. Men  have  questioned  whether  it  was  an 
experience  of  God  or  the  Devil,  and  have  sought  to 
regulate  it.  Others  have  claimed  their  inspiration 
from  their  possession  of  an  abnormal  religious  life, 
and  asserted  that  peculiar  knowledge  of  God  or  of 
life  was  given  to  them  in  that  experience.  Being 
practical^  men,  the  leaders  of  religious  life  have 
Bought  to  restrainjthis  phenomena  TyitfrinJimit.fr,  nnc\ 
"those  limits  havejbeen  laid 

of"  the  timeT  Mystics,  perhaps  the  only  ones  who 
Tiaverealised  religion  as  an  experience  different  from 
the  other  experiences  of  life,  have  never  won  a  large 
following.  Quakers  remain  few,  even  though  their 
first  quietism  has  been  largely  lost.  The  effort  to 
keep  the  contemplative  orders  true  to  their  first  ideal 
has  often  seemed  impossible  of  success.  The  normal 
life  which  does  not  recognise  sharp  distinctions  be- 
tween the  experience  of  religion  and  other  experiences 
has  dominated  the  Church.  Hence  the  practical 
spirit  of  the  Church  has  expressed  itself  in  restrain- 


2          THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

ing  the  expression  of  religion  as  a  thing  distinct  from 
life's  other  activities.  On  the  theoretical  side  theolo- 
gians have  been  much  more  concerned  with  the 
revelations  made  and  the  ideas  drawn  from  the  re- 
ligious experience  than  they  have  been  with  that  ex- 
perience itself.  The  official  teachers  and  leaders  of 
Christianity  have  therefore  paid  little  attention  to 
the  religious  phenomena  for  its  own  sake.  The  terms 
used  in  describing  it  are  not  drawn  from  an  analysis 
of  the  phenomena,  but  from  assumptions,  many  of 
them  crude  and  carelessly  used. 

Outside  of  official  Christianity  there  has  been,  of 
recent  years,  considerable  study  of  religious  phe- 
nomena. The  history  of  religions,  comparative  re- 
ligion, together  with  the  science  and  the  psychology 
of  religion,  though  naming  fields  whose  boundaries  are 
only  very  roughly  defined,  outline  the  modern  inter- 
est in  the  subject.  By  contact  with  differing  forms 
of  religious  expression,  and  especially  by  contact  with 
the  East,  where  attention  has  for  centuries  been  cen- 
tered on  these  phenomena,  our  western  world  has  been 
aroused  to  a  careful  objective  study  of  religion.  This 
has  not  yet  gone  far  enough  to  give  us  new  terms, 
since  it  has  hardly  yet  formulated  clearly  even  the 
principal  problems.  We  cannot  look  to  this  objec- 
tive study  for  clear  definitions  of  our  terms,  or  for 
unambiguous  terms.  Nor  would  they  serve  us  for 
more  than  a  start.  Valuable  as  the  results  of  the  sci- 
entific study  of  religion  will  be  for  the  future  theolo- 
gian, these  studies  will  be,  even  for  him,  merely  de- 
scriptive. The  determination  of  the  normal  age  of 
conversion,  or  the  solution  of  the  relative  consist- 
ency of  differing  forms  of  religious  expression,  can 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  3 

give  to  the  theologian  only  more  material  and  new 
problems.  N<one  of  these  modern  studies  concerns 
itself  with  the  meaning  of  the  religious  experience. 
If  it  is  proved  that  there  is  no  distinct  experience  of 
this  type,  then  its  only  meaning  will  lie  in  its  rela- 
tions to  the  physical  life  of  the  race,  but  the  deter- 
mination of  this  point  can  not  be  found  in  the  sci- 
ence of  religion,  whether  genetic  or  descriptive. 
Only  a  philosophic  study  of  the  implications  of  the 
normal  religious  life  can  even  point  the  way  to  a  so- 
lution of  such  a  problem. 

The  philosophical  study  of  the  expression  of  the 
religious  life  is  newer  even  than  its  scientific  study. 
By  philosophy  of  religion  in  even  recent  times  has 
been  meant  the  application  to  religion  of  the  meta- 
physical concepts.  While  this  is  valid,  and  means 
much  for  theology,  it  can  not  take  the  place  of  a 
study  based  on  the  experience  itself.  Independent 
studies  of  this  latter  kind  have  been  very  few.  Many 
semi-popular  adaptations  of  modern  theology  to 
modern  religious  needs  there  have  been,  and  it  is 
significant  that  men  like  Eucken  and  Royce  have  at- 
tempted this.  Yet  this  is  not  a  philosophical  study 
of  the  experience  itself.  It  has  its  relation  rather 
with  the  practical  problems  of  the  Christian  leader, 
than  with  the  logical  analysis  of  the  Christian  phi- 
losopher. Besides  the  present  condition  of  religious 
thought,  there  is  such  a  complex  situation  in  philo- 
sophic thought  generally  that  we  are  to-day  unable 
to  reach  any  general  agreement  on  terms.  Each 
thinker  must  define  for  himself  and  his  readers  the 
meaning  he  gives  to  his  words,  else  only  confusion 
results.  When  the  students  of  philosophy  dispute  as 


4          THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

fiercely  as  they  do  over  the  definition  of  conscious- 
ness, it  is  useless  to  attempt  to  assume  an  agreement 
on  the  definition  of  the  religious  consciousness.  Some 
agreement,  however,  is  necessary,  and  this  present 
attempt  will  be  justified  if  the  religious  experience  can 
be  so  defined  that  in  the  further  study  of  it,  whether 
for  the  practical  churchman  or  for  the  scientific 
worker  in  the  history  or  the  philosophy  of  religion, 
there  may  be  some  basis  of  agreement  as  to  what  is 
the  religious  problem. 

In  defining  the  problem  of  the  religious  experience 
we  cannot  assume  agreement  even  on  the  terms  which 
we  have  been  using.  To  say  that  the  problem  is 
concerning  the  validity  of  the  religious  experience  is 
to  beg  the  question  in  each  word  of  our  statement. 
Men  are  not  agreed  in  what  sense  they  shall  use  the 
word  experience.  So  in  dealing  with  the  experience 
of  something  which  is  unlike  any  other  experience  in 
the  world  —  if  we  are  to  take  the  word  of  those  who 
claim  to  have  that  experience  in  its  fullest  form  — 
then  the  first  question  is  whether  this  is  an  experience 
or  an  hallucination.  We  must  begin  at  the  beginning. 
The  beginning  is  with  this  word  experience.  If  any- 
thing that  is  in  our  consciousness  is  an  experience, 
then  a  man  who  has  any  religious  ideas  has  a  religious 
experience.  To  use  the  word  in  this  sense  would  not 
imply  anything  further  about  the  experience  than 
that  there  was  some  meaning  to  the  word  religion; 
there  was  a  state  of  consciousness  which  we  could 
identify  as  the  consciousness  of  religion.  That  men 
do  mean  something  when  they  speak  of  religion  we 
may  take  for  granted.  Whether  the  religious  state 
or  feelings  or  consciousness  is  the  same  as  other  con- 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  5 

scious  states  is  a  debatable  question,  but  the  existence, 
and  material  success,  of  religious  organisations 
proves  that  men  believe  in  them  enough  to  support 
them,  and  they  would  not  give  as  largely  as  they  do 
of  their  means  unless  that  meaning  existed  for  them. 
Whether  we  call  it  fear  or  love,  men  do  think  they 
accomplish  something  by  their  support  and  pursuit 
of  religion.  Even  if  it  is  merely  the  effort  to  live 
a  moral  life,  then  that  effort  is  what  we  call  religion. 
The  very  fact  that  religion  is  to-day  the  object  of 
such  widespread  serious  study  shows  that  men  have 
a  consciousness  of  some  meaning  to  the  word  "  re- 
ligion." 

The  fact  of  the  existence  of  a  religious  conscious- 
ness does  no  more  than  make  possible  the  various 
problems.  To  define  the  terms  of  these  problems  we 
must  analyse  this  consciousness.  Anything  may  be 
analysed  in  many  different  ways.  With  differing 
motives  the  directions  of  the  cuts  which  separate  the 
resulting  parts  will  be  different.  The  scientific  and 
historical  analysis  of  the  consciousness  of  religion 
has  been  often  undertaken  in  these  days.  The  result 
of  the  historical  analysis  is  to  define  what  men  have 
meant  by  this  term  "  religious."  The  contents  of 
the  religious  concept  become  more  and  more  definite 
as  this  history  of  religion  portrays  what  men  have 
thought  that  religion  meant.  What  it  does  mean  is, 
however,  not  the  province  of  history  to  inquire. 
That  is  left  to  science  and  to  philosophy.  The  recent 
modern  development  of  the  scientific  study  of  religiori 
has  done  much  towards  the  description  of  the  reli- 
gious phenomena.  We  have  a  far  clearer  idea  to- 
day than  ever  before  what  the  psychological  and 


6          THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

physiological  elements  of  the  religious  consciousness 
are.  This  scientific  analysis,  however,  must  content 
itself  with  the  objective  side  of  consciousness.  It 
can  tell  what  a  man  is  thinking  about  when  he  prays, 
or  it  can  correlate  his  desire  to  pray  with  certain 
physiological  conditions.  What  it  cannot  do,  so 
long  as  it  remains  a  science,  is  to  consider  the  impli- 
cations of  the  experience.  It  can  test  the  questions 
of  fact,  as  in  perception  it  can  decide  whether  the 
perception  has  relation  to  something  we  call  the  ob- 
ject of  perception;  it  can  distinguish  in  terms  of  the 
knowledge  relation  between  true  perception  and  false, 
between  vision  and  hallucination;  but  as  it  cannot 
decide  whether  the  object  is  real  or  conceptual, 
whether  the  test  is  one  of  knowledge  or  logic,  but 
must  leave  that  to  metaphysics,  so  the  science  of 
religion  cannot  decide  whether  the  religious  con- 
sciousness has  objective  validity  or  is  purely  sub- 
jective. The  consideration,  even,  of  the  application 
of  these  terms  to  the  religious  consciousness  belongs 
not  to  the  science  but  to  the  philosophy  of  religion. 
The  analysis  which  we  have  to  make  is  therefore  the 
philosophical  analysis.  We  are  concerned  not  with 
questions  of  fact,  but  of  meaning.  It  would  not 
serve  our  purpose,  therefore,  to  define  religion  in 
terms  of  its  content.  We  need  neither  to  make  a 
parallel  to  the  scientific  analysis,  nor  do  we  need,  ex- 
cept incidentally,  to  take  over  its  results.  In  raising 
the  question  of  validity,  whatever  we  may  mean,  we 
do  not  mean  to  question  the  fact  of  its  existence  or 
what  its  existence  includes.  We  do  not  ask  whether 
any  given  case  of  religion  is  or  is  not  a  true  religious 
experience.  We  are  concerned  only  with  the  form  of 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  7 

the  religious  experience  and  the  questions  we  ask  are 
questions  of  possibility  and  of  implication.  Our 
analysis  is  therefore  to  be  an  analysis  of  concepts. 
Given  the  existence  of  something  we  conceive  to  be 
the  religious  consciousness  or  religious  state,  we  seek 
to  analyse  our  conception  of  it. 

In  this  analysis,  the  first  term  to  be  questioned  is 
the  last  of  our  titles.  So  far  a  number  of  terms  have 
been  used  in  speaking  of  the  religious  phenomena  in 
order  to  avoid  the  implications  of  any  one  of  them. 
The  concept  which  we  will  find  ourselves  forced  to 
consider  most  is  brought  to  us  in  the  word  "  experi- 
ence." To  assume  it  in  any  one  sense  would  be 
dangerous,  so  we  must  ask  first  what  is  meant  by  the 
term  as  applied  to  religion.  At  the  start,  and  from 
whatever  point  we  make  our  start,  the  application  to 
religion  must  be  carefully  examined.  The  widest 
meaning  is  therefore  the  best  to  bring  out  the  most 
general  implications.  The  widest  use  is  that  already 
referred  to,  when  anything  which  may  be  the  object 
of  a  man's  consciousness  is  called  his  experience. 
Dreams,  insight  into  artistic  activities  or  values,  as 
well  as  the  perceptual  facts  of  everyday  life,  are  in 
a  man's  experience.  Even  in  this  widest  use,  how- 
ever, there  are  limits.  It  is  a  question  whether  a 
man  experiences  his  own  purposes,  or  his  own  will. 
The  question  might  be  put  in  the  form  as  to  whether 
there  can  be  a  subjective  experience.  Ordinarily 
the  assumption  would  be  that  there  could  not.  What 
a  man  experiences,  though  it  may  come  to  him  from 
his  own  body  or  even  his  "  subconscious  life,"  is 
usually  assumed  to  be  something  over  whose  coming, 
or  at  least  over  the  complete  determination  of  whose 


8          THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

coming,  he  does  not  have  control.  Even  the  artist, 
in  seeking  to  realise  and  make  possible  the  experience 
of  his  ideal  of  beauty,  must  discover,  at  least  in  part, 
rather  than  create,  that  beauty.  He  deals  with  a 
world  not  completely  under  his  power.  The  experi- 
ence of  the  moral  struggle  leads  to  the  same  discovery 
of  weakness  in  the  will  to  do  right.  The  experience 
comes  because  the  action  is  governed  by  other  forces 
besides  and  in  addition  to  the  ideal.  The  problem  as 
to  whether  the  God  of  ordinary  theology  can  have 
a  moral  experience,  since  his  omnipotence  can  feel  no 
limits,  illustrates  the  ordinary  use  of  the  term.  A 
man  experiences  that  which  in  some  way  or  other  is 
not  subject  to  his  will.  Our  ordinary  activity,  the 
direct  result  of  our  will,  can,  however,  and  does  be- 
come the  object  of  knowledge  and  of  subsequent  will 
activity.  Just  as  we  speak  of  a  man  experiencing 
anger,  when  we  refer  primarily  to  the  presence  of 
the  angry  feelings  in  his  consciousness,  so  we  can  and 
sometimes  do  speak  of  his  experience  of  an  ideal. 
Especially  is  this  true  of  religion.  In  the  popular 
devotional  literature,  whether  of  revivalist  or  mystic, 
the  effort  is  made  to  concentrate  attention  on  the 
active  side  of  a  man's  nature.  He  is  asked  to  pay 
attention  to  his  motives,  or,  with  the  Indian  mystic, 
to  ignore  his  desires.  In  either  case  motives  or 
desires  are  treated  as  something  in  his  consciousness 
which  may  be  objects  of  attention.  The  philosophic 
use  of  the  word  "  object "  as  opposed  to  "  subject " 
has  led  to  the  danger  of  ignoring  the  fact  that  in 
ordinary  usage  the  same  consciousness  often  has  ap- 
plied to  it  both  words.  When  a  man  becomes  con- 
scious of  any  purpose,  whether  "  the  will  to  believe  " 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  9 

or  the  will  to  do  right,  or  the  will  to  seek  the  abolition 
of  desire,  in  so  far  as  he  is  conscious  of  what  he  is 
seeking,  in  ordinary  language  we  say  that  he  experi- 
ences that  desire.  In  the  very  nature  of  self-con- 
sciousness the  experience  of  the  self  is  involved.  The 
metaphysical  difficulties  which  surround  the  problem 
as  to  how  the  subjective  will  can  be  objective  need 
not,  however,  concern  us  here.  As  we  are  now  deal- 
ing with  the  meaning  of  terms,  it  is  enough  to  point 
out  the  implication  of  applying  to  religion  the  word 
"  experience,"  used  in  this  most  general  sense.  The 
two  elements  we  have  been  discussing  may  be  brought 
together  in  the  statement  that  a  man  experiences  any- 
thing which  is  the  object  of  attention,  and  so  far  as 
it  is,  he  does  not  have  it  completely  under  his  con- 
trol. This  is  true  of  the  very  case  of  self-conscious- 
ness, a  man  by  no  means  controls  his  consciousness 
of  his  own  will.  Often  he  will  seek  very  earnestly  in 
some  direction,  only  to  some  day  awake  to  the  con- 
sciousness that  that  was  not  really  what  he  wanted, 
or  that  what  he  did  want  was  not  consistent  with 
this  other  thing  for  which  he  was  equally  anxious.  A 
man,  in  the  common  use  of  words,  may  be  said  to  find 
out  what  it  is  he  wants.  He  experiences  his  will 
when  it  comes  to  consciousness  in  his  mind,  and  that 
will  may  be  one  that  his  whole  self  does  not  control. 
This  is,  as  I  understand  it,  the  attitude  of  the  Budd- 
hist toward  desire.  There  are  purposes  that  the 
true  self  must  cast  off  if  it  is  to  be  true  to  itself.  So 
long  as  they  exist,  they  are  not  subject  to  the  true 
self.  Whether  or  not  correct  as  a  hasty  statement 
of  the  Buddhist  position,  such  a  statement  illustrates 
the  possibility  of  the  union  of  the  two  ideas  in  the 


10        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

use  of  the  word  experience.  To  say  that  a  man  ex- 
periences something  is  to  say  that  he  is  conscious 
of  something  over  which  he  has  not  complete  control. 
When  this  meaning  of  experience  is  applied  to  re- 
ligion the  religious  phenomena  are  described  as  ob- 
jects of  consciousness  over  which  the  man  experi- 
encing them  has  not  complete  control.  Taking  the 
first  half  of  this  statement  first,  when  religion  is 
spoken  of  as  the  object  of  consciousness  something 
more  is  meant  than  that  it  is  studied  as  we  are  now 
studying  it.  Any  concept  may  be  the  object  of  in- 
quiry, even  though  that  concept  has  no  content. 
The  concept  of  a  round-square,  though  it  has  proper- 
ties that  can  be  studied  can  never  be  an  experience, 
for  since  a  round-square  can  never  exist,  it  cannot 
be  the  object  of  consciousness.  A  study  of  the  con- 
ception of  a  thing  is  not  the  study  of  the  thing.  To 
be  object  of  consciousness  religion  must  exist.  There 
must  be  states  of  men's  minds  which  can  be  studied 
and  known  under  the  concepts  of  religion.  Grant- 
ing that  this  is  the  case,  since  the  material  devotion 
proves  that  men,  as  we  have  already  said,  mean 
something  when  they  speak  of  religion,  the  asser- 
tion comes  to  the  form  that  religion,  assuming  it 
to  exist,  exists  as  an  object  of  consciousness.  Re- 
membering in  what  sense  we  used  the  term  object  as 
applied  to  experience,  including  in  it  experience  of 
will  and  value,  we  come  to  the  assertion  that  religion 
is  a  possible  content  of  consciousness  and  the  sub- 
ject or  focus  of  the  attentive  consciousness.  This  is 
by  no  means  self  evident.  If  we  should  follow  many 
of  the  mystics  in  their  statements  of  the  impossi- 
bility of  describing  or  adequately  coming  to  con- 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  11 

sciousness  of  the  religious  experience  we  should  have 
to  conclude  that  it  is  not  a  possible  focal  center  for 
clear  consciousness.  The  fact  that  Buddhists  are 
by  no  means  agreed  as  to  what  terms  are  applicable 
to  Nirvana  proves  that  to  assert  that  in  this  sense 
of  "  object  of  consciousness  "  religion  is  an  experi- 
ence is  not  accepted  by  many  who  call  themselves 
religious.  Accepting  experience  as  conscious  ex- 
perience, and  religion  as  existent,  the  whole  char- 
acter of  the  relation  between  them  remains  to  be 
examined.  Therefore  for  this  first  meaning  of  ex- 
perience we  have  the  problem  of  the  possibility  of 
the  religious  state  being  in  any  sense  focal  and 
clear.  In  this  it  shares  in  the  present  condition  of 
any  problem  which  seeks  to  define  the  consciousness 
of  the  subject  of  knowledge,  or  to  describe  in  logical 
terms  self-consciousness.  To  a  certain  extent  it 
must  share  the  fate  of  the  outcome  of  such  attempts, 
yet  a  negative  view  here  is  conceivably  possible  what- 
ever be  the  conclusion  as  to  self-consciousness.  If 
self-consciousness  is  agreed  upon  as  something 
existent  which  cannot  itself  be  focal  in  consciousness, 
but  only  a  condition  behind  consciousness,  then  there 
is  the  possibility,  if  religion  is  also  in  its  nature  non- 
focal,  that  religion  and  self-consciousness  may  be 
closely  related.  Undoubtedly  there  is  a  certain 
tendency  in  this  direction  observable  in  the  work  of 
the  absolute  idealists.  The  religious  union  with 
God,  for  the  Hindoo  as  well  as  for  many  of  our  own 
thinkers,  is  often  spoken  of  as  the  true  self.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  student  of  philosophy  does 
allow  the  focal  nature  of  self-consciousness,  he  may 
still,  whether  by  relegating  religion  to  the  subcon- 


12         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

scious  realm,  or  by  exalting  it  to  the  ineffable  re- 
gions beyond  even  self-consciousness,  conceive  it  as 
not  possibly  an  experience  of  our  conscious  life,  and 
therefore  in  this  case  very  different  from  self-con- 
sciousness. This  question  must  be  met,  therefore, 
by  -the  student  of  religious  concepts.  He  must  ask 
whether  from  their  nature  they  are  or  are  not  possi- 
ble focal  centers  in  consciousness. 

If  with  this  question  of  presence  in  consciousness 
we  come  into  deep  waters,  we  must  swim  in  even 
deeper  when  we  consider  the  latter  half  of  our  pre- 
liminary definition  of  experience.  If  experience  is 
something  over  which  a  man  has  not  complete  con- 
trol, then  we  are  met  at  the  very  outset  by  conflict- 
ing ideas  among  those  who  profess  to  have  the  re- 
ligious life.  Whatever  religion  may  be,  this  ques- 
tion is  as  fundamental  as  the  issue  between  Augustine 
and  Pelagius.  It  is  really  this  that  was  the  issue 
between  them.  If  we  are  to  call  or  acknowledge  the 
possibility  of  an  experience  of  religion,  we  must  face 
the  problem  they  faced.  If  man  can  by  his  own 
will  and  in  his  own  strength  attain  to  the  condition 
of  union  with  God  which  is  another  name  for  what 
we  have  called  the  religious  phenomena,  then,  in  the 
extreme  case  where  that  union  remains  completely 
under  his  control,  it  cannot  be  called  in  our  sense 
an  experience.  If  that  religious  state  comes  to  him 
even  partially  as  the  result  of  forces  outside  his  own 
will  and  not  subject  to  him,  then  it  may  be  an  ex- 
perience. The  whole  theology  which  must  be  the 
result  for  a  believer  in  religion  from  the  study  of 
his  religion  will  differ  according  to  the  answer  given 
this  question.  It  is  not  merely,  however,  the  prob- 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  13 

lem  which  faced  Augustine.  Taking  the  religious 
state  apart  from  its  relation  to  morality,  the  prob- 
lem is  just  as  acute.  To  a  certain  extent  the  Yogi, 
in  laying  out  for  himself  definite  exercises,  assumes 
that  he  can  control  that  which  will  result  from 
the  course  he  is  taking.  While  he  may  not  assert 
that  when  it  comes  he  has  complete  control  over  it, 
still  he  tends  in  this  direction.  The  acme  of  the 
religious  state,  as  it  occurs  in  the  consciousness  of 
Brahma,  would  seem  always  to  be  conceived  in  terms 
which  do  not  allow  of  the  application  to  it  of  the 
word  "  experience."  Brahma  or  the  Christian  God, 
if  described  in  the  terms  which  are  often  used,  can- 
not be  said  to  have  in  consciousness  anything  over 
which  he  has  not  complete  control.  Absorption  in 
him,  therefore,  would  be  union  with  a  being  who  has 
no  experience.  In  this  the  Indian  thinker  is  often 
more  consistent  than  the  Christian.  If  religion  is 
something  which  a  man  can  ideally  consider  as  under 
his  complete  will  and  control,  then  ideally,  and  as 
he  conceives  its  nature,  it  is  not  an  experience,  what- 
ever else  we  may  call  it.  If  it  is  thus  conceived  as 
not  an  experience,  the  whole  question  again  arises  of 
its  relation  to  self-consciousness  and  takes  corre- 
sponding forms  to  the  results  that  we  have  seen 
were  possible  in  the  consideration  of  the  first  half 
of  our  definition.  Another  result  of  the  assertion 
that  religion  may  be  experienced  must  be  noted. 
Whether  or  not  the  result  of  man's  will,  as  against 
God's,  it  may  be  conceived  as  the  result  of  physical 
forces  over  which,  as  we  know  in  other  departments 
of  life,  a  man  never  has  complete  control.  If  re- 
ligion is  physiological  or  subject  to  "  natural  law," 


14        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

it  must,  if  it  can  come  into  consciousness,  be  an  ex- 
perience. This  is  true  whether  the  contents  of  re- 
ligion be  more  than  emotions  or  not.  As  we  have 
seen,  ideals  and  values,  which  are  not  mere  emotions, 
because  they  are  often  the  result  of  physical  condi- 
tions and  therefore  not  completely  subject  to  man, 
are  for  that  reason  possible  experiences.  To  con- 
clude that  religion  may  be  experienced  leaves  the  way 
open  for  the  physiological  and  psychological  studies 
which  are  the  fashion  to-day.  A  negative  answer 
means  that  what  these  men  are  studying  is  not  re- 
ligion. If  religion  is  what  a  man  wills  then  those 
states  and  actions  which  are  the  result  of  material 
or  natural  forces  cannot  be  called  religion.  Our 
present  problem,  therefore,  is  logically  prior  to  any 
scientific  study  of  religion.  If  religion  is  to  be 
studied  as  an  experience,  it  must  first  be  shown  to  be 
by  its  very  nature  not  completely  controllable  by  the 
will  of  the  man  experiencing  it. 

The  general  definition  of  experience  with  which 
we  have  been  working  so  far  cannot  lead  into  the 
heart  of  the  problem.  In  what  we  have  been  con- 
sidering questions  of  validity  have  not  entered. 
However  we  may  answer  the  questions  as  to  the  posi- 
tion in  consciousness  and  of  control  of  religion  by 
the  will,  we  have  not  defined  any  implications  of  the 
experience.  At  the  most  we  have  merely  defined 
something  of  its  nature.  Our  description  may  be 
true  or  untrue,  but  the  experience  itself,  if  it  be  an 
experience,  cannot  be  said  to  be  either.  Before  the 
question  of  validity  is  raised,  there  should  be  some- 
thing recognised  as  implying  connections  beyond 
itself.  As  long  as  the  religious  experience  is  defined 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  15 

in  terms  that,  even  though  objects  of  conscious 
thought  do  not  imply  relations  with  obj  ects  or  beings 
outside  consciousness,  we  cannot  say  that  the  experi- 
ence is  true  or  false.  A  dream  may  be  consistent  or 
inconsistent,  but  it  cannot,  unless  used  for  divination, 
be  true  or  false.  No  question  of  validity  can  logic- 
ally be  raised  by  the  modern  man  in  regard  to  even  a 
consistent  dream.  It  is  to  further  definition  or 
limitation  of  the  idea  of  experience  that  we  must 
look  for  a  clearer  idea  of  the  limits  of  our  problem. 
The  next  step  in  such  a  description  is  the  question  of 
the  source  of  the  experience.  Here  again  ordinary 
language  is  a  guide.  It  differentiates  two  kinds 
of  experience,  inner  and  outer.  A  man  experiences 
within  him  whatever  comes  from  his  own  body ;  he 
experiences  objects  outside  of  him  by  perceiving 
them  through  some  one  or  more  of  his  sense  organs. 
This  distinction  between  inner  and  outer  which 
causes  the  philosopher  so  much  trouble  causes  none 
in  the  world  of  ordinary  conversation.  A  man's  ex- 
perience of  an  illness  is  assumed  to  be  different  from 
his  experience  in  seeing  or  hearing  a  horse.  The 
ordinary  mind  jumps  at  once  over  the  intermediate 
steps,  which  may  be  somewhat  alike  in  the  two  cases, 
to  the  question  of  source,  and  because  the  source  of 
the  sickness  is  to  be  found  within  the  body  and  the 
cause  of  the  perception  of  a  horse  outside,  in  the 
horse,  the  two  experiences  are  held  sharply  apart. 
Both  are  experiences,  and  the  word  is  used  of  both, 
but  they  are  different.  A  clearer  illustration  of  the 
difference  is  given  in  the  difference  between  the  sen- 
sation of  heat  resulting  from  or  accompanying  a 
fever,  and  that  of  drawing  near  some  heated  object. 


16        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

The  sensation  may  be  much  alike  in  the  two  cases, 
but  because  the  cause  is  different  the  two  are  dis- 
tinguished.    One,  the  latter,  is  perception,  the  other 
we  may  call  a  physiological  experience.     In  this  dis- 
tinction we  are  no  longer  concerned  with  the  rela- 
tion of  the  experience  to  the  simple  facts  of  atten- 
tion or  control,  that  is,  to  its  relation  to  the  sub- 
ject of  consciousness  (using  the  philosophical  terms 
without  defining  them)  but  with  the  relation  of  the 
experience  to  the  world  of  which  it  is  part.     The 
subject  or  will  is  ignored  in  the  ordinary  differenti- 
ation of  inner  and  outer  experience  and  the  differ- 
ence  thought   of   in   terms   of   the  physical   world. 
The  relation  between  the  body  and  its  parts,  and  the 
relation  between  our  body  and  other  material  ob- 
jects are  the  objects  of  concern.     The  terms  of  the 
experience-relation  are  now  of  the  same  kind,  both 
clearly  objective  if  not  always  so  clearly  material. 
As  long  as  the  only  question  was  whether  a  given  pos- 
sibility could  or  could  not  be  in  consciousness,  and 
whether  it  was  controllable  by  the  individual  will,  no 
false  implication  was  possible,  for  with  the  first  part 
of  the  definition,  either  the  religious  state  is  in  con- 
sciousness or  it  is  not.     The  state  itself  considered 
simply  as  experience  does  not  point  to  any  other  ex- 
perience or  object.     The  same  is  true  of  the  question 
of  control  by  the  will.    From  this  point  of  view  the  re- 
ligious state  does  not  lead  to  any  inference  to  things 
beyond  itself,  the  question  is  simply  one  of  (logical) 
fact.     When  we  deal  with  relation  within  the  same 
world,  however,  inference  is  at  once  possible.     "  Is 
the  sensation  of  heat  due  to  fever  or  a  hot  object " 
is  a  question  as  to  what  the  sensation  or  conscious- 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  17 

ness  implies.  The  experience  is  conceived  as  point- 
ing out  from  itself,  and  the  thing  or  act  to  which 
it  points  may  or  may  not  be  the  real  cause  of  the 
experience.  Any  experience  may  be  said  to  be  valid 
when  the  object  to  which  it  points  is  the  real  or  in 
a  general  sense  the  sufficient  cause  of  its  existence. 
The  validity  of  an  experience  involves  therefore  two 
things,  an  implication  as  to  the  cause,  and  the  ,truth 
of  the  implication.  In  examining  any  experience  as 
to  its  validity,  we  examine  the  implication  —  in  the 
case  of  the  fever  patient  we  make  sure  that  it  is 
heat  and  not  cold  that  he  feels  —  and  then  examine 
the  truth  of  the  implication  —  in  the  case  above,  the 
feeling  that  the  room  has  become  hot.  These  two 
things,  the  existence  of  an  indication  as  to  the 
source  of  the  experience,  and  the  truth  of  the  indi- 
cation, are  the  essential  factors  in  this  present  phase 
of  the  question. 

The  first  of  these  problems  as  it  applies  to  the 
religious  consciousness  may  be  defined  as  the  discus- 
sion as  to  the  physiological  or  non-physiological 
origin  of  the  religious  experience.  The  first  ques- 
tion would  be  whether  there  is  an  indication  of 
source.  In  putting  it  this  way  we  must  remember 
that  what  the  crux  is,  is  not  what  is  the  source,  but 
what  indications  as  to  source  are  there  in  the  ex- 
perience itself.  If  here  are  no  such  indications, 
then  whatever  the  cause  of  the  experience  may  be 
concluded  to  be,  the  question  of  validity  is  not  raised, 
for  the  experience  made  no  assertion  or  implication 
whose  validity  could  be  judged.  The  confusion  on 
this  point  has  led  to  fruitless  controversy  as  to  the 
relation  of  emotion  to  religion.  Unless  the  religious 


18        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

state  implies  that  it  is  not  a  matter  of  emotion,  then 
religion's  validity  or  truth  is  not  impugned  by  the 
assertion  that  it  is  merely  emotion.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  religion  seems  to  imply  that  it  has  emotion  as 
its  starting  point,  as  some  revivalists'  methods  seem 
to  assume  that  it  does,  then  the  denial  of  emotion  as 
its  cause  is  a  denial  of  its  validity.  Again  we  must 
remember  that  our  examination  is  an  examination  of 
the  concept  or  form  of  the  experience.  Not  what 
the  contents  of  religion,  or  the  assertions  of  the  re- 
ligious man  are,  but  what  the  form  or  conception 
of  the  possibility  of  the  experience  whose  possession 
he  asserts  implies,  is  the  question.  The  experience 
must  be  examined  to  find  if  it  gives  any  indication 
of  its  source.  An  occurrence  always  at  the  age  of 
adolescence,  and  at  no  other  time,  would  point  to 
some  connection  with  the  physiological  conditions  of 
that  period  as  its  cause.  There  would  then  be  pos- 
sible an  examination  of  the  truth  of  that  indication. 
Indications  of  an  exterior  will  power,  such  as  the 
description,  if  it  always  came  in  that  form,  of  ex- 
periences like  that  of  St.  Paul  or  St.  Augustine 
would  be  plain  indications,  which  again  would  have 
to  be  examined,  of  origin  in  some  supra-personal 
power.  These  are  crude  illustrations  of  the  prob- 
lems as  to  the  existence  of  implications  in  the  ex- 
perience. An  examination  as  to  the  presence  of  such 
implications  is  the  first  step  in  the  consideration  of 
the  validity  of  the  religious  experience. 

The  second,  and  main  question,  in  regard  to  valid- 
ity is  the  question  of  the  validity  or  truth  of  the 
indications.  The  chief  danger  here  is  that  we  shall 
regard  this  phase  as  including  the  whole  question. 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  19 

This  it  does  not  do.  Unless  the  indications  are  so 
clear  and  full  that  they  include  every  question  that 
might  be  asked  in  regard  to  the  experience  and  its 
source,  agreement  that  the  indications  so  far  as  they 
go  are  true  does  not  carry  us  the  whole  way.  What 
it  does  do  is  to  give  a  firm  basis  on  which  to  stand. 
In  any  case,  even  were  the  indications  of  source  un- 
mistakable, so  that  the  examination  of  their  correct- 
ness became  a  mere  form,  what  would  be  known  would 
simply  be  the  relation  of  the  experience  to  its  source. 
Referring  again  to  the  illustration  of  the  fever,  the 
indication  of  the  experience,  even  if  it  is  clear  enough 
to  convince  the  sufferer  that  it  is  he  and  not  the 
room  that  is  hot,  yet  no  deductions  from  that  fact 
can  be  assumed.  The  physician  may  be  at  a  loss 
to  know  what  is  the  cause,  or  he  may  see  in  the  indi- 
cations or  symptoms  which  the  patient  has  told  him 
evidences  of  further  and  more  remote  complications. 
Yet  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  conclusion 
that  the  source  is  bodily  and  not  perceptual  is  not 
involved  in  these  further  questions.  The  relation  of 
the  sensation  of  heat  to  the  blood  vessels  is  clear. 
In  the  same  way,  the  present  phase  of  our  problem 
applies  only  to  the  first  step,  to  the  immediate  im- 
plications of  the  experience,  not  to  what  may  be  de- 
duced from  them.  Only  when  this  step  is  clear  can 
the  next  be  taken  without  danger.  The  indica- 
tions of  the  experience  must  be  judged  as  to  their 
truth  in  their  primary  significance.  It  is  the  dis- 
regard of  this  that  has  made  theology,  in  the  eyes  of 
philosopher  and  scientist,  seem  to  be  walking  on  air, 
and  erecting  its  building  without  first  constructing  a 
strong  foundation  on  the  earth.  An  assumption 


20        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

that  because  the  religious  experience  or  the  asser- 
tions of  religious  men  assert  the  presence  in  them  of 
the  power  of  God,  so  long  as  it  remains  an  assump- 
tion and  unexamined,  does  not  warrant  even  the 
raising  of  the  question  as  to  the  truth  of  God's  pres- 
ence in  that  man's  life.  The  deduction  is  usually 
taken  step  by  step  from  the  idea  of  God  to  that  of 
his  revelation  in  man.  It  is  just  as  necessary  to 
take  step  by  step  the  deduction  from  the  analysis 
of  the  experience.  The  question  at  this  point,  there- 
fore, is  to  be  limited  to  the  primary  indications  of 
the  form  of  the  religious  experience  as  to  its  source. 
It  is,  as  was  said  once  before,  almost  reducible  to  the 
question  as  to  the  perceptual  or  physiological  origin 
of  the  religious  state.  Is  that  experience  the  ex- 
perience of  perceiving  something  outside  the  body, 
or  is  it  due  to  causes  within  the  body,  is  the  general 
form  of  the  question.  If  there  is  an  answer  to  this 
preliminary  question,  it  must  be  obtained  before  we 
can  go  very  far. 

One  important  difference  between  the  sensations 
which  arise  from  causes  within  the  body  and  those 
which  are  the  results  of  the  excitation  of  the  sense 
end  organs,  is  that  the  former  are  vaguer  than  the 
latter.  Pain  or  pleasure  may  be  definitely  referred 
to  the  body,  or  even  to  some  definite  part  of  the 
body,  and  this  localisation  may  be  entirely  correct 
yet  nothing  more  be  given  in  the  pleasure  or  pain 
than  this.  If  nothing  more  were  given  in  ordinary 
perception  than  this  vague  localisation  we  should 
have  little  knowledge  of  the  world  beyond.  Our 
sensations  of  sight,  especially,  are  very  definite  in 
what  they  tell  us  in  regard  to  the  source  to  which 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  21 

we  refer  them.  Not  merely  what  is  the  source,  but 
what  it  is  like,  is  given  in  the  sensation.  An  in- 
quiry into  the  validity  of  an  experience,  if  that  ex- 
perience is  a  sensation  or  based  on  a  sensation, 
must  therefore  ask  not  merely  whether  the  source  is 
correctly  pointed  out,  but  also  whether  what  is  said 
about  it  is  true.  As  the  question  of  origin  of  the 
sensation  may  be  said  to  be  the  problem  of  psychol- 
ogy, so  this  present  one  is  the  problem  of  science, 
or  if  psychology  is  a  science,  the  difference  is  be- 
tween the  psychological  and  the  natural  sciences. 
Even  if  the  experience  is  not  of  the  type  of  sensa- 
tion, but  is  emotional,  the  same  questions  confront 
us.  If  the  sight  of  some  one  man  arouses  in  me 
anger,  the  feeling  of  anger  is  not  merely  referred 
to  him  as  the  exciting  cause,  but  it  is  recognised  that 
it  is  anger  and  not  affection  that  he  inspires.  The 
question  of  the  validity  of  the  anger  at  the  sight  of 
this  man  is  not  merely  whether  the  sight  of  him 
does  arouse  the  angry  feelings,  but  also  whether 
there  is  sufficient  reason  in  the  sight  of  him  to  ex- 
plain and  justify  the  hostile  feeling.  The  question 
of  validity  here  takes,  then,  two  forms :  first,  is  there 
any  indication  as  to  what  the  source  is  like,  and 
second,  is  the  indication  correct  or  true. 

In  applying  this  question  to  the  religious  experi- 
ence we  have  to  remember  again  that  it  is  not  the 
implication  or  statement  itself  that  we  have  to  con- 
sider, but  the  form  of  the  experience  and  the  possi- 
bility of  the  statement  being  correct.  The  religious 
experience  is  not  ordinary  perception,  else  it  would 
not  have  a  separate  name  and  be  studied  as  it  is  as  a 
separate  phenomenon.  The  first  question  therefore 


22        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

becomes,  is  it  so  different  that  no  direct  indication  of 
the  nature  and  qualities  of  the  source  is  given.  The 
answer  of  primitive  religions  to  this,  with  their  vivid 
and  detailed  descriptions  of  their  gods,  would  seem 
to  be  that  detailed  knowledge  is  possible,  while  the 
theologians,  from  the  time  of  the  rise  of  scholasticism, 
certainly,  have,  in  basing  their  description  of  God 
on  abstract  arguments,  seemed  to  assume  that  the 
experience  of  God  gives  little  or  no  direct  knowledge 
of  his  nature.  On  the  answer  as  to  this  possibility 
depends  the  form  of  theology.  If  there  is  a  possi- 
bility of  direct  knowledge,  much  like  that  of  ordinary 
perception,  then  theology  becomes  a  science,  and  the 
religious  experience  is  to  be  studied  as  or  nearly  as 
we  study  natural  or  psychological  phenomena.  To 
assume,  however,  that  theology  is  a  science  akin  to 
psychology  is  to  assume  the  answer,  not  to  prove  it. 
There  is  also  the  possibility  that  the  form  of  the 
experience  does  not  make  possible  any  assurance  as 
to  its  truth.  The  indications  or  seeming  assertions 
may,  though  caused  by  events  or  objects  outside  the 
body,  not  be  at  all  representative  of  the  objects 
which  gave  rise  to  them.  The  thunder  may  impress 
upon  the  religious  mind  the  sense  of  awe,  and  then 
the  worshiper  imagine  that  he  experiences  the  pres- 
ence of  some  aweful  or  awe-inspiring  being.  We  are 
too  familiar  with  attacks  of  this  kind  made  upon 
ordinary  religious  ideas  to  need  any  insistence  on  the 
necessity  of  meeting  the  issue.  Yet  we  cannot  say 
that  modern  theology  has  met  it.  Probably  because 
it  has  not  seen  that  this  question  of  the  possibility 
of  direct  information  coming  under  the  form  of  the 
religious  experience  is  so  fundamental,  it  has  not 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OP  RELIGION          23 

met  the  resulting  problem  of  the  possibility  of  the 
exciting  cause  being  different  from  the  report  of  it 
in  the  experience.  This  problem  as  to  the  per- 
ceptual or  non-perceptual  form  of  the  religious  ex- 
perience is  so  central  that  it  cannot  be  passed  over. 
The  approach,  though,  to  a  solution  is  not  easy. 
Not  only  must  we  distinguish  the  assertions  made  by 
religious  men  from  the  ground  on  which  they  make 
them,  but  also  in  examining  the  form  of  their  experi- 
ence, we  must  hew  out  a  path  that  will  lead  us  clear 
of  the  ambush  of  modern  philosophical  warfare.  As 
we  are  not  constructing  an  all  inclusive  metaphysical 
system,  the  more  we  can  avoid  conflict  the  stronger 
and  more  useful  the  results  of  our  work  will  be  for 
any  system  that  can  use  them.  This  means  that  we 
cannot  start  with  idea  of  knowledge  and  ask  how 
the  subject-object  relation  applies  to  this  relation  of 
a  worshiper  to  his  God.  We  must  start  from  the 
other  side.  In  examining  religion  we  have  to  trace 
the  possibility  of  the  conveyance  through  the  re- 
ligious consciousness  of  facts  about  the  outside 
world,  and  reach  some  conclusion  as  to  what  kind  of 
fact  can  be  known  in  this  consciousness. 

The  problem  then  takes  the  form  of  laying  down 
the  method  of  the  test  as  to  truth  of  those  indica- 
tions or  revelations  that  are  judged  possible.  We 
leave  to  one  side  the  problem  of  fact.  But  as  this 
would  only  be  the  question  about  a  given  experience, 
whether  it  is  true  or  false,  it  does  not  concern  a  phi- 
losophy of  religion.  The  inquiry  into  the  details 
of  the  revelation  made  in  the  experience  is  the  prob- 
lem of  a  scientific  theology.  Such  a  science  would 
test  and  judge  the  differing  experiences  and  ask 


24        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

which  is  true,  and  what  the  resulting  truth  is.  Be- 
fore such  a  science  can  be  accepted,  however,  we  must 
ask  whether  it  is  possible.  So  it  is  not  the  scientific 
criteria  that  we  seek  here,  but  the  broader  problems 
which  must  give  some  result,  even  if  but  temporary, 
before  a  science  can  be  logically  established.  On  the 
result  of  this  question  as  to  method  depends  also  the 
character  of  such  a  theology.  If  the  indications  of 
the  experience  are  best  studied  by  methods  akin  to 
those  of  psychology,  our  theology  will  be  of  one 
form,  a  form  which  has  hardly  yet  been  to  any  ex- 
tent developed ;  while  if  the  method  must  come  nearer 
to  that  of  the  historical  sciences,  we  have,  only  now 
accepting  it  with  a  clear  understanding  of  its  nature, 
something  nearly  like  the  method  of  traditional 
theology.  In  such  a  case  the  line  is  not  over  well 
marked  between  the  science  and  the  history  of  re- 
ligion. There  remains  the  third  possibility,  more 
largely  present  in  primitive  religions  than  elsewhere, 
that  theology  is  much  like  the  natural  sciences. 
Here  the  god  and  the  natural  phenomena  are  to  be 
studied  by  methods  closely  alike.  Perhaps  the  ap- 
plication of  the  theory  of  evolution  to  religion  marks 
the  growth  of  such  a  system  of  theology.  Each  of 
these  three  tendencies  is  represented  by  conflicting 
claims  to  exclusive  right  over  the  field  of  religion, 
yet  few  of  the  schools  of  thought  have  made  the 
preliminary  inquiry.  Not  till  we  know  the  method, 
can  we  know  what  the  science  is  to  be.  The  religious 
experience  must  be  studied  to  see  what  form  the 
indication  of  the  world  beyond  it  takes. 

In  studying  any  experience,  after  we  have  reached 
some  conclusion  as  to  how  the  information  about  its 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  25 

source  is  conveyed,  we  have  still,  before  the  inquiry 
has  a  firm  basis,  to  ask  whether  these  indications  can 
be  tested.  It  is  the  argument  of  the  agnostic  that 
confronts  us.  We  must  realise  that  it  is  just  at 
this  point,  and  in  connection  with  the  arguments  for 
God's  existence,  and  concerning  the  divine  attributes, 
that  the  agnostic  position  presents  its  strongest 
front.  The  problem  is  not  for  us,  however,  the 
epistemological  one,  not  the  problem  of  knowledge, 
but  that  of  scientific  method.  In  examining  the 
general  concept  of  experience  this  comes  out  more 
clearly.  While  the  question  of  knowledge  centers 
around  the  conception  and  office  of  consciousness, 
and  the  subject's  relation  to  the  thing  known,  we  are 
here  at  one  with  science  in  ignoring  the  conscious 
and  subjective  side  as  far  as  we  can,  and  in  putting 
the  question  in  the  objective  form.  That  is,  we  are 
not  asking  what  is  the  possibility  of  knowing  God  or 
man,  but  only  what  is  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
coming  through  the  religious  experience.  The  terms 
in  which  religious  people  often  describe  their  experi- 
ence present  what  is  perhaps  the  strongest  argu- 
ment for  the  philosophical  agnostic.  When  the  ex- 
perience of  religion  is  conceived  and  explained  as  a 
miracle,  the  scientist  tends  to  reject  its  claim  along 
with  those  of  all  miracles.  If  God  reveals  himself 
always  in  sudden  wonderful  moments,  whose  genesis 
none  can  trace,  a  scientific  test  can  not  be  worked 
out.  The  phenomena  may  be  catalogued  and  studied 
as,  for  instance,  the  varieties  of  insanity  are,  but  no 
more  than  is  true  of  mental  aberrations  could  they 
be  used  as  a  pathway  to  knowledge.  There  have 
been  times  when  the  miracle  of  God's  appearance  in 


26        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

a  human  soul  has  been  judged  almost  to  need  no 
other  argument  than  the  suddenness  of  the  conver- 
sion or  realisation  of  his  presence.  To  faith  the 
source  is  clear,  but  unless  that  faith  allows  of  the 
pathway  over  which  it  came  being  known,  we  cannot, 
to  use  the  language  of  religion  itself,  know  whether 
the  experience  is  from  God  or  the  devil.  The  test  of 
this  has  been  sought  outside  of  the  experience  itself. 
"  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them."  To  conclude 
that  this  must  be  so  is  to  assume  that  the  religious 
experience  does  not  furnish  a  test  by  which  we  may 
judge  of  the  accuracy  of  its  revelations.  To  this 
conclusion,  largely  held  though  not  always  recog- 
nised, is  due  the  depreciation  in  many  quarters  of  un- 
due devotion,  especially  among  the  "  sane  "  men  of 
all  ages.  The  mystics  have  seldom  been  the  leaders 
of  the  church.  Yet  if  we  are  to  gain  knowledge 
through  the  religious  experience,  and  not  rest  in  a 
semi-Christian  agnosticism,  the  issue  must  be 
squarely  faced.  We  must  inquire  whether  the  ex- 
perience can  be  tested  by  some  sure  method. 

Whatever  comes  unexpectedly,  must,  if  the  scien- 
tist is  to  make  use  of  it,  be  so  related  to  what  has 
gone  before  that  it  is  seen  to  be  the  inevitable  out- 
come of  the  preceding  events.  This  is  true  of 
psychological,  natural,  and  historical  science  equally, 
as  far  as  ideal  goes.  The  whole  purpose  of  the 
parallelistic  theories  in  psychology  is  to  make  possi- 
ble some  connection,  if  not  between,  at  least  in- 
volving, the  successive  parts  of  the  stream  of  con- 
sciousness. The  main  effort  of  modern  historical 
study  is  to  work  out  the  underlying  movements  in 
order  to  connect  what  seems  at  first  to  be  unrelated 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION          27 

events .  With  the  natural  sciences  this  has  been 
practically  completely  successful,  each  event  or  ex- 
perience is  so  related  to  every  other,  that  for  science 
there  remains  no  chance,  no  single  element  of  the 
universe  which  is  not  at  least  claimed  as  acting  under 
some  general  principle.  Everything  is  related  to 
everything  else.  When  an  experience  presents  itself, 
therefore,  for  scientific  study,  the  effort  is  made  to 
bring  it  under  these  general  laws.  If  no  law  at 
present  exists,  a  new  one  is  formulated,  but  some 
general  principle  there  must  be.  Every  experience 
can  be  studied  scientifically,  that  is  not  questioned, 
but  not  every  experience  can  be  brought  under  any 
one  set  of  natural  laws.  Insanity  is  to-day  being 
very  largely  the  subject  of  scientific  inquiry,  but 
not  in  the  same  way  that  the  normal  brain  is  studied. 
One  relates  itself  to  changes  in  the  brain  centers,  the 
latter,  while  it  may  be  studied  in  its  relation  to  the 
brain,  has  also  relations  to  the  objective  material 
world.  This  is  not  the  difference  between  historical 
or  psychological  and  natural  sciences,  but  is  a  dif- 
ference in  the  way  in  which  any  one  of  these  sciences 
would  approach  the  given  experience.  In  addition, 
therefore,  to  asking  to  what  scientific  method  the 
scientific  study  of  religion  is  to  be  akin,  we  have  the 
harder  question  to  answer  of  what  point  of  view 
shall  be  used  in  any  study  of  the  experience. 
Knowledge  will  be  attained,  generally  speaking,  by 
any  method,  but  the  chief  value  and  results  are  at- 
tained from  any  experience  when  it  is  taken  at  its 
highest  possible  value.  The  experience  of  the  in- 
sane is  exhausted  when  the  causes  for  the  difference 
from  the  normal  are  explained,  but  the  normal  ex- 


28        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

perience  is  used  to  its  fullest  extent  only  when  the 
knowledge  that  comes  in  it  is  tested.  A  study  of  a 
dream  is  ended  when  the  psychology  of  it  is  com- 
plete, while  the  real  vision  of  man's  waking  hours 
is  completely  studied  only  when  the  things  seen  are 
examined.  If  agnosticism  is  to  be  overthrown  in 
any  science,  it  can  only  be  by  the  working  out  of  the 
full  value  of  the  experience. 

In  the  case  of  the  religious  experience  this  be- 
comes very  important.  If  we  take  the  valid  or  real 
experiences  which  form  the  basis  of  spiritualistic 
claims,  orthodox  religion  rejects  them, —  though 
again  the  reason  is  not  always  recognised, —  for  this 
reason,  that  the  inferences  drawn  from  them  are  not 
justified.  The  experience  is  held  not  to  reach  to 
the  revelation  of  such  things  as  are  asserted.  No 
amount  of  argument  as  to  special  instances  of  seem- 
ingly otherwise  unexplainable  predictions  or  knowl- 
edge can  shake  this  rejection.  If  we  believe  that 
the  experience  can  not  give  the  knowledge,  then  what 
may  come,  even  if  it  turns  out  to  be  true,  will  not  be 
called  knowledge.  Before  we  can  ask  what  revela- 
tions from  the  realm  of  the  dead  are  true,  we  have 
to  ask  whether  the  experience  does  not  reach  its  full 
value  without  including  this  kind  of  knowledge.  This 
is  the  scientific  principle  that  the  simplest  theory 
that  will  explain  the  facts  is  the  one  to  be  adopted. 
Unless  the  experience  is  not  sufficiently  explained  by 
the  theory  that  denies  validity  to  its  assertions,  we 
must  reject  its  claims.  The  burden  of  proof  against 
the  agnostic,  in  the  religious  as  in  every  other  field, 
rests  on  the  students  of  that  science.  In  the  case  of 
the  religious  experience,  we  have  to  be  sure  that 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION          29 

studies  such  as  are  now  frequent,  from  both  the 
historical  and  the  psychological  side,  do  not  exhaust 
the  problems  of  this  experience.  If  it  does,  then  a 
theology  such  as  has  been  based  on  it  becomes  im- 
possible. If,  however,  we  find  that  religion  can  be 
reduced  neither  to  the  resolution  of  interior  crises 
within  a  man,  nor  to  that  and  a  combination  of 
emotion  and  ethics,  we  will  have  to  attack  directly 
the  question  of  knowledge.  On  the  result  of  this 
will  depend  the  course  of  our  inquiry.  If  we  should 
find  that  prediction,  as  our  forefathers  thought 
possible  by  inspired  prophets,  is  a  possibility,  we 
should  have  to  trace  the  method  by  which  such  fore- 
knowledge could  come  to  the  individual.  It  is 
logically  possible  that  we  could  trace  it.  If  so,  we 
could  build  up  a  critique  of  prophecy.  If  we  should 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  in  the  religious  ex- 
perience there  is  nothing  to  warrant  foreknowledge, 
but  that  it  does  point  to  influences  from  beyond  the 
life  of  the  individual,  and  we  find  that  we  can  trace 
the  path  of  such  influences  into  the  consciousness  of 
the  believer,  we  should  have  a  firm  basis  for  our 
theology. 

As  in  many  fields,  so  probably  in  this,  we  shall  find 
limits  to  our  method.  The  knowledge  that  comes 
may  very  likely  be  only  partial.  In  that  case  agnos- 
ticism is  partially  justified.  It  becomes  necessary, 
therefore,  to  examine  the  logical  outcome  of  agnos- 
ticism whether  complete  or  partial.  To  take  an 
illustration  apart  from  our  field,  skepticism  as  to  the 
possible  knowledge  of  the  other  side  of  the  moon  does 
not  deny  the  existence  of  that  other  side.  It  only 
points  out  the  limits  of  truthful  assertion.  Study 


30        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

can  go  on,  and  the  attempt  be  made,  by  indirect 
means,  to  reach  some  degree  of  probability.  The 
logic  of  such  cases  will  therefore  yield  a  positive  re- 
sult for  our  critical  method.  Agnosticism  applies 
to  those  cases  where  existence  is  possible,  or 
suspected,  or  even  proven,  but  where  all  else  is  un- 
certain. It  is  evident  that  the  arguments  for  such 
bare  existence  are  different  from  the  scientific  meas- 
ure of  direct  perception.  A  physicist  tests  directly 
colors  and  sounds,  but  the  atoms  or  the  electro- 
magnetic ether  he  can  never  see  or  touch.  Their 
existence  for  him  is  the  result  of  inference.  Certain 
happenings  are  explainable  only  by  the  existence  of 
something  unseen  and  otherwise  unknown.  This  un- 
known cause  or  basis  has  neither  shape  or  size.  It 
is  purely  conceptual.  Avoiding  the  questions  of 
the  nature  of  conceptual  reality,  we  may  say  that 
such  ideas  as  to  the  atoms  or  irons  are  formal.  All 
we  know  of  them  is  the  form  under  which  their  pres- 
ence is  made  known  to  us,  but  we  also  have  strong 
reason  to  believe  that  they  are  themselves  different 
from  that  form.  In  such  cases  a  partial  agnos- 
ticism is  the  necessary  scientific  attitude.  So  long 
as  the  unknowable  is  the  necessary  result  of  impli- 
cations in  what  is  knowable  and  known,  agnosticism 
only  points  out  to  us  our  method.  Our  problem  be- 
comes limited  to  the  form  of  the  unknowable  reality. 
That  this  does  not  by  any  means  stop  our  work  is 
shown  in  the  case  of  space  and  time,  the  greatest, 
perhaps,  of  these  conceptual  realities.  Some  ex- 
planation of  spacial  and  temporal  relations  there 
must  be,  so  in  some  sense  we  must  conceive  the  exis- 
tence of  something  to  give  the  explanation.  Yet  in 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION          31 

themselves  and  apart  from  these  relations  which  they 
help  to  explain,  we  can  know  nothing  of  space  and 
time.  This  does  not  stop  the  development  of  the 
geometrical  sciences,  nor  even  their  application  to 
practical  problems,  even  though  they  deal  with  a 
purely  "  formal "  subject,  one  with  no  material  con- 
tent. If  the  result  of  our  conclusion  in  any  field  be 
a  complete  or  partial  agnosticism,  it  may  mean 
merely  that  we  are  dealing  with  one  of  these  formal 
or  conceptual  forms  of  necessary  existence. 

This  is  not  so  remote  from  the  ordinary  position 
of  orthodox  theology  as  it  at  first  seems.  When  the 
Trinity  is  spoken  of  as  a  mystery,  and  we  are  told 
not  to  question  but  to  accept  all  on  faith,  it  is  on  the 
ground  that  certainty  can  not  be  won  by  question- 
ing. To  the  request  to  see  God  much  the  same  re- 
ply must  be  made  as  to  the  request  to  be  shown 
empty  space.  God  is,  for  orthodox  theology,  to  be 
known  in  his  manifestations,  especially  in  Jesus  of 
Nazareth,  just  as  space  is  to  be  seen  in  its  mani- 
festations as  the  space  you  and  I  and  each  part  of 
the  world  occupies.  We  cannot  say,  though,  that 
orthodox  theology  has  held  this  position  consistently. 
At  the  same  time  that  it  asserted  the  inadequacy 
of  "  natural  religion  "  it  made  other  assertions  on 
the  basis  of  "  revealed  religion  "  which  it  required 
men  to  accept  as  completely  known  and  certain. 
This  inconsistency  we  must  carefully  avoid.  If  the 
religious  experience  is  found  to  yield  valid  conclu- 
sions only  as  to  the  conceptual  truths  about  God, 
then  the  theological  method  must  so  use  the  concep- 
tion of  faith  as  not  to  include  in  it  assertions  of 
direct  knowledge.  This  much  becomes  evident.  So 


32        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

far   as   the   limitation   on   the   religious   experience 
holds,  theology  is  not  a  science  but  a  philosophy, 
basing  its  assertions  on  deductions  from  experience, 
but  unable  to  put  them  to  the  test  of  experiment. 
The    result    of    the    complete    refusal    of    scientific 
method    to    theology    is    however    not    particularly 
pleasing  to  the  modern  theologian.     It  would  shut 
him  off  from  the  whole  field  of  direct  contact  with 
God,  so  far  as  the  study  of  God  is  concerned.     He 
could  not  appeal,  for  instance,  to  the  presence  in 
Jesus   of  the  love  of  mankind,   as   a  proof  of  the 
nature  of  God  as  love.     If  Jesus  reveals  God  to  men 
so  that  seeing  him  they  see  God,  then  that  knowledge 
is  direct,  not  a  matter  of  inference.     If  no  direct 
knowledge  is  possible,  then  not  even  from  Jesus  can 
that  direct  knowledge  come.     The  love  of  God  would 
have  to  be,  if  we  completely  distrust  the  religious 
consciousness,    a    deduction    from    the    conceptual 
nature  of  God,   not  an  induction  from  our  direct 
knowledge   of  him.     Orthodox   theology,   therefore, 
must  face  clearly  this  question,  as  to  the  extent  of 
the  limitation   of  religious  knowledge.     We  cannot 
rightly  at  the  same  time  limit  and  assert  the  exist- 
ence of  no  limits.     So  far  as  there  is  a  limit,  direct 
knowledge  is  impossible,  and  God  a  result  purely  of 
conceptual  and  logical  necessity. 

In  analysing  any  type  of  experience,  we  have  next 
to  go  into  more  detail  in  regard  to  the  source.  This 
time  it  is  not  so  much  a  question  of  the  type  of 
knowledge,  as  of  the  objective  status  of  the  source 
of  the  experience.  To  relate  this  experience  to 
other  experiences,  we  have  to  find  out  the  relative 
place  of  the  source  of  this  to  the  sources  or  objects 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  33 

of  the  rest  of  our  conscious  life.  In  the  effort  to 
place  rightly  our  sensation  of  heat,  physicists  teach 
that  the  sources  of  heat  and  light  are  identical. 
The  relation  is  purely  in  the  objective  world,  but 
every  point  refers  itself  to  the  experience.  So  far 
as  the  cause  does  lie  outside  of  the  consciousness 
which  experiences  it,  we  must  seek  this  source  also 
outside.  The  connection  of  red  and  heat  is  not 
explained  until  it  is  referred  outside  the  conscious- 
ness to  a  fire  either  seen  or  remembered.  The  im- 
portance of  the  experience  for  knowledge  depends 
on  this  proper  placing  of  its  source.  So  long  as 
heat  and  light  are  unconnected,  knowledge  of  one 
gives  no  knowledge  of  the  other,  but  the  moment  we 
connect  the  two,  each  increase  of  knowledge  about 
heat  gives  us  some  new  information,  even  though 
small,  on  the  problems  of  light.  In  answering  any 
such  problem,  we  are  concerned  still  with  the  experi- 
ence, though  not  as  an  isolated  bit  of  consciousness. 
We  are  still  analysing,  but  now  it  is  the  relation  be- 
tween the  varying  sensations  that  is  central  in  our 
thought.  Account  is  taken  of  the  rest  of  our  con- 
scious life.  So  long  as  the  relation  which  is  being 
studied  is  spacial  and  temporal,  and  nothing  more, 
the  source  or  relation  in  the  objective  world  which  is 
the  origin  of  the  related  experiences  will  be  found  to 
be  of  the  type  of  natural  science.  If  the  relation  is 
purely  temporal,  it  may  prove  to  belong  to  psychol- 
ogy, while  if  it  is  connected  with  questions  of  past 
time,  whether  spacial  or  not,  it  will  be  history. 
This  is  the  necessary  result  of  the  fact  that  we  are 
dealing  with  analysis  of  relations.  The  result  of  the 
analysis  merely  brings  out  what  is  already  in  the 


34        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

consciousness.  We  are  dealing,  therefore,  in  such 
a  case,  not  with  facts  as  we  generally  understand 
the  word,  but  with  scientific  relations.  The  deter- 
mination of  the  general  place  of  a  given  experience 
in  the  whole  field  of  life  is  a  "  normal "  matter,  in 
the  sense  in  which  we  have  been  using  the  word.  It 
does  not  affect  the  correctness  of  the  analysis  of 
the  relation  of  light  and  heat  if  some  one  case  of 
supposed  light  be  found  to  be  an  hallucination.  Once 
established,  the  relations  within  the  field  of  experi- 
ence are  independent  of  whether  special  cases  of 
them  are  found  or  not.  What  men  mean  by  light 
and  heat  are  related  in  the  way  physicists  assert, 
and  the  deduction  resting  on  scientific  experimenta- 
tion gives  general  information  about  the  nature  of 
the  thing  or  process  which  causes  or  produces  the 
sensations  and  the  experience.  It  is  to  analysis  of 
this  type  that  we  must  turn  for  further  information 
about  any  experience. 

With  the  religious  experience,  such  an  analysis 
cannot  be  immediately  undertaken.  This  results 
from  the  fact  that  we  are  really  dealing  with  a  whole 
group  of  related  experiences  rather  than  with  one 
narrowly  limited  type.  Within  a  narrowly  limited 
group  of  relations,  the  place  is  to  be  found,  of  any 
one  of  them,  by  certain  limited  methods.  Where 
we  are  dealing  with  sensations  such  as  light  and 
heat,  their  interrelation  is  to  be  studied  by  the 
method  we  know  in  physics.  Where,  however,  the 
group  itself  is  uncertain,  the  methods  are  equally  un- 
certain. If  we  could  say  offhand  with  any  assur- 
ance that  the  religious  experience  was  of  the  psycho- 
logical type,  then  the  psychological  methods  would 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  35 

be  used,  and  only  such  results  obtained  as  they  per- 
mitted. If  instead,  it  is  an  historical  experience, 
only  the  result  that  historical  methods  allow  would 
be  reached.  To  the  failure  clearly  to  see  this  is  due 
the  jumble  of  methods  that  one  often  finds  used  in 
theology.  As  we  are  not  making  what  might  be 
called  theological  experiments,  but  only  considering 
what  those  methods  should  be,  the  important  prob- 
lem before  us  is  to  define  the  issue,  and  find  what 
kind  of  results  the  methods  which  can  be  used  will 
bring.  If  we  are  limited  to  the  microscope  and  the 
telescope,  then  the  only  God  we  shall  be  able  to  find 
will  be  one  in  material  form.  If  we  can  use  only 
psychological  experiments,  then  our  deity  will  in- 
evitably be  one  related  solely  to  the  realm  of  con- 
sciousness. If  our  methods  are  those  of  ethics,  then 
our  God  will  be  the  source  of  morality.  On  the 
method  depends  the  results. 

While  leaving  the  detailed  study  of  possible 
methods  for  fuller  consideration  later,  one  general 
question  stands  so  plainly  at  the  outset  that  it 
should  be  indicated  here.  With  an  experience  whose 
source  is  unknown  to  us,  the  first  question  is,  is  it 
real?  By  this  is  usually  meant,  is  it  the  product  of 
man's  brain  or  does  it  represent  and  reflect  and  give 
us  knowledge  of  something  outside  of  man?  This  is 
not  quite  the  same  as  the  question  we  considered  a 
while  ago,  as  to  whether  there  were  in  the  experience 
any  indications  of  its  source.  We  are  now  asking 
whether,  when  the  source  is  indicated  as  outside  of 
the  particular  experience,  it  is  also  outside  of  the 
whole  consciousness.  This  is  also  not  the  problem 
of  idealism  against  realism.  By  either  idealism  or 


36        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

realism,  there  must  be  recognised  the  difference  be- 
tween dreams  and  real  vision.  Each  is  in  conscious- 
ness, but  while  the  former  points  only  to  a  former 
experience,  as  does  memory  the  latter  points  to  re- 
lations outside  the  present  field  of  consciousness,  to 
what  we  ordinarily  call  the  real  world.  It  is  a 
question  of  the  independence  of  the  source.  Is  it 
subject  to  the  laws  of  the  individual  experience,  or 
is  it,  partially  at  least,  free  from  them?  If  free, 
the  interrelations  to  be  studied  are  those  of  the 
world  outside  the  individual  consciousness.  If  not 
free,  the  methods  used  must  be  those  which  are  ap- 
plicable within  the  individual  life.  This  is  true  of 
any  experience.  Ethics  is  to-day  fighting  out  the 
question  of  its  method  along  this  line.  So  far  as  it 
is  a  matter  of  individual  choice,  as  with  the  Utilitar- 
ians, the  methods  used  can  give  no  other  result  than 
a  dependence  on  the  individual  will.  The  moment 
we  appeal  to  the  history  of  the  race,  however,  we 
allow  the  use  of  historical  methods,  and  wider  re- 
sults are  possible.  It  is  the  experience  itself  that 
must  decide  what  methods  are  possible.  As  color- 
blindness can  not  be  studied  as  are  the  atoms,  so  one 
experience  can  not  be  assumed  to  allow  the  use  of 
methods  fitted  to  another.  The  questions  must  be 
raised  for  each,  what  relations  it  has  to  things  out- 
side of  the  individual  consciousness,  and  on  the  an- 
swer to  this  will  depend  largely  the  methods  to  be 
used. 

With  the  religious  experience,  this  is  not  so  much 
the  question  between  the  material  and  the  dream 
world,  as  between  the  limitations  of  humanity,  and 
the  more  general  relations  of  the  universe.  On  a 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  37 

first  glance  the  religious  experience  is  seen  not  to  be 
of  the  type  that  natural  science  studies.  It  is  more 
like  ethics,  and  the  science  of  morals.  Limitation 
in  a  case  like  this  means  something  different  from 
what  it  does  with  sensations.  If  my  sensation  of 
sight  does  not  bear  the  test  of  relation  to  the  flower 
I  think  I  see,  but  which  is  not  there,  I  call  it  a 
memory  or  an  hallucination,  and  no  more  need  be 
said.  When  we  deal  with  forces  of  more  general 
character,  such  as  influence  the  whole  life  of  man, 
the  consequences  of  limitation  are  more  important. 
If  the  religious  experience  has  no  relation  outside  of 
individual  human  life,  then  the  source  is  human,  and 
the  experience  brings  no  new  power  into  human  life. 
It  could  then  be  described  only  as  we  describe  the 
successful  outcome  of  an  inner  struggle,  purely  hu- 
man. Something  like  this  it  often  seems  to  be.  St. 
Paul  and  St.  Augustine  are  familiar  examples  of 
this  type  of  experience.  If  the  incentive  or  impulse 
to  such  an  experience  came  only  from  their  individ- 
ual life,  or  only  from  the  individual  life  of  some  other 
man,  and  gives  no  indication  of  a  source  further 
back,  then  no  theories  as  to  God's  nature  or  powers 
can  be  deduced  from  it,  or  if  there  are  such  deduc- 
tions, it  must  be  of  a  God  limited  to  human  capacity. 
This  is  the  Comptean  position,  so  far  as  it  is  con- 
sistent with  itself.  It  is  evident  that  we  cannot  go  on 
and  ask  about  the  validity  of  the  revelation  of  God 
to  man,  of  a  revelation  of  an  outer  realm,  if  in  that 
inner  experience  there  is  no  indication  that  it  comes 
from  any  higher  source  than  itself.  This  becomes 
very  important  for  the  relation  of  religion  to  ethics. 
If  ethics  has  to  deal,  as  modern  ethics  does  deal, 


38       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

with  such  questions  as  the  working  out  in  man  of  the 
great  natural  laws  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  it 
can  have  little  concern  with  an  experience  which  goes 
no  deeper  than  limited  human  life.  Unless  the  re- 
ligious experience  points  also  to  a  root  in  the  great 
underlying  universe,  the  connection  of  religion  and 
ethics  is  very  slight.  Ethics,  dealing  with  general 
laws,  relations  which  include  all  existence,  and  a  lim- 
ited experience  such  as  religion  would  then  be,  could 
have  little  in  common  in  methods  or  results.  The 
problem  is  therefore  important,  as  to  the  indications 
in  the  religious  experience  as  to  the  human  or  super- 
human nature  of  its  origin. 

The  consequences  of  the  other  possible  result  to 
this  particular  problem  need  to  be  noted  if  we  are 
to  understand  the  place  of  our  problem  in  current 
thought.  If  the  source  of  any  experience  is  outside 
the  individual,  the  explanation  of  the  experience  in- 
volves other  than  individual  phases  of  existence.  If 
the  source  is  also  beyond  what  we  may  call  human 
limitations,  then  the  explanation  must  also  go  be- 
yond. An  explanation  of  physical  life  in  terms  of 
inorganic  matter  and  energy,  if  it  ever  is  satisfac- 
torily done,  will  involve  in  its  explanation  all  exist- 
ence. Once  pass  the  bounds  of  organic  life,  and  we 
can  stop  only  with  those  principles  which  are  at  the 
basis  of  both  organic  and  inorganic.  So  an  inor- 
ganic theory  of  organic  life  in  order  to  explain  the 
relations  between  the  experiences  of  an  organism  and 
of  "  dead  "  matter  involves  the  recourse  to  a  world 
outside  of  organisms.  This  involves  also  the  rela- 
tion between  the  organism  and  the  matter  which  com- 
poses it.  The  analysis  of  the  total  experience,  and 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION         39 

the  part  which  the  limited  experience  under  discus- 
sion has  to  the  whole,  therefore  involves  the  assump- 
tion, or  rather,  proves  the  existence,  of  forces  which 
are  superhuman,  or  perhaps  we  might  say,  more 
fundamental  than  humanity.  Proof  of  this  sort  is 
still  "  formal."  It  is  not  a  deduction  from  asser- 
tions in  the  experience.  The  material  principles  to 
be  used  need  not  be  clearly  defined.  It  is  only  that 
some  principles  beyond  what  we  call  human  life 
would  be  logically  necessary. 

If  a  result  of  this  kind  becomes  necessary  to  ex- 
plain the  place  of  the  religious  experience  in  life,  then 
the  existence  of  some  superhuman  power  becomes 
necessary  for  thought.  This  is  the  place,  valid  to 
this  extent,  of  the  arguments  of  a  "  natural  "  religion 
for  God's  existence.  To  a  certain  extent  the  con- 
ception of  God  has  always  been  used  to  contain  the 
unexplainable  remnant  from  the  constructive  work 
of  systematic  philosophy.  So  far  as  there  is  such  a 
remnant,  instead  of  saying  that  recourse  is  to  be  had 
to  a  deus  ex  machina,  we  would  rather  say  that  the 
thinker  has  realised,  even  though  but  very  imper- 
fectly, that  some  recourse  to  powers  or  principles 
beyond  man  was  necessary.  If  his  system  could  not 
explain  everything  in  human  terms,  then  the  criticism 
should  be  of  that  system,  not  of  the  logical  conclu- 
sion that  something  unexplained  must  be  referred  to 
another  source.  We  cannot,  however,  afford  to  fail 
to  distinguish  between  the  arguments  from  the  reli- 
gious experience  itself  and  those  from  its  place  in  life. 
The  first  concern  the  definite  statements  or  intima- 
tions in  the  experience.  These  must  be  tested  as  sci- 
ence tests  any  statements.  The  second  deal  with  re- 


40        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

lations,  and  are  to  be  judged  as  propositions  about 
relations.  It  is  therefore  not  a  question  of  what  any 
man's  experience  is,  whether  heathen  or  Christian, 
but  what  is  the  relation  of  that  experience  —  whether 
Christian  or  heathen  —  to  the  man's  other  experi- 
ences. The  difference  between  revealed  and  natural 
religion,  if  the  terms  apply  here,  is  not  the  distinction 
between  man's  unaided  discoveries  about  God  and 
those  things  which  God  reveals  about  himself,  but  it 
is  the  difference  between  a  study  of  definite  experi- 
ences and  assertions,  and  the  study  of  the  form  of 
the  experience.  In  this  particular  problem,  of  the 
existence  of  the  superhuman,  we  have  to  do  entirely 
with  the  form.  However  God  may  be  known  in  the 
life,  a  study  simply  of  the  moments  in  which  his  pres- 
ence is  most  strongly  felt  can  not  yield  any  conclu- 
sion as  to  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  this  experi- 
ence from  our  ordinary  life.  We  must  examine  the 
relation  between  the  two  classes  of  experience,  and 
the  moment  we  do  so  we  are  dealing  with  form,  not 
content.  This  removes  from  the  science  of  theology 
the  whole  question  of  the  proofs  of  God's  transcend- 
ence. Not,  however,  from  theology  as  we  know  it  to- 
day, for  our  modern  theology  is  an  inconsistent  mix- 
ture of  science  and  philosophy.  The  two  must,  for 
clearness,  be  sharply  distinguished,  and  the  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  and  presence  in  man  of  a 
superhuman  power  be  kept  strictly  to  questions  of 
form  and  logical  necessity.  The  relation  of  such  a 
course  to  the  problems  of  a  living  faith  can  not  be 
rightly  judged  until  our  constructive  work  is  com- 
plete. It  needs  only  be  said  here,  however,  that  in 
the  problem  of  the  experience,  faith  or  conviction  as 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION          41 

to  the  relation  between  itself  and  life  must  be  taken 
carefully  into  account,  and  judged  as  valid  or  invalid. 
We  are  therefore  not  slighting  faith  in  making  this 
distinction.  The  religious  experience  must  be  care- 
fully studied,  if  we  are  to  regard  the  faith  which  it 
contains  or  expresses  in  a  superhuman  being  as  valid. 
The  next  and  final  problem  of  the  religious  experi- 
ence which  we  must  define  before  we  proceed  is  that 
of  the  relation  of  the  religious  experience  to  the  will. 
In  general  our  experiences  may  be  divided  into  two 
types,  the  normative  and  the  passive.  Where  the  will 
is  involved  the  will  or  desire  seeks  to  control.  Anger, 
for  instance,  can  not  be  experienced  without  affect- 
ing the  motor  system.  A  man  can  not  be  passively 
angry.  Any  emotion,  even  one  such  as  melancholy, 
is  in  this  class,  for  they  all  either  increase  or  diminish 
action.  The  motor  element  is  present.  The  best 
example  of  the  other  type  of  experience  is  ordinary 
perception.  While  we  are  more  or  less  active  in  per- 
ception, it  is  rather  in  order  to  prepare  for  the  re- 
ception of  an  experience  which  we  realise  as  coming 
from  outside  of  ourselves  than  as  being  conscious  or 
experiencing  the  motor  forces  at  work.  This  is  the 
vital  difference.  The  motor  side  of  our  life  is  always 
active,  but  with  the  normative  experiences  we  are 
conscious  of  its  activity,  while  in  perception  and  the 
passive  experiences  our  attention  is  focused  on  the 
results  of  the  activity.  In  the  one  case  the  experi- 
ence points  or  gives  knowledge  of  the  activity,  in  the 
other  of  the  inciting  cause  of  the  activity.  This  dis- 
tinction, of  course,  means  a  large  difference  in  an 
inquiry  into  the  validity  of  the  experience.  If  the 
function  of  the  experience  is  centered  around  the 


42        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

source,  the  questions  we  are  asking  must  be  as  to  the 
validity  of  the  information  which  is  given  of  the 
source.  If  the  experience  is  involved  mainly  with 
the  activity  of  the  organism,  then  the  main  question, 
at  least  of  validity,  is  that  of  yielding  a  valid  knowl- 
edge of  human  motor  activities,  and  also,  in  the  eth- 
ical field,  the  problems  of  how  efficiently  the  experi- 
ence helps  or  hinders  those  activities.  The  experi- 
ences of  the  insane  may  yield  true  information  of 
the  state  of  the  insane  mind,  give  us  valid  knowledge 
of  this,  but  still  not  be  valid  in  the  ethical  sense  as 
not  allowing  the  normal  activities  of  life  full  play. 
We  have  come  upon  another  meaning  of  the  word 
validity.  We  must  raise  the  question,  in  consider- 
ing any  experience,  as  to  what  is  really  the  meaning 
in  the  special  case,  is  it  the  effect  on  the  normal 
activity  or  on  normal  knowledge  which  is  under  ex- 
amination ? 

In  applying  this  problem  to  religion  we  reach  the 
statement  of  what  for  the  modern  man  is  perhaps  the 
most  debated  problem  of  religion.  In  these  days  we 
are  willing  to  admit  the  presence  in  man  of  forces 
which  are  superhuman,  but  what  we  do  not  admit,  ex- 
cept under  compulsion,  is  the  presence  of  a  moral 
element  outside  of  humanity.  We  conceive  the  basic 
forces  of  existence  just  as  far  as  we  can  in  non- 
moral  terms.  Any  problem  which  connects  itself 
with  this  issue  is  bound  to  be  of  interest.  From  the 
arguments  of  the  past  generation  to  prove  God  right- 
eous in  spite  of  natural  catastrophes,  to  the  present 
day  questions  of  the  moral  element  in  economic  con- 
ditions, the  same  general  problem  is  present.  In  our 
study  of  the  religious  experience  we  do  not  need  to 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION          43 

deal  with  this  question  in  its  wider  aspects.  Only  as 
regards  the  relation  of  the  religious  experience  to 
the  will  to  do  right  must  we  be  clear.  Applying  the 
distinction  between  normative  and  passive  experi- 
ences, we  have  to  classify  the  religious  life  under  one 
of  these  heads.  It  is  sometimes  assumed  in  these 
days  that  the  religious  and  the  moral  experiences  are 
the  same.  The  fact  that  in  name  they  are  distinct 
forces  us  to  accept  such  an  identification  only  after 
very  careful  scrutiny.  The  problem  demands  the 
examination  of  religion  as  to  its  effect  on  the  will. 
The  identification  in  some  religions  and  in  other  ages 
of  knowledge  and  goodness  would  lead  us  in  paths 
contrary  to  the  modern  trend.  If  the  religious  ex- 
perience is  mainly  passive,  and  is  the  revelation  of 
knowledge,  then  it  can  not  at  the  same  time  be  mainly 
normative  and  powerful  in  directing  the  will.  The 
old  conception  of  revelation  led  to  the  definition  of  a 
type  of  experience  which  was  preeminently  passive, 
else  it  could  not  receive  and  transmit  the  revealed 
truths  which  God  gave  in  and  through  it.  If  this 
was  its  function,  then  for  the  individual  it  had  little 
directive  force.  It  might  have  results  eventually, 
but  in  itself  it  left  him  passive.  Very  different  from 
this  is  the  modern  conception  of  religion  as  a  power 
that  makes  for  righteousness,  a  moral  dynamic.  If 
the  older  view  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
belief  in  the  revelation  of  abstract  dogmas  direct 
from  God,  the  new  is  often  an  equally  unthinking  re- 
sult of  the  reaction  against  such  "  revealed  truths." 
The  correctness  of  either  view  can  be  established  only 
after  a  careful  study  of  the  experience  with  reference 
to  this  distinction  of  passive  or  normative. 


44        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

To  understand  the  issue,  it  will  help  if  we  draw  out 
some  of  the  consequences  of  defining  an  experience 
by  either  of  these  terms.  With  the  passive  experi- 
ences, the  source  must  be  outside  the  individual.  If 
the  immediate  excitation  comes  from  the  body,  then 
the  source  behind  that  must  be  the  one  which  is  out- 
side. We  have  to  remember  that  in  some  of  his  bod- 
ily experiences  man  is  passive.  Perception  itself  is 
one  of  these.  Heat  and  cold,  pain,  and  many  of  the 
organic  sensations  are  passive  so  far  as  the  result  on 
the  will  is  concerned.  On  the  other  hand,  pleasure 
and  dislike,  which  are  essentially  motor,  are  often 
referred  outside  and  placed  in  the  pleasant  object. 
The  cause  seems  to  be  outside.  Yet,  after  all,  it  is 
the  effect  of  the  pleasurable  object  on  us  which  con- 
stitutes the  pleasure,  while  with  the  perception  of,  for 
instance,  the  beating  of  our  own  heart,  it  is  the  fact 
of  perceiving,  and  not  the  result  of  perceiving,  which 
is  focal.  If  we  have  thought  that  we  had  heart  trou- 
ble, and  are  pleased  to  find  our  organ  working  regu- 
larly, then  the  experience  changes.  The  change  is 
due  to  the  change  in  the  function  of  the  experience. 
In  the  latter  case  the  experience  calls  attention  to  it- 
self, in  the  former  to  something  outside  of  itself.  It 
is  therefore  not  to  the  source  being  inside  or  outside 
of  the  body,  but  to  its  being  contained  or  ijot  con- 
tained in  the  experience,  that  the  distinction  arises. 
What  we  mean  by  the  self  is  really  the  will.  So  long 
as  the  body  is  simply  physical  it  is  simply  mechan- 
ical. Those  things  which  affect  only  the  body  do  not 
affect  the  self.  This  is  well  illustrated  in  certain 
cases  of  fear.  Fear  may  be  felt  in  the  presence  of 
harmless  reptiles.  The  reason  rejects  the  fear,  and 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION          45 

if  necessary  may  overcome  it.  In  one  sense  the  fear 
is  motor,  yet  as  long  as  it  is  instinctive  it  is  really 
passive.  The  man  is  led  to  avoid  the  snake  by  a 
force  of  which  he  is  not  conscious.  It  is  only  when 
he  makes  the  effort  to  go  nearer,  that  is  only  when 
some  other  experience  constrains  him,  that  he  be- 
comes conscious  of  the  instinctive  repulsion.  The 
motor  activity  before  this  was  purely  reflex  or  with- 
out consciousness  except  that  it  occurred.  It  was 
only  when  something  else  brought  to  him  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  will  or  desire  to  draw  near  the  snake 
that  the  avoidance  came  to  be  seen  and  felt  as  op- 
posing the  approach.  This  is  closely  allied  to  the 
Pauline  doctrine  that  except  for  the  law  there  would 
be  no  sin.  Except  for  the  presence  of  a  motor  con- 
sciousness or  normative  experience  action  is  not 
realised  as  the  result  of  will  or  desire.  We  can  not 
well  say,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  is  the  conflict 
that  brings  the  consciousness  of  desire.  It  may  pos- 
sibly be  true  that  the  first  awaking  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  normative  experiences  is  due  to  the  strong 
shock  of  opposition,  as  the  child  finds  its  will 
thwarted  by  the  will  of  those  around  it.  However 
this  may  be,  in  after  life  the  experience  of  the  desire 
to  serve  some  one  in  distress  is  clear  as  a  desire  or 
normative  experience  even  without  opposition.  An 
experience  which  is  not  normative,  even  though  it 
may  affect  action,  does  not  affect  the  desires.  It 
does  not  come  into  the  sphere  of  man's  interest. 
The  fear  in  the  presence  of  harmless  snakes  is  of  no 
interest  except  to  be  overcome.  The  sound  of  one's 
heart  beating  is  of  interest  when  connected  with  the 
desire  to  be  or  find  one's  self  well,  and  not  otherwise. 


46        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

It  is  not  a  question  of  how  fundamental  and  neces- 
sary the  experience  may  be  to  the  physical  life,  but 
of  how  it  may  enter  into  the  interests  of  human  life. 
To  say  that  an  experience  is  mainly  passive  is  there- 
fore to  say  that  it  is  not  one  that  in  itself  is  central 
in  human  life.  The  work  of  our  internal  organs 
becomes  of  interest  only  when  they  are  out  of  order. 
The  normal  experience  of  them  is  not  central  in  our 
life.  To  classify  an  experience  as  passive  is  there- 
fore to  classify  it  as  outside  the  direct  field  of  influ- 
ence on  human  life.  This  is  true  of  perception.  It 
is  not  the  sensations  that  are  important,  but  our 
reason  for  attending  to  them.  If  religion  is  passive, 
it  is  the  object,  not  the  incentive,  to  desire.  It  may 
be  studied,  but  it  does  not,  if  this  be  true,  affect  our 
life  interests. 

The  consequences  of  this  for  religion  would  be,  if 
proven,  very  great.  If  the  religious  experience  is 
as  some  theologians  and  perhaps  all  of  the  Buddhist 
thinkers  have  taught,  essentially  passive,  the  inpour- 
ing  into  man  of  truths  about  God,  then  that  experi- 
ence does  not  itself  enter  vitally  and  immediately  into 
man's  life.  According  to  their  tendency  on  this 
point  mystics  have  differed  among  themselves.  So 
far  as  the  experience  is  the  abolition  of  desire,  then 
the  true  self  or  self  of  ordinary  life  is  lost.  Ortho- 
dox Christian  theology,  in  differing  with  the  mystics 
on  this  point,  yet  keeping  their  idea  of  a  passive 
experience,  has  not  been  consistent.  Emotion  would 
have  no  place  in  such  an  experience.  If  God  is  known 
only  through  the  reason  and  through  what  the  rea- 
son may  deduce  from  a  passive  perception  of  God, 
then  action  can  follow  only  because  of  the  will  to  live 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION  47 

up  to  what  is  thus  made  known.  This  will,  if  it  does 
not  enter  into  the  experience,  and  it  can  not  if  the 
individual  desires  are  destroyed,  can  not  be  part  of 
the  experience  or  a  direct  result  of  it.  This  experi- 
ence will  be  on  a  par  with  the  logical  experiences  of 
the  theologian.  He  may  believe  a  God  exists,  but 
not  will  to  serve  him.  So  long  as  the  religious  ex- 
perience is  a  revelation  of  the  being  and  existence  of 
God,  and  no  more,  the  man,  as  the  devils  are  said  to, 
may  still  believe,  but  not  will  to  serve.  The  experi- 
ence will  have  no  coercive  force.  If  this  is  true,  the 
appeal  to  the  emotion  and  to  the  sense  of  the  pres- 
ence of  God,  in  the  effort  to  arouse  men  to  their 
duty,  becomes  useless.  The  more  use  there  was  of 
religion,  only  more  knowledge  of  God  would  result, 
not  more  will  to  obey  him.  This  would  put  God  on 
the  same  footing  as  the  natural  laws.  We  experience 
the  laws  of  nature,  and  know  that  to  live  we  must 
follow  them,  but  those  laws  or  this  knowledge  of  their 
existence  does  not  inspire  a  desire  to  act.  Fir'e 
burns,  but  so  long  as  it  does  not  burn  us  our  knowl- 
edge of  a  fire  elsewhere  does  not  rouse  us  to  any 
action  or  desire.  If  we  want  to  use  the  fire,  or  learn 
more  about  it,  desire  exists,  but  the  experience  is 
then  not  simply  of  the  fire,  but  of  our  desire  to  cook, 
or  for  more  knowledge.  To  make  the  religious  ex- 
perience entirely  passive  is  thus  to  make  whatever 
force  and  power  there  may  be  in  religion  something 
akin  to  natural  forces,  not  entering  into  man's  life, 
controlling  man,  yet  not  human  because  not  arous- 
ing human  desire  and  will.  Whatever  God  there 
would  be  would  be  a  blind  force,  indifferent  to  man. 
The  normative  experiences  touch  directly  the  cen- 


48         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

ter  of  human  life.  The  experience  of  loyalty,  which 
Royce  stretches  to  include  the  whole  religious  ex- 
perience, in  its  narrower  manifestations  can  fill  the 
whole  of  life.  The  patriot,  whether  a  soldier  or  a 
statesman  or  reformer,  can  be  so  under  the  sway  of 
the  desire  to  serve  his  country  that  no  obstacles  will 
stop  him.  The  desire  to  gain  knowledge,  which  is 
not  the  experience  of  knowing,  but  the  preliminary 
to  it,  may  so  fill  and  envelop  a  man  that  he  gives  his 
whole  life  to  it.  On  lower  planes  the  desire  for  social 
recognition,  which  is  truly  an  experience,  the  realis- 
ing of  the  want,  and  the  conscious  striving  for  social 
advancement,  does  affect  for  many  every  act  of  their 
lives.  The  personality  is  vitally  changed  by  the  en- 
trance of  the  consciousness  of  any  one  of  these  needs 
into  a  man's  life.  These  experiences  affect  us  so 
closely  that,  once  experienced,  they  become  part  of 
our  nature.  A  man's  nature  may  be  defined  in  terms 
of  the  influences  which  mold  his  actions.  The  con- 
scious striving  for  wealth  is  such  an  experience,  a 
power  within  which  seeks  to  control  action.  Any 
such  influence  must  by  its  nature  be  personal.  This 
is  recognised  in  our  modern  use  of  the  word  "  social 
will."  Society,  many  would  argue,  is  even  more  per- 
sonal than  the  individual.  It  is  super-individual, 
and,  as  such,  more  intensely  human  than  the  indi- 
vidual. As  the  source  of  many  of  these  influences 
which  make  man  what  he  is,  this  social  will  enters 
closely  into  every  part  of  human  life.  For  good  or 
ill  a  man  is  a  social  creature,  hence  the  social  will  is 
essentially,  in  its  result  and  operation,  closely  con- 
nected with  human  life.  In  no  true  sense  can  it  be 
said  to  be  blind  to  the  individual.  Instead  of  acting 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION          49 

equally  for  man  and  matter  it  concerns  itself  directly 
with  man,  and  exists  in  consciousness  only  as  it  suc- 
ceeds in  entering  men.  To  these  normative  experi- 
ences, since  they  do  seek  to  affect  action,  man  can 
never  be  indifferent,  as  he  is  to  the  natural  forces. 
To  a  power  which  seeks  to  rule  him  he  must  either 
yield  or  offer  all  the  resistance  of  which  he  is  capa- 
ble. Another  feature  of  these  experiences  is  that 
they  come  without  individual  incentive.  A  man  may 
see  in  life  something  unexplainable  and  seek  a  gen- 
eral principle  to  account  for  it,  and  so  come  to  know 
and  be  conscious  of  some  general  law,  but  a  nor- 
mative experience  does  not  make  itself  known  except 
by  influencing  him ;  hence  until  it  does  touch  him  he 
can  not  know  of  it  even  enough  to  seek  it.  He  may 
seek  to  learn  something  about  it,  as  a  physician  may 
study  some  mental  disease  of  which  he  himself  can 
not  be  conscious  so  long  as  he  is  sane,  but  the  experi- 
ence itself  can  come  to  the  student  of  a  normative 
experience  only  when  it  influences  him,  only  when  he 
is  subject  to  its  sway.  Out  of  the  sphere  of  its  in- 
fluence he  can  not  come  to  consciousness  of  it,  and 
within  its  influence,  once  conscious  of  it,  he  must 
either  accept  or  oppose  it ;  he  can  not  be  indifferent. 
Hence  the  normative  experience  may  be  said  to  have 
a  will  of  its  own.  It  comes  when  it  will,  and  not 
when  we  will.  A  man  can  not  make  himself  patri- 
otic, or  create  in  himself  the  desire  for  artistic  ex- 
pression. The  experience  of  that  desire,  so  far  as 
he  is  concerned,  just  comes.  It  is  a  law  unto  him- 
self. In  this  sense  any  such  experience  is  the  experi- 
ence of  a  personal  power. 

To  conclude  that  the  religious  experience  is  to  be 


50         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

described  in  terms  of  the  normative  experience  is  to 
conclude  that  the  source  of  the  experience  is  a  per- 
sonal power.  It  is  the  result  sought  by  theists.  We 
must  remember  that  this  is  independent  of  the  results 
of  our  attempts  at  classification  under  other  sets  of 
terms.  To  classify  God  as  personal,  that  is  as  the 
source  of  a  conscious  personal  power  in  human  life, 
is  not  to  say  that  he  either  is  or  is  not  almighty. 
It  only  asserts  that  he  is  revealed  as  one  who  con- 
cerns himself  with  affecting  human  action.  Examin- 
ing, as  we  are,  the  form  of  the  religious  experience, 
such  a  conclusion  would  not  involve  the  determina- 
tion of  what  the  influence  on  morality  was.  As  we 
might  say,  it  would  not  reveal  what  kind  of  a  God 
we  have.  Only  one  thing  would  be  certain,  that  God 
acted  directly.  Whatever  might  be  the  channel 
through  which  the  influence  came,  church  or  sacra- 
ments or  human  society,  in  the  experience  which  the 
believer  has,  he  would  feel  immediately  that  power. 
Any  revelation  of  what  God  is  like,  as  far  as  defini- 
tion of  intellectual  truths  go,  would  not  be  given. 
When  we  see  a  nation  tending  unduly  to  seek  ex- 
pansion by  force  of  arms,  the  knowledge  in  its  formu- 
lated aspect  is  not  given  in  our  experience  of  hostil- 
ity to  their  designs  on  us,  but  is  the  later  result,  in 
our  quieter  moments,  of  reflection  on  our  experience. 
This  is  especially  true  if  we  are  members  of  such  a 
nation.  The  influence  sways  us  ;  then  later  we  reflect 
on  its  meaning.  The  knowledge  that  comes  may  well 
be  true  and  valid,  but  it  is  not  immediate.  So  if 
the  religious  experience  is  mainly  normative,  the 
truths  about  God,  though  based  on  the  experience, 
are  the  product  of  constructive  tnought.  Not  the 


A  £ HlLosoPirsr  of  RELIGION       #i 

dogmas,  nor  the  formulas  about  God,  but  the  very 
personality  or  nature  of  God  would  be  given  in  the 
experience.  Such  an  examination,  which  must  pre- 
cede any  sure  and  firm  confidence  in  the  methods  o£ 
theology  has  rarely  been  even  thought  of  by  theo<- 
logians.  In  their  arguments  in  behalf  of  God's  per- 
sonality they  have  at  times  attempted  to  use  imme- 
diate revelation.  Such  revelation  there  is  in  a  nor- 
mative experience,  an  intimate  revelation  of  what  the 
personal  influence  which  is  in  the  man's  life  is,  but 
any  revelation  of  this  kind  must  be  of  the  type  of 
the  consciousness  of  God  as  love,  or  as  a  fearful 
being,  of  him  as  helping  or  opposing  man's  natural 
desires,  or  whether  he  influences  toward  or  from  as- 
ceticism. Such  revelations  would  be  made  just  as 
clearly,  however,  if  the  examination  of  the  source,  as 
we  have  pointed  out  in  our  earlier  classifications, 
should  show  that  the  religious  experience  has  no  ori- 
gin outside  of  the  individual.  In  that  case  the  reve- 
lation of  personality  goes  for  nothing.  Or  even  if 
the  source,  that  is  God,  is  proven  to  be  outside  the 
individual,  he  may  still  be  known  in  a  passive  experi- 
ence as  punishing  certain  acts  of  man,  as  natural 
law  does,  and  yet  not  be  a  personal  being.  The 
fact  of  our  conviction  that  if  we  do  right  he  will 
help  us  no  more  proves  that  God  cares  for  us  than 
does  the  fact  that  if  we  keep  on  firm  ground  we  will 
not  fall  proves  that  the  earth  is  friendly.  It  is_pj 
if  in  the  religious  experience  God  is  revealed  to  us  as 
a  power  striving  to  bring  men  to  do  certain  things 
that  we  can  call  him  personal. 

To  examine  the  full  validity  of  the  conclusions  of 
Christian  theology  we  must  ask  whether  the  Christian 


52         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

religious  experience  or  the  religious  experience  in  its 
full  meaning  is  exhausted  in  the  experience  or  points 
to  a  source  outside,  whether  it  allows  of  the  truth  of 
its  implications  about  such  a  source  being  tested, 
whether  what  it  does  give  is  objective  detail,  and 
whether  the  test  can  be  completely  applied  to  all  that 
is  implied.  Besides  this,  we  must  examine  the  place 
of  this  experience  in  general  experience,  especially 
with  reference  to  the  question  whether  it  goes  beyond 
human  limitations,  and,  finally,  whether  it  affects 
the  will  or  is  a  passive  revelation  of  knowledge.  This 
is  an  outline  of  the  task  belonging  to  a  philosophy 
of  religion.  Far  reaching  in  each  result  attained,  it 
has  an  important  place  in  philosophy.  Not  merely 
the  application  to  religion  of  an  already  completed 
system,  it  is  rather  the  pioneer  toward  such  a  sys- 
tem, examining  one  of  man's  experiences  as  all  must 
be  examined,  independently,  to  give  a  valid  metaphys- 
ical system.  The  philosophy  of  Religion  is  thus  a 
distinct  critique. 


LECTURE  II 
RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE 

If  we  are  to  experience  religion,  it  must  be  possible 
for  religion  to  be  in  consciousness.  It  must  be  pos- 
sible for  us  to  be  conscious  of  the  contents  of  the 
experience.  In  very  many  cases  there  is  no  doubt  in 
the  believer's  mind  about  his  perception  and  knowl- 
edge of  what  he  has  experienced.  In  the  visions  of 
the  Jewish  prophets,  so  far  as  we  can  take  the  ac- 
counts as  truly  representing  the  personal  experience 
of  the  prophets;  in  the  accounts  of  the  experience 
of  St.  Paul  on  the  road  to  Damascus ;  in  the  story 
of  the  conversion  of  St.  Augustine;  and  in  our  own 
day  the  many  instances  that  might  be  brought  to 
mind  of  strong  belief  in  definite  revelations,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  the  existence  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness. Into  this  category  must  be  brought 
those  cases  of  "  divine  call,"  where  the  assertion  is 
made  that  God  has  given  definite  assurance  or  definite 
command  about  some  detailed  matter.  It  is  not, 
however,  merely  those  cases  which  can  be  adequately 
described  in  simple  terms  that  show  the  religious  ex- 
perience often  to  be  very  definite.  The  mystic  who 
asserts  that  the  experience  "  passeth  knowledge  "  or 
description  is  very  certain  about  that  experience. 
It  is  so  definitely  in  his  consciousness  that  he  has  no 
doubt  that  ordinary  words  and  ideas  do  not  ade- 

53 


54        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

quately  portray  or  define  it.  It  is  a  very  definite 
experience  which  makes  him  so  certain  about  this. 
At  those  times  when  language  seems  so  very  insuffi- 
cient that  paradox  becomes  the  only  possible  figure 
of  speech,  as  frequently  happens  with  St.  Paul,  it  is 
the  definiteness  of  the  experience  that  makes  the  be- 
liever so  sure  that  the  seeming  paradox,  which  at 
other  times  would  be  meaningless,  is  now  the  best 
statement  of  the  fact. 

To  say  that  at  times  the  experience  is  thus  plainly 
in  consciousness  is  not  to  conclude  immediately  that 
always  the  religious  man  is  sure  of  what  he  experi- 
ences. It  does,  however,  prove  that  religion  can  be 
experienced,  and  in  very  definite  forms.  Whether  we 
should  call  those  things  which  can  not  thus  be  in 
consciousness  true  religion  is  another  question. 
Taking  for  the  moment  only  the  definite  forms,  we 
can  here  be  sure  that,  whatever  else  they  may  be, 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  definite  religious  experi- 
ence. Such  an  experience  may  have  very  definite 
content.  St.  Paul  spoke  of  his  experience  on  the 
Damascus  Road  as  the  appearance  of  the  risen  Jesus, 
and  as  a  proof  of  the  Resurrection.  Though  it  may 
be  that  not  the  whole  of  religion  can  be  experienced, 
yet  a  part  can  enter  into  consciousness.  It  is  this 
part  which  becomes  our  study.  At  this  point  we  do 
no  more  than  draw  out  the  consequences  of  this 
experience  so  far  as  we  find  it  to  exist.  So  far  as  it 
comes  into  consciousness  it  opens  to  us  the  possi- 
bility of  study.  Even  the  mystic  experience,  since  it 
asserts  that  ordinary  language  can  not  describe  it, 
challenges  us  to  try  the  impossible,  and  it  must  in 
turn  meet  our  challenge  to  it  to  prove  its  assertion. 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         55 

Being  in  experience  in  any  of  these  ways,  and  becom- 
ing an  object  of  study,  at  once  it  must  yield  its  claim 
of  exemption  from  criticism.  If  it  were  not  in  con- 
sciousness, we  could  not  put  it  to  the  test,  but  being 
there,  at  least  in  those  cases  where  definite  assertions 
concerning  it  are  made,  we  can  test  it.  Even  re- 
vealed truth,  therefore,  subjects  itself  to  test.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  have  put  religion  in  the  world  of 
reality.  What  kind  of  reality  it  may  prove  to  have 
is  a  further  question,  but  when  it  is  an  experience 
that  can  be  tested  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  put  it 
aside  as  something  imaginary. 

However  wide  may  be  the  variety  of  cases  where 
definite  assertions  about  the  contents  of  the  religious 
experience  are  possible,  there  are  undoubtedly  many 
cases  where  no  such  definiteness  exists.  For  the 
"  modern  man,"  especially  the  man  of  our  western 
civilisation,  religion  takes  usually  neither  the  mystical 
nor  prophetic  forms.  Cases  of  the  type  of  conver- 
sion which  James  has  used  in  his  "  Varieties  of  Re- 
ligious Experience  "  are  rather  rare  and  exceptional. 
Yet  the  modern  religious  man  is  by  no  means  uncon- 
scious of  his  religion.  We  are  inclined  to  call  re- 
ligious those  great  common  impulses  which,  whether 
the  same  as  the  moral  movements  or  not,  are  to-day 
more  in  the  fore  front  of  consciousness  than  perhaps 
ever  before.  Great  movements  there  have  always 
been,  but  we  understand  better  where  we  are  being 
led  than  did  our  forefathers.  To  take  movements 
which  are  not  clearly  moral  —  the  present  efforts, 
widespread  and  growing,  to  convert  the  world  to 
Christianity  and  to  bring  about  Church  unity,  are 
each  of  them  definite,  and  brought  forward  as  the  re- 


56         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

suit  of  religious  experience.  Whether  they  should 
properly  be  called  religion  might  be  questioned,  but 
so  long  as  they  are  in  consciousness  religion  is  also. 
When  a  man  is  on  fire,  as  we  say,  with  missionary 
enthusiasm,  his  religion  seems  to  most  people  to  be 
very  real.  In  his  own  mind  at  least,  and  this  is  the 
test,  it  is  his  religion  which  gave  him  the  impulse. 
This  is  even  clearer  with  the  great  moral  reform 
movements  where  they  are  connected  in  consciousness 
with  religion.  The  man  gives  his  life  to  destroying 
injustice  with  the  full  conviction  that  it  is  his  re- 
ligion which  is  impelling  him  to  do  this.  What  he 
calls  his  consciousness  of  religion  is  his  consciousness 
of  this  impulse.  And  because  he  is  conscious  of  the 
impulse  he  is  conscious  of  what  he  takes  to  be  his 
religion.  It  is  not  a  valid  objection  that  the  con- 
sciousness has  no  clear  content.  Neither  has  the 
consciousness  of  desire.  We  often  long  for  we  know 
not  what,  and  we  know  that  the  desire  is  vague. 
There  may  be  a  very  distinct  consciousness  of  a  very 
vague  thing,  and  the  experience  be  very  definite  just 
on  this  fact  of  vagueness.  This  type  of  religion, 
which  is  largely  in  men's  minds  to-day  because  it  is 
in  consciousness,  is  an  experience,  and  because  it  is 
connected  in  its  nature  and  in  men's  minds  with  re- 
ligion it  should  be  accepted  as  a  type  of  the  religious 
experience. 

The  definiteness  here  is  not  in  the  object,  but  in  the 
direction  of  the  impulse.  The  experience  is  of  the 
active  type.  What  that  may  mean  and  how  far  it 
can  be  shown  to  be  true  of  all  types  of  religion  will 
be  our  last  task.  At  this  point  we  need  only  to  note 
that  this  type  can  be  studied  and  tested  equally  well 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         57 

with  the  preceding.  An  impulse  of  this  type  is  even 
more  real  than  the  command  to  St.  Augustine  if  we 
are  to  judge  by  modern  standards.  To  what  is 
active  we  tend  to  give  a  higher  place  than  to  the 
passive.  So  to  these  conscious  religious  impulses, 
and  so  to  religion  we  must  assign  a  place  in  the  real 
world. 

There  are  instances  of  religion  where  neither  does 
there  seem  to  be  any  definite  object  nor  any  great 
impulse.  In  many  of  these  cases,  as  in  some  of  the 
preceding,  we  find  that  the  religious  feeling,  or  what- 
ever it  was,  came  at  a  definite  time.  A  man  may  be 
distressed  and  torn  by  conflicting  desires,  and  while 
thus  in  turmoil  a  sudden  peace  come  upon  him.  Not 
always  is  this  peace  ascribed  to  God,  but  often  it  is, 
and  spoken  of  as  true  evidence  of  God's  peace  in  the 
soul.  At  some  definite  time,  perhaps  a  moment  or 
just  as  likely  a  day  or  even  a  week,  the  inconsistent 
and  warring  impulses  are  quieted,  and  discord  ceases. 
This  is  not  a  case  of  impulse  coming  from  the  re- 
ligious experience,  for  the  incentives  to  action  are 
here  limited,  not  increased.  The  man  looks  back  on 
that  day  or  hour  as  the  point  at  which  the  internal 
warfare  of  impulses  ceased.  He  is  sure  that  that 
time  does  mark  a  dividing  point  in  his  conscious  life. 
He  is  conscious  of  the  discord  that  preceded  and  of 
the  peace  that  followed  the  coming  of  the  religious 
experience.  The  contrast  here  is  what  marks  his 
consciousness.  There  may  be  nothing  additional  in 
his  life  except  just  this  realisation,  that  he  is  at 
peace.  This  is  not  to  be  put  aside  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  negative,  and  that  we  can  not  call  it  con- 
scious. When  a  man  is  conscious  of  a  lack,  that 


58        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

lack  is  in  his  mind.  If  religion  at  times  is  to  him  the 
absence  of  something,  then  that  consciousness,  though 
consciousness  of  something  negative,  is  itself  positive 
and  real. 

At  other  times  religion  comes  under  just  the  oppo- 
site form.  With  the  awaking  of  what  Christians  call 
the  sense  of  sin,  there  results  an  inner  conflict. 
Where  there  had  been  self-complacency  there  now  ex- 
ists the  realisation  of  this  struggle,  conflict  between 
ideal  and  performance,  and  between  one's  own  ideals 
and  those  of  society  or  of  God.  In  many  cases  the 
necessary  effort  of  one  who  is  seeking  to  convert  an- 
other is  to  make  that  person  conscious  of  his  sins. 
This  occurs  often  just  as  suddenly  and  just  as  defi- 
nitely as  does  the  cessation  of  struggle.  The  man 
may  later  come  to  feel  that  the  struggle  against  sin 
was  only  a  passing  phase  of  the  religious  experience, 
yet  still  it  was  a  true  phase.  The  struggle  por- 
trayed in  "  Pilgrim's  Progress  "  is  proof  enough 
that,  for  many,  religion  consists  just  in  such  a  strug- 
gle. That  struggle  often  can  be  dated  in  its  begin- 
ning as  accurately  as  any  other  event  of  life.  This, 
as  before,  requires  that  the  experience  be  in  con- 
sciousness. That  the  struggle  in  each  separate  case 
takes  a  different  form  is  no  objection.  It  might  even 
be  that  men  grouped  under  the  religious  experience 
moments  of  quite  different  and  irreconcilable  char- 
acter. Still  our  problem  would  not  be  solved  until 
we  found  out  what  it  is  that  such  moments  have  in 
common.  For  our  present  purpose  we  are  pointing 
out  that  however  else  different  they  may  be,  they 
all  alike  involve  consciousness.  We  are  dealing  with 
conscious  experiences.  When  we  date  a  mental  ex- 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         59 

perience,  we  imply  that  we  are  conscious  of  it.  Defi- 
nite dates  for  the  beginning  of  conversion,  and  of  its 
ending  or  completion,  prove  that  at  times  religion 
can  be  very  definitely  in  consciousness. 

To  date  an  experience  is  to  give  it  a  very  real 
place  in  existence.  It  is,  however,  not  necessary  al- 
ways to  know  its  exact  date.  If  we  can  say  that  this 
month  we  realise  our  sin,  and  last  month  we  did  not, 
we  date  the  experience,  even  though  not  to  the  exact 
moment.  We  assign  it  a  place  among  the  real  and 
vital  things  of  our  life.  As  such  it  must  be  reckoned 
with.  Even  those  who  declare  that  religion  is  either 
ineffable  or  purely  subjective  can  not  pass  by  this 
consciousness  of  time.  Whether  or  not  religion  re- 
veals anything  about  the  objective  world  of  space 
outside  of  our  bodies,  so  long  as  it  has  a  place  in  the 
stream  of  time  it  is  real.  Being  real,  it  is  open  to 
questions  of  the  accuracy  of  the  time  element,  but 
unless  it  has  its  definite  place  in  the  stream1  of  time 
it  could  not  be  said  to  be  in  consciousness.  In  show- 
ing that  at  least  in  many  cases  it  may  be  dated  we 
have  therefore  made  possible  the  assertion  that  it  is 
a  conscious  experience,  and  so  a  real  experience. 

There  is  still  another  large  group  of  religious  ex- 
periences which  comes  under  none  of  the  types  we 
have  mentioned.  Where  emotion  enters  largely  into 
religion  it  comes  to  consciousness  neither  because  of 
its  definite  assertions  about  something  outside  of  it- 
self, nor  is  it  always  to  be  grouped  as  a  moral  or 
religious  impulse,  and  not  always  is  there  any  clear 
consciousness  of  its  date  or  place  in  time.  Emotion 
has  its  own  laws,  and  comes  into  consciousness  for  its 
own  reasons.  A  man  who  is  lifted  up  into  the  high- 


60         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

est  realm  by  great  church  music,  or  finds  his  devotion 
to  religion  strengthened  by  gorgeous  ceremonial,  as 
well  as  by  the  crude  emotion  of  the  back  country  re- 
vivalist, is  conscious  of  something^  It  is  true  that 
not  always  does  he  recognise  that  it  is  emotion  which 
is  chief  in  his  experience.  Always,  however,  he  knows 
that  he  is  pleased  with  religion.  The  actions  which 
follow  from  his  experience  are  not  always  conscious, 
and  very  often  he  does  not  realise  the  direction  in 
which  his  emotion  is  leading  him.  Yet  the  emotion 
itself  is  in  consciousness.  The  controversy  about  the 
function  of  the  organism  in  emotion  has  no  place 
here.  Whatever  may  be  the  relative  priority  of  body 
or  mind,  what  he  is  conscious  of  is  the  emotion.  It 
is  true  that  such  experiences  are  not  so  clearly  seen 
to  be  distinctively  religious  as  those  we  have  been 
discussing.  Yet  that  too  does  not  concern  us.  If 
religion  should  prove  to  be  simply  emotion,  then 
what  we  find  to  be  true  of  religion  will  still  be  true, 
though  applicable  also  to  emotion.  Since  emotions 
are  in  consciousness,  so  far  as  religion  includes  or 
unites  with  emotion,  it  too  is  in  consciousness. 

As  we  are  not  arguing  that  religion  must  be  sub- 
sumed under  any  one  of  these  heads,  we  do  not  need 
to  make  our  classification  exhaustive.  All  that  we 
have  done  is  to  show  that  under  the  forms  it  usually 
takes  religion  is  in  consciousness,  and  hence  is  a  con- 
scious experience.  Being  an  experience,  it  is  sub- 
ject to  study.  So  we  have  a  basis  for  the  rest  of 
our  work.  The  differing  types  of  consciousness  show 
us  that  the  kind  of  reality  this  gives  to  religion  is 
either  different  from  that  of  any  one  of  these  types 
or  differs  according  to  the  type.  An  emotion  is  not 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         61 

in  consciousness  in  the  same  way  or  same  sense  that 
the  perception  of  a  tree  is,  nor  do  we  know  or  study 
our  impulses  as  we  study  the  tree  or  the  perception 
of  the  tree.  There  is  the  possibility  that  underneath 
these  differing  forms  lies  something  which  is  common 
to  them  all,  and  that  this  constitutes  religion.  It  is 
evident  that  we  have  not  yet  come  to  any  definition 
of  the  experience  which  we  are  studying.  To  say 
that  it  is  real  and  is  a  conscious  experience  is  there- 
fore not  to  define  what  type  of  reality  it  has.  It 
has  simply  met  the  first  test.  We  have  a  clearer 
idea  of  what  we  mean  by  the  religious  consciousness. 
When  we  said  that  men  must  mean  something  by  the 
word  religion  we  had  to  act  on  faith.  Now  we  have 
certain  experiences  before  us  which  include  nearly  all 
that  men  do  mean  by  religion.  They  may*  include 
more  than  just  the  religious  elements,  but  if  we  are 
to  study  religion  we  shall  find  it  somewhere  in  these 
experiences. 

As  we  look  more  carefully  at  the  different  types,  we 
find  each  one  constantly  changing.  While  some  reve- 
lations from  God  seem  at  times  to  be  very  distinct, 
yet  often  one  which  may  be  just  the  opposite  is  just 
as  distinct.  The  multitude  of  gods  is  as  great  al- 
most as  the  number  of  men.  With  savage  tribes  each 
clan  has  its  own  religious  experience.  They  are  con- 
sistent in  assuming  that  this  means  that  there  exist 
various  gods.  In  higher  religions  they  are  fre- 
quently able  to  distinguish  which  god  it  is  which  ap- 
pears to  them  by  the  form  of  the  appearance.  This 
is  still  a  difference  in  consciousness  even  in  cases 
where  we  may  suppose  the  form  is  influenced  by  what 
others  have  told  of  their  experience.  The  stories  of 


62        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

the  god  constantly  change,  and  this  points  to  a 
changing  experience.  The  gods  of  one  race  are  very 
different  from  those  of  another.  Even  where  their 
functions  have  come  to  be  similar  their  form  remains 
distinct.  What  holds  true  of  visual  or  other  ap- 
pearances of  the  gods  is  still  more  true  in  regard  to 
their  utterances.  In  all  ages  there  have  been  false 
prophets,  men  whose  experience  of  the  god  has  not 
met  the  approval  of  the  best  religious  tests.  In  the 
experience  itself  there  is  given  no  test  by  which  these 
may  be  ruled  out  of  religion.  The  reported  wariness 
of  the  Delphic  oracle  is  not  more  suggestive  on  this 
point  than  this  disagreement  as  to  what  is  revealed 
truth.  Theologians  have  recognised  this  and  sought 
outside  of  the  experience  their  arguments  to  support 
their  views.  The  fanaticism  of  the  Mohammedan, 
which  leads  him  to  believe  that  God  commands  a  holy 
war,  must  be  equally  included  as  religion  with  the 
passive  resistance  which  the  Quaker  offers  to  being 
drafted  for  military  service.  It  is  equally  a  sense  of 
divine  command  which  leads  the  Indian  fanatic  to  seek 
death  under  the  wheels  of  Juggernaut  and  the  Eng- 
lish authorities  to  prevent  it.  The  experiences  of 
each  must  be  included  under  the  head  of  the  religious 
experience.  From  these  examples  it  is  evident  that 
the  content  of  the  religious  experience  is  not 
constant.  Forever  varying,  the  revelations  given 
through  that  experience  can  not  define  religion. 

This  varying  content  means  that  the  religious  ex- 
perience is  far  different  from  the  types  of  ordinary 
perception.  Men  see  material  objects  slightly  differ- 
ently, but  never,  if  they  really  see  them,  so  differently 
that  we  can  not  identify  the  common  object.  When 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         63 

words  are  spoken,  though  they  may  be  heard  slightly 
inaccurately,  yet  it  is  possible,  if  they  were  "  really  " 
heard,  to  find  what  the  words  were.  A  chance  of 
agreement  on  the  basis  of  the  experience  exists. 
When  in  theology  the  defenders  of  religion  or  of  or- 
thodoxy must  defend  their  views,  not  by  an  appeal 
to  Christian  experience  as  direct  evidence  of  the 
truth,  but  to  analogy  and  deduction,  it  is  evident  that 
we  are  dealing  with  an  experience  whose  own  evidence 
is  not  sufficient  proof.  With  perception  there  can  be 
no  evidence  outside  of  itself.  If  a  man  tells  us  that 
he  sees  something,  the  only  way  of  disproving  his 
statement  is  for  some  one  to  assert  that  he  sees  in 
that  place  something  else  which  is  not  the  thing  the 
first  man  sees.  The  test  lies  within  the  experience 
or  at  least  within  the  type.  With  the  varying  forms 
of  religious  consciousness  where  those  forms  are  most 
definite  there  is  no  such  test.  To  tell  the  man  who 
asserts  that  a  god  is  speaking  to  him,  that  I  see  no 
god,  makes  no  difference  to  him.  Or  if  I  tell  him 
that  the  god  spoke  to  me  in  a  different  way  and  with 
a  different  command,  he  may  either  doubt  my  ex- 
perience, or  he  may,  by  referring  it  to  another  god 
or  to  a  devil,  give  it  equal  validity  with  his.  Even 
self-consistency  does  not  seem,  necessary.  The 
gods,  especially  those  of  primitive  tribes,  are  often 
very  willful  in  their  commands.  Yet  we  must  include 
these  experiences  among  the  evidences  of  the  religious 
life.  To  say  that  they  are  not  the  highest  type  of 
that  life  is  only  to  erect  a  division  within  the  field; 
it  is  not  to  exclude  any  experience  as  unreligious. 
This  is  evident  with  the  passive  experiences  of  the 
true  mystics.  Never  are  these  experiences  described 


64        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

twice  alike,  and  the  definite  assertion  is  often  made 
that  they  are  not  of  the  type  of  the  perception  of 
physical  tilings.  Words  which  describe  material  ob- 
jects will  not  apply  to  this  experience.  We  have 
come  practically  to  this  conclusion  independently  of 
the  mystic.  Whatever  it  may  be,  religion  does  not 
consist  in  the  perception  of  definite  objects. 

In  reviewing  carefully  the  second  type  of  religious 
experiences  we  see  that  the  same  indefiniteness  or 
variability  exists.  Great  common  impulses  such  as 
the  movements  toward  church  unity  or  the  missionary 
movement  were  taken  as  types.  Yet  for  many  peo- 
ple, especially  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  re- 
ligion consisted  in  the  destruction  of  church  unity, 
and  for  others  to-day  in  the  at  least  passive  opposi- 
tion to  foreign  missions  in  order  to  work  at  the  social 
problems  of  our  great  cities.  If  we  had  taken  other 
impulses,  just  as  truly  religious,  but  not  so  wide- 
spread, this  would  be  more  evident.  For  one  man 
the  religious  impulse  requires  self-denial,  while  for 
another  such  denial  is  foolishness,  not  religion,  and 
he  teaches  the  satisfaction  of  every  normal  desire. 
Celibate  or  married,  the  religious  leader  is  equally 
strongly  convinced  that  religion  impels  him  to  do  the 
thing  he  is  doing.  The  religious  element  is  recog- 
nised by  St.  Paul  in  his  treatment  of  those  who  be- 
lieved and  those  who  did  not  believe  in  keeping  the 
Mosaic  law.  Though  the  religious  impulse  led  in  just 
opposite  directions,  both  were  religious  impulses. 
The  conception  and  conviction  that  God  is  behind 
our  present  social  order,  and  against  lawlessness  is 
met  by  the  equally  strong  conviction  that  this  order 
must  be  destroyed.  Each  in  his  determination  is 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         65 

partly  at  least  religious,  so  far  as  the  idea  of  divine 
sanction  enters  in.  That  neither  will  grant  this  to 
the  other  is  no  reason  for  our  refusing  to  see  the  re- 
ligious element  in  both.  Whatever  they  may  mean 
by  God,  they  both  assert  that  their  experience  of  him 
is  such  that  they  are  convinced  that  he  wants  and 
impels  them  to  act  as  they  are  acting.  The  impulses 
are  antagonistic,  yet  both  are  to  be  classed  as  reli- 
gious. 

If  for  any  reason  we  take  some  one  line  of  action 
as  moral,  and  all  that  opposes  it  as  immoral,  it  is 
evident  that  religion  is  neither.  If  it  is  right  to  at- 
tack the  present  economic  order,  then  religion,  which 
seems  equally  to  sanction  such  attack  and  to  con- 
demn it,  is  not  identical  with  morality.  Again  we 
may  say  that  the  test  of  morality  is  within  the  ex- 
perience, and  for  religion  outside  of  it.  The  reli- 
gious leader,  in  defending  one  or  the  other  conviction 
does  not,  at  least  not  in  these  days,  appeal  to  that 
conviction,  but  to  moral  arguments,  or  arguments 
from  ethics  or  some  conception  of  divine  law  or  man's 
destiny.  With  the  moral  experience  that  test  is 
within.  Not  attempting  to  define  morality,  we  only 
need  to  point  out  that  social  morality  is  a  test  in 
itself.  So  far  as  a  man  is  moral  he  shares  the  ex- 
perience of  his  fellows.  He  can  test  his  ideas  of 
right  by  theirs.  Again,  -the  experience  is  one  that 
can  be  communicated,  or  at  least  described  in  unam- 
biguous terms.  With  religion,  while  the  direction  of 
the  impulses  may  be  evident,  there  is  no  such  test.  A 
man  will  not  accept  his  neighbor's  word  that  his  re- 
ligious impulse  is  not  as  fundamental  as  his  neighbor's 
religion.  The  impulse  itself  he  feels  whether  he  al- 


66        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

lows  it  to  act  or  not,  and  argument  or  comparison 
does  not  destroy  this  first  character.  Again  and 
again,  when  uniformity  has  been  decreed  in  religion, 
has  a  great  mass  of  men  broken  over  the  bounds. 
Dissent  in  England  is  a  standing  protest  against  ap- 
plying coercive  measures  to  the  religious  experience. 
It  will  not  run  for  all  in  the  same  channel.  Men  will 
not  accept  another's  experience  as  the  guide  and 
measure  of  theirs.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  reli- 
gion and  morality  are  not  identical.  One  is  social, 
allowing  and  seeking  a  test  at  the  hands  of  society, 
the  other  rejects  such  a  test,  and  goes  its  own  way. 
Yet  that  way  is  itself  constantly  changing,  for  the 
individual  as  well  as  between  individuals.  A  man 
may  to-day  believe  religion  to  be  impelling  him  in 
one  direction,  and  to-morrow  become  convinced  that 
it  is  impelling  him  in  another.  Religion  cannot  be 
defined  in  terms  of  direction. 

We  find  this  same  negative  result  in  the  last  of  the 
types  of  religious  experience  which  we  examined. 
While  very  often  the  experience  can  be  dated,  this  is 
by  no  means  always  true.  While  Protestantism 
seems  often  to  assume  that  religion  is  to  be  aroused 
at  some  definite  time,  the  Catholic  churches,  Roman 
and  Anglican  and  Eastern,  base  their  whole  scheme 
of  sacramental  life  on  the  opposing  assumption  that 
religion  has  no  special  time  as  its  beginning,  nor  is  it 
normally  marked  by  crises  which  can  be  easily  dated. 
In  a  certain  sense  it  has  a  date  if  we  have  the  experi- 
ence now,  but  the  dating  does  not  come  into  con- 
sciousness unless  something  explicitly  calls  it  here. 
For  those  for  whom  no  such  datable  crises  exist,  the 
religious  experience  is  as  it  has  always  been,  and  no 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         67 

changes  have  been  so  sudden  as  to  force  a  conscious- 
ness of  date.  Any  experience  which  consists  or  may 
consist  of  a  gradual  development  shares  this  feature. 
Life  itself,  the  consciousness  of  physical  existence, 
since  we  have  always  had  it,  can  have  no  date  in  our 
life.  The  man  who  is  always  well  is  hardly  conscious 
that  he  is  alive.  Where  the  consciousness  of  a  given 
type  permeates  the  whole  stream  of  time  it  cannot 
be  given  a  special  place  within  that  stream.  The 
more  natural  and  all  pervading,  therefore,  that  re- 
ligion becomes  in  the  individual  life,  the  less  can  it 
be  dated.  The  more  gradual  and  inevitable  the 
growth  in  the  religious  life,  the  less  will  it  consciously 
assume  definite  dates. 

This  does  not  invalidate  our  former  argument.  In 
those  cases  where  the  consciousness  of  date  does  ap- 
pear, religion  thereby  becomes,  in  some  sense  or  other, 
real,  but  there  may  be  equally  clear  cases  of  religion 
which  do  not  thus  win  reality.  What  religion  is  in 
its  essence  remains  therefore  unanswered.  It  is,  how- 
ever, something  that  may  be  dated.  At  times  it  in- 
volves very  plainly  the  consciousness  of  change. 
These  particular  experiences  are  in  so  far,  then,  ex- 
periences, that  is,  focal  in  consciousness.  The  other 
cases  of  which  we  have  spoken  are  instances  which 
usually  come  under  one  of  the  other  heads.  When  a 
man  has  a  religious  experience,  or,  to  avoid  the  word 
"  experience,"  recognises  that  he  has  a  religious 
nature,  and  that  nature  grows  as  any  other  part  of 
him  does,  he  is  conscious  either  of  the  impulses  that 
come  from  it,  the  habits  in  which  the  church  and 
Christian  society  have  trained  him,  or  he  thinks  of 
the  definite  teachings  of  God  and  His  work  which 


68         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

have  been  told  him  since  before  he  could  remember. 
Hence  these  cases  get  their  recognition  as  real  with- 
out the  need  of  the  consciousness  of  date.  No  one  of 
these  classifications,  however,  fits  the  whole  of  the 
religious  phenomena  in  consciousness.  It  might  be 
said  that  this  means  that  there  is  not  possible  any  one 
definition  of  religion,  but  that  its  reality  is  of  many 
irreconcilable  types ;  that  in  reality  there  are  many 
religions.  This  is  not  a  valid  conclusion  from  our 
discussion.  At  any  time  any  religious  experience 
can  be  dated.  Let  it  cease,  or  change  abruptly,  and 
the  consciousness  of  that  change  takes  its  place  in  the 
stream  of  time.  Or  if  it  does  not  change,  and  the 
question  of  date  is  raised,  we  can  always  come  to 
a  consciousness,  if  that  be  the  truth,  that  we  have 
always  been  religious.  It  is  true  that  in  these  cases 
it  is  some  other  interest  which  brings  the  conscious- 
ness of  time,  but  when  it  is  once  brought,  that  be- 
comes part  of  the  religious  consciousness.  We  have 
therefore  not  two  types,  mutually  exclusive,  of  re- 
ligious life,  but  only  a  varying  degree  of  temporal 
consciousness.  By  union  with  this  time  conscious- 
ness religion  may  be  proven  to  be  real,  but  the  union 
is  not  a  vital  part  of  religion.  Religion  is  there- 
fore not  something  of  the  type  of  the  perception  of 
time.  We  can  not  rightly  define  it  as  the  perception 
of  the  incoming  into  man  of  God's  grace.  Such  a 
definition  would  imply  that  there  was  in  conscious- 
ness always  a  sense  of  a  time  when  we  did  not  have 
that  grace,  and  then  a  sense  of  a  time  when  we  did 
have.  Since  this  is  not  always  true,  the  definition  is 
not  adequate.  Religion  does  not  depend  on  the  sense 
of  time. 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         69 

In  each  of  the  cases  we  have  examined  we  have 
found  similar  results.  While  often  the  religious  ex- 
perience is  proven  real  by  its  definiteness  in  content, 
in  direction,  and  in  date,  just  as  often  it  does  not 
possess  these  characteristics.  It  is  possible,  even, 
that  at  times,  as  in  some  of  the  mystic  trances,  it 
possesses  none  of  them.  Since  it  can  possess  them, 
it  is  real,  for  if  it  was  not  real,  it  could  not  have  this 
definiteness  in  consciousness.  It  can  be  focal,  hence 
it  is  an  experience,  yet  the  definiteness  may  remain 
only  a  possibility.  This  possibility  consists  in  its 
relation  to  other  experiences.  For  no  one,  however 
much  they  assert  that  religion  should  fill  the  whole 
of  life,  does  the  consciousness  of  religion  ever  do 
this.  By  this  consciousness  we  mean  something  dis- 
tinct from  the  general  consciousness  of  life.  Man 
may  be  always  religious,  but  he  certainly  is  not  al- 
ways conscious  of  it.  Therefore  there  are  other 
things  or  experiences  irTour  conscious  life.  The  mo- 
ment that  these  other  experiences  touch  and  mingle 
with  the  religious  consciousness,  it  takes  on  the  same 
reality  they  have.  When  a  man  seeks  to  make  asser- 
tions about  that  experience,  he  is  able  not  only  to 
make  the  assertion  definite,  he  can  test  its  truth,  at 
least  for  himself.  If  his  assertion  is  that  the  religious 
consciousness  is  vague  in  definite  commands,  then 
that  vagueness  can  be  tested  by  him  the  next  time  he 
comes  into  this  religious  mood.  Because  it  can  be 
tested,  it  has  a  hold  on  reality.  In  the  same  way, 
we  have  seen  that  although  it  does  not  always  involve 
a  consciousness  of  time,  yet  it  may  always  be  dated, 
at  least  as  existent  now.  In  relation  with  these  other 
experiences  it  appears  equally  real,  for  it  takes  them 


70        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

into  itself.  The  possibility  consists  therefore  in  this 
relation  of  possible  inclusion.  It  is  always  possible 
to  give  this  reality  to  religion,  therefore  always  pos- 
sible, at  least,  to  find  it  to  be  a  true  experience,  which 
may  be  focal  in  consciousness. 

To  define  it  in  these  terms  is  to  say  that  it  is  very 
different  from  perception.  Perception  is  or  it  is  not 
real.  We  either  perceive  or  we  do  not  perceive.  At 
times  that  perception  may  be  on  the  fringe  of  con- 
sciousness, but  if  we  are  not  at  least  dimly  conscious 
of  it  before,  when  our  attention  turns  to  it,  then  the 
perception  comes  for  the  first  time.  A  perception  is 
the  consciousness  of  something,  not  the  possibility  of 
that  consciousness.  A  sensation  may  be  defined  as 
the  permanent  possibility  of  perception,  but  percep- 
tion itself,  if  unconscious,  is  non-existent.  There  is 
nothing  left  to  it,  if  we  take  away  consciousness. 
Nothing  mental  remains,  only  organic  movements  and 
states  of  which  the  mind  knows  nothing.  With  re- 
ligion we  have  found  this  to  be  reversed.  While  it 
may  have  the  reality  that  perception  has,  such 
reality  is  not  necessary  to  it.  There  remains  some- 
thing to  our  conception  of  religion  even  when  we  take 
away  all  that  there  is  in  our  idea  of  perception. 
Whether  perception  of  things,  of  truths,  of  moral 
movements,  or  of  time,  religion  is  something  more 
than  any  one  of  these,  or  all  of  these  put  together. 
It  satisfies  our  test  as  to  consciousness,  for  it  may  be 
in  consciousness,  but  it  does  more  than  this.  Hence 
it  is  very  distinctly  different  from  perception. 

Around  the  second  part  of  our  definition  of  experi- 
ence centers  more  important,  because  more  disputed, 
questions  than  around  the  part  we  have  considered. 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         71 

We  here  approach  the  first  of  the  controversies  which 
yield  or  deny  to  religion  some  form  of  objectivity. 
In  the  case  before  us,  it  is  rather  simply  the  question 
of  control  by  man.  If  not  controllable  at  all,  it  can 
hardly  be  called  a  normal  human  experience,  as  we 
have  defined  experience.  We  have,  therefore,  to  ask 
how  far  it  is,  and  how  far  it  is  not,  controllable  by 
man. 

The  existence  of  religious  phenomena  few  or  none 
dispute.  A  classification  in  broad  terms  makes  prac- 
ticable studies  from  various  points  of  view  upon  this 
data.  Not  so  many,  however,  have  gone  into  the 
question  of  the  reality  of  the  experience  as  a  distinct 
experience,  having  a  place  of  its  own  in  reality.  As 
a  contribution  toward  this,  an  analytic  study  of  the 
religious  consciousness  is  necessary.  Such  a  study  is 
that  which  follows. 

The  first  question  which  arises  is  that  of  the  re- 
lation of  religion  to  the  will.  Can  man  control  it? 
As  a  preliminary  answer,  man  can  control  religion 
to  the  extent  of  being  able  to  seek  or  not  to  seek  it. 
Religious  influences,  as  they  lie  about  us  from  in- 
fancy, are  not  here  in  question,  for  these  influences 
do  not  constitute  our  experience  of  religion.  When 
a  boy  grows  up,  it  only  too  frequently  happens  that 
he  deliberately  rejects  and  turns  from  those  influ- 
ences, and  ceases  to  have  the  experiences  that  he 
would  if  he  remained  true  to  the  teaching  of  his  child- 
hood. He  can  shut  those  influences  out  of  his  life. 
By  the  influence  of  the  companions  whose  company 
he  seeks,  a  new  set  of  influences  and  experiences  take 
the  place  of  the  old.  On  the  other  side,  a  man 
brought  up  with  one  type  of  Christian  teaching,  and 


72         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

knowing1  religion  through  some  one  type  of  religious 
experience,  may  deliberately,  because  of  some  feeling 
of  inadequacy  or  unrest,  seek  a  fuller  or  different  ex- 
perience. He  may  not  have  clearly  in  mind  just  what 
it  is  he  seeks,  and  he  may  never  find  rest,  but  he  will 
by  his  own  will  change  his  religious  experience.  All 
these  cases  are  cases  where  the  experience  is  known 
in  some  form  to  the  man  who  seeks  to  change  it.  The 
question  might  be  raised  whether  a  man  who  knew 
nothing  of  the  experience,  except  by  hearsay,  could 
by  seeking  find  it.  The  teaching  that  no  man  by 
searching  can  find  out  God  seems  to  deny  this. 
Whatever  the  correct  exegesis  of  that  text  may  be, 
we  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  we  are  not  at  this  point 
saying  that  in  the  religious  experience  man  does  find 
out  God.  That  problem  will  trouble  us  enough  when 
we  are  ready  for  it.  Now  we  are  asking  the  ques- 
tion without  regard  to  its  consequences,  seeking  only 
the  correct  answer,  whatever  it  may  be.  Yet  seeing 
its  possible  importance,  we  must  consider  it.  As  far 
as  we  can  define  terms,  a  man  can  deliberately  seek 
and  find  this  experience.  To  one  who  has  seen  the 
devotion,  especially  in  public  worship,  of  some  loyal 
church  member,  or  has  seen  some  evidence  of  loyal 
service  to  man  which  seems  to  come  from  the  religious 
experience  of  the  one  under  observation,  then  it  is 
possible  for  the  observer,  wishing  to  induce  in  himself 
the  same  spirit  of  worship  or  of  service,  to  seek  and 
to  put  himself  under  influences  that  will  bring  to  him 
the  same  experience.  It  is  as  possible  as  the  effort, 
which  may  be  crowned  with  success,  of  an  admirer  of 
art  to  attain  some  appreciation  of  true  artistic  spirit. 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         7.3 

Consequently,  man  can,  by  effort,  at  least  partly 
change  and  control  his  religious  experience. 

The  consequences  of  this  may  be  stated  in  the  form 
that  man  can  induce  the  religious  experience,  or  can 
bring  about  a  new  form  of  the  experience  as  he  wishes. 
In  so  far  he  can  create  the  experience.  It  is  not 
something  that  will  hide  from  him,  and  come  to 
light  only  of  its  own  accord.  Not  all  religion,  there- 
fore, is  of  the  type  of  sudden  conversion,  or  what  a 
surface  reading  of  the  New  Testament  seems  to  give 
as  St.  Paul's  experience.  Religion  takes  normally 
and  as  a  possibility  its  place  among  the  other  ex- 
periences of  life,  whose  lack  we  can  correct  by  seeing 
the  experience.  As  we  can  seek  to  gain  the  experi- 
ence of  heat  or  cold,  so  we  can  seek  religion.  To 
this  extent  it  is  like  ordinary  perception. 

The  case  to  which  we  referred,  of  a  boy  turning 
from  home  influences  and  with  that,  from  religion, 
might  really  fall  under  our  next  heading.  As  man 
can  change,  so  he  can  reject  religion.  Yet  as  this 
problem  is  so  much  wider  than  this  particular  in- 
stance, it  will  be  well  not  to  dwell  on  this  one  case. 
The  real  point  at  issue  is  whether  religion  is  so  all- 
powerful  that  whether  a  man  will  or  no  he  must  sub- 
mit to  it.  It  is  to  be  conceded  that  he  may  not  act 
according  to  its  impulses,  and  yet  he  may  have  the  ex- 
perience. The  boy  leaving  home  can  not  take  out  of 
his  life  that  home  experience,  even  though  he  prevent 
any  return  of  it  in  the  future.  If  the  conception  of 
the  religious  experience  is  that  of  the  incoming  into 
man  of  God's  all  powerful  grace,  which  a  man  may 
disobey,  but  which  he  can  not  reject  as  an  experience, 


74         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

then  he  is  not  free  to  reject  it.  A  man  may  shut  his 
eyes  and  refuse  to  see,  and  be  able  under  ordinary 
conditions  to  refuse  to  look  at  the  scene  before  him. 
If  he  cannot  do  this  in  religion,  then  religion  is  a  dif- 
ferent sort  of  experience.  We  must  remember  that  it 
is  not  necessary  to  claim  that  when  once  the  experi- 
ence is  upon  a  man,  that  then  he  can  not  avoid  it. 
When  a  man's  eyes  are  open,  very  frequently  he  can- 
not help  seeing.  Yetj  if  his  attention  is  distracted,  and 
he  is  thinking  of  something  else,  he  may  not  perceive 
the  scene  before  him  in  any  conscious  way.  It  would 
seem  that  at  times,  at  least,  religion  is  like  this.  While 
if  a  man  lets  himself  go,  his  religious  consciousness 
may  become  more  acute,  whether  emotionally  or  in- 
tellectually, he  may  ordinarily,  by  turning  the  current 
of  his  thoughts  in  other  directions,  prevent  the  com- 
ing into  consciousness  of  this  experience.  In  a  crowd 
a  man  may  remain  impervious  to  the  mob  spirit  if  his 
interests  are  centered  elsewhere,  while  if  he  lets  him- 
self be  swayed  by  the  mob,  he  may  go  the  full  distance 
of  approval  of  their  acts,  and  share  in  their  experi- 
ences. Such  is  the  case  with  religion.  The  spirit 
which  a  man  brings  to  worship,  all  devotional  writers 
recognise,  is  crucial  for  the  experience  of  worship. 
If  he  comes  in  a  prayerful  spirit,  the  full  experience 
may  come  to  him,  but  if  he  is  distraught,  the  words  of 
the  familiar  prayers  fall  meaningless  on  his  ears.  So 
by  rejecting  the  religious  experience  we  mean  that  its 
entrance  into  consciousness  is  dependent  on  what  is 
already  there.  The  man  may,  by  allowing  other  in- 
terests to  precede,  shut  out  religion. 

Religion  is  therefore  not  always  so  compelling  that 
it  can  force  its  way  into  consciousness  against  a 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         75 

man's  will.  Whatever  bearing  the  doctrine  of  elec- 
tion may  have  on  this  point,  if  it  means  that  GocI 
forces  those  whom  he  elects  to  salvation  to  have  sense 
of  assurance  of  his  presence,  we  must  question  it 
closely.  It  may  not  mean  this,  but  if  it  does,  the 
doctrine  must  be  changed  to  allow  for  the  rejection 
by  man  of  the  religious  experience.  The  arguments 
on  which  predestination  is  based  start  from  the  idea 
of  God.  Since  we  are  trying  to  arrive  at  the  idea 
of  God  as  he  may  prove  to  make  himself  known  in  ex- 
perience, our  discussion  must  take  logical  precedence, 
and  if  we  are  wrong  we  must  be  met  on  our  own 
ground.  If  we  find,  as  we  have,  evidence  that  man 
may  refuse  and  succeed  in  the  refusal,  by  staying 
away  from  religious  influences,  or  by  opposing  other 
interests,  then  any  doctrine  of  God's  nature  must 
be  made  to  explain  this.  It  can  not  succeed  by 
dogmatically  denying  facts.  If  God  is  made  known 
to  man  in  an  experience  which  man  may  reject,  then 
we  can  not  define  the  religious  experience  as  always 
prevailing.  There  is  this  to  be  said,  though,  that 
we  are  not  seeking  to  prove  that  man  may  always  be 
able  to  reject  religion.  Just  as  there  are  times  when 
a  man  may  not  refuse  to  see  what  is  before  him,  under 
the  impulse  of  surprise,  perhaps,  so  there  may  be 
moments  when,  taken  by  surprise,  a  great  wave  of  re- 
ligious consciousness  may  sweep  over  him  before  he 
can  make  the  attempt  to  shut  it  out.  Still  this  does 
not  make  religion  any  different  from  vision.  Again, 
religion  takes  its  place  in  this  regard  among  normal 
experiences. 

As  man  can  by  seeking  find  religion,  and  as  he  can 
reject  it  when  it  comes  to  him  unsought,  so  when  he 


76        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

is  conscious  of  religion  he  is  able  to  modify  it.  Even 
St.  Paul,  whose  experience  we  have  been  taking  as  a 
type  of  the  irresistible  religious  experience,  tells  us 
that  he  was  not  disobedient  to  the  heavenly  vision. 
(Acts  26:  19.)  He  also  tells  us  that  the  expression 
of  the  religious  state,  such  as  "  speaking  with 
tongues  "  should  be  controlled.  (I  Cor.  14.)  This  is 
not  merely  a  matter  of  the  expression  of  religion.  Just 
as  religion  may  be  shut  out  if  what  is  already  in  con- 
sciousness holds  the  attention  too  strongly,  so  it  can 
be  obscured  in  consciousness  by  other  ideas  and  ex- 
periences. As  a  man  grows  older  those  things  which 
enshrined  for  him  religion  come  either  to  mean  more 
to  him,  or  else  gradually  lose  their  meaning.  The 
tendency,  which  many  have  pointed  out,  for  conver- 
sion to  occur  near  or  at  the  age  of  adolescence  shows 
the  very  considerable  influence  of  a  man's  nature  and 
surroundings  upon  his  religious  experience.  That  it 
may  also  be  modified  by  direct  effort  of  the  will  is 
true  in  at  least  some  cases.  A  man  who  deliberately 
makes  the  effort  by  prayer  to  increase  and  build  up 
in  himself  a  sense  of  God's  presence,  is  changing  his 
consciousness  of  religion.  Whatever  truth  there  may 
be  in  the  emphasis  on  sacraments  and  outward  forms 
made  by  the  great  mass  of  Christendom  rests  on 
this  possibility.  The  church  teaching  insists  that 
through  the  outward  form  man  can  change  the  inner 
experience.  Men  set  apart  one  day  out  of  seven  in 
the  belief  that  only  by  forming  deliberate  habits  can 
one  continue,  ordinarily,  in  touch  with  divine  forces. 
Only  so  will  most  men  continue  to  have  any  con- 
sciousness of  religion  that  is  at  all  definite.  Man 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         77 

may,  therefore,  if  he  will,  modify  his  consciousness  of 
religion. 

The  results  of  this  possibility  of  modification  are 
to  differentiate  religion  somewhat  from  perception. 
What  a  man  sees  he  sees,  and  while  he  can  be  indiffer- 
ent to  some  details,  he  can  not  really  change  those 
details.  Blue  remains  blue,  if  he  sees  it  at  all,  or  if 
it  changes,  the  change  is  not  due  to  his  willing  it. 
It  is  evident  that  we  are  dealing  with  something  more 
like  insight,  or  artistic  perception.  As  a  man  may 
increase  his  ability  to  perceive  beauty,  so  he  may,  we 
have  found,  increase  his  consciousness  of  religion. 
This  results  in  the  conclusion  that  religion  is  more 
a  matter  of  internal  mental  life,  and  perhaps  has  to 
do,  as  art  does,  with  values,  rather  than  with  material 
objects.  It  at  least  opens  the  way  to  this  result.  It 
does  not  prove  that  such  a  result  shuts  out  the  possi- 
bility that  in  the  religious  experience  it  may  be  some 
new  type  of  objects  that  are  perceived.  The  im- 
portance of  the  possibility  of  modification  lies  rather 
in  the  question  of  the  relation  to  the  will.  We  are 
plainly  dealing  with  something  that  is  man's  own  ex- 
perience, over  which  he  exercises  some  control.  It  is 
not  an  entirely  passive  experience  which  comes  to  him 
like  a  dream,  going  its  own  way  independently  of  his 
will,  but  something  which  claims  from  him  the  neces- 
sity of  exercising  on  it  his  will  power.  It  thus  comes 
into  the  real  world  of  action.  Not  merely  real  be- 
cause it  is  in  consciousness,  it  is  also  real  be- 
cause man  may  make  it  the  object  of  desire.  In  this 
it  does  not  stand  alone  among  human  experiences. 
As  a  man  may  desire  and  work  to  gain  a  conscious- 


78        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

ness  of  history  or  science,  so  he  may  desire  and  work 
to  gain  a  consciousness  of  religion.  We  are  dealing 
with  an  experience  which  is  vital,  which  seems  to  many 
among  men  something  to  be  striven  for  with  all  their 
strength.  The  anchorite  in  the  desert  felt  religion  to 
be  very  real  when  he  gave  up  all  for  it.  Not  only, 
then,  do  we  find  it  really  in  consciousness,  we  also 
find  it  known  and  real  in  so  far  that  men  consciously 
seek  to  bring  it  to  fuller  focus  in  their  lives. 

These  three  points  that  we  made  are  arguments 
only  for  the  possibility  for  control  by  man's  will.  In 
many  cases  we  find  religion  proving  itself  above  such 
control.  In  human  life  religion  came  so  early  both 
for  the  race  and  the  individual  that  we  are  not  con- 
scious of  any  will  to  receive  or  reject  it.  It  is  a 
part  of  our  life.  This  is  very  often  true  also  of  those 
sudden  crises  which  to  many  are  the  main  examples 
to  be  studied.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  under- 
lying train  of  events  when  St.  Paul  was  struck  blind 
on  the  Damascus  road,  it  came  to  him  as  a  totally 
unexpected  experience.  The  same  is  true  of  St. 
Augustine,  and  many  who  could  be  mentioned. 
Every  conversion,  even  if  it  has  been  long  desired, 
comes  with  this  shock  of  surprise.  Frequently  also, 
on  the  emotional  side,  there  arises  in  man's  mind  dur- 
ing worship  a  type  of  consciousness  of  which  he  has 
had  no  forewarning,  and  which  often  it  is  difficult  to 
keep  under  control,  much  less  to  put  out  of  his  mind. 
The  revival  spirit  sweeps  one  away  sometimes  even 
when  the  sober  will  is  somewhat  opposed.  The 
quieter  influences  of  religion,  too,  affect  a  man  with- 
out his  effort.  The  solemn  service  often  at  the  most 
unexpected  times  brings  to  the  worshiper  a  greater 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         79 

depth  of  feeling  than  he  has  known  before.  Also, 
at  times,  when  he  seeks  that  feeling,  he  can  not  find 
it.  All  other  things  may  seem  as  usual,  yet  the  ex- 
perience does  not  come.  Whether  it  be  sin,  or  lack 
of  faith  does  not  matter,  man  can  not  always,  by 
simply  willing  it,  get  religion.  In  both  ways,  there- 
fore, in  coming  without  man's  will,  and  at  times  in 
eluding  that  will,  religion  proves  itself  above  com- 
plete control  by  man. 

So  far  this  gives  to  religion  the  right  by  the  sec- 
ond of  our  tests  to  be  called  an  experience.  It  is  not 
simply  a  creature  of  man's  will.  This  also  differenti- 
ates religion  from  morality.  Morality  concerns  en- 
tirely man's  will  to  act.  If  it  came  upon  him  without 
his  will,  his  action  would  not  be  free,  and  so,  not 
moral.  But  religion,  in  coming  or  staying  independ- 
ently of  man,  is  shown  to  be  different.  It  is  there- 
fore not  dealing  with  values  as  morality  deals  with 
them.  This  point  is  of  importance  because  it  leaves 
open  the  question  of  the  origin  of  the  experience. 
If  it  were  a  product  of  man's  own  will,  then  it  could 
not  possibly  reveal  objects  beyond  man.  As  it  is  not, 
in  its  origin,  man's  creation,  we  may  find  that  it  does 
come  from  a  source  outside  of  man.  It  may  be  more 
like  perception  than  fantasy. 

A  man  may  reject  religion,  but  reckon  with  it  he 
must.  In  rejecting  it  he  must  recognise  it  as  a  force 
which  he  can  keep  out  of  his  life,  but  not  one  which 
he  can  destroy  by  the  mere  fiat  of  his  will.  The 
methods  by  which  he  succeeds  in  thus  barring  it 
show  this.  When  he  turns  from  religious  associ- 
ations, and  avoids  church  going,  or  refuses  to  go  to 
the  church  where  the  experience  which  he  shuns  holds 


80         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

sway,  he  recognises  the  impulse  to  the  experience  as 
something  exterior  to  himself.  When  he  shuts  it  out 
of  his  life  by  centering  his  attention  and  energy  on 
other  and  conflicting  things,  he  does  not  control  it 
as  he  does  his  desires,  but  as  he  does  the  view  of  a 
scene  he  does  not  wish  to  see.  He  erects  barriers 
against  it,  so  that  it  can  not  enter.  There  are  times 
when  a  man  deliberately  stifles  any  appearance  of  re- 
ligion within  him  by  sheer  force  of  will.  He  forces 
his  attention  away  from  it,  and  sees  that  no  expres- 
sion of  its  presence  goes  forth  into  action.  Yet  even 
here,  the  most  that  can  be  said  for  will  power  is  that 
it  called  forth  something  which  requires  the  utmost 
power  to  destroy.  Man  may,  at  times,  if  the  experi- 
ence is  not  strong,  turn  from  it  as  he  does  from  a 
dream.  This  proves  only  that  religion  may  not  al- 
ways be  a  real  experience,  that  it  shades  over  into 
something  else.  Yet  we  have  to  notice  that  even  here 
we  use  the  expression,  "  he  turns  from:  religion." 
What  he  does,  in  our  ordinary  idea,  is  to  refuse  to 
give  religion  a  place.  It  is  not  that  he  refuses  to 
create  it.  He  may  turn  from  it  as  from  a  dream, 
but  we  do  not  usually  think  of  him  as  putting  it  aside 
as  he  does  a  possible  action.  A  dream  is  in  some 
sense,  as  not  completely  controllable  by  man,  an  ex- 
perience. So  our  analogy  has  not  hurt  the  claim  of 
religion  to  be  an  experience.  There  is  still  the  pos- 
sibility that  it  is  more  like  a  waking  dream,  called 
forth  or  not  as  man  wills.  This  may  be  true  in  some 
cases,  and  rejection  not  involve  giving  to  religion  any 
other  reality  than  that  of  a  rejected  possibility. 
This  does  not,  however,  affect  those  other  cases  where 
its  rejection  implies  that  it  is  something  to  be  strug- 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         81 

gled  against,  if  it  is  to  be  destroyed.  It  is  possible 
that  religion  may  not  always  be  what  we  have  de- 
scribed as  an  experience.  But  those  cases  where  it  is 
not,  where  it  remains  a  rejected  possibility,  are  not 
cases  of  the  presence  of  religion  but  of  its  absence. 
Where  we  have  religion,  frequently  even  in  rejecting 
it,  a  man  finds  it  to  be  real,  and  that  it  makes  its 
effect  on  him  despite  his  will.  When  a  man  who  has 
fought  against  all  "  tenderness,"  and  sought  to  im- 
merse himself  in  the  struggle  for  self-betterment,  finds 
that  sometimes,  in  spite  of  his  growing  coldness,  he  is 
tempted  to  do  some  act  of  kindness,  when  he  realises, 
as  Dickens'  Christmas  story  portrays,  that  he  has 
not  conquered,  he  knows  that  in  rejecting  religion  he 
has  not  destroyed  it.  In  spite  of  him  it  has  proved 
its  claim  to  existence. 

Because  it  can  not  be  blotted  from  existence  by  the 
mere  arbitrary  will  of  a  man,  religion  may  at  times, 
even  if  not  always,  be  a  real  experience.  It  is  real 
in  the  sense  of  exerting,  whether  passively  or  actively 
does  not  matter  here,  some  force  in  opposition  to 
being  willed  out  of  existence.  This  does  not  mean 
that  it  is  necessarily  of  the  type  of  the  will,  nor  does 
it  prove  at  once  that  it  is  identical  with  the  social 
will.  For  perception  gives  cases  where,  especially  if 
they  are  painful,  we  find  an  experience  persisting  in 
spite  of  all  attempts  to  ignore  it.  As  this  quality  of 
opposition  to  control  is  a  characteristic  of  any  real 
experience,  we  have  not  proved  more  than  that  re- 
ligion is  such,  by  showing  that  at  times  it  resists  the 
individual  will.  Again,  it  does  not  necessarily  imply 
that  we  are  dealing  with  a  power  in  man  alien  to  his 
nature,  and  therefore  of  divine  origin.  All  that  we 


82        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

have  done  is  to  find  the  way  still  open  to  discover  the 
source  of  the  experience. 

The  last  of  the  three  points  which  we  examined  in 
regard  to  the  power  of  the  individual  over  his  re- 
ligious experience  was  that  of  the  ability  of  the  be- 
liever to  modify  his  experience.  We  need  not  dis- 
cuss the  fact  that  not  always  can  he  so  modify  it. 
That  is  really  included  in  our  conclusion  that  he  can 
not  always  reject  it.  If  he  can  not  always  reject  it, 
then  there  are  limits  to  his  power  of  modifying  it. 
The  more  important  thing  is  to  realise  that  religion 
can  modify  the  rest  of  life,  or  change  the  will  itself. 
Of  this  we  need  little  proof.  The  story  of  the  life 
of  John  Bunyan,  to  take  a  classic  instance,  illustrates 
the  great  power  of  religion  to  change  the  whole  course 
of  life.  The  Inasmuch  mission  in  Philadelphia, 
founded  to  help  men  who  have  fallen  into  evil  so  far 
that  only  despair  remains,  by  men  who  have  them- 
selves been  in  that  state,  and  who  attribute  the  change 
to  religion,  is  a  modern  instance.  Again  and  again, 
though  by  no  means  always,  has  conversion,  the  com- 
ing into  man  of  religion  for  what  he  regards  as  the 
first  time,  meant  a  turning  point  in  his  life.  To  say 
that  while  the  change  is  attributed  to  religion,  yet  it 
was  really  due  to  something  else,  is  not  a  valid  ob- 
jection. What  is  in  consciousness  is  that  the  reli- 
gious state  and  the  change  are  related  as  cause  and 
effect.  It  might  be  shown  that  the  religious  state 
was  only  itself  the  result  of  a  third  something  which 
produced  the  change.  This  is  to  go  behind  the  ex- 
perience in  a  way  which  we  have  not  as  yet  attempted. 
As  we  are  not  attempting  to  say  how  the  experience 
has  its  effect,  one  theory  here  is  as  useful  as  another, 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         83 

and  no  theory  of  how  it  works  takes  away  the  fact 
that  some  change  is  effected  in  connection  with  the 
religious  experience.  Religion  has  taken  this  definite 
place  in  the  real  world.  The  consciousness  of  re-" 
Hgion  is  a  consciousness  of  something  that  is  able  to 
affect  and  change  man's  life.  It  can  exercise  power 
over  him  as  well  as  he  over  it. 

This  gives  us  the  complete  result  necessary  to  as- 
serting that  the  religious  experience  is  a  real  experi- 
ence. As  the  experience  of  pleasure  or  pain  from 
the  perception  of  some  object  can  affect  us,  so  can  re- 
ligion. It  therefore  takes  its  place  alongside  of  per- 
ception as  a  mode  of  experience.  It  can  be  focal  in 
consciousness,  and  by  its  power  to  change  conscious- 
ness can  claim  that  focus  for  itself,  often  suddenly, 
as  in  conversion,  sometimes  in  the  quiet  power  of  re- 
ligious habit.  It  is  an  experience  that  can  affect  and 
hold  its  place  in  consciousness.  Yet  in  all  this  it  re- 
mains possible  to  man  to  control  it.  It  is  his  experi- 
ence. It  is  therefore  real  by  any  test  that  we  can 
apply.  Real  because  it  is  in  consciousness,  as  a  pos- 
sible object  to  man's  will,  as  bringing  power  to  bear 
on  man,  and,  in  the  combination  of  these  qualities, 
being  as  truly  an  experience  as  any  experience  of  life. 
Religion  therefore  is  real.  It  is  not  the  idle  cre- 
ation of  man,  nor  the  by-product  of  some  powerless 
unimportant  nook,  to  be  disregarded  as  of  little 
moment.  Experience  itself,  since  this  is  also  truly 
an  experience,  can  not  be  adequately  described  with- 
out reference  to  this.  Religion  must  be  explained  be- 
fore we  can  rest  satisfied  with  our  understanding  of 
life  or  reality. 

In  thus  giving  religion  a  place  in  the  real  world,  we 


8*        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

have  also  made  possible  a  definition  of  that  place. 
We  find  that  at  times  the  consciousness  of  religion 
can  be  very  definite,  that  it  has  often  definite  direc- 
tion in  that  it  moves  men  to  definite  things,  and  that 
it  very  frequently  can  be  dated ;  also,  that  it  has  very 
often  very  distinct  emotional  color.  Yet  we  also 
find  that  at  other  times  what  we  call  equally  exactly 
u  the  consciousness  of  religion  "  is  indefinite  as  to 
its  object,  has  no  one  direction  to  the  resulting  im- 
pulse, or  works  out  in  conflicting  directions,  that  with 
great  bodies  of  men  the  time  element  does  not  enter 
into  the  experience,  and  that  the  emotional  tone  is 
variable,  sometimes  religion  being  passive,  and  some- 
times active.  It  has  however  further  become  evident 
that,  while  some  of  the  categories  which  apply  to 
perception  apply  here  also,  many  do  not.  The  chief 
difference  is  found  in  the  fact  that  definiteness  does 
not  seem  to  be  a  characteristic  of  religion.  From  a 
survey  of  the  field  no  clew  is  given  us  by  which  we 
may  be  entitled  to  conclude  that  the  indefinite  forms 
are  less  typical.  As  far  as  ordinary  presumption 
goes,  it  is  equally  the  indefinite,  especially  some  of  the 
mystical  experiences,  which  give  us  the  typical  forms. 
Perception  must  be  definite  in  all  its  clearer  forms. 
Man  strives,  if  his  perception  is  indistinct,  to  obtain 
clearer  and  more  certain  knowledge.  If  we  see  in- 
distinctly, we  approach  nearer  to  the  object,  or  con- 
sult an  eye  specialist.  With  religion,  not  only  is 
such  an  attempt  not  usually  made,  but  we  have  from 
many  the  idea  that  to  make  it  distinct  would  destroy 
the  religious  element.  Such  would  seem  to  be  valid 
interpretation  of  the  Buddhist  doctrine  of  the  aboli- 
tion of  desire.  This  applies,  it  is  to  be  noted,  not 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         85 

only  to  definiteness  as  to  the  content  perceived  more 
or  less  passively,  but  also  to  the  emotional  content. 
It  is  therefore  evident  that  if  we  are  to  do  justice  to 
religion  in  all  its  forms  we  can  not  define  it  as  we 
would  perception.  Definiteness  cannot  enter  as  a 
term  in  our  description.  Religion  therefore  stands 
apart  not  only  from  perception,  but  from  the  moral 
forces,  and  also  from  emotion.  It  may  be  connected 
with  any  or  all  of  these,  but  not  necessarily  so,  so  far 
as  our  study  has  thus  far  shown.  We  have  to  be 
careful,  therefore,  as  we  go  on,  that  we  do  not  carry 
over  into  our  study  of  religion  ideas  and  presupposi- 
tions based  on  our  conception  of  any  of  these  other 
kinds  of  experience.  Religion  must  be  judged  by  it- 
self, for  it  is  unlike  the  other  ordinary  type  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Our  discussion  has  had  to  do  with  the  relation  of 
religion  to  man's  will.  Again  we  found  a  great  in- 
definiteness.  At  times  found  when  sought,  rejected 
at  man's  pleasure,  and  modified  by  him  as  he  willed, 
within  certain  limits;  in  other  and  no  less  typical 
cases,  it  came  without  being  sought,  or  when  sought 
did  not  come,  it  came  even  when  the  man  sought  to 
exclude  it,  and  it  resisted  change  by  man's  will,  but 
instead  changed  him  according  to  its  own  working. 
Again  it  does  not  fall  under  the  usual  categories,  as 
it  refused  to  be  found  within  the  limits  set  percep- 
tion, morality,  and  emotion.  In  coming  to  this  con- 
clusion, in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  has  a  certain  in- 
dependence over  against  man's  will,  it  was  difficult 
not  to  use  language  that  would  imply  that  in  the  reli- 
gious experience  we  have  to  deal  with  another  will. 
As  we  were  careful  to  point  out,  the  bare  fact  of  a 


86        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

certain  independence  of  the  will  was  common  to  any 
real  experience.  Yet  such  experiences  also  point, 
usually,  to  some  source  outside  of  the  individual  will. 
What  a  man  perceives  is  either  his  will,  or  something 
that  is  not  his  will.  Religion  is  very  evidently,  since 
it  resists  his  will,  not  identical  with  it.  It  therefore 
takes  its  place  in  the  other  class  of  experiences.  Its 
likeness  to  perception  differentiates  it  from  the  pro- 
ducts purely  of  men's  desires.  In  passing,  it  might 
be  interesting  to  note  that  this  would  seem  to  discour- 
age attempts  to  get  men  to  desire  religion,  and  the 
description  of  heaven,  etc.,  in  terms  to  awaken  de- 
sire. So  far  as  the  desire  is  met  by  religion,  and  no 
more,  religion  is  not  religion.  It  is  not  what  we  have 
found  people  to  mean  by  the  term.  It  is  an  experi- 
ence which  opens  to  man  a  realm  which  he  can  not 
completely  control.  Since,  however,  it  is  not  a  per- 
ception of  that  realm,  for  it  is  not  in  its  nature  the 
same  as  perception,  we  can  take  it  as  an  ordinary 
way  of  gaining  knowledge  about  a  new  field.  We  can 
not  go  to  religion  as  we  would  to  our  sense  of  hear- 
ing, or  our  knowledge  of  emotion  to  learn  of  this  new 
region  of  life.  We  have  to  go  in  another  direction. 
It  is  this  difference  not  likeness  to  perception,  that 
makes  our  present  inquiry  into  the  form  of  the  ex- 
perience necessary.  The  primary  object  of  a  study 
of  any  experience  must  be  to  gain  more  knowledge  of 
that  experience.  The  fact  that  on  the  very  thresh- 
old we  are  balked  by  the  seeming  inconsistencies  of 
religion  forces  us  to  avoid  the  direct  attack.  Before 
we  can  adequately  describe  this  experience,  much  less 
answer  any  question  as  to  its  value,  we  have  to  further 
examine  it  in  order  to  find  in  what  its  possible  value* 


RELIGION  REAL  AND  UNIQUE         87 

may  consist.  We  have  to  gain  fuller  knowledge  of 
the  experience.  Our  result  so  far  has  had  this  value, 
that  it  has  given  to  religion  a  place  in  real  experi- 
ence, and  has  raised  problems  beyond  what  might  at 
first  appear. 


LECTURE  III 
THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION 

Having  given  religion  a  place  in  reality,  the  in- 
evitable question  faces  us  as  to  its  meaning  and  sig- 
nificance. This  is  preliminary  to  the  question  of 
validity.  Before  we  can  examine  the  truth  of  its 
implications  and  the  value  of  its  revelations  of 
reality,  we  have  to  ask  how  far  those  indications  go. 
The  query  comes  to  us  first  as  to  the  source  of  this 
experience.  If  it  is  an  experience,  we  tend  imme- 
diately to  assume  that  it  must  be  an  experience  of 
something.  Our  next  task  is  to  search  and  see 
whether  there  appears  to  be  anything  beyond,  which 
can  be  experienced,  or  whether  in  this  also  religion  is 
unique,  that,  while  satisfying  the  rest  of  the  defini- 
tion of  an  experience,  it  does  not  justify  the  phrase 
"  the  object  of  experience."  This  can  not  be  assumed 
one  way  or  the  other,  but  must  be  carefully  studied. 
Our  first  impression  is  that  the  negative  position  is 
nearer  the  truth.  An  experience  which  is  infinitely 
variable  in  its  form,  which  will  not  submit  to  any 
definition  in  terms  of  contents,  would  not  seem  to  have 
any  object  or  fixed  content.  Where,  with  perception, 
we  look  for  the  object,  we  find  it  in  a  general  agree- 
ment both  between  experiences  of  our  own  which 
differ  in  time,  but  agree  more  or  less  in  content,  and 
between  the  experiences  of  different  people.  The 
physical  object  given  or  experienced  in  perception 

88 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION  89 

is  or  can  be  described  as  the  focus  of  agreement  of  a 
certain  group  of  experiences.  No  such  focus  ap- 
pears in  religion.  If  it  exists,  it  is  so  hidden  that  it 
has  as  yet  eluded  the  most  industrious  search.  The 
most  that  we  can  say  for  the  god  in  whom  we  believe 
is  that  we  are  convinced  that  he  is  the  one  revealed 
in  what  is  the  highest  type  of  religion.  We  do  not 
attempt  to  claim  that  the  great  mass  or  even  the 
majority  of  religious  people  feel  and  know  him  as 
the  same  being.  Instead,  we  assert  that  wisdom  rests 
with  a  minority,  that  the  individual  is  as  likely  to 
be  right  as  the  crowd.  Even  where  this  individual- 
ism is  losing  sway,  we  have,  instead  of  the  idea  that 
the  individual  experience  will  of  itself  approach  the 
norm,  the  idea  that  it  needs  direction  by  some  au- 
thority, educational  or  ecclesiastical.  As  no  focus 
appears  to  help  us  in  defining  the  perception  of  the 
source  of  the  experience,  so  none  is  seen  to  indicate 
its  direction.  If  the  source  were  not  similar  to  an 
object  but  to  a  center  of  energy,  then  the  focus 
would  be  in  terms  of  direction,  either  carried  back- 
ward into  the  past,  or  directed  forward  toward  some 
one  future  end.  Neither  seems  to  exist.  Religion 
tends  neither  toward  some  one  goal,  nor  does  it  seem 
due  to  one  existing  cause.  Hence  here  also,  no  indi- 
cation of  source  appears.  Yet  we  can  not  at  once 
seek  refuge  in  the  negative  conclusion  as  proven. 
Rather  we  must  seek  a  guide  and  look  more  care- 
fully. 

The  negative  conclusion  as  to  source  came  from  the 
attempt  to  apply  the  usual  tests  to  this  experience. 
With  an  unique  experience,  however,  we  should  be 
ready  to  expect  that  either  an  unique  source  will  be 


90        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

found,  or  that  the  exciting  cause  will  reveal  itself  in 
an  unique  way.  As  we  have  already  plainly  seen,  re- 
ligion is  not  like  perception  or  morality.  The 
methods,  which  with  those  experiences  give  valid  con- 
clusions as  to  the  source  or  object  or  cause,  would 
not  be  expected  to  yield  valid  conclusions  for  religion. 
To  give  valid  results,  there  must  be  shown  to  be  a 
nucleus  of  some  kind.  It  is  possible  that  what  we 
call  religion  is  not  the  product  of  one  source  or  ob- 
ject, but  of  several,  which  differ  among  themselves. 
In  such  a  case  the  justification  for  a  common  name 
would  be  that  the  differing  sources  made  known  their 
presence  in  somewhat  the  same  way.  All  perception 
is  not  the  perception  of  the  same  object,  but  because 
the  different  objects  come  into  consciousness  in  sim- 
ilar ways,  we  put  the  various  modes  of  perception 
under  one  head.  If  this  is  true  of  religion,  the  di- 
versity of  content  may  be  due  to  the  difference  in 
source.  The  fact  that  no  one  focus  appears  would 
therefore  be  no  argument  that  there  was  no  source 
or  existence  revealed  in  the  experience,  but  only  that 
different  objects  or  sources  were  revealed  at  different 
times.  Then  there  is  the  other  possibility,  that 
there  may  be  a  common  source  or  object,  (I  use  the 
two  words  in  order  not  to  assume  anything  as  to  the 
character  of  the  source),  a  common  cause  which  re- 
veals itself  in  different  ways.  The  diversity  is  then 
due  to  the  mode,  and  not  to  the  cause.  With  this 
uncertainty,  we  have  to  forsake  the  beaten  trails.  It 
is  to  the  failure  to  do  this  that  a  great  deal  of  the 
unprogressiveness  of  certain  periods  in  theology  is 
due.  The  god  who  is  revealed  in  religion,  since  uni- 
formity of  content  does  not  exist,  must  be  sought 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION  91 

by  an  unique  method.  As  we  do  not  know  even  to 
what  the  diversity  is  due,  whether  of  modes  or  ob- 
jects, we  must  look  elsewhere  than  to  foci  of  ex- 
perience to  guide  us  to  the  source  of  the  religious 
experience. 

There  is  one  other  possibility,  which  might  be  put 
under  the  head  of  the  one  source  manifesting  itself 
in  different  ways,  but  which  deserves  separate  treat- 
ment. The  one  source  may  be  perfectly  consistent 
in  its  actions,  and  the  appearance  of  differences  be 
due  to  our  reflection  on  the  experience.  The  pure 
experience  may  be  different  from  our  account  of  it. 
What  we  have  been  calling  the  contents  of  the  ex- 
perience, which  differ  so  from  one  another,  would 
then  not  really  belong  to  the  experience,  and  we 
should  have  to  seek  further  to  find  the  experience, 
and  even  further  to  discover  its  source.  With  this 
possibility,  in  addition  to  the  others,  we  must  go  to 
the  bottom  of  the  experience,  and  seek  any  indica- 
tion that  appears  to  point  to  a  focus.  If  we  can 
find  it,  it  will  lead  us  out,  so  that  we  will  not  need 
to  take  up  in  detail  the  three  possibilities  which  we 
have  been  outlining.  The  truth  is,  that  our  first 
preference  for  the  negative  or  agnostic  conclusion  as 
to  the  possibility  of  revelation  in  the  religious  ex- 
perience was  due  to  the  fact  that  our  analysis  has 
not  yet  gone  deep  enough.  We  have  yet  to  find  the 
first  indication  of  anything  in  common  in  the  various 
types  of  the  experience.  Nothing  that  we  have  as 
yet  found  justifies  even  the  ascription  of  these  vari- 
ous types  to  a  common  class.  It  is  in  the  possession 
of  a  common  source,  in  type  if  not  numerically,  that 
we  must  look  for  this. 


92         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

The  most  convenient  way  to  find  whatever  common 
element  there  is  in  the  varying  types  of  religion  is 
to  take  those  things  in  which  the  types  differ,  and 
try  to  find  if  even  in  these  differences  there  may  not 
be  something  which  is  constant.  The  first  respect 
in  which  the  religious  experiences  differ  among  them- 
selves is  that  of  content.  We  found  that  there  may 
be  felt  religious  states  which  seem  to  have  almost 
no  content,  and  also  those  of  very  sharply  con- 
trasted and,  if  taken  at  their  full  value,  irreconcil- 
able, character.  These  two  classes,  the  definite  and 
the  indefinite,  have  to  be  considered  apart.  We  take 
up,  first,  therefore,  the  case  where  there  seems  to  be 
no  definiteness  to  the  experience,  as  far  as  its  con- 
tent is  concerned. 

Since  the  experience  is  in  these  cases  indefinite, 
the  accounts  which  the  believers  give  are  even  more 
various  than  is  true  of  the  more  sharply  contrasted 
cases.  St.  Paul  many  times  uses  paradox  to  de- 
scribe his  experience,  and  once  tells  us  that  no  de- 
scription can  be  given.  (II  Cor.  12:  4.)  Yet  even 
here,  he  too,  or  the  one  he  is  describing,  is  spoken 
of  as  caught  up  into  the  third  heaven.  Even  though 
he  is  not  quite  sure  whether  this  is  outside  the  body, 
he  is  constrained  to  mention  it  as  outside  of  man's 
normal  mental  life.  In  some  way  or  other  it  is  ex- 
terior to  man,  and  objective  to  his  will  and  conscious- 
ness. The  experience  points  beyond  itself.  It  im- 
plicitly claims  to  reveal  things  which  are  not  to  be 
spoken  of,  things  which  do  not  enter  sufficiently  into 
the  ordinary  life  of  the  self-conscious  will  and  ordi- 
nary perception  to  be  rightfully  classed  under  the 
same  terms.  The  one  who  has  the  experience  is  by 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION  93 

it  led  beyond  what  he  would  call  his  usual  self. 
Another  realm  is  opened  to  him.  That  to  many 
to-day  this  is  easily  disposed  of  by  calling  it  the 
region  of  the  sub-conscious,  of  the  subliminal  self, 
is  no  valid  objection.  Whatever  is  subconscious  is 
not  in  any  conscious  experience,  and  if  religion  has 
its  roots  in  the  subconscious,  it  has  a  foundation 
outside  of  conscious  life,  which  means,  since  it  is  a 
conscious  state,  outside  of  itself.  In  the  "  Theologica 
Germanica  "  (ch.  viii.)  this  mystic  state  is  called  "  a 
glance  into  eternity."  The  mystics  seem  to  alter- 
nate between  the  description  of  it  as  an  insight  into 
the  eternal  and  as  the  coming  of  the  light  of  God,  or 
of  the  eternity  of  God,  into  the  life  of  man.  Always, 
with  the  insistence  on  passivity,  they  claim  this  state 
as  one  that  leads  beyond  the  individual.  Man  lets 
himself  be  lost  in  God.  The  passivity  of  the  Budd- 
hist when  he  attains  Nirvana  is  indignantly  distin- 
guished from  annihilation.  It  is  the  realm  of  pure 
being  to  which  he  has  penetrated.  It  does  not 
matter  that  he  or  the  Brahmin  believes  that  what 
he  then  sees  is  what  in  truth  he  always  should  have 
known,  for  it  is  his  true  self.  The  conscious  experi- 
ence is  not  the  thing  known.  Neither  Nirvana  nor 
Brahma  can  be  known  in  terms  of  conscious  thought. 
The  conscious  experience  is  constantly  striving  to 
overpass  itself.  The  source,  the  thing  revealed,  lies 
behind.  The  very  effort  to  escape  from  definiteness 
is  therefore  the  assertion  that  this  experience  is  a 
pathway  to  something  beyond  consciousness,  and 
therefore  beyond  itself. 

When  we  come  to  the  definite  forms  of  religious 
life,  where  the  believer  asserts  that  God  has  appeared 


94         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

in  certain  describable  forms,  or  with  certain  definite 
commands,  or  that  the  experience  is  one  of  a  very 
definite  emotion  centering  around  some  one  object, 
we  find  that  however  much  difference  in  the  objects 
there  may  be,  always  there  is  some  object.  There 
has  been  a  tendency  to  deny  to  some  tribes  low  in 
the  scale  of  evolution  the  possession  of  religion,  be- 
cause like  the  aborigines  of  Australia,  and  in  general 
of  many  totemistic  tribes,  they  seem  to  have  no  ob- 
ject which  they  worship.  This  is  due  to  our  mis- 
understanding, for  the  totem  itself  is  a  sufficient 
object  to  satisfy  our  definition.  Belief  in  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  totem  in  dreams,  the  conviction  that 
the  tabu  will  be  enforced  by  death,  which  frequently 
is  very  strong,  are  forms  of  religious  experience. 
These  forms  clearly  assert  that  what  is  present  is 
an  experience,  that  is,  that  there  is  some  reality  be- 
hind the  totem.  The  enforcement  of  the  tabu  by 
social  custom  and  tribal  law  may  from  our  point  of 
view  be  all  that  there  is,  but  even  this  is  going  beyond 
the  bare  experience.  In  the  experience  the  believer 
in  a  totem  feels  that  he  is  in  the  presence  of  some- 
thing larger  and,  though  perhaps  not  universally, 
usually,  stronger  than  himself.  The  experience 
leads  beyond  itself  to  something  which  he  can  not  and 
does  not  try  to  describe,  but  in  whose  existence  he 
believes  strongly.  Where  the  experience  takes  the 
form  of  definite  assertions  or  appearances,  it  claims 
plainly  to  go  beyond  itself.  If  the  man  believes  it 
a  dream  and  nothing  more,  he  does  not  give  it  re- 
ligious significance.  It  is  only  in  those  cases  where 
he  attributes  to  it  a  source  beyond  itself  that  he 
calls  it  religion.  St.  Augustine  or  St.  Paul  con- 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION  95 

sidered  the  voices  that  spoke  to  them  at  their  con- 
version to  be  the  voice  of  God,  while  we,  if  we  do 
not  consider  some  sound  to  be  from  God,  do  not  call 
it  religion.  The  distinguishing  element  is  the  claim 
to  a  source  beyond  itself.  With  the  type  of  definite 
as  of  indefinite  experience,  there  is  found  the  refer- 
ence to  a  source  beyond  and  outside  of  the  conscious 
experience. 

The  second  characteristic  which  varies  is  that 
which  we  have  called  direction.  There  are  many 
experiences,  especially  some  of  the  more  radically 
mystic,  where  direction  does  not  seem  to  exist,  while 
in  others  it  is  very  prominent,  but  often  directly 
opposed  to  the  direction  of  the  impulse  given  in  an- 
other religious  experience.  These  two  types,  the 
passive  and  the  active,  furnish  each  their  own  prob- 
lem. We  approach  first  that  of  the  passive  experi- 
ence. We  are  to  find,  if  possible,  something  in  com- 
mon with  that  of  the  active  type.  The  passivity  of 
the  religious  man  is  never,  so  far  as  I  know,  con- 
ceived as  absolute,  or  ideally  the  complete  absence 
of  any  movement  in  the  universe.  The  man  is  to 
be  passive  that  the  god  may  enter  in.  The  passivity 
is  for  a  purpose.  It  is  not  simply  the  unwillingness 
to  act.  Instead  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  most 
difficult  thing  of  all.  To  attain  it  he  who  is  to  be 
Buddha  must  be  prepared  by  countless  ages  of  trial 
and  effort.  A  passivity  which  can  be  reached  only 
after  excessive  effort  and  strife  is  not  sluggishness. 
It  is  not  the  simple  refusal  of  the  normal  exercise 
of  the  will.  Instead  it  is  a  striving  after  something 
which  is  not  within  the  reach  of  any  but  the  ex- 
ceptional man.  It  is  something  which  lies  beyond 


96         THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

the  round  of  material  life  in  which  we  are  bound. 
The  experience  of  him  who  seeks  the  passive  state 
is  that  of  one  who  must  strive  as  the  mountain 
climber  strives.  Peace  and  rest  may  come  when  the 
top  is  reached,  but  the  top  does  not  now  lie  within 
reach.  Even  when  it  is  attained,  and  becomes  the 
"  present  state,"  as  would  be  true  of  a  Buddha  when 
he  has  attained  enlightenment,  even  when  it  is 
recognised  as  the  truth  of  life,  and  all  else  as  illusion, 
even  then  it  is  sharply  distinguished  from  that  illu- 
sion. The  experience  is  one  that  must  forever  re- 
main outside  of  ordinary  life.  It  reaches  beyond 
the  bounds  of  normal  consciousness.  This  is  true 
also  of  the  Christian  forms  of  quietism.  Here  it  is 
plain  that  the  state  is  conceived  as  the  indwelling  of 
God.  St.  Paul,  when  he  says  that  he  no  longer  lives, 
adds  almost  as  a  reason  for  his  first  statement,  that 
it  is  Christ  that  lives  in  him,  (Gal.  2:20.)  The 
apparent  lack  of  direction  of  the  experience  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  human  will  no  longer  attempts  to 
direct,  but  lets  the  direction  be  determined  by  the  will 
of  God.  The  experience  looks  beyond  itself,  or 
rather  beyond  the  normal  will,  to  a  power  which  is 
not  itself. 

With  the  more  active  experiences,  where  the  im- 
pulse seems  to  be  the  essence  of  the  religious  state, 
we  meet  a  case  which  is  not  so  clear.  At  first  sight, 
and  in  the  minds  of  many  to-day,  the  moral  impulse 
which  is  the  truest  type  of  religion  has  its  roots  en- 
tirely within  man.  In  their  minds  it  has  no  refer- 
ence to  a  God  or  power  above  man,  who  implants 
the  impulse  in  the  heart  of  man.  That  part  of  this 
objection  which  has  to  do  with  the  relation  of  the 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION  97 

source  of  the  experience  to  man,  whether  within  or 
without  humanity,  we  have  to  consider  on  its  own 
merits  later.  Here  we  are  only  concerned  with  find- 
ing whether  the  experience  has  its  source  in  some- 
thing, whether  man  or  not,  which  is  beyond  its  own 
narrow  conscious  limits.  The  great  modern  move- 
ments such  as  the  missionary  awakening  church 
unity,  and  those  impulses  directly  related  to  or- 
ganised Christianity  we  find  referred  to  the  voice  of 
God.  This  might  be  thought  to  be  the  result  not 
of  the  experience,  but  of  the  prejudice  of  orthodox 
belief.  But  we  find  the  same  to  hold  with  the  great 
social  movements.  The  prophets  of  social  justice 
and  social  reform  appeal,  not  to  the  authority 
simply  of  their  own  ideas,  but  to  the  ideas  of  natural 
right,  or  of  man's  right  to  the  satisfaction  of  cer- 
tain needs.  Limiting  strictly  to  the  life  of  man  the 
source  of  the  impulse  which  they  seek  to  spread,  or 
to  the  material  universe  as  it  has  been  evolved  in 
man,  they  by  this  very  claim  go  beyond  the  conscious 
experience.  Until  they  do  ground  the  impulse  in 
some  general  principle,  we  regard  it  not  as  religion, 
but  as  a  personal  vagary.  If  the  prophet  regards 
it  as  religion,  it  is  because  he  is  convinced  that  it  is 
grounded  on,  and  that  it  comes  to  him  out  of,  the 
secret  depths  of  life.  Whether  those  depths  be  his 
or  another's  matters  as  little  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Hindu  mystic.  The  source,  if  found  in  the  basic 
impulses  of  life,  is  other  than  the  experience  itself. 
Consciousness  does  not  reveal  to  us  all  the  secrets  of 
life,  else  those  secrets  would  belong  to  all  who  are 
conscious.  As  we  are  not  claiming  that  religion  is 
unique  in  its  reference  to  something  beyond  itself, 


98        THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

but  only  that  so  far  we  have  found  it  in  all  its  types 
to  possess  this  character,  we  do  not  need  to  argue 
that  other  experiences  also  do  not  lead  the  way  to  the 
secrets  of  existence.  If  religion  claimed  to  have  its 
origin  just  within  itself,  that  would  not  be  what  we 
usually  call  an  experience,  but  rather  an  instance  of 
creative  activity ;  it  would  not  assert  a  claim  to  con- 
nection with  the  physical  forces  which  have  produced 
man.  The  impulse  would  then  have  an  origin  with- 
in that  inner  experience  which  makes  religion  so 
purely  individual.  This  not  even  the  preachers  of 
the  Inner  Light  claim.  They  assert  in  the  strongest 
terms  the  right  of  private  judgment,  but  they  hold 
that  that  judgment  is  valid  for  all  men.  The  Light 
comes  from  something  which  is  common  to  all  men. 
Since  the  experience  is  itself  not  common,  for  the 
impulses  vary  and  even  oppose  one  another,  the 
common  ground  lies  outside.  In  this  type,  too,  the 
experience  points  outside  of  itself  for  its  source. 

It  might  seem  that  the  uncertainty  in  the  dating 
of  an  experience  could  have  little  relation  to  the 
question  of  its  source.  The  uncertainty  comes, 
however,  from  an  element  which  reveals  the  character 
of  the  experience,  and  hence  it  is  of  importance. 
With  many  who  have  little  of  what  in  a  general 
sense  we  might  call  the  "  mystical,"  it  is  a  ques- 
tion whether  religion  can  be  called  an  event.  It  re- 
veals itself  in  such  cases  as  pervading  the  whole  of 
life,  from  the  baptism  as  an  infant,  through  the 
gradual  development  of  youth,  to  a  calm  and  rather 
uneventful  course  in  mature  life,  ending  in  the  quiet 
of  old  age.  There  is,  in  such  lives,  nothing  to  mark 
the  coming  or  going  of  the  religious  consciousness. 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION  99 

At  times  it  may  be  more  vivid  than  at  others,  but  al- 
ways it  seems  to  be  present.  Any  indications  of 
source  are  bound  to  be  very  slight,  for  the  conscious- 
ness, in  any  form,  of  religion  is  here  not  very  sharp. 
Religion  takes  its  place  with  the  other  usual  things  of 
life,  and  is  as  little  to  the  front  as  they.  Yet  so  far 
as  there  is  consciousness,  the  experience  goes  beyond 
itself.  The  will  gives  no  indication  of  having  cre- 
ated the  religious  life.  That  life  comes  as  does 
physical  life.  Like  physical  life,  religion  in  such 
cases  arose  before  the  will  became  conscious.  Its 
source  therefore  is  to  be  sought  before  the  rise  of 
consciousness.  The  origin  of  the  experience  in  this 
case  therefore  lies  somewhere  outside  of  the  con- 
scious experience.  This  is  not  true  of  the  will  itself, 
nor  of  self-consciousness ;  man,  when  he  finds  no  indi- 
cation of  any  outside  source,  calls  that  state  his 
desire.  It  may  be  the  result  of  the  influence  of  others 
upon  him,  but  so  long  as  he  is  unaware  of  this,  he 
looks  upon  it  as  his  own  creation,  and  the  expres- 
sion of  his  own  will.  This  is  not  true  of  the  religion 
which  he  has  carried  with  him  from  his  infancy. 
The  creation  of  habit  ground  in  by  his  parents  he 
may  call  it,  or  the  result  of  early  teaching,  but  not 
the  result  of  his  own  desire.  Even  when  religion  is 
merely  a  pervasive  uneventful  element  in  man's  life, 
it  thus  keeps  the  character  which  we  have  found 
elsewhere,  of  indicating  that  it  has  a  source  beyond 
itself. 

In  much  of  the  religious  experience  there  is  not 
the  pervasive  character  which  makes  it  so  difficult  to 
give  it  a  place  in  the  stream  of  time,  but,  instead, 
a  definite  indefiniteness.  The  experience  is  an  event, 


100      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

and  when  it  is  in  consciousness  can  be  given  an  exact 
temporal  place,  but  its  coming,  or  sometimes  its 
going,  can  not  thus  be  dated.  The  man  is  converted, 
he  recognises  that  a  change  has  taken  place,  but 
just  when,  it  is  impossible  accurately  to  say.  As 
this  is  usually  true  also  of  the  will,  we  can  no  longer 
use  this  uncertainty  to  distinguish  religion  from  the 
creative  experiences.  Seldom  does  it  come  to  any 
man  to  know  definitely  just  when  he  made  up  his 
mind  to  do  any  given  thing.  If  therefore  this  un- 
certainty in  religion  showrs  any  trace  of  a  source 
outside  of  the  individual  will,  it  must  be  found  in 
some  other  aspect  than  the  bare  fact  of  our  inability 
to  date  it.  A  good  illustration  of  this  type  is  to  be 
found  in  the  case  of  the  confirmation  and  first  com- 
munion of  children  in  those  denominations  where  a 
definite  conversion  is  not  emphasised.  The  change 
comes,  and  is  associated  with  the  ceremony,  but  in 
itself  there  is  nothing  to  date,  and  for  a  child 
brought  up  in  the  Sunday  School  and  Church,  there 
is  apt  to  be  no  change,  but  only  a  heightened  emo- 
tional state.  The  change,  when  it  is  perceived,  which 
may  not  be  until  long  afterward,  has  in  itself  no  inti- 
mation of  time.  In  fact  the  ceremony  may  not  mean 
a  great  deal  until  long  after  it  took  place.  This 
is  also  and  especially  true  of  infant  baptism,  even 
where  the  child  is  old  enough  to  notice  and  dimly 
remember.  Yet  in  these  cases  the  ceremony  does 
have  its  effect,  and  the  life  of  the  child  is  changed. 
The  uncertainty  is  therefore  of  a  different  kind 
from  that  of  the  creative  will.  There  are  other 
cases,  where  men  in  mature  life,  through  outward  in- 
fluences or  study,  come  gradually  to  find  themselves 


THE  SOURCE  OF  REI^JXjIGN 

changed  in  belief.  Here  again  the  cause  is  plainly 
exterior,  and  the  uncertainty  due  only  to  the  gradual 
nature  of  the  change.  The  impossibility  in  certain 
cases  of  dating  the  coming  into  the  life  of  the  believer 
of  religion  does  not  by  any  means,  therefore,  prove 
that  it  has  come  in  from  outside. 

The  variation  in  the  religious  experience  does  not 
prevent  every  case  considered  from  indicating  a 
claim  to  have  something  outside  of  itself  as  its 
source.  These  claims  would  all  be  invalidated,  how- 
ever, if  the  objection  would  hold  that  because  re- 
ligion is  in  part  subject  to  man,  we  can  not  postu- 
late a  source  outside  of  the  individual.  This  ob- 
jection we  may  consider  in  each  of  the  three  cases 
of  control  which  we  found,  the  possibility  of  man's 
rejecting  religion,  the  possibility  of  his  modifying 
it,  and  even  of  searching  for  it. 

In  the  assertion  of  the  power  on  man  to  reject 
the  religious  experience  we  acknowledge  that  it  is 
outside  of  man.  If  it  were  his  own  will,  and  entirely 
rejected,  it  could  never  come  into  being.  What  a 
man  rejects,  or  refuses  to  do,  comes  to  him  from  out- 
side. His  dreams  or  ideals  which  he  creates  he  may 
not  be  able  to  objectify,  but  at  least  he  creates  them 
as  dreams  or  ideals.  He  does  not  entirely  refuse 
them  a  place  in  his  life.  If  he  refuses  anything  such 
a  place,  it  can  not  have  existence  unless  something 
else  gives  reality  to  it.  If  it  has  no  existence  what- 
ever, it  can  not  be  a  conscious,  even  though  a  nega- 
tive, will.  What  the  man  rejects  is  something  which 
is  presented  to  him  from  some  source  outside  of  this 
conscious  will.  When  we  speak  of  his  ability  to  re- 
fuse to  concern  himself  with  religion,  we  mean  to 


102     .THE;RELIOIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

assert  that  religion  has  been  presented  to  him  in  some 
form,  and  that  he  has  willed  not  to  allow  it  entrance 
into  his  consciousness.  The  existence  which  is  neces- 
sary to  have  it  brought  to  his  notice  must  exist  else- 
where. To  be  rejected,  that  is,  it  must  already  have 
objective  reality.  Since  it  is  an  object  of  will,  and 
not  so  by  any  willingness  on  the  man's  part,  that 
objectivity  indicates  an  exterior  source. 

The  same  holds  true  of  the  power  to  modify  it. 
This  assumes  that  it  comes  to  him  in  one  form,  and 
that  he  changes  it.  The  origin  is  outside.  Into  the 
question  as  to  how  far  in  most  cases  it  is  changed 
we  do  not  need  to  go.  What  concerns  us  is  not  the 
contents,  but  the  source.  What  should  be  noted  is 
that  when  the  experience  comes  it  has  form.  It  is 
something  that  is  to  be  changed,  not  something  to 
which  form  has  to  be  given.  What  we  are  here  con- 
sidering, that  is,  is  a  case  of  full  existence  coming 
into  a  new  environment,  and  there  meeting  and  being 
acted  upon  by  new  forces.  It  is  not  a  case  of  the 
reaction  of  man  upon  something  which  is  merely  the 
exciting  cause,  not  the  real  source,  of  the  resulting 
experience.  A  man  in  a  certain  sense  creates  his 
day  dreams.  Even  though  roused  in  him  by  some 
passing  event,  we  can  not  rightly  say  that  he  changed 
their  form,  for  except  in  his  mind  they  had  no  form. 
The  cases  which  we  found  it  best  to  describe  as  in- 
stances of  modification  of  the  religious  experience 
therefore  point  us  to  the  existence  of  a  form  or  of 
the  experience  in  some  form,  outside  of  its  appear- 
ance in  the  individual  consciousness. 

With  the  remaining  instances  of  control,  the  prob- 
lem is  not  so  easily  solved.  When  a  man  seeks  for 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION          103 

something  it  may  prove  to  be  only  the  creation  of 
his  own  will.  He  may  be  unable  to  find  it,  or  he  may 
be  able  to  give  to  his  inner  ideal  objectivity.  In 
either  case  no  exterior  source  is  implied.  Again  we 
have  to  remember  the  specific  instances  which  gave 
us  this  classification.  When  a  man,  seeing  religion 
in  others,  or  hearing  that  it  exists  in  others,  seeks 
it,  or  searches  for  a  new  expression  of  it,  he  does  so 
by  putting  himself  under  religious  influences,  he  at- 
tends services,  or  converses  with  religious  people.  If 
the  experience  had  its  source  in  himself,  he  would 
not  need  to  search  for  it,  for  by  "  himself  "  we  mean 
the  conscious  will,  which  would  be  plain  without 
search.  If  a  man  searches  for  his  ideal,  he  is  looking 
for  something  which  meets  his  requirements  but  which 
he  can  not  himself  create.  Objective  existence  must 
be  given  to  it  from  some  other  source  than  his  will. 
This  is  true  of  those  experiences  which  in  themselves 
are  entirely  within  the  mind.  The  artist  searches 
for  the  realisation  of  his  ideal  of  beauty.  When 
found  it  is  entirely  within  his  mind,  so  much  so  that 
often  no  others  see  the  beauty  in  it  as  he  does,  yet 
he  does  not  consider  that  he  created,  but  only  that 
he  discovered  it.  The  ultimate  cause  or  ground  of 
the  scene  is  in  the  world  outside.  Man  may  like- 
wise seek  religion,  but  by  seeking  he  acknowledges 
that  by  his  own  unassisted  will  he  is  not  able  to 
bring  into  existence  the  experience  which  he  desires. 
When  it  comes,  it  comes  partly  at  least  from  forces 
which  he  was  not  at  first  able  to  control.  The  ex- 
perience, even  when  sought,  finds  its  root  in  some- 
thing which  has  a  place  in  reality  before  the  ex- 
perience comes  into  being.  This,  at  least,  is  the 


104      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

claim  and  implication  of  the  experience.  From  the 
typical  cases  of  control  by  man,  as  well  as  the  in- 
stances of  extreme  variation,  we  find  the  same  re- 
sult, the  religious  experiences  imply  a  source  exterior 
to  themselves. 

In  the  midst  of  the  disagreement  in  many  details 
between  the  various  instances  of  religion,  we  find  one 
constant  factor.  Man  finds  certain  experiences  or 
states  of  consciousness  which  differ  in  most  respects, 
but,  together  with  other  likenesses  with  which  we  are 
not  concerned,  all  claim  to  have  a  source  outside  of 
themselves.  The  source  of  this  conscious  state  is 
not  present  in  the  state.  This  is  true  of  other  con- 
scious states,  such  as  sense  perception,  but  with  them 
it  is  accompanied  by  a  greater  uniformity  in  con- 
tents. The  variation  is  less.  Yet,  while  the  cases 
are  different,  one  may  illustrate  the  other.  In  per- 
ception the  object,  however  it  may  be  defined,  is  the 
something  which  logically  or  physically  explains  the 
perception.  That  object  is  not  given  in  the  per- 
ception. The  perception  is  itself  object  of  con- 
sciousness, but  in  so  far  as  it  refers  to  something 
which  is  not  in  consciousness,  a  permanent  material 
object,  it  does  not  rest  content  in  itself.  It  leads 
beyond  to  something  else,  which  may  be  defined  as  the 
focus  of  social  agreement  about  certain  sensations 
varying  within  certain  narrow  limits.  This  social 
agreement,  or  logical  or  physical  permanency,  is 
implied  in  the  consciousness  of  the  object  which  is 
in  consciousness,  but  meanwhile  the  sensation  of  blue 
or  the  feeling  of  roughness  is  not  that  rough  blue 
material  object.  So  in  religion,  all  these  states 
which  we  call  cases  of  the  religious  experience  lead 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION          105 

out  of  themselves.  There  is  something,  they  claim, 
which  is  not  given  in  full  consciousness  which  is  nec- 
essary if  we  are  to  understand  these  experiences. 
Nowhere,  in  what  we  call  religion,  do  we  find  this 
cause  present  in  the  consciousness  itself.  It  is  true 
that  it  is  said  that  the  God  appears  to  the  believer 
at  times,  but  the  very  word  "  appears  "  refers  that 
bit  of  consciousness  to  a  source  outside.  The  re- 
ligious experience  always  has  this  reference.  We 
never  find  it  complete  and  self-satisfied. 

It  is  the  importance  of  this  negative  element  that 
we  next  need  to  note.  In  religion  men  realise  that 
they  are  not  conscious  of  the  fullness  of  life.  It  is 
the  experience  which  brings  them  to  this  knowledge. 
Just  in  proportion  as  men  become  acutely  conscious 
of  the  full  meaning  of  their  religion,  they  become 
restless  and  seek  that  meaning  elsewhere,  or  seek  to 
increase  the  consciousness.  Even  if  they  come  to 
believe,  as  did  Gautama,  that  they  have  discovered 
the  source,  and  have  it  in  consciousness,  they  define 
that  source  in  terms  which  are  inapplicable  to  the 
conscious  state,  as  did  the  Buddha.  Wherever  the 
terms  which  imply  the  presence  of  a  god  or  spirit  are 
used,  and  this  includes  the  far  greater  mass  of  all 
devotional  literature,  the  experience  acknowledges  its 
lack,  the  lack  which  exists  even  in  mysticism,  whether 
eastern  or  western.  It  may  be  said  to  be  stronger 
for  the  mystics  than  for  those  to  whom  the  god  must 
come  in  bodily  form  in  order  to  be  seen.  Always  in 
mystic  contemplation  we  are  told  that  it  is  neces- 
sary to  rise  beyond  the  realm  of  conscious  life ;  we 
must  empty  our  minds  of  all  images,  so  that  the  true 
light  may  shine  undimmed.  Unless  we  equate  re- 


106      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

ligious  experience  with  the  final  state  of  illumination 
or  union  with  true  being,  the  mystic  experience  is 
one  of  constant  striving  to  destroy  itself,  to  do  away 
with  the  consciousness  which  it  has.  The  final  state, 
which  for  the  mystic  is  true  religion,  consists  in  the 
absorption  of  his  narrow  consciousness  in  something 
wider,  hence  the  individual  is  acknowledged  as  not 
the  source.  In  all  other  cases,  where  individual  con- 
sciousness still  holds  sway,  the  experience  realises 
that  the  source  is  not  in  the  individual.  Even  the 
man  whose  religion  is  a  habit,  and  who  goes  to  church 
because  he  has  been  accustomed  to  go,  is  one  of  the 
first  to  assert  that  it  is  not  of  his  own  initiative 
that  he  goes  this  particular  Sunday.  Some  power, 
whether  habit  or  Christian  society,  constrains  him, 
and  he  recognises  this  in  the  consciousness,  when 
consciousness  comes  at  all,  that  really  to-day  he  does 
not  want  to  go.  Not  only,  therefore,  is  the  re- 
ligious consciousness  incomplete  in  itself,  and  always 
implying  something  beyond,  it  is  also  conscious  of 
this  lack  and  of  the  implication. 

This  claim  and  this  realisation  by  the  religious 
consciousness  that  it  does  not  include  its  source 
within  itself  bring  us  to  the  conclusion,  which  is  the 
same  thing  put  in  another  way,  that  the  source  of 
religion  is  not  given  in  the  consciousness  of  religion. 
Whatever  is  in  consciousness  is  consciously  known. 
If  it  is  there  it  is  in  consciousness,  and  in  the  fore- 
front of  attention.  If  the  attention  is  not  laid  upon 
it,  it  is  not  in  consciousness,  and  whatever  it  might 
be  does  not  count.  When  a  change  has  come  we 
have  not  the  same  conscious  state.  If  we  adopt  the 
criticism  of  the  followers  of  Bergson,  and  identify 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION          107 

the  state  with  the  changing  stream  of  consciousness, 
and  give  it  another  name,  the  matter  becomes  easier 
for  us,  for  then  it  is  of  the  essence  of  the  changing 
stream  not  to  be  content  to  remain  the  same,  but  it 
must  be  forever  changing.  Its  source,  therefore, 
since  it  is  past,  and  its  goal,  since  it  is  to  come,  are 
not  the  same  as  that  which  is  now  in  consciousness. 
This  might  be  a  very  fair  statement  of  what  we  have 
been  trying  to  state  in  the  terms  of  the  older  philoso- 
phy. With  any  such  dynamic  experience,  the  con- 
tinuity lies  not  in  the  differing  appearance  of  the  sur- 
face, but  in  something  which  lies  beneath.  The 
source  or  cause  may  be  in  the  subconsciousness  or 
fringe  of  consciousness,  but  if  there,  it  is  not  in 
consciousness.  In  this  sense  the  religious  experience 
is  essentially  dynamic.  It  makes  its  source  its  goal, 
for  it  is  always  realising  its  lack,  and  trying  to  make 
itself  complete.  Acknowledging  that  its  source  is 
outside  of  itself,  it  seeks  to  know  it.  This  seeking 
proves  that  the  source  is  not  now  in  the  focus  of 
attention. 

If  the  source  is  not  given  in  the  consciousness  of 
the  religious  experience,  it  is  distinct  from  that  ex- 
perience. We  have  to  remember  that  we  are  not  dis- 
cussing the  absolute  consciousness,  nor  even  the  cos- 
mic consciousness,  but  are  concerned  with  religion  as 
it  comes  to  us  in  the  experience  of  the  individual. 
If  we  do  not  find  some  source  in  that  individual  ex- 
perience, but  instead,  when  we  come  on  any  trace  of 
it,  find  the  consciousness  which  we  are  studying  al- 
ways referring  us  elsewhere,  we  have  to  conclude  that 
the  source  is  not  in  consciousness.  It  could  be  said 
that  although  not  consciously  there,  yet  the  source 


108       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

was  really  plainly  known,  only  not  known  as  the 
source.  The  first  result  of  such  an  argument  is  the 
assumption  that  there  must  be  several  different 
sources,  if  there  is  no  one  thing  which  is  common  to 
all  the  cases  of  consciousness  of  religion.  This 
might  be  true,  and  our  grouping  of  all  these  cases 
under  one  head  be  a  mistake.  Yet  when  we  turn  to 
the  concrete  experiences  we  find  nothing  which  can 
be  the  source.  Even  a  dream  has  a  source  outside 
of  itself,  and  religion  must  so  far  be  given  the  same 
character.  The  mystic  experience  is  again  the  test, 
for  here  the  contents  are  at  their  minimum.  In  such 
an  experience,  as  we  have  it  from  many  sources,  there 
is  nothing  which  can  be  seized  on  for  any  purpose. 
As  one  mystic  says  (St.  John  of  the  Cross,  "The 
Dark  Night  of  the  Soul,"  bk.  ii,  ch.  xvii,  quoted  in 
James'  "Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,"  p. 
4*07),  "  the  sold  finds  no  terms,  no  means,  whereby 
to  render  the  sublimity  of  the  wisdom  and  delicacy 
of  the  spiritual  feeling  with  which  she  is  filled.  .  .  . 
We  receive  this  mystical  knowledge  of  God  clothed 
in  none  of  the  kinds  of  images,  in  none  of  the  sensible 
representations  which  our  mind  makes  use  of  in  other 
circumstances."  The  non-mystical  forms  of  reli- 
gion, if  we  can  rightly  call  any  such,  plainly  give  us 
nothing.  Where  religion  is  mainly  conceived  as  so- 
cial service,  the  feeling  is  of  a  common  humanity,  and 
this  common  humanity  can  not  be  in  consciousness. 
We  can  recognise  it,  but  one  individual  by  himself 
cannot  create  it.  Where  religion  is  habit,  as  was 
said  before,  the  consciousness  gives  nothing  which 
will  explain  the  state  without  recourse  to  something 
other  than  itself.  When  the  mystic  state,  the  most 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION          109 

individualistic  form  of  religion,  finds  no  place  in  it- 
self for  its  own  source,  we  shall  look  in  vain  to  the 
less  individualistic  forms  for  such  an  individual 
source.  The  individual  experience  gives  no  place  in 
its  consciousness  for  the  source  of  religion. 

We  pass  now  from  what  the  experience  claims 
in  itself  to  the  result  of  these  claims.  Or  rather 
we  have  just  passed  this  point.  However  much 
the  religious  mind  may  or  may  not  seek  the  source 
of  its  own  experience, —  and  when  the  conscious- 
ness of  religion  is  dim,  the  source  is  little  sought, 
—  the  work  to  which  we  have  set  ourselves  is  to 
find  that  source  if  possible.  The  claim  of  religion 
that  it  takes  its  rise  in  the  individual  from  some- 
thing beyond  or  beneath  individuality  therefore  lays 
upon  us  the  duty  of  examining  the  truth  of  that 
claim.  When  to  the  experience  itself,  and  to  the 
outsider  as  he  enters  so  far  as  he  may  into  the  ex- 
perience, there  can  be  discovered  in  that  conscious- 
ness no  cause  for  its  existence,  one  can  but  conclude 
that  the  experience  is  not  self-existent.  It  is,  as  has 
been  said,  a  dynamic  experience.  It  is  incomplete, 
in  spite  of  its  own  efforts  to  reach  completion.  Since 
we  can  not  force  it  to  self-completeness  which  it  does 
not  possess,  we  must  take  its  incompleteness  for  one 
of  our  foundation  facts.  As  we  have  here  gone  over 
from  the  field  of  description  to  that  of  implication, 
we  can  only  say  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  kind  of 
consciousness  which  sets  us  a  problem,  and  gives  us 
no  hint  of  a  solution  within  its  own  borders.  It 
does,  however,  set  us  very  distinctly  the  problem. 
In  itself  it  warrants  no  explanation  of  its  existence. 
Taken  just  by  itself,  we  can  give  it  no  meaning. 


110       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

Even  the  mystic,  who  declares  that  no  meaning  can 
ever  be  given  to  it  in  terms  that  we  will  understand, 
at  the  same  time  give  it  a  meaning  by  relating  it  to  a 
larger  sphere.  In  and  by  itself,  even  for  him,  it  is 
meaningless. 

The  result  of  this  is  that  we  must  conclude  that  the 
source  of  religion  is  not  to  be  found  within  the  indi- 
vidual. The  experience  of  religion  is  that  it  points 
beyond  itself.  Without  this  implication  of  the  relation 
of  which  it  is  the  mark,  the  experience  has  no  signifi- 
cance. But  more  than  this,  unless  these  implications 
are  correct  in  some  way,  the  very  existence  of  these 
forms  of  consciousness  is  left  unexplained  and  unex- 
plainable.  If  we  are  to  find  an  adequate  cause  or 
reason  for  religion,  it  must  be  sought  outside  of  the 
individual  experience.  Not  only  can  we  say  that  we 
must  look  outside,  we  can  be  sure  that  only  outside 
of  the  circle  of  human  individual  consciousness  will 
that  cause  or  source  be  found.  In  this  field  we  can 
no  more  assume  agnosticism,  and  say  that  perhaps 
there  is  no  explanation,  and  then  rest  content,  than 
can  the  student  of  natural  science.  A  source  and  an 
explanation  we  must  assume,  or  else  prove  limits  to 
our  reason.  Since  these  limits  can  not  be  proven, 
neither  for  religion  nor  for  science,  our  conclusion 
remains  that,  since  the  source  of  religion  can  not  be 
found  within  the  individual  consciousness,  it  will  be 
found  outside.  The  whole  superstructure  of  "  re- 
vealed theology,"  for  this  is  what  "  revealed  reli- 
gion "  really  means  to  those  who  use  the  term,  as- 
sumes the  very  thing  we  are  arguing,  that  the  source 
lies  outside  man.  It  can  not  therefore  rightly  in- 
terpose the  agnostic  position  that  maybe  we  can  not 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION          111 

find  any  source.  As  it  assumes  a  source,  and  we  do 
not  find  it  in  one  place,  on  the  basis  of  its  own  posi- 
tion we  are  bound  to  assume  it  in  another.  By  rea- 
son, therefore,  we  reach  the  conclusion  of  "  revealed 
religion,"  that  the  source  of  the  religious  experience 
is  to  be  found  somewhere  else  than  in  the  individual's 
consciousness  of  religion. 

The  result  of  this,  the  fact  that  the  religious  expe- 
rience does  not  reveal  a  source  within  itself,  brings 
into  the  effort  to  explain  religion  an  unknown  factor. 
If  the  source  were  plainly  revealed,  either  within  the 
experience  or  unmistakably  placed  in  the  exterior 
world,  our  work  of  description  and  explanation  would 
be  easy.  As  it  is,  there  is  this  imperfectly  known 
something,  whose  existence  seems  necessary  to  ex- 
plain the  experience,  yet  is  itself  not  given  or  indi- 
cated by  any  focusing  of  the  contents  of  the  various 
types  of  religion.  If  there  had  been  such  focusing, 
a  drawing  or  tending  in  one  direction  of  the  religious 
experience  of  mankind  sufficient  to  indicate  where  the 
source  lay,  we  should  not  have  the  varieties  that  we 
have.  Even  within  one  religion,  such  as  Christian- 
ity, there  is  more  diversity  than  uniformity  in  the 
idea  of  God,  so  far  as  that  idea  depends  on  experi- 
ence. Yet  we  have  seen  that  something  does  enter 
into  consciousness  which  can  not  be  explained  by  that 
consciousness  nor  by  our  conscious  life.  There  is 
this  unknown  factor  to  be  dealt  with.  It  is  rightly 
described  as  a  factor,  for  in  no  other  way  have  we  as 
yet  been  able  to  describe  it.  Not  objectively  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  religious  man  under  any  one 
identifiable  form,  yet  constantly  asserted  to  be  there 
by  varying  types  of  religion,  and  in  varying  forms, 


112      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

we  may  rest  content  for  the  present  with  calling  it 
the  "  as  yet  unknown  factor." 

With  not  having  in  our  possession  even  one  char- 
acter important  in  the  description  of  this  "  factor," 
it  is  evident  that  we  learn  of  its  presence  mainly 
through  the  effect  it  produces.  The  god  of  the  sav- 
age and  of  the  Christian  seem  to  differ  so  much  that 
we  can  not  say  that  either  is  true  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  other.  (Can  not,  I  mean,  on  the  basis  of  this 
study.)  Yet  there  is  the  similarity  which  we  have 
considered,  of  possessing  in  common  the  claim  that 
the  consciousness  is  the  result  of  something  beyond 
itself,  and  have  found  this  claim  to  be  true  so  far  as 
the  fact  of  the  presence  of  an  unknown  factor  goes. 
There  is  something  at  work  here  which  we  do  not 
understand,  but  we  do  see  that  it,  or  something,  is 
at  work.  To  this  extent,  the  consciousness  of  re- 
ligion is  dynamic;  it  reaches  beyond  and  is  not  sat- 
isfied in  itself,  and  gives  no  ground  for  believing  that 
that  search  comes  from  within  itself.  This  is  not  the 
same  as  saying  that  religion  is  caused  by  a  power 
not  ourselves  working  in  us.  The  source  may  not  be 
a  power,  but  only  the  occasion.  Just  as  the  flower 
does  not  cause  us  to  see,  but  gives  the  opportunity 
for  the  sunlight  to  strike  it,  and  when  an  eye  is  pres- 
ent leads  to  the  mental  vision  which  we  call  the 
flower,  so  the  source,  as  we  have  been  calling  it,  of 
religion  may  not  be  the  cause  but  the  occasion ;  still 
it  is  the  effect  of  the  presence  of  this  something  which 
forces  us  to  acknowledge  an  unknown  factor.  Not 
any  definite  thing,  but  the  very  indefiniteness  of  the 
experience  of  religion  has  brought  us  to  this  positing 
of  a  cause  or  source.  In  some  way  or  other  there 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION 

has  entered  into  consciousness  the  result  of  the  pres- 
ence of  this  something.  We  want  to  bear  in  mind 
that  it  is  this,  and  not  any  definite  revelation  of  the 
character  of  the  unknown,  which  has  resulted  from 
our  study.  We  are  dealing  so  far  with  something 
known  only  by  the  fact  that  it  affects  consciousness. 
In  the  analysis  we  have  so  far  made  we  have  not 
only  found  differing  descriptions  of  the  religious  ex- 
perience, we  have  also  not  obtained  any  clew  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  source  of  it.  That  no  conclusion 
is  readily  given  is  evident  by  the  varying  explana-* 
tions  which  we  meet  with  in  these  days.  More  than 
this,  we  can  say  that  any  indication  that  may  be 
given  will  not  be  through  definite  description.  Un- 
less we  deny  the  name  of  religion  to  great  masses  of 
what  we  would  usually  call  religious  phenomena, — 
and  that  is  not  a  justifiable  beginning, —  we  find  a 
divergence  so  great,  as,  for  instance,  between  the  ex- 
ponents of  social  or  ethical  and  those  of  mystical 
religion,  that  the  very  nature  of  the  source  of  religion 
remains  indescribable  in  any  terms  common  to  the 
differing  types.  Where  definite  contradiction  exists, 
we  are  not  at  liberty  to  accept  either  statement  as 
the  guide  to  truth.  Yet  of  one  thing  we  may  be  sure. 
The  cause  or  occasion  will  be  adequate.  It  is  this 
assurance  which  is  the  basis  for  our  present  conclu- 
sion. Not  because  we  know  what  the  source  is,  but 
because  we  know  the  experience,  are  we  sure  that  the 
source  lies  outside.  Within  the  experience  we  have 
found  nothing  adequate  to  explain  it.  Part,  at  least, 
we  conclude,  of  the  factors  entering  into  the  coming 
into  existence  of  this  consciousness  lies  beyond.  The 
total  factors  must  be  adequate  to  solve  our  problem. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

Confronted  with  the  lack  of  agreement  in  content, 
this  is  the  only  path  left  open  to  us.  In  treading 
it  we  can  be  sure  of  the  adequacy  of  the  solution 
when  found,  but  our  assurance  comes  from  the  gen- 
eral assumption  that  everything  must  have  an  ade- 
quate cause,  not  from  anything  inherent  in  religion. 
Men,  in  striving  to  prove  the  existence  of  God,  have 
sought  an  infallible  proof.  As  long  as  human  minds 
are  fallible  they  can  not  succeed.  The  proof  for 
God's  existence  must  rest  on  the  same  general  ground 
as  does  any  proof.  Invoking  the  principle  of  the  ex- 
istence, necessary  existence,  of  a  sufficient  cause,  ade- 
quate to  explain,  we  say  that  there  does  exist,  out- 
side of  the  religious  consciousness,  something  which 
is  an  adequate  cause  of  its  existence. 

That  our  conclusion  rests  on  the  assumption  for 
any  existent  thing  of  a  sufficient  cause  means  that 
our  argument  from  henceforth  must  be  "  formal." 
This  procedure  is  forced  on  us.  We  find  it  useless, 
in  a  search  for  the  source  of  religion,  to  ask  what,  in 
detail,  religion  says  of  itself.  Getting  no  agreement 
in  reply  to  such  a  question,  we  have  had  to  make 
independently  our  own  study.  This  means  that  our 
conclusions  will  and  must  be  formal.  Concerned 
with  the  form,  deduced  from  it,  they  become  more 
general  than  if  they  were  dependent  on  the  state- 
ments or  contents  of  the  religious  consciousness.  So 
long  as  we  depend  on  such  statements,  there  is  open 
the  objection  that  even  if  in  all  cases  agreement  were 
found,  there  might  fee  error.  Modern  psychology 
tells  us  of  the  divergences,  usually  disregarded,  in  our 
perception  or  even  sensations  of  ordinary  physical 
objects.  Accuracy  is  only  a  question  of  degree.  So 


THE  SOURCE  OP  RELIGION       115 

long,  therefore,  as  we  seek  assurance  of  this  sort,  so 
long  shall  we  be  disappointed.  We  turn  to  a  "  for- 
mal "  proof  to  escape  this  uncertainty. 

Certainty  is  in  its  essence  logical.  Practical  cer- 
tainty, which  is  the  desire  of  science  and  ordinary 
life,  is  an  approximation  along  what  we  might  call 
pragmatic  lines.  We  disregard  what  experience 
shows  to  be  the  negligible  error.  Where  the  result 
to  be  obtained  is  numerical,  where  an  approximation 
to  within  one- thousandth  of  an  inch  is  just  as  good 
and  useful  as  the  attainment  of  the  exact  measure- 
ment, this  practical  certainty  is  all  that  common 
sense  strives  for.  When,  however,  it  is  a  question  of 
existence  the  issue  changes.  At  times  we  may  have, 
as  always  with  the  past,  to  weigh  the  balance  of 
probability  as  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  existence, 
but  this  is  only  because  we  are  content  with  such 
probability.  Either  Julius  Caesar  did  or  did  not 
exist.  With  a  social  agreement  as  to  the  facts,  we 
can  use  probability,  but  if  the  question  has  no  gen- 
eral agreement  behind  it,  if  we  do  not  agree  to  act 
on  one  or  the  other  assumption,  we  must  seek,  whether 
we  find  it  or  not,  complete  certainty.  Numerical 
approximation  will  not  do.  In  disregarding,  there- 
fore, the  contents  of  the  religious  experience  we  are 
merely  following  the  general  procedure  of  philoso- 
phy. That  general  procedure  I  will  not  attempt 
here  to  defend.  It  is  not  necessary  to  do  so,  for 
what  we  need  is  admitted  by  all  students  of  philosoph- 
ical method.  It  may  be  summarised  for  our  pur- 
pose thus:  —  what  an  object  appears  to  be  is  a  log- 
ically secondary  matter  to  the  fact  of  its  existence. 
Any  conclusions  which  are  drawn  from  the  fact,  the 


116      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

"  formal "  fact,  of  its  existence  have  therefore  a 
more  general  application  than  the  details  of  its  ob- 
jective appearance,  which  may  vary  from  time  to 
time.  This  is  true  whether  we  establish  that  exist- 
ence pragmatically  or  otherwise.  Formal  arguments 
are  merely  those  which  are  drawn  from  the  admitted 
existence,  or  non-existence,  of  an  object.  They  hold 
true  through  all  the  varying  forms  which  that  object 
may  take.  They  are  the  logically  necessary  conse- 
quences of  the  existence  of  that  object.  If  the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  to  be  established  at  all,  it  must  be  in 
this  way.  Statements  about  existence  do  not  es- 
tablish existence.  Only  one  existence  can  prove  an- 
other. In  using,  therefore,  the  formal  argument  we 
are  on  the  road  to  the  only  certainty  which  is  pos- 
sible. 

In  seeking  this  certainty  we  are  depending  on  the 
incompleteness  of  the  experience  taken  by  itself. 
Our  procedure  is  not  a  mere  matter  of  logical  jug- 
gling, for  it  has  a  distinctly  practical,  or  pragmatic, 
side.  As  a  practical  matter  we  find  that  the  reli- 
gious experience  is  not  self-explanatory.  Its  impli- 
cations of  something  beyond,  the  claim  to  reveal  an- 
other world,  which  we  have  seen  to  be  characteristic 
of  it,  is  not  explained  by  anything  in  it.  The  un- 
known factor  with  which  we  are  dealing  is  something 
which  prevents  our  dealing  with  this  experience  with 
any  assurance  of  being  on  the  right  road.  If  the 
claim  of  the  experience  is  correct,  and  it  opens  to  us 
knowledge  of  a  realm  beyond  the  world  of  sense  per- 
ception, we  should  treat  the  impulses  which  result 
from  it  far  differently  from  the  fate  which  would 
befall  them  if  we  regard  religion  as  merely  the  idle 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION          117 

dreams  of  abnormal  human  beings,  or  as  the  insight 
not  into  another  world,  but  into  the  depths  of  the 
world  of  social  human  life.  Our  treatment,  there- 
fore, of  religion  depends  on  our  judgment  as  to  this 
unknown  factor.  We  therefore  are  not  able  to  de- 
cide as  to  our  attitude  toward  this  experience  on  its 
own  claims.  In  our  treatment  of  it,  it  does  not  stand 
on  its  own  feet  entirely.  This  not  only  makes  such 
an  inquiry  as  we  are  engaged  in  a  matter  of  prac- 
tical importance,  it  also  brings  us  face  to  face  with 
the  results  of  this  incompleteness,  or  lack  of  clear- 
ness in  the  religious  experience.  As  incomplete,  its 
reality  is  defective.  That  is,  taken  by  itself,  it  is  not 
completely  determined.  This  is  true  both  logically 
and  practically. 

Though  incomplete,  the  religious  experience  is  yet 
real.  It  is  real  in  the  sense  which  we  found  in  the 
early  part  of  our  analysis  of  it.  It  has  a  place  in 
the  existent  world.  It  is  also  real  in  the  logical  sense 
of  an  object  of  study.  Since  for  us  it  has  a  mean- 
ing, it  has  some  sort  of  reality.  Finally,  it  is  real 
for  the  world  of  everyday  affairs,  since  the  religious 
impulse,  in  some  form  or  other,  has  to  be  reckoned 
with  by  every  one.  It  possesses  this  reality  inde- 
pendently of  the  fact  of  its  incompleteness.  Taking 
it  as  it  is,  more  or  less  of  an  enigma,  it  has  a  place 
in  the  world  of  reality.  Into  this  reality  it  carries 
its  incompleteness.  The  experience  which  comes  to 
us  is  one  that  claims  to  go  beyond  itself;  it  is  one 
that  is  unexplainable  in  itself.  It  is  just  this  experi- 
ence which  we  find  to  be  real.  Its  indefiniteness, 
therefore,  can  not  affect  its  reality  since  it  is  included 
in  it.  Whether  it  comes  to  reality  by » its  own  voli- 


118      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

tion  is  also  of  no  concern.  All  that  is  important  is 
that  we  find  here  reality.  Moreover,  it  is  really  ex- 
istent. As  an  experience  it  does  not  hold  a  shadowy 
reality  dependent  on  its  relation  to  the  mind  whose 
experience  it  is.  It  is  not  in  the  same  category  with 
day-dreams.  Not  simply  as  the  object  of  concep- 
tion, as  the  entities  of  pure  mathematics,  but  in  it- 
self it  is  real.  We  remember  that  it  possesses  the 
reality  of  an  experience.  Although  in  consciousness, 
it  depends  on  consciousness  no  more  than  does  our 
perception  of  the  table  on  which  we  are  writing. 
Whatever  reality  belongs  to  the  experience  of  the 
table  belongs  to  the  experience  of  religion.  This  in- 
complete, baffling  experience  is  a  part  of  the  world 
with  which  we  must  do  battle. 

The  unknown  source,  as  involved  in  the  experience, 
is  a  necessary  part  of  it.  Not  now  merely  logically 
necessary  (if  mere  logical  necessity  exist  as  a  thing 
by  itself  apart  from  life),  but  necessary  to  the  prac- 
tical dealing  with  religion.  Religion  would  not  be 
religion,  not  exist  as  religion,  without  this  outside 
source.  Whatever  may  be  what  we  have  called  the 
source,  but  more  accurately  the  unknown  factor, 
without  it  the  experience  would  be  non-existent. 
Again  this  is  not  a  matter  of  words,  but  of  fact. 
What  the  practical  man  meets  when  he  has  to  deal 
with  religion,  and  what  baffles  him  at  times  is  just 
this  claim  to  a  source  higher  or  other  than  itself  or 
himself.  Without  this  claim  it  would  not  be  the 
thing  of  impulse  which  confronts  him.  Something 
partially  like  it  there  might  be,  but  what  for  him 
distinguishes  this  particular  experience  would  not  be 
in  existence.  We  are  not,  of  course,  saying  that  this 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION          119 

proves  that  the  source  is  higher  because  the  religious 
man  claims  that  it  is.  We  are  only  maintaining  that 
the  fact  that  the  source  is  not  given  in  the  experience 
is  of  the  essence  of  the  experience.  Without  that  ele- 
ment, of  a  source  outside  of  itself,  it  would  not  be  the 
religious  experience ;  it  would  not  be  what  it  is.  This 
unknown  exterior  element  is  therefore  involved  in  the 
reality  of  the  experience.  In  the  world  of  everyday 
life  it  has  a  real  part  to  play  in  the  religious  experi- 
ence. 

This  unknown  element,  as  the  important  element  in 
religion,  is  through  this  fact  in  touch  with  the  world 
of  reality,  however  we  may  define  that  world.  De- 
prive religion  of  this  unknown  quantity,  and  you  de- 
stroy it  as  religion.  This  lesson,  which  not  all  eth- 
ical culturists  have  learned,  is  apart  from  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  advisability  of  such  destruction.  It  is 
apart  also,  for  the  time,  from  the  question  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  such  annihilation.  We  have  now,  whether 
we  will  have  in  the  future  or  not,  an  experience,  as 
real  a  part  of  our  life  as  any  other  experience,  which 
in  its  essence  involves  the  presence  of  an  unknown, 
exterior  factor.  The  experience  is  real;  the  un- 
known factor  is  a  very  real  element  in  the  experience. 
The  unknown  element  is  therefore  real.  It  has  this 
reality,  it  is  true,  in  its  relation  to  the  experience, 
and  we  have  not  proven  more  than  this.  Yet  in  that 
relation  it  is  real.  Through  that  relation  to  our  con- 
sciousness it  enters  as  an  important  factor  into  hu- 
man life.  Also  as  logically  necessary  to  explain 
religion,  it  has  a  secure  place  in  the  realm  of  neces- 
sary truth.  This  means  that  the  religious  experience 
has  given  us  the  basis  for  the  assertion  of  something 


120      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

not  itself  in  the  religious  consciousness.  In  assert- 
ing that  reality  has  been  conferred  on  something 
beyond  we  mean  only  beyond  the  present  conscious- 
ness. We  do  not  in  this  offhand  way  deny  either  the 
presence  of  God  in  consciousness  nor  the  possibility 
that  the  source  may  be  found  to  be  entirely  human. 
Only  we  are  asserting  the  necessary  real  existence  of 
the  source  or  occasion  of  the  religious  experience 
outside  of  the  religious  consciousness.  In  religion 
God  is  known  as  real. 

We  have  been  looking  toward  the  source  of  the 
religious  consciousness;  it  is  now  possible  to  turn 
back  again  to  the  experience  itself,  and  notice  what 
we  have  learned  about  its  nature  during  our  inquiry. 
In  the  first  place,  we  have  one  side  of  a  relation. 
Since  this  consciousness  is  incomplete  in  itself,  and 
reaches  rational  completion  as  well  as  practical  only 
when  we  take  into  account  the  unknown  source,  this 
relation,  of  which  the  religious  consciousness  is  one 
term,  becomes  a  way  of  characterising  the  experience. 
This  we  have  already  done  several  times.  We  need 
to  notice  here  that  what  we  have  is  one  term  and  the 
relation.  These  are  inherent  in  this  type  of  con- 
scious life.  It  is  a  true  experience,  having  its  mean- 
ing because  of  this  relation  to  something  not  given 
within  it. 

Not  only,  however,  have  we  one  term  and  the  rela- 
tion, the  relation  is  such  that  we  are  sure  that  the 
other  term  is  real  and  exists.  Religion  is  therefore 
to  be  taken  as  a  relation  to  or  consciousness  of  real- 
ity. This  may  be  a  truer  phrase  to  use  than  the  one 
we  have  made  use  of.  "  Source  "  covers  the  ground 
only  because  we  did  not  want  to  prejudice  our  case 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION 

by  speaking  of  the  object  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness. Nor  do  we  want  to  do  so  now.  Making  the 
situation  as  general  as  possible,  we  only  say  that  we 
have  a  relation  between  two  real  and  existent  terms, 
one  of  which,  and  the  relation,  are  given  to  us  in 
consciousness.  So  far  as  consciousness  is  concerned 
this  is  a  one-sided  or  one  directional  relation.  Our 
work  must  be  done  from  the  side  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness, working  back  to  the  other  term  of  the 
relation.  The  relation  itself,  since  without  it  the 
consciousness  is  incomplete  and  non-typical,  is  essen- 
tial and  given.  Its  absence  destroys  what  we  call  re- 
ligion. From  these  we  have  deduced  the  existence  of 
a  something  as  the  other  term.  We  have  already, 
then,  been  working  from  the  experience  out  to  the  un- 
known. From  a  real  experience  we  have  deduced  a 
real  occasion  or  object  of  that  experience. 

What  we  have  done  in  general  may  be  done  in  de- 
tail. So  far  as  the  religion  is  not  one-directional, 
what  is  true  of  its  relation  to  one  of  its  terms  will  be 
true  of  the  other.  So  far  as  it  is  one-directional, 
that  is  such  as  the  relation  of  the  lamp  to  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  light  of  the  lamp,  we  can  infer  di- 
rectly from  the  consciousness  to  the  object  or  cause. 
What  is  true  of  the  relation,  whether  applying  in 
both  directions  or  in  only  one,  has  a  connection  with 
both  terms.  We  are  dealing  with  two  real  existences, 
such  that  they  can  have  this  relation  between  them. 
This  fact  defines  to  a  certain  extent  the  nature  of 
each.  Since  we  know  the  nature  of  the  conscious- 
ness, a  certain  line  is  open  to  us  by  which  we  may 
obtain  information  about  the  unknown  term.  It 
must  be  such  that  it  can  enter  into  this  relation  with 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

this  experience  or  type  of  consciousness.  The  rela- 
tion in  which  these  terms  are  to  each  other  not  only 
establishes  the  reality  of  the  one  not  in  conscious- 
ness, but  also  determines  or  defines  its  character. 
The  relation,  we  must  remember,  is  in  consciousness 
as  well  as  the  term.  That  is,  the  religious  conscious- 
ness is  not  simply  one  term  of  this  relation,  it  is  one 
term  and  the  relation.  The  term  is  the  concrete 
case,  the  mystic  trance,  or  the  voice  on  the  road  to 
Damascus;  the  relation  is  the  conviction  that  this 
voice  or  trance  came  from  somewhere  beyond. 
Knowing  therefore  the  relation,  we  have  another 
means  of  reaching  conclusions  as  to  the  type  of 
reality  which  it  brings  into  relation  to  our  conscious 
life.  The  relation  which  we  call  religious  knowledge 
can  and  does  define  its  object. 

Defining  its  object  or  source,  from  a  study  of  the 
experience  we  can  learn  some,  at  least  of  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  object  of  that  experience.  The  re- 
lation is  in  some  way  to  be  defined  as  the  determina- 
tion of  consciousness  by  this  object  or  existence, 
whatever  it  may  be.  As  this  is  a  real  relation  be- 
tween real  things,  the  consciousness  shows  in  its 
structure  the  result  of  this  determination.  This 
turning  backward  of  our  procedure,  and  defining  the 
relation  in  terms,  so  to  speak,  of  cause,  makes  it  pos- 
sible for  us  to  take  it  in  the  other  direction.  Not 
now,  however,  as  a  possibility,  and  to  establish  the 
reality  of  the  source,  but  to  establish  the  reality  of 
some  detailed  characteristics  of  the  source.  The 
same  procedure  that  gave  us  general  results  will  give 
us  more  detailed  ones.  We  can  use  the  religious  ex- 
perience as  the  ground  from  which  to  quarry  the 


THE  SOURCE  OF  RELIGION 

foundations  on  which  we  may  build  up  our  idea  of  the 
nature  of  this  source  of  religion.  Taking  our  stand 
in  the  world  of  reality,  we  can  not  too  strongly  in- 
sist that  in  thus  deducing  the  nature  of  the  object  of 
the  religious  consciousness  we  are  not  building  in  the 
air.  Indeed  we  must  make  the  attempt  to  give  to 
this  something  which  we  conceive  as  real  a  body  of 
flesh  and  bones.  If  real,  it  is  concrete,  for  it  is  real 
as  a  cause  or  occasion,  as  revealed  by  concrete  indi- 
cations of  consciousness.  The  relation  may  be  gen- 
eral, but  it  is  a  relation  between  terms  of  the  same 
class.  What  leads  us  to  give  reality  to  this  source 
is  that  the  reality  of  the  consciousness  is  incomplete 
without  it.  The  consciousness  becomes  concrete  and 
really  existent  only  when  the  source  makes  it  possible 
for  it.  In  this  sense,  therefore,  the  source  is  concrete. 
It  expresses  itself  in  definite  instances,  and,  since  it 
is  not  present  in  all  our  minds  all  the  time,  it  is  not 
present  universally.  As  concrete,  it  must  have  cer- 
tain characters.  These  characters  it  is  possible  to 
discover  partially  by  a  further  analysis  of  the  relig- 
ious consciousness. 

Thus  we  have  so  far  vindicated  the  validity  of  the 
religious  experience.  As  an  experience,  we  have 
found  that  it  reveals  reality.  It  is  such  that  in  no 
other  way  can  it  itself  be  real.  In  general,  therefore, 
it  is  valid  as  an  experience.  Without  maintaining 
what  we  have  seen  to  be  impossible,  that  each  implica- 
tion of  religion  is  to  be  accepted  as  true,  yet  the 
primary  implications  of  all  the  types  of  religion, 
that  they  proceed  from  or  to  a  reality  beyond  them- 
selves, is  a  valid  implication.  There  is  a  reality  not 
given  in  consciousness,  to  which  they  refer.  They 


124?      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

have  therefore  been  proved  worthy  by  this  last  test  to 
be  called  an  experience.  So  far  as  the  existence  of  a 
source  beyond  themselves  is  concerned,  the  religious 
consciousness  is  a  valid  experience. 


LECTURE  IV 
THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION 

To  each  valid  experience  there  corresponds  a 
proper  test.  The  religious  experience  is  valid,  but 
not  all  experiences  are  religious.  There  may  well  be 
some  modes  of  consciousness  which  claim  or  seem  to 
imply  that  they  are  what  we  have  defined  and  ac- 
cepted as  religious,  and  yet  which  are  due  really 
to  some  other  cause.  To  distinguish  such,  to  see 
whether  the  similarity  to  religion  is  sufficient  to  put 
both  in  the  same  category,  some  test  is  needed.  To 
conclude  that  religion  is  valid,  and  then  not  to  have  a 
standard  by  which  we  can  find  out  what  is  religion, 
would  leave  to  our  work  little  value.  The  existence 
of  such  a  test  of  validity  can  not,  however,  be  as- 
sumed. We  could  very  consistently  conclude  that  if 
there  existed  anything  of  the  nature  of  what  we  have 
defined  as  religion,  that  this  was,  if  it  existed,  a  valid 
and  true  experience,  and  yet  deny  that  we  could  ever 
be  sure  that  we  had  found  such  an  experience.  To 
make  our  argument  practical,  we  must  find  some  way 
by  which  to  try  the  types  of  consciousness  we  have, 
and  see  if  among  them  is  one  such  as  we  have  con- 
ceptually found  religion  to  be.  This  is  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  our  definition  came  from  an  analysis  of 
what  men  call  religion.  It  might  be  that  men,  hav- 
ing the  idea  of  religion,  incorrectly  apply  it.  To  the 

125 


126      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

truth  of  this,  only  one  who  has  some  standard  and 
has  applied  it  can  reply.  Historically,  many  stand- 
ards have  been  sought.  As  before,  we  ignore  dogma- 
tism, and  seek  only  within  the  experience.  This  is 
not  to  conclude  immediately  that  the  test  also  is  to 
be  found  within  religion,  but  only  that,  if  it  is  to  re- 
veal truth  to  us,  we  must  find  a  test  that  accords  with 
the  religious  method  of  revelation. 

With  our  ordinary  experiences,  especially  those  of 
perception,  the  objective  contents  give  us  the  oppor- 
tunity of  judgment.  A  man  who  is  color  blind  is 
called  abnormal  and  his  experiences  untrue  because 
what  he  reports  as  to  the  objects  within  his  field  of 
consciousness  does  not  accord  with  what  others  re- 
port of  theirs.  No  two  persons  exactly  agree,  but 
for  the  great  majority  there  is  an  approximation  to- 
ward an  agreement  among  themselves  and  a  disagree- 
ment with  the  victim  of  color  blindness.  The  object 
is  here  the  test.  The  majority  say  that  it  is  not  as 
the  odd  man  sees  it.  What  they  call  the  real  object 
is  this  social  form  of  agreement.  The  test  is  objec- 
tive, not  because  material,  but  because  it  depends  on 
the  contents  of  experience,  both  as  to  color,  and  as  to 
the  other  persons,  who  are  equally  objective  to  the 
man's  will.  The  reason  for  some  particular  focus 
may  be  best  explained  pragmatically,  that,  inde- 
pendent of  metaphysics,  we  can  test  the  truth  of  ex- 
perience, and  do  so  by  this  social  agreement  or  focus. 
No  object,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word,  can  ex- 
ist unless  there  is  this  focus.  Ordinarily,  also,  we 
mean  not  merely  an  agreement  that  something  exists, 
but  that  something  on  whose  appearance  and  char- 
acter we  are  all  well  agreed,  is  in  our  consciousness. 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  127 

Objective  detail  is  detail  of  the  contents  of  experience. 
Persons  are  objects  so  far  as  they  present  to  any  who 
see  them  the  same  appearance  so  that  they  can  be 
recognised  by  their  photograph,  clothes,  or  general 
character.  In  so  far  as  they  do  not  present  common 
features  to  all,  we  do  not  call  them  objects.  It  is 
this  very  difference  from  a  stone,  that  a  man  may  be 
in  very  different  relations  to  different  people,  so  that 
he  does  not  appear  to  be  the  same,  that  makes  us  call 
people  persons.  So  far  as  an  object  enters  into  these 
different  relations,  we  do  not  call  these  particular  re- 
lations part  of  the  object.  The  spot  to  which  we 
alone  are  attached,  by  reason  of  some  personal  memo- 
ries, is  to  some  one  else  nothing  out  of  the  ordinary. 
The  world  denies,  in  such  a  case,  the  particular  in- 
terest to  that  object,  and  says  that  it  is  due  solely  to 
the  man.  Only  those  characteristics  which  may  be 
common  property  are  called  objective. 

The  religious  experience  we  have  found  to  be  pe- 
culiar in  that  there  is  not  found  any  such  social  focus, 
or  point  of  approach  to  agreement.  Outside  of  the 
bare  formal  agreement  as  to  an  exterior  source,  no 
consensus  of  agreement  is  reported.  The  source, 
since  all  acknowledge  it,  is  objective;  it  is  a  focus 
common  to  all  types  of  religion, —  but  nothing  more 
than  this  can  be  concluded.  There  is  not  found  any 
approach  within  the  field  of  consciousness  to  the  as- 
cription even  of  an  equivalent,  much  less  of  the  same 
qualities,  or  to  description  in  the  same  objective 
terms.  There  is,  therefore,  no  objective  element 
other  than  the  bare  externality  of  its  source,  to  be 
found  in  religion.  The  apparent  willfulness  of  re- 
ligion under  objective  standards  is  to  be  explained 


128       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

by  this  lack.  When  an  object  is  assumed,  whether  a 
semi-materialistic  god,  or  an  abstract  yet  objective 
statement  of  truth,  some  or  many,  not  finding  such  in 
their  consciousness,  yet  believing  themselves  to  be  re- 
ligious, protest.  The  volume  of  such  protest  has,  in 
many  ages,  led  to  religious  revolution.  Some  agree- 
ment there  is  at  times,  but  never  to  the  extent  that  is 
claimed.  The  more  carefully  the  experience  itself  is 
studied,  and  not  reported  in  terms  taken  from  a  fixed 
vocabulary,  the  less  the  agreement  is  seen  to  be.  The 
fact  that  agreement  is  apparently  greater  among  the 
uneducated,  who  are  more  influenced  by  one  another, 
and  grows  less  as  we  advance  up  the  scale  of  those 
better  able  to  accurately  report  just  what  is  in  their 
consciousness,  is  proof  that  the  apparent  agreement 
is  due  to  imitation  rather  than  to  the  experience 
itself.  The  agreement  we  mean  is  agreement  in  exact 
description,  such  as  is  asserted  in  regard  to  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  angels,  not  the  general  agreement  as 
to  type.  We  are  throughout  this  part  of  our  work 
concerned  with  the  contents  of  the  experience.  The 
similarity  as  to  contents,  which  might  be  reported, 
gives  no  focus.  The  Mormon,  and  the  Christian,  the 
Mohammedan  and  the  Buddhist,  no  one  of  these 
would  agree  to  what  any  other  claimed  to  be  the  di- 
vine revelation  of  God's  nature.  There  is  no  major- 
ity vote  for  any  one  description.  Either  most  men 
are  defective,  or  there  is  no  object  given  in  the  reli- 
gious experience,  no  focus  or  point  to  which  the  de- 
scriptions tend. 

Since  there  is  no  agreement  as  to  the  proper  con- 
tents or  revelation  of  religion,  we  can  not  with  suc- 
cess seek  an  objective  test.  The  test  as  to  perception 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  129 

is  based  on,  though  not  quite  identical  with,  the  agree- 
ment of  the  large  majority  of  men.  The  focus  of 
such  agreement,  studied,  and  brought  to  a  point,  de- 
termined with  reference  to  certain  individual  varia- 
tions, such  as  the  position  of  the  spectator  and  the 
source  of  light  (in  vision)  gives  us  the  test.  The 
wood  is  really  brown  because  the  great  multitude  of 
those  who  take  care  to  observe  their  experiences  of 
color  so  report  it.  All  experiences  which  report  it 
as  brown  are  therefore  called  normal.  When,  how- 
ever, we  have  no  such  preliminary  agreement  as  to 
who  are  the  experts,  when  there  is  not  even  any  con- 
sensus of  opinion  as  to  what  direction  these  experts 
should  turn,  when  there  is  no  common  view  to  be 
refined  and  standardised,  there  is  no  starting  point. 
It  is  as  if  in  relatively  equal  numbers  the  reports  came 
in  that  the  wood  was  green  and  red  and  white  as  well 
as  brown.  The  more  experts  studied  the  different 
types  of  consciousness,  the  less  would  aigjreement 
result,  unless  we  said  that  none  had  seen  the  wood. 
This  is  the  case  with  religion.  The  experts  of  each 
religion,  so  far  as  they  assert  objective  revelation, 
deny  any  validity  to  any  of  the  other  religions.  No 
focus  exists  to  be  brought  to  a  point.  The  work  of 
the  expert  is  to  lead  the  lines  of  convergence  to  a 
center,  a  norm.  Where  there  is  instead  divergence, 
there  can  exist  no  center.  Hence  there  is  no  test. 
An  objective  test,  therefore,  can  not  be  found  for  re- 
ligion. We  are  unable  to  test  the  validity  of  a  man's 
religious  experience  by  what  he  reports  of  the  con- 
tents of  his  consciousness  at  that  time.  We  can  not 
say  that,  because  he  asserts  that  a  voice  proclaimed 
many  wives  or  one  wife,  he  is  not  truly  religious. 


130      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

We  must  remember  that  this  is  all  that  the  test 
means.  It  is  a  test  of  the  truth  of  the  experience, — 
whether  it  is  what  it  claims  to  be,  that  is  religious, — 
not  a  test  of  what  it  claims  to  reveal.  Such  a  test,  of 
revealed  truth,  so  far  as  religion  is  concerned,  we 
have  just  seen  to  be  impossible.  Since  there  is  no 
focus  to  the  objective  side  of  religion,  no  agreement, 
there  can  be  no  test  which  we  can  apply  to  its  con- 
tents. 

From  the  contents  of  the  religious  revelation  there 
comes  to  us  no  test  of  its  accuracy.  Yet  we  can  not 
rightly  conclude  from  this  that  the  source  of  the  re- 
ligious experience,  the  object  which  is  experienced,  is 
a  formless  thing,  without  definite  nature.  If  it  were 
formless  and  structureless,  it  could  not  give  birth  to 
religion.  An  absolutely  undetermined  existence  can 
not  enter  into  any  causal  or  source  relation,  for  that 
relation  determines  it.  If  it  is  the  occasion  of  an  ex- 
perience, that  to  which  the  particular  consciousness 
points,  it  is  so  far  determined.  It  is  something  to 
which  that  consciousness  can  point.  In  the  case  of 
religion  it  is  so  far  determined  that  we  can  say  of  it 
that  it  is  not  within  the  field  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness. It  is  something  which  does  not  depend 
on  that  religious  consciousness  for  its  existence. 
From  the  religious  experience  we  concluded  that  it 
did  exist,  but  only  because  the  experience  was  not  suf- 
ficient to  give  existence  to  itself  by  itself.  The  source 
gives,  partly,  at  least,  existence  to  the  experience,  not 
vice  versa.  Its  existence,  then,  undetermined  so  far 
as  the  field  of  religion  is  concerned,  is  nevertheless  de- 
ducible  from  that  consciousness.  The  type  to  which 
it  gives  rise,  though  variable  in  content,  is  of  a  defi- 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  131 

nite  type.  The  relation  between  the  source  and  the 
religious  experience  is  such  that  we  are  conscious 
that  there  is  a  relation.  This  relation,  moreover,  is 
one-directional.  The  source  bears  a  different  rela- 
tion to  the  experience  from  what  the  consciousness 
does  to  the  source.  It  is  source  or  object,  the  con- 
sciousness is  subject  or  perception.  Putting  it  in 
the  terms  of  our  definition  of  an  object,  we  have  on 
the  one  side  the  focus  of  religious  agreement,  and  on 
the  other  the  lines  which  are  converging.  Since  the 
experience  is  not  completely  self -determining,  in  part 
at  least  the  determination  comes  from  the  object  or 
source.  Whether  by  self-determination  or  otherwise, 
this  source  has  a  determinate  character.  It  acts  un- 
der these  conditions  in  this  way. 

Having  a  certain  character,  the  source  has  quali- 
ties which  may  be  described.  Qualities  are  our  de- 
scription of  the  nature  of  an  object.  When  an  ex- 
istence becomes  for  us  an  object,  exterior  to  us,  and 
known  as  the  focus  of  converging  experiences,  the 
ways  in  which  it  acts  or  appears  are  described  as  its 
qualities.  They  are  the  means  by  which  we  com- 
municate our  judgment  as  to  its  nature  and  behavior. 
Just  as  soon  as  we  conclude  that  there  is  a  certain 
type  of  behavior,  just  so  soon  we  make  the  effort  to 
describe  its  qualities.  Having  determinate  and  defi- 
nite modes  of  behavior  it  will  therefore  have  qualities. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  these  qualities  be  themselves 
physical,  or  in  themselves  existent.  Electricity  is  it- 
self never  perceived,  hence  we  can  not  describe  it  in 
terms  of  light  or  heat  or  sound,  though  it  shows  it- 
self in  all  these  ways.  Its  nature  and  qualities  are 
given  in  terms  of  its  behavior,  and  the  results  which 


132      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

come  from  its  presence.  Electricity  is  just  as  ob- 
jective as  though  we  could  see  or  feel  it,  and  its  quali- 
ties are  just  as  fixed.  Because  it  has  certain  modes 
of  action,  it  has  certain  qualities,  which  we  cannot 
perceive,  but  which  we  deduce  from  the  phenomena. 
In  so  far  as  religion  has  certain  definite  modes  of 
action,  in  so  far  as  the  source  reveals  itself  in  typical 
and  recognisable  forms  of  activity,  it  has  certain 
qualities,  and  it  is  possible  for  us  to  describe  them. 
This  is  altogether  apart  from  the  contents  of  the 
experience,  as  the  qualities  of  electricity  are  not  given 
in  terms  of  the  brilliancy  of  the  lightning.  Since 
there  is  no  focus  of  content  in  religion,  and  since 
there  is  a  focus  of  behavior,  at  least  to  the  extent  of 
occasioning  religion,  in  the  behavior  of  the  source,  it 
is  to  this  behavior  or  activity  that  we  must  look  for 
our  description  and  test  of  the  validity  of  our  de- 
scription of  the  object  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness. 

This  definition  of  the  character  or  nature  of  an  ob- 
ject gives  us  the  basis  for  our  test  as  to  the  contents. 
Though  the  contents  in  themselves  furnish  no  criteria 
by  which  we  may  judge  among  them,  there  are  tests 
which  we  can  apply  which  can  be  deduced  from  the 
necessary  qualities  of  the  object,  necessary  to  the 
object  as  the  occasion  or  source  of  the  experience. 
When  some  experience,  claiming  to  be  a  true  revela- 
tion of  the  object  of  worship,  reveals  of  that  object 
some  quality  which  is  inconsistent  with  its  nature  as 
the  object  of  worship,  we  have  the  right  to  reject  the 
claim  of  that  experience  to  validity.  The  ground  for 
this  is  that  determination  has  a  negative  as  well  as  a 
positive  side.  When  something  is  determined  as  ex- 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  133 

istent,  something  else  is  determined  as  non-existent. 
We  do  not  want  here  to  be  mixed  up  with  the  argu- 
ments of  the  lack  of  determination  for  the  meeting  of 
opposites  in  the  Absolute  Being.  So  far  as  these 
arguments  are  valid,  they  do  not  concern  us,  for  the 
source  which  we  are  studying  is  the  definite  source  of 
religion,  revealing  itself  in  certain  particular  ways. 
If  in  God  falsehood  is  done  away  because  all  things 
are  equally  true  or  equally  false,  that  is  itself  a 
quality,  and  its  denial  is  untrue.  So  we  have  come 
to  the  familiar  reducio  ad  absurdam.  For  our  pur- 
pose, and  by  our  definition,  that  would  be  a  mode  of 
behavior,  and,  as  found  only  in  the  Absolute,  a  defini- 
tion of  Absolute  Being,  and  therefore  a  test  of  truth 
as  the  revelation  of  ultimate  reality.  Whether  valid 
or  not,  therefore,  it  does  not  affect  our  argument. 
Since  if  under  any  circumstances  falsehood  is  true, 
the  assertion  that  always  it  is  false,  is  itself  false, 
and  our  argument  is  upheld.  Any  determination  im- 
plies that  its  denial  is  untrue.  It  carries  with  it, 
therefore,  the  denial  of  existence  as  well  as  its  affirma- 
tion. 

When  in  any  experience  we  find  the  claim  to  know 
something  as  existent,  especially  if  that  something  be 
a  quality  of  the  object  of  the  experience,  it  can  be 
put  to  this  test.  If  the  quality  is  such  that,  if  it  is 
truly  part  of,  or  belonging  to  the  object,  that 
object  can  not  be  the  object  of  that  experience, 
then  the  claim  to  knowledge  is  untrue.  If  a  man  says 
that  he  sees  and  knows  of  water  flowing  uphill,  we  re- 
fuse to  accept  his  statement,  because  water  does  not 
behave  in  that  way.  To  be  water  under  any  circum- 
stances known  to  us,  it  must  obey  the  law  of  grav- 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

ity.  Not  until  it  ceases  to  be  water  and  becomes 
vapor  can  it  flow  uphill.  To  take  a  plainer  case, 
if  a  man  claims  to  see  a  round-square,  we  refuse  to 
believe,  because  the  nature  of  a  square  is  that  it  shall 
not  be  round.  We  do  not  wait  to  examine  his  mind, 
or  the  object  he  claims  he  sees;  we  are  sure  before- 
hand that  there  is  no  such  quality  as  roundness  pos- 
sible to  a  square.  So  when  a  man  asserts  that  he 
knows  of  a  god  who  is  unknowable,  we  equally  quickly 
reject  his  statement.  If  in  the  religious  experience 
he  knows  God,  then  the  quality  he  claims  is  untrue, 
that  God  is  unknowable.  This  is  not  the  position  of 
Agnosticism,  which  bases  its  conclusion  as  to  the  ex- 
istence of  the  unknowable  on  other  than  religious 
grounds.  It  does,  however,  come  near  to  some  of  the 
cruder  statements  of  the  mystics.  For  the  religious 
man  to  claim  that  God  can  not  enter  into  relations, 
that  he  is  the  infinite  unrelated,  is  likewise  untenable. 
If  God  is  unrelated  being,  then  He  can  not  be  related 
to  him  the  worshiper  as  the  object  of  worship.  But 
God  is  worshiped.  Therefore  the  claim  that  he  is 
known  as  unrelated  is  untrue.  These  instances, 
taken  because  they  are  clear,  might  be  extended  into 
the  field  of  more  exact  determination.  That  is  not 
needed  here,  but  only  the  understanding  that  if  we 
find  qualities  that  are  inconsistent  with  the  relation 
of  the  source  of  religion  to  the  religious  experience, 
those  qualities  are  to  be  rejected.  So  we  have  a 
valid  test. 

On  the  positive  side  we  do  not  need  to  wait  until 
some  revelation  occurs.  It  may  be  psychologically 
necessary  that  each  idea  first  occur  as  a  revelation 
or  discovery  in  some  experience,  but  logically  it  may 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  135 

be  known  by  reasoning  before  it  is  ever  known  ob- 
jectively in  consciousness,  known  in  the  reasoning 
about  religion,  before  it  is  known  in  religion.  Since 
to  terms  in  relation,  as  the  source  and  the  conscious- 
ness are,  there  are  definite  qualities,  so  for  us,  once 
given  the  relation,  the  qualities  which  are  logically 
involved  become  necessary  qualities.  Again  we 
parallel  our  reasoning  as  to  the  existence  of  the 
source.  Whatever  may  prove  to  be  necessary  to  the 
source  in  order  that  it  may  be  in  this  relation,  and 
make  the  religious  consciousness  what  it  is,  may  be 
concluded  to  exist.  What  mode  of  existence  belongs 
to  it  is  not  a  question  that  needs  answer  here;  only 
we  say  it  has  such  reality  that  we  can  say  of  a  state- 
ment about  it  that  that  statement  is  true  or  false. 
For  instance,  the  source  must  have  the  quality  of  ob- 
jectivity. It  must  be  such  that  it  can  be  in  the  ex- 
perience, or  involved  in  the  experience  of  many 
people.  The  God  of  religion  must  be  a  God  of  all 
men,  or  at  least  of  all  religious  men,  and  we  stamp 
as  true  the  assertion  that  He  is  equally  approachable 
by  all,  that  is,  by  all  who  are  religious.  As  religion 
is  the  experience  of  some  objective  existence,  then 
that  existence  or  being  is  such  that  it  can  be  known 
in  this  experience.  The  qualities  which  like  this  can 
be  deduced  from  the  experience  furnish  a  basis  for 
valid  judgments  about  religion. 

As  they  furnish  a  basis,  they  give  us  the  chance 
to  further  develop  our  test.  When  there  comes  be- 
fore us  the  revelation  or  statement  of  the  contents  of 
religion,  that  the  qualities  of  God  are  known  to  be 
of  a  certain  type,  if  that  type  is  one  that  is  involved 
in  the  religious  relation  to  God,  we  are  competent  to 


136      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

judge  whether  that  is  a  true  religious  experience,  and 
its  statements  valid.  Since  the  test  does  not  depend 
on  the  statement  of  the  religious  man,  but,  as  a  good 
test  should  be,  is  independent  of  it,  we  do  not  have 
to  depend  on  psychological  analysis  of  the  experience. 
Psychology  can  not  in  this  case  take  the  place  of 
theology,  for  if  the  statement  is  true,  our  judgment 
depends  not  on  the  way  it  gained  entrance  to  the 
believer's  mind,  but  on  the  fact  of  its  agreement  with 
the  logical  implications  of  his  experience.  Not  all 
qualities  can  be  brought  under  this  test,  for  not  all 
qualities  are  directly  necessary  or  directly  opposed 
to  the  implications  of  religion.  Those  which  are  not 
so  directly  involved,  can  not  be  tested.  However  as 
a  type  they  may  be.  If  in  a  study  of  religion  it 
should  be  found  that  all  imagery  is  from  physical 
sources,  at  once  all  imagery  of  God  could  be  thrown 
out  as  no  true  revelation.  If  it  were  found  that  re- 
ligion involved  always  an  effect  on  the  will,  all 
claims  to  this  effect  could  be  at  least  partly  accepted. 
So  could  the  test  be  broadened.  It  is  clear,  therefore, 
that  we  have  a  means  which  is  capable  of  use  in  the 
discrimination  of  the  true  religion  from  the  false. 

In  this,  though  we  have  constantly  made  use 
of  the  conception  of  an  object  as  a  focus  of  social 
agreement,  our  test  does  not  bear  this  social  char- 
acter. There  are  agreements  in  which  only  the 
weight  of  numbers  counts.  No  logic  can  distinguish 
between  red  and  blue,  nor  between  cold  and  heat. 
Which  is  which  is  a  matter  for  the  social  mind  or  com- 
mon perception  to  say.  Tests  of  perception  are 
always  of  this  character.  The  value  of  the  test  is 
the  certificate  it  gives  that  the  given  experience  agrees 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  137 

with  the  normal  experience.  When  a  man  finds  that 
to  him  two  objects  are  alike  in  color,  and  finds  that 
to  others  they  are  also  alike,  he  knows  that  he  can  act 
on  his  perception  as  a  guide  to  what  his  fellows'  per- 
ception will  be.  The  validity  of  his  perception  comes 
from  the  fact  of  this  agreement.  That  which  will  not 
stand  the  test  is  the  abnormal.  A  man  who  sees  no 
color  where  another  sees  red  may,  if  he  is  a  railroad 
engineer,  fail  to  act  on  the  danger  signal.  The  fact 
of  his  difference  from  others  affects  the  validity  of 
his  experience.  In  itself,  if  only  the  others  shared 
in  the  lack,  the  experience  would  be  as  good  as  any 
other.  But  when  the  great  mass  of  men  have  differ- 
ing color  vision,  the  test  of  agreement  is  important. 

This  is  also  true  where  it  is  not  a  case  of  percep- 
tion, but  is  still  the  consciousness  of  objective  truth. 
The  classic  idea  of  revelation,  that  to  the  seer  truth 
may  be  revealed  in  terms  that  he  fails  to  grasp,  but 
which  nevertheless  to  another,  rightly  gifted,  yields 
its  full  meaning,  is  of  this  type.  The  truth  is  thought 
of  as  enshrined  in  some  formula,  which  the  prophet 
repeats  blindly.  To  God  who  originates,  and  to  the 
man  who  understands,  the  meaning  is  the  same,  while 
to  the  prophet,  the  medium  of  revelation,  the  meaning 
does  not  come.  The  consciousness,  so  far  as  the 
words  or  letters  or  message  go,  is  the  same,  only 
the  understanding  differs.  The  prophet  has  not  the 
key.  Once  the  key  is  known,  or  agreed  on,  the  full 
meaning  is  known.  The  test  of  this  sort  of  objective 
revelation  is  the  same  as  with  perception.  Only  here 
the  parties  to  the  agreement  include  God.  As  words 
have  meaning  according  to  the  agreement  or  use 
common  to  the  speaker  and  hearer,  so  truth  is  re- 


138       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

vealed  in  so  far  as  God  speaks  in  terms  men  may 
understand.  If  there  is  no  agreement  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  the  words  used,  no  key  common  to  speaker  and 
hearer,  they  are  not  words  but  gibberish.  The  test 
of  speech  is  the  test,  again,  of  social  agreement. 
Hearing  a  language  which  we  do  not  understand, 
even  though  we  may  be  sure  there  is  meaning,  there 
is  no  test  which  we  can  apply.  So  far  as  God  speaks 
in  terms  which  we  do  not  understand,  there  is  no  test 
which  we  can  apply  to  a  claim  to  be  His  spokesman. 
True  and  false  sound  alike  where  neither  is  under- 
stood. Since  there  is  no  agreement  as  to  the  lan- 
guage of  religion,  no  common  dialect,  there  can  not 
be  a  test.  Having  no  test,  we  are  unable  to  either 
accept  or  reject  objective  revelation.  In  one  sense 
this  means  that  there  can  be  no  objective  revelation. 
Having  no  agreement  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  words 
and  images  of  religion,  we  do  not  have  objectivity. 
Dependent  as  objects  are  for  recognition  on  social 
agreement,  where  there  is  instead  divergence,  there 
is  nothing  to  be  called  a  focus,  or  object.  Lacking 
any  agreement  as  to  details,  we  have  no  objective 
qualities  in  religion.  Neither  have  we,  therefore,  a 
test  of  objectivity.  Truth  can  not,  then,  be  given 
to  us  as  an  object,  or  if  given,  we  can  not  test  it,  and 
certainty  is  impossible.  Objective  validity,  of  truth 
as  well  as  of  perception,  does  not  come  through 
religion. 

The  test  which  we  have  outlined  proceeds  on  an- 
other basis.  Not  by  agreement,  but  by  reason. 
Taking  the  experience,  it  is  studied,  and,  in  another 
part  of  the  stream  of  mental  life,  it  is  analysed. 
Those  qualities  which  are  found  to  be  necessary  to 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  139 

its  existence  are  acknowledged  as  true,  those  destruc- 
tive of  that  existence  branded  as  false.  It  is  not 
an  objective  test,  since  it  does  not  depend  on 
agreement.  The  man  who  reasons  most  correctly, 
and  not  the  majority  vote,  is  the  best  guide.  The 
validity  which  comes  to  any  results  from  the  appli- 
cation of  this  test  are  therefore  due  to  reason,  and 
not  to  perception  or  objective  comprehension.  The 
religious  consciousness  does  not,  in  this  case,  furnish 
its  own  test.  The  truth  which  it  reveals  is  recog- 
nised as  truth,  not  because  all  agree  to  call  it  truth, 
but  because  when  tested  by  our  reason  it  fulfills  all 
demands.  It  is  reasoned  truth.  The  validation 
therefore  comes  only  after  the  work  of  the  philosopher 
or  theologian.  Not  due  to  him,  but  tested  by  him,  we 
owe  to  the  application  of  this  test  of  reason  the 
validity  of  our  religion.  Many  times  men  have 
sought  by  the  weight  of  authority  to  call  uniformity 
in  religion  the  mark  and  test  of  truth.  Again  and 
again,  however,  they  have  failed.  Where  there  is 
no  real  agreement,  no  real  objectivity,  the  objective 
test  of  agreement  must  sooner  or  later  fail.  We  re- 
sort to  reason  in  religion  because  in  no  other  way  is  a 
test  of  religion's  validity  possible. 

This  fact  of  the  necessary  use  of  the  reason  if  we 
are  to  give  validity  to  the  contents  of  our  religious 
states,  results  in  a  limitation  of  the  field  of  that  reve- 
lation. The  object  of  revelation  is  to  assure  men. 
If  they  can  not  be  assured  except  by  use  of  the  reason, 
then  only  such  things  can  be  made  sure  to  them  as 
can  be  certified  to  by  reason.  Truth  may  roughly 
be  classified  as  a  priori  and  derived.  A  priori  truth 
is  that  which  depends  on  nothing  else,  and  comes  to 


140      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

certitude  of  its  own  weight.  Though  it  may  seem 
very  far  from  the  usual  use  of  the  term,  the  truths 
of  objective  perception  are  of  this  type.  No  man 
may  question  what  I  see,  and  no  man,  if  social  agree- 
ment exist,  may  question  the  reality  of  any  object. 
It  carries  conviction  by  its  own  presence  in  conscious- 
ness. The  truths  to  which  the  word  is  usually  re- 
stricted are  those  which  likewise  make  their  own  way. 
They  are  principles  on  which  much  depends,  but  not 
themselves  derived  from  anything  else.  Their  test 
can  only  be  the  objective  test  of  universality.  Time 
and  space  are  a  priori  because  universal.  They  are 
for  this  same  reason  objective.  The  test  which  we 
are  working  out  can  not  be  applied  to  such  basic 
principles.  Derived  as  it  is  from  the  nature  of  the 
religious  experience,  it  is  a  derived  test,  and  the 
truths  which  it  validates  stand  several,  at  least  two, 
removes  from  a  priori  universality.  It  is  the  lack  of 
any  universal  element  in  religion  except  that  of  hav- 
ing an  exterior  source  that  has  forced  us,  for  any 
description  of  that  source,  to  this  derived  test.  As 
a  test,  it  has  no  business  with  a  priori  truths.  If 
they  come  through  religion  they  make  their  way  to 
acceptance  without  aid.  Such  a  truth  is  the  existence 
of  an  exterior  source.  But  further  we  can  not  go. 
In  religion  we  have  found  no  other  universal  element. 
No  other  a  priori  truth,  therefore,  can  come  to  us 
through  religion. 

The  test  of  validity  is  therefore  to  be  applied  only 
to  derived  truth.  It  is  better  to  put  this,  that  the 
recognition  of  anything  as  true  following  the  applica- 
tion of  this  test  makes  it  a  derived  truth.  It  is  well 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  141 

to  meet  the  objection  that  this  would  destroy  dog- 
matic theology,  and  take  from  the  church  all  right 
to  put  forth  dogmas.  So  far  as  those  dogmas  con- 
cern a  priori  truth,  they  will  meet,  if  true,  no  chal- 
lenge. Such  is  the  case  with  the  assertion  of  the 
existence  of  higher  powers.  Men  are  so  agreed  on 
this  that  the  assertion  of  it  rouses  no  antagonism. 
It  is  the  insistence  on  doctrines  which  they  do  not 
accept  which  gives  to  dogma  its  bad  name.  The  fact 
that  any  doctrine  needs  to  be  forced  on  men's  intel- 
lect, is  proof  that,  if  they  are  normal  men,  it  is  not 
universally  accepted,  and  hence  not  a  priori.  Rather 
the  churches  have  claimed  to  hold  the  key  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  utterances  of  the  prophets. 
Such  interpretation,  however,  depends  for  its  accep- 
tance on  some  agreement  as  to  the  terms  of  that  reve- 
lation. It  must  be  objective.  But  as  has  been 
already  pointed  out,  agreement  on  the  terms  of  re- 
ligion is  not  found.  Hence  objective  revelation  of 
this  type  is  impossible.  Men  must  test  the  church 
which  claims  infallibility,  and  that  test  must  be  of 
the  type  we  have  found.  The  reason  is  the  final 
arbiter  as  to  conflicting  claims.  Objective  truth  is 
truth  which  is  unopposed.  The  moment  it  meets  any 
considerable  opposition  it  so  far  loses  its  objectivity, 
and  must  submit  to  a  test  drawn  from  a  consideration 
of  its  nature  and  existence.  Such  a  test  is  not 
a  priori,  for  a  priori  truths  in  the  Kantian  sense  are 
deducible  from  the  necessary  conditions  of  experience 
in  general,  but  not  of  this  one  in  particular.  Dogma 
can  not  appeal  to  them  to  bolster  such  particular 
deductions.  As  to  the  place  of  dogma  as  a  method 


U2      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

of  discipline  and  teaching  within  the  church  we  have 
of  course  no  comment.  As  a  guarantee  of  intellectual 
certainty  it  is  useless. 

To  dogmatism  is  usually  opposed  the  will  of  the 
majority.  If  truth  is  not  the  possession  solely  of  a 
few  or  of  one,  if  the  guarantee  conies  not  from  some 
one  source,  then  the  decision  as  to  what  is  true 
would  seem  to  be  best  made  by  a  majority  vote.  To 
the  monarchical  or  aristocratic  conception  democ- 
racy would  seem  to  be  the  logical  opposite.  In  some 
respects  it  is.  Instead  of  declaring  that  one  or  a 
few  only  possess  the  key  to  truth,  it  declares  that  all 
who  are  religious  have  an  equal  insight  into  that 
truth.  This  is  the  primary  assumption  of  any 
democracy.  The  arguments  for  universal  suffrage 
are  based  on  the  assumption  that,  with  the  exception 
of  the  criminal  and  abnormal  classes,  each  man  has 
about  the  same  insight  into  what  is  best  for  him.  It 
places  all  men  on  an  equality  in  this  respect.  This 
is  clearly  the  doctrine  of  our  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence. The  justification  for  the  decision  as  to 
religious  truth  by  a  majority  or  preponderating  vote 
of  a  free  or  representative  assembly  assumes  likewise 
that  each  member  of  that  body  has  an  equal  ability  in 
judging,  if  not  in  discovering,  truth.  One  vote 
counts  for  as  much  as  another.  This  means  that  the 
truth  is  something  that  can  be  possessed  equally  by 
all.  It  is  something  concerning  which  there  is  or  can 
be  social  agreement,  and  that  agreement  is  decisive 
with  regard  to  it.  In  matters  of  action,  a  majority 
vote  means  that  each  one  voting  is  assumed  to 
have  equal  intelligence  in  judging  of  the  expediency 
of  the  proposal.  It  is  something  which  is  to  have 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  143 

objective,  social  existence.  The  judgment  is  made 
on  the  basis  of  the  results  of  former  collective  actions. 
We  judge  of  the  working  of  some  proposal  for  future 
activity  by  the  results  of  the  carrying  into  action  of 
similar  propositions  in  the  past.  So  the  majority 
vote  in  this  case  is  based  on  something  which  may  be 
equally  within  the  knowledge  of  all,  something  ob- 
jective. With  objective  truth  this  method  is  valid 
for  the  same  reason.  Where  the  question  at  issue 
may  be  equally  well  judged  by  all,  substantial  agree- 
ment among  those  present  will  come  nearer  the  truth 
than  the  judgment  of  any  one.  The  decision  of  the 
majority  is  better  than  the  judgment  of  one  be- 
cause its  nullifies  the  presence  of  personal  peculiar- 
ities. So  a  court  of  law  prefers  as  many  witnesses 
as  is  possible  so  far  as  they  are  of  equal  intelligence 
and  equal  opportunity  for  observation,  to  aid  in  a 
decision  as  to  fact.  So  also  the  use  in  our  courts  of 
the  jury.  The  judgment  of  twelve  men  as  to  matters 
of  fact  is  thought  better  than  the  judgment  of  one. 
To  turn  to  the  decision  of  numbers  as  to  truth  is  valid 
if  all  have  had  equal  opportunities  for  the  perception 
of  the  truth  under  discussion.  Certain  truths  or 
rather  facts  in  religion  can  be  so  decided.  Whether 
there  is  or  is  not  agreement  as  to  the  contents  of 
the  religious  experience  can  only  be  decided  by  a  con- 
sensus of  opinion.  Whether  that  experience  is  a 
pure  matter  of  feeling,  or  purely  of  intelligence,  or 
purely  "  mystical,"  is  a  question  of  fact,  and  every 
religious  person  has  equal  opportunity  of  arriving 
at  a  true  judgment.  In  these  cases,  therefore,  agree- 
ment among  numbers  of  people  is  a  guide  to  truth. 
The  test  of  truth  by  numbers,  equally  with  the  test 


144       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

by  agreement  with  dogma,  rests  on  the  assumption 
that  the  truth  is  given  in  objective  terms.  When  the 
truth  is  not  so  given,  there  is  a  serious  question 
whether  the  decision  of  even  all  but  one  of  mankind 
is  a  guide  to  the  truth.  It  is  just  the  religious  man 
who  asserts  that  numbers  do  not  guarantee  truth, 
and  that  he  is  justified  in  standing  out  against  the 
world.  In  so  far  as  he  believes  the  truth  to  be 
a  priori  and  objective,  equally  given  readily  to  any 
one,  he  is  wrong  in  this,  for  what  is  the  possession 
of  all  is  best  judged  by  the  voice  of  all;  but  in  so  far 
as  religious  truth  is  as  we  have  found  it  to  be,  derived 
and  not  objective,  he  is  right.  The  facts  of  gravita- 
tion were  known  to  all,  but  Newton  was  justified  in 
setting  his  judgment  against  the  judgment  of  the  rest 
of  the  world.  The  facts  were  common  property,  but 
the  theory,  which  is  derived  from  the  facts,  was  due 
to  the  insight  of  one  man.  The  man  untrained  in 
scientific  methods  and  scientific  deductions  is  not  as 
well  qualified  to  judge  as  is  the  scientist.  The  par- 
allel here  to  our  courts  of  law  still  holds.  While  the 
judgment  of  the  jury  as  to  the  facts  of  the  case  is 
taken,  the  interpretation  of  the  law  is  made  for  them 
by  the  judge.  Since  that  judgment  as  to  the  law  in 
the  case  depends  for  its  validity  on  a  trained  judg- 
ment, not  every  man  is  equal  in  his  judgment  concern- 
ing it.  It  is  true  that  our  highest  courts  decide  by 
a  majority  vote,  but  it  is  a  vote  of  those  thought 
best  qualified  among  all  the  nation  to  decide  such 
questions.  The  decision  is  by  those  trained  in  the 
law.  It  is  an  intellectual  decision,  of  deduction  from 
legal  principles.  The  illustration  applies  to  the  test 
of  religious  truth.  In  so  far  as  that  truth  is  de- 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  145 

rived,  we  can  not  trust  the  decision  of  the  man  un- 
skilled in  the  deduction  of  religious  truth,  but  must 
rest  our  assurance  elsewhere.  Even  among  experts, 
however,  numbers  do  not  assure  truth.  Some  new 
light  may  come  to  a  man  outside  the  ranks  of  the  pro- 
fessional theologian,  and  he  be  found  right  and  they 
wrong.  That  is  only  a  further  proof  that  numbers 
or  position  do  not  guarantee  the  validity  of  an  in- 
tellectual deduction. 

Authority,  whether  of  power  or  of  numbers,  does 
not  guarantee  the  truth  of  religion,  for  the  religious 
truths  are  those  which  we  deduce  from  our  expe- 
rience, and  numbers,  as  we  have  just  seen,  can  never 
give  such  a  guarantee  for  reason.  This  means  that 
the  test  of  the  accuracy  of  our  deduction  is  to  be 
sought  elsewhere.  It  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  social 
agreement,  nor  in  any  external  authority.  Since 
such  social  or  external  authority  can  be  valid  only 
for  objective  truths,  it  is  not  valid  for  us.  The  test 
must  lie,  therefore,  within  the  individual  experience. 
Each  judgment  must  meet  the  standard  of  individual 
judgments,  and  it  must  be  made  by  the  individual. 
This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  necessarily  capricious. 
The  individual  judgment  is  subject  to  its  own  test  of 
validity.  Science  does  not  reject  a  theory  because 
it  comes  from  one  man.  Each  scientist  as  he  accepts 
it  makes  the  same  judgments  as  did  the  author  of  it. 
He  accepts  it  not  because  his  fellow  scientist  proposed 
it,  but  because  he  himself  judges  it  to  be  true.  There 
comes  to  be  a  consensus  of  opinion  among  scientific 
men,  but  the  value  of  that  rests  on  the  value  of  each 
individual  judgment,  and  again  and  again  this  con- 
sensus of  opinion  has  been  proven  to  be  in  error.  The 


146      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

validity  of  the  doctrine  or  theory  rests  for  each  in- 
dividual on  his  own  ability  to  form  correct  judg- 
ments in  regard  to  the  deduction  of  the  theory.  He 
does  often  submit  to  the  superior  wisdom  of  a  master, 
but  only  because  he  makes  the  judgment  that  the  one 
he  follows  is  better  able  than  he  to  form  correct  de- 
cisions. It  is  not  position  or  numbers,  but  personal 
ability  that  is  concerned.  The  authority  still  rests 
in  the  individual  judgment.  This  is  the  basis  of  the 
freedom  of  religion,  as  it  is  of  science.  The  right  of 
every  man  to  his  own  opinion  of  God  does  not  depend 
on  his  right  to  a  private  revelation  of  God,  for  such 
a  revelation  has  no  standing  in  the  experience  of 
others,  but  in  his  right  to  make  his  own  deductions 
from  a  common  objective  experience.  It  is  the  free- 
dom of  science  which  the  theologian  claims,  the  oppor- 
tunity to  express  his  individual  judgment  that  it  may 
meet  the  criticism  of  other  individuals,  and  through 
the  mutual  friction,  the  truth  shine  more  clearly.  It 
is  not  the  freedom  of  the  individualist  to  disregard  his 
neighbors  and  go  his  own  way.  This  freedom  is  the 
freedom  of  open  discussion.  The  man  who  dogmat- 
ically asserts  his  right  to  his  own  opinion,  and  his 
right  to  propagate  that  opinion,  and  refuses  to  stand 
the  test  of  meeting  his  fellow  seekers  after  truth,  has 
no  valid  claim  to  that  freedom.  Not  because  every 
man  has  an  equal  insight  into  truth  is  he  free,  for  then 
the  majority,  which  is  against  him,  would  be  right  in 
forcing  its  view  on  him,  but  because  some  one  may 
have  a  clearer  insight,  and  a  greater  ability  to  discern 
the  truth,  should  each  be  given  freedom  of  expression. 
This  has  nothing  to  do  with  freedom  of  action.  A 
man  may  or  may  not  have  the  right  to  act  as  he 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  147 

thinks.  Only  he  should  be  able  to  tell  what  he  thinks. 
Where  no  self-evident  truth  furnishes  us  with  a  sure 
and  certain  test,  and  where  agreement  among  some 
great  number  is  no  guarantee  of  correctness,  we  must 
turn  to  the  experience  itself.  This  is  what  is  done 
in  the  development  of  every  scientific  theory.  The 
facts  are  observed,  and  determined  by  the  usual  meth- 
ods of  objective  observation.  They  are  certified  to 
by  agreement  among  careful  observers.  The  deduc- 
tions from  these  facts  are  then  made  by  the  individual 
judgment,  and  checked  by  other  individual  judgments. 
It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  every  careful  observer 
seeing  exactly  the  same  things,  it  is  possible  to  have 
several  theories  to  account  for  the  same  facts.  Each 
theory  must  be  a  logical  deduction  or  induction  from 
the  known  facts.  It  is  often  forgotten  that  a  theory 
is  really  no  more  than  a  test.  Where  any  one  of  sev- 
eral tests  will  equally  well  pass  judgment  on  alleged 
facts  or  alleged  deductions  from  the  facts,  any  one 
of  these  tests  is  in  so  far  an  accepted  theory.  They 
must  be  of  use  in  this  testing.  By  pointing  out  what 
are  the  qualities  necessary  to  account  for  the  facts, 
and  what  qualities  can  not  be  present  so  long  as  the 
facts  are  as  observed,  the  theory  furnishes  a  test  to 
save  time  in  future  inquiries.  The  theory  is  correct 
or  incorrect  according  as  it  rightly  or  wrongly  makes 
this  analysis  of  the  facts,  according  as  the  reasoning 
in  the  analysis  is  right  or  wrong.  The  accuracy  of 
the  theory  depends,  therefore,  on  the  correctness  of 
its  logical  procedure.  If  we  have  a  correct  theory 
of  some  physical  phenomena,  we  have  the  description 
of  the  things  whose  presence  or  absence  is  necessary 
to  account  to  those  facts.  This  enumeration  becomes 


148       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

the  basis  for  a  check  on  observation.  If  energy  is 
always  used  up  in  movement,  we  can  immediately 
brand  as  incorrect  an  alleged  observation  of  move- 
ment without  the  expenditure  of  energy,  as  scientists 
do  reject  the  possibility  of  perpetual  motion.  Of 
course  if  the  fact  should  become  well  enough  attested, 
the  theory  would  have  to  change,  but  until  the  theory 
is  proved  incorrect,  it  serves  as  a  test  of  the  accuracy 
of  the  observation  of  the  facts. 

It  is  of  this  type  that  we  have  seen  that  the  doc- 
trines or  theories  drawn  from  the  religious  experience 
must  be.  From  an  examination  of  the  agreed  facts, 
the  philosopher  or  theologian  analyses  out  the  neces- 
sary elements,  and  also  finds  whether  there  are  any 
elements  whose  presence  would  make  the  experience 
impossible.  The  accuracy  of  this  analysis  depends 
on  the  correctness  of  his  logic.  It  is  as  untrue  in 
religion  as  in  science  to  say  that  one  man's  opinion 
is  as  good  as  another's,  and  for  the  same  reason.  All 
are  not  equally  trained  in  logical  analysis.  But  the 
theory  of  religion  depends  no  more  on  insight  than 
does  science.  So  far  as  insight  plays  a  part  in  all 
theory  and  massing  of  facts  it  has  a  place  in  the 
forming  of  religious  doctrines,  but  no  more.  The 
test  must  therefore  follow  this  analysis.  When  made, 
when  the  elements  in  the  experience  are  seen  in  their 
right  relation,  then  it  is  possible  to  judge  which  of 
the  differing  forms  of  the  experience  is  nearer  normal. 
To  a  certain  extent  it  will  be  possible  to  accept  cer- 
tain forms  as  showing  or  revealing  more  clearly  than 
others  the  true  relationship  of  the  various  elements. 
Thus  we  shall  have  a  test  by  which  we  may  advance  to 
a  fuller  knowledge  than  is  possible  from  a  survey  of 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  149 

the  whole  of  the  religious  phenomena.  It  has  been 
objected  that  we  should  not  make  our  deductions  as 
to  religious  truth  from  the  lower  and  more  primitive 
forms.  This  is  true,  but  before  we  have  the  right  to 
label  one  form  as  primitive  and  another  as  advanced, 
we  must,  if  we  are  to  have  any  assurance  of  cor- 
rectness in  our  results,  work  out  and  use  a  test  by 
which  we  can  discern  with  some  certainty  between  the 
fuller  and  the  more  elementary  forms.  If  we  merely 
assume  that  Christianity  reveals  more  of  the  truth 
than  does  Mohammedanism,  there  can  be  no  intel- 
lectual assurance  of  the  correctness  of  our  theology. 
To  find  such  assurance  we  must  make  of  theology  a 
science,  and  use  scientific  methods. 

To  a  certain  extent  we  are  thus  forced  to  logic  for 
our  theology.  A  test,  however,  can  never  give  abso- 
lute assurance  of  truth.  It  is  always  a  test.  It  is 
dependent  first  on  correct  observation,  and  second  on 
correct  reasoning.  The  first  may  be  practically, 
through  long  continued  correction  and  checking  by 
many  observers,  rendered  reliable.  The  second,  the 
process  of  reasoning,  since  it  is  always  individual,  can 
not  be  so  certified.  The  methods  may  be  checked,  but 
at  most  it  is  only  a  guide  to  the  truth.  Certain 
things  in  science  as  in  religion  must  always  remain 
matters  of  theory,  not  because  we  have  any  reason 
to  doubt  their  truth,  but  because  of  the  possibility 
of  incorrect  reasoning  which  some  future  generation 
may  detect.  Proof  in  the  absolute  sense  does  not 
belong  to  scientific  theory.  Facts,  objective  truth 
as  we  have  called  it,  may  be  proven,  and  certainty  be 
reached.  To  keep  these  two  distinct  we  shall  not  at- 
tempt to  go  over  into  the  field  of  theory.  What  the 


150      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

test  is  and  what  forms  of  religion  it  would  call  the 
truer,  we  shall  therefore  not  attempt  to  say.  Limit- 
ing ourselves  to  the  task  of  proving  the  necessity  of 
a  scientific  test  for  religion,  we  leave  to  others  the  use 
of  such  a  test.  We  are  thus  kept  outside  the  whole 
realm  of  theory,  and  so  outside  of  the  science  of  re- 
ligion, and  have  to  deal  only  with  those  things  which 
may  be  proven.  This  latter  field  is  by  no  means  un- 
important even  for  the  science  of  religion,  for  until 
a  basis  such  as  we  are  striving  to  give  to  that  science 
is  reached,  the  results  of  its  work  will  have  no  more 
validity  than  the  dogmatic  pronouncements  of  ec- 
clesiastical authority.  Except  where  dealing  with 
facts,  as  in  the  history  of  religion,  scientific  study  in 
the  religious  field  has  not  met  with  the  recognition 
among  church  people  that  it  has  deserved,  because  of 
this  apparent  opposing  of  dogma  to  dogma.  When 
it  is  seen  that  the  scientific  theory  of  religion  has  a 
valid  and  a  necessary  place  in  theology,  we  shall  find 
theology  making  more  use  of  it. 

The  use  of  scientific  methods  in  the  study  of  re- 
ligion must  be  based  on  correct  observation.  Yet  the 
process  of  analysis  is  not  derived  from  that  observa- 
tion, though  the  analysis  itself  is.  The  process  is 
that  worked  out  through  long  ages  as  the  correct 
logical  method.  The  process  is  thus  independent  of 
religion.  Its  validity  depends  on  something  else  than 
on  the  religious  experience,  and  would  be  valid  even 
though  there  were  no  religion.  To  call  such  a  science 
merely  the  application  of  a  theoretical  test  is  there- 
fore not  to  do  it  justice.  The  test  which  is  applied 
is  the  result  of  the  same  methods  which  have  made 
possible  our  great  advance  in  the  control  of  the  forces 


THE  TEST  OF  RELIGION  151 

of  nature.  Similar  methods  are  giving  us,  at  least 
so  it  seems  to  the  optimist,  control  of  the  social  and 
economic  forces  in  the  world.  It  is  because  of  this 
general  validity  that  the  application  of  such  a  test  to 
religion  opens  the  way  to  a  practical  development. 
It  is  theory  that  has  led  the  way  in  the  advance  in 
these  other  fields  of  natural  and  economic  science.  It 
is  to  theory,  scientific  theory,  that  the  religious  world 
is  turning  more  and  more  in  search  of  a  solution  to 
its  problems.  The  very  part  of  the  process  which  is 
least  subject  to  guarantee,  the  mental  process  of 
reasoning,  is  the  means,  in  these  other  fields,  of  our 
modern  advance.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  ad- 
vance can  be  attained  in  religion,  if  the  analogy  with 
the  other  fields  of  human  endeavor  has  any  value,  by 
the  use  of  theories  and  tests'  which  are  not  absolutely 
beyond  error,  but  which  can  be  used  until  greater 
certainty  comes.  By  their  use  greater  knowledge  is 
attained,  and  thus  greater  certainty  made  possible. 
Just  as  the  search  for  the  process  that  would  trans- 
mute the  baser  metals  into  gold  has  led  to  modern 
chemistry,  so  even  an  incorrect  theory,  if  used,  may 
result  in  a  greater  and  fuller  knowledge  of  the  re- 
ligious experience,  and  of  its  revelations. 


LECTURE  V 
HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN 

In  a  survey  of  the  different  types  of  religion  we 
find  that  they  all  agree  in  placing  the  source  of  the 
religious  experience  outside  of  that  experience.  In 
approaching  our  problem  we  have  to  attempt  a  nar- 
rower definition  of  that  agreement.  The  whole  out- 
side is  a  large  field.  To  place  more  carefully  the 
source  of  religion,  we  need  to  know  its  relation  to 
other  divisions  of  life.  The  chief  of  these  fields  of 
life  is  human  life.  So  we  have  to  find  out  whether 
there  is  agreement  as  to  the  position  of  the  source 
of  religion  within  or  outside  of  human  nature.  To 
do  this  most  easily,  it  is  well  to  have  a  brief  outline 
of  the  position  of  the  various  religious  types  on  this 
point.  To  make  a  beginning  where  religion  is  least 
clear,  we  shall  start  with  animism. 

Animism  could  not  well  be  used  in  an  effort  to  prove 
directly  the  existence  of  God.  It  is  probably  to 
some  animistic  religions  that  reference  is  sometimes 
made  in  the  statement  that  some  tribes  have  no  con- 
ception of  superhuman  powers  in  the  universe.  It  is 
true  that  neither  that  nor  the  next  highest  religion, 
totemism,  gives  us  clear  ideas  on  this  subject.  One 
thing  they  and  especially  animism  do  present,  how- 
ever, is  the  belief  in  forces,  if  not  superhuman,  at 

least  not   inherent  in  man.     The  belief   in   sacred 

152  > 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         153 

stones  or  trees  points  to  the  attribution  to  these 
things  of  some  power.  The  savage  knew  as  well  as 
we  that  the  stone  was  not  a  man,  and  in  his  fear  or 
worship  of  it  he  differentiated  it  from  himself.  It  is 
true  he  did  not  understand  its  inorganic  nature  as  we 
do,  but  neither  did  he  have  any  clear  idea  of  human 
nature.  He  did,  however,  believe  very  strongly  that 
there  was  something  in  that  particular  stone  which 
could  affect  him  in  some  very  practical  and  important 
way.  He  was  convinced  that  it  was  not  merely  with 
men  that  he  had  to  deal,  but  with  powers  beyond. 
Whether  he  identified  these  powers  with  the  physical 
tree  or  stone  he  himself  could  not  say.  But  his  at- 
titude toward  them,  the  attitude  of  primitive  religion, 
shows  that  his  experience  had  reference  to  something 
which  was  not  like  his  fellow  men.  It  is  true  that  at 
times  he  may  have  held  this  same  attitude  toward  a 
fellow  man,  as  shown  by  the  tabu  which  often  sur- 
rounded king  and  priest.  At  such  times  he  regarded 
them  as  different  from  the  rest  of  mankind;  some- 
thing had  entered  or  been  born  in  them  which  was  not 
the  common  lot  of  man.  In  this  case  too,  he  dif- 
ferentiated between  his  nature  and  the  nature  of  the 
being  he  worshiped  or  feared.  The  very  center  of 
his  attitude  was  that  the  priest-king,  the  tree  or  the 
stone,  was  different  from  himself.  The  source  or 
object  of  his  experience  of  these  objects  and  of  his 
relation  to  them  is  therefore,  in  his  belief,  to  be  found 
outside  of  ordinary  human  nature.  The  religious 
object  is  conceived  as  superhuman. 

At  times  it  has  seemed  that  the  result  of  our  study 
of  totemism  would  be  to  conclude  that  it  was  not  re- 
ligion at  all,  if  we  define  religion  as  worship.  The 


154      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

totem  hardly,  according  to  some  views,  seems  to  be 
worshiped,  so  much  as  coerced  by  formulae,  or  bar- 
gained with  by  the  performance  of  the  proper  rites. 
With  the  definition  of  worship  in  the  narrow  sense 
we  are  not  here  concerned.  Whether  the  totem  is 
worshiped  or  bargained  with  equally  proves  it  some- 
thing apart  from  the  normal  idea  of  the  clan  or  tribe. 
While  it  may  be  thought  of  as  the  ancestor  of  the 
clan,  and  said  to  have  initiated  the  ceremonies  which 
the  clan  performs  now  as  worship,  yet  the  totem  is 
different  from  the  clan.  The  totem  is  in  relation  to 
the  clan,  but  even  when  most  personified,  it  is  through 
that  relation  that  it  has  a  part  in  the  clan  life.  The 
lion  or  the  corn  does  not  cease  to  be  non-human  when 
it  becomes  a  human  totem.  Perhaps  it  is  the  quali- 
ties of  physical  power  in  the  lion  or  of  nourishment 
in  the  corn  which  is  the  purpose  or  practical  effect 
of  the  relationship  for  the  clan.  It  is  because  the 
connection  with  the  totem  brings  something  that  the 
clan  can  not  get  through  its  own  human  power  that 
the  totemic  ceremonies  are  so  carefully  continued  and 
so  exactly  performed.  In  all  ages,  especially  where 
the  struggle  for  the  first  necessaries  of  existence 
presses  as  hard  as  it  does  upon  the  savage,  not  much 
time  is  put  on  things  which  could  be  attained  more 
easily  in  other  ways.  If  the  savage  believed  that  he 
got  nothing  from  his  totem  except  what  he  could  get 
from  himself,  his  totem  would  no  longer  be  of  interest 
to  him.  But  because  he  is  convinced  that  from  the 
totem  come  powers  which  he  himself  does  not  have, 
he  prizes  his  relationship  to  it.  The  object  of  his 
religious  attention  is  in  his  mind  clearly  outside  of 
humanity. 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         155 

Taking  its  beginning  from  the  formulae  of  animism 
or  the  practices  of  totemism,  prayer  and  especially 
sacrifice  is  common  to  all  the  higher  forms  of  religion. 
As  mankind  advanced,  the  sacrifice, —  mainly  at  first 
in  its  form  of  the  offering  of  the  god  in  the  sacrificial 
meal, —  and  invocations  to  the  god,  came  more  and 
more  to  take  the  form  of  petitions.  Probably  there 
always  remained  some  element  of  the  magic  idea  that 
the  god,  if  the  proper  words  were  uttered,  his  true 
name  spoken,  must  answer.  Still,  in  the  earliest 
hymns  of  the  Aryan  invaders  of  India,  as  in  the 
worship  of  Babylon  and  Egypt,  and  even  more  clearly 
in  that  of  Greece  and  Rome,  it  is  a  power  beyond  man 
which  is  addressed.  Sacrifice,  which  had  been  the 
offering  of  the  god,  came  to  be  an  offering  to  the 
god,  as  we  have  it  in  the  prevailing  idea  of  the  Old 
Testament  teaching  of  sacrifice,  so  prevalent  that  it 
almost  hides  the  earlier  idea  of  the  sacrificial  meal. 
The  primitive  worshiper  may  have  thought  that  he 
could  compel  or  constrain  the  god,  but  to  do  this  re- 
quired methods  which  were  not  the  ordinary  methods 
of  human  intercourse.  It  was  not  as  he  constrained 
men  in  daily  life,  but  in  a  far  different  way,  that  the 
priest  sought  to  obtain  from  the  god  his  request. 
The  god  was  in  closer  relation  to  that  ordinary  life 
than  many  to-day  believe  God  to  be  to  us,  but  still 
the  god  was  not  the  same  as  man.  So  easily  was  any 
deviation  from  normal  or  ordinary  manhood  looked 
on  as  divine,  that  those  men  whose  exploits  made  them 
seem  different  from  other  men  were  called  the  off- 
spring of  gods.  It  is  the  deviation  and  not  the  like- 
ness to  men  that  characterises  the  god.  For  all 
"  natural  religions,"  therefore,  we  may  be  sure  that 


156       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

the  object  of  religious  pursuit  was  conceived  as  super- 
human. 

Among  the  more  advanced  religions  Buddhism  may 
seem  to  offer  an  exception  to  this  agreement.  With 
its  teaching  that  god  and  man  are  alike  caught  in  the 
round  of  rebirth,  the  distance  and  distinction  between 
them  is  reduced  very  low.  If,  however,  we  look,  not 
on  the  worship  of  the  gods,  but  on  the  pursuit  of 
Nirvana,  or  of  enlightenment,  as  the  special  religious 
experience  of  the  true  Buddhist,  for  around  this  their 
whole  doctrine  of  the  Buddha  centers,  then  this  Way 
or  Path  becomes  the  object  of  their  religion.  What- 
ever it  may  be  that  constitutes  Nirvana,  the  Buddhist 
asserts  strongly  that  there  is  something.  And  he  as 
strongly  asserts  that  that  something  is  to  be  attained 
by  the  annihilation  of  all  human  desires.  Only  by 
ceasing  from  those  activities  which  we  of  the  west 
call  the  essence  of  human  life  can  this  enlightenment 
be  attained.  It  is  therefore  not  what  we  would  call 
human.  The  power  of  this  Way  therefore  takes  its 
rise  not  in  humanity,  for  to  tread  it  we  must  leave 
our  humanity  behind,  but  it  comes  from  something 
or  is  something  which  is  not  our  seeming  and  ordinary 
self.  The  Buddhist  religion  therefore  claims  to  be 
a  relation  to  something  even  more  different  from 
human  nature  than  are  the  gods.  They  share  some 
human  characters,  they  are  creatures  of  time  but  true 
religion  and  true  salvation  are  to  be  found  in  a  some- 
thing having  about  it  still  less  of  this  world  of  time, 
still  less  human.  It  is  true  that  for  some  forms  of 
Brahminism  allied  to  Buddhistic  reasoning  this  which 
is  found  by  self-abnegation  is  the  true  self.  That  is 
only  to  say,  as  the  Christian  often  does,  that  the 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         157 

ordinary  man,  the  man  as  he  lives  in  the  world,  is  not 
true  to  his  calling.  It  is  however,  this  ordinary  man 
from  whom  we  take  our  category  of  "  human."  The 
abnegation  of  this  normal  manhood  which  is  necessary 
for  these  forms  of  Brahminism  and  for  Buddhism 
points  clearly  to  the  fact  that  the  goal  of  endeavor 
is  something  beyond  the  normal  manifestations  of 
humanity. 

The  remaining  type  of  religion,  under  which  may 
be  grouped  all  the  forms  which  we  have  not  considered 
separately,  is  theistic  religion.  This  might  not  seem 
to  require  more  than  passing  notice,  since  the  very 
thing  that  gives  to  these  religions  their  character  is 
that  the  theist  believes  in  a  god.  The  problem  is  not 
quite  so  simple  as  this,  for  it  is  not  belief  that  we 
are  concerned  with,  but  the  religious  experience,  so 
that  what  we  care  about  is  whether  the  theist  at- 
tributes to  the  god  the  origin  of  his  religious  attitude, 
or  regards  the  god  as  the  object  or  end  of  that  atti- 
tude. It  is  possible  to  believe  in  a  god  and  do  neither 
of  these  two  things.  The  man  of  to-day  who  is  in- 
tellectually willing  to  believe  in  God  as  a  primal  force 
or  essence,  but  who  feels  no  religious  emotion  or  will 
centering  around  that  belief,  is  a  theist,  but  not  re- 
ligious. With  him  and  with  that  type  of  intellectual 
theism  we  are  therefore  not  concerned.  Religious 
theism  takes  two  forms,  which  we  may  conveniently 
call  deistic  and  mystical.  The  deistic,  as  most  clearly 
theistic,  confronts  us  first.  To  the  deist, —  and  that 
term  probably  includes  the  mass  of  people  who  have 
an  interest  in  the  churches,  yet  could  not  be  called 
devout,  the  occasional  attendants, —  to  them  God  is  a 
power,  rather  removed  from  their  everyday  life,  with 


158      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

whom  it  is  well  to  keep  on  good  terms.  At  times  he 
interferes  in  their  life  and  must  be  taken  account  of. 
I  do  not  mean  that  they  necessarily  believe  in 
miracles,  but  they  believe  that  at  least  at  great  crises 
God  touches  the  lives  of  men,  and  is  more  or  less 
present  in  the  social  and  moral  movements  of  the 
age.  Yet  because  they  do  not  feel  that  power  in  any 
direct  way,  they  tend  to  ignore  it.  They  may  at- 
tribute the  social  reforms  to  some  spirit  of  progress 
in  humanity,  and  so  put  the  source  of  their  religious 
experience  elsewhere  than  in  God.  With  these  it  is 
not  so  much,  however,  that  they  deny  the  presence  of 
God  in  religion,  as  that  they  have  little  religion. 
The  pursuit  of  other  ideals,  even  though  those  ideals 
are  tenement  or  labor  reform,  leaves  little  energy  or 
time  for  them  to  develop  the  religious  side  of  their 
nature.  Little  time  is  found  in  which  to  ask  the 
question  as  to  whence  came  the  impulse  that  led  them 
into  this  reform  movement.  In  a  certain  way  they 
are  religious,  but  their  religion,  their  consciousness 
of  some  power  outside  of  momentary  experience  sel- 
dom comes  to  consciousness.  They  seldom  have, 
therefore,  that  conscious  experience  which  we  are 
studying.  Yet  with  all  there  are  moments  when  they 
feel  that  the  power  that  sweeps  over  them  is  more 
than  their  ordinary  limited  will  could  accomplish. 
They  come  to  feel  that  they  are  the  spokesmen  for  the 
fundamental  powers  of  existence.  So  far  as  the  reli- 
gious Socialist  claims  that  his  activity,  his  social  ex- 
perience, is  the  result  of  his  awakening  to  the  fact 
that  such  principles  are  fundamental  to  existence, 
are  larger  than  the  mere  will  of  man,  he  attributes  his 
experience  to  something  beyond  man.  The  few  indi- 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN          159 

viduals  who  directly  deny  this  do  so,  probably,  in 
the  heat  of  conflict  against  the  pressure  of  orthodoxy 
and  the  "  rich  man's  "  religion,  and  do  not  call  their 
experience  religious.  For  the  deist,  so  far  as  he  is 
religious,  his  religion  is  a  relation  to  a  power  which 
is  not  limited  to  man. 

The  other  type  of  theism  and  of  religion  is  the 
mystic.  For  the  man  who  experiences  the  mystic 
trance  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  has  a  religious 
experience.  The  question  comes  as  to  his  belief  in 
regard  to  that  experience.  At  times  we  seem  to 
have  the  practice  of  Buddhism  without  its  positive 
teaching  of  a  goal.  To  outsiders  at  least,  devotion 
to  a  religious  object  seems  to  be  more  for  the  emotion 
or  trance  than  for  the  good  of  the  object  worshiped. 
The  ecstasy  seems,  whether  in  trance  or  in  the  stress 
of  emotion,  to  be  an  end  in  itself.  To  a  certain  ex- 
tent the  mystic  does  seek  to  induce  the  trance,  as  the 
revivalist  seeks  to  rouse  the  emotions  in  order  to  reach 
the  religious  experience  desired.  It  is  the  negative 
aspect  of  mysticism  which  proves  to  the  mind  of  the 
mystic  that  the  outsider  is  wrong.  The  more  the 
mystic  state  is  sought  as  an  end  in  itself, —  we  are  no 
longer  speaking  of  revivals, —  the  more  is  the  insist- 
ence on  self  surrender.  The  mind  must  be  emptied. 
It  is  not  even  a  question  as  with  Buddhism  of  enlight- 
enment. The  way  may  be  similar,  but  the  Christian 
mystic  sometimes  has  even  less  of  a  goal  in  sight  than 
has  his  eastern  brother.  Equally  though,  does  he  in- 
sist on  the  abolition  of  desire.  To  reach  the  desired 
state,  the  world  must  be  left  behind.  With  the 
Quaker  it  is  the  Inner  Light  which  points  the  way. 
Here  too,  then,  a  power  or  object  beyond  normal 


160      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

humanity  is  sought.  That  not  always  is  this  object 
clearly  identified  with  God  need  not  bother  us,  for 
"  God  "  is  usually  in  such  a  case  thought  of  in  non- 
mystical  terms,  due  to  the  pressure  of  orthodoxy. 
As  the  mystic  is  not  very  much  interested  in  the  in- 
tellectual outcome,  not  at  all  if  the  mystic  state  be 
his  sole  concern,  he  does  not  stop  to  correct  the  ordi- 
nary idea  of  God.  The  object  of  his  religious  en- 
deavors, however,  is  not  the  God  of  the  populace 
around  him,  but  the  power,  superhuman,  which  he 
finds  by  divesting  himself  of  his  humanity  in  the  mys- 
tic state.  For  the  mystic  too,  then,  the  source  or 
object  of  religion  is  believed  to  lie  beyond  the  limits 
of  human  personality. 

Such  is  the  claim  of  religion  in  all  its  forms.  It  is, 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  experience  it,  a  relation  to 
something  beyond  their  individual  life,  and  beyond  the 
sphere  of  human  limitation.  In  understanding  this 
claim  we  must  have  a  clear  idea  of  what  we  mean  by 
individual  and  supra-individual,  of  human  and  super- 
human. We  can  most  easily  start  with  the  idea  of 
individual.  And  first  the  logical  concept.  Our  first 
understanding  of  a  thing  when  we  think  of  it  as  an 
individual  thing  is  that  it  is  concrete.  In  some  way 
it  is  unique.  Even  if  there  are  thousands  of  other 
pins  so  near  like  this  one  that  we  can  not  tell  them 
apart,  still  they  do  not  have  the  same  relation  to 
space,  to  you  and  to  me  and  to  one  another  as  this 
one  has.  Though  alike,  they  are  not  this  one. 
Whatever  may  be  in  common,  this  pin  is  itself  not 
shared  by  any  other  pin.  In  its  tin  no  other  pin 
has  any  concern,  though  the  other  pin  be  tinned  from 
the  same  piece  of  ore.  Concreteness  is  not  synony- 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         161 

mous  with  "given."  The  shape  of  these  pins  is 
equally  "  given,"  but  being  the  same  for  many  pins, 
it  is,  in  relation  to  the  pins,  not  concrete,  because  it 
is  something  which  two  distinct  individuals  possess  in 
common.  In  relation  to  other  shapes,  however,  it  is 
concrete,  because  it  is  just  itself,  and  is  not  in  com- 
mon shared  by  itself  and  something  else.  So  far  as 
it  is  concrete  it  is  not  shared.  It  must  be  recognised 
also  that  concreteness  is  equally  with  its  opposite  a 
concept.  It  is  something  which  is  common  to  those 
objects  we  call  individuals.  Concreteness  is  there- 
fore not  itself  an  individual,  except  in  the  world  of 
concepts.  Whether  a  given  fact  or  thing  is  an  in- 
dividual depends  therefore  on  our  point  of  view.  If 
we  find  in  it,  and  emphasise,  its  complete  unlikeness 
in  some  particular  to  anything  else  in  the  world,  then 
it  is  concrete,  and  in  so  far  is  an  individual. 

A  human  individual  as  a  concrete  being  is  in  so  far 
unlike  any  other  human  being.  He  is  an  individual 
by  reason  of  this  partial  unlikeness.  Whatever  he 
may  share  with  others  is  not  concrete  and  individual. 
The  detective  uses  the  thumb  prints  to  prove  the 
identity  of  the  individual  because  they  are  never  just 
the  same  for  any  two  persons.  The  individual  char- 
acteristics are  those  which  a  person  does  not  share 
with  others.  Breathing  does  not  make  a  man  an  in- 
dividual, because  there  are  other  beings  who  breathe, 
but  being  in  this  part  of  space  at  this  time  does  mark 
him  off,  for  no  other  material  object  is  here  at  this 
time.  In  a  given  assemblage,  if  the  one  is  seated  and 
all  the  rest  standing,  that  one  has  an  individual  char- 
acter. From  this  point  of  view  an  individual  experi- 
ence is  one  which  is  not  shared  with  any  other  being. 


162      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

A  concrete  experience  is  by  its  concreteness  different 
in  some  respect  from  all  other  experiences.  Whether 
there  are  any  but  concrete  experiences  we  need  not 
ask  at  this  point.  If  when  some  other  person  looks 
at  an  object  it  is  seen  differently,  with  a  slightly  dif- 
ferent color,  and  from  a  different  angle,  then  we  have 
an  individual  experience  of  that  object.  Each  of  the 
two  differing  perceptions  is  concrete  and  individual 
because  of  the  difference.  The  individuality  is  shown 
in  the  contribution  which  is  made  to  the  experience 
by  the  perceiver.  Each  experience,  since  it  is  never 
in  just  the  same  relation  to  the  object  or  to  the  other 
perceptions  within  the  same  field  of  consciousness,  is 
so  far  unique.  Its  concreteness  and  individuality 
consist  in  the  quality  of  not-to-be-repeated.  The 
human  individual,  then,  is  that  existence  whose  parts 
will  never  be  found  in  exactly  the  same  way  in  any 
other  human  being.  He  is  concrete  and  individual 
because  of  this  unlikeness  to  all  else. 

Concreteness  is  sufficient  to  define  individuality, 
but  there  are  other  characteristics  which  are  impor- 
tant. In  a  sense  they  are  the  result  of  the  indi- 
vidual's concreteness,  but  it  is  easier  to  draw  out 
their  meaning  independently.  Chief  among  these  is 
the  determination  of  the  individual.  What  is  in- 
dividual is  fixed  and  unchangeable.  The  things  about 
an  individual  which  may  be  changed  are  not  what 
constitute  him  an  individual,  for  when  changed,  the 
resulting  being  is  different  from  the  preceding,  and 
so  is  another  individual.  We  then  have  two  concrete 
beings,  not  one.  We  say  that  the  individual  persists 
in  spite  of  change,  and  that  his  individuality  shows 
itself  in  his  persistence.  A  typical  case  is  that  of  the 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         163 

number  series  (1,  £,  3,  etc.).  The  terms  of  the  series, 
if  given  one  by  one  in  successive  moments  of  time,  are 
in  constant  change,  yet  the  series  remains  constant, 
and  would  not  be  a  series  without  the  change.  In  so 
far,  however,  as  the  series  is  something  common  to  its 
terms,  it  is  their  common  law,  it  is  not  concrete  and 
individual.  It  is  only  when  regarded  as  differing 
from  other  series  that  it  becomes  concrete,  as  from  the 
series  1,  4,  16,  etc.  Any  one  member  of  a  class  is  an 
individual  in  respect  to  the  class.  The  law  of  the 
series  persists  and  shows  itself  as  individual  even 
though  the  terms  change,  but  only  as  individual  com- 
pared to  other  changing  systems.  In  relation  to 
them  it  is  determined  by  whatever  is  the  difference 
between  them.  If  we  define  a  concrete  series,  we  have 
a  series  which  will  not  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the 
definition  of  another  concrete  series.  The  series  of 
even  numbers  can  not  be  so  defined  as  to  be  identical 
in  all  respects  with  the  series  of  odd  numbers.  Their 
concreteness,  their  individuality,  shows  itself  in  this 
fixedness  or  determination.  It  is  not  subject  to  our 
will.  Not  because  it  is  a  fact,  but  because  it  is  a 
fact  held  in  by  limitations  so  as  to  be  always  partially 
unlike  anything  else,  is  it  an  individual. 

Applied  to  the  human  individual  we  see  that  his 
limitation  is  important.  It  is  the  persistence  of  the 
unlikeness  of  one  man  to  another  throughout  life  that 
marks  the  individual  man.  Because  there  is  this 
fixedness,  there  is  limitation.  One  individual  can  not 
completely  transcend  the  limitation  and  enter  into 
another's  experience. 

Especially,  however,  is  the  logical  limitation  im- 
portant. Because  he  is  an  individual,  the  definition 


164       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

which  will  completely  designate  him  can  not  be  the 
definition  of  any  other  man.  An  individual  experi- 
ence can  not  be  defined  adequately  by  a  definition 
which  will  also  adequately  define  another  experience. 
Because  of  this  determination,  the  individual  is  logi- 
cally a  fixed  quantity.  Whatever  causes  him  to  be 
regarded  as  an  individual  fixes  him  in  some  one  qual- 
ity, at  least.  Because  he  is  unique  the  thing  which 
constitutes  that  uniqueness  can  not  be  lost  and  he 
remain  an  individual.  A  grain  of  sand  on  the  sea- 
shore can  remain  an  individual  grain  of  sand  only  so 
long  as  it  is  not  dissolved  in  water  and  its  shape  and 
position  lost.  Since  its  individuality  consists  in 
shape  and  position,  once  these  are  gone,  though 
chemically  it  may  be  the  same,  it  is  not  a  concrete 
individual  grain  of  sand.  So  with  the  human  indi- 
vidual. He  must  keep  certain  things  which  no  one 
else  has,  and  the  more  of  these  limitations  he  possesses 
the  more  individual  we  call  him.  Individuality  there- 
fore shows  itself  in  limitation  and  definiteness. 

The  individual  is  concrete,  and  determined  or 
definite.  Because  of  this  definiteness  he  is  also  lim- 
ited. In  whatever  constitutes  his  individuality  he 
not  only  can  not  change  that,  but  also  he  can  not  take 
on  other  qualities  inconsistent  with  it.  While  this  is 
an  evident  consequence  of  the  idea  of  the  persistence 
of  definiteness  in  the  individual,  it  needs  consideration 
by  itself.  As  an  individual  I  am  not  free  to  go  on 
expanding  and  seeking  larger  experience  wherever  I 
desire.  As  a  member  of  the  individual  race  called 
man  I  can  not  see  the  ultra-violet  rays  of  light.  As 
a  Caucasian  I  can  not  have  the  experience  of  a  negro. 
As  one  sitting  in  this  room  I  can  not  have  the  experi- 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         165 

ence  of  one  sitting  in  the  next  room.  I  may  go  into 
the  next  room,  but  I  can  not  know  just  what  is  hap- 
pening there  now.  A  series  is  concrete  because  it  can 
develop  only  in  certain  ways.  The  number  series 
can  not  include  fractions  so  long  as  it  is  an  individual 
series  and  concrete.  This  logical  limitation  becomes 
actual  the  moment  the  individual  tries  to  perpetuate 
himself.  When  he  tries  to  keep  his  particular  pecu- 
liarities, and  at  the  same  time  accomplish  something 
which  will  destroy  those  peculiarities,  one  of  two 
things  must  happen,  either  the  larger  experience  does 
not  come,  or  he  becomes  more  like  other  men,  and  less 
of  an  individual.  When  we  are  dealing  with  logical 
individuals,  as  in  a  number  series,  the  limitation  is 
also  actual.  So  long  as  according  to  the  rules  %  and 
£  are  4,  we  can  not  in  truth  make  their  sum  any  dif- 
ferent. We  are  limited  in  power  over  what  may  be 
called  our  own  creation  because  we  have  created  in- 
dividuals. Individuality,  so  long  as  it  is  preserved, 
gives  fixedness,  and  this  fixedness  means  limitation. 
Instead  therefore  of  calling  the  logical  individual  free, 
he  is  in  a  certain  sense  self  limited.  In  some  direc- 
tion, whatever  it  may  be  that  constitutes  him  an  in- 
dividual, he  can  not  seek  change.  He  has  not  ab- 
solute freedom. 

So  far  as  the  human  being  is  an  individual  he  is 
thus  not  free.  This  means  that  his  individual  ex- 
periences are  limited.  Because  of  their  individuality 
they  can  not  go  on  indefinitely  expanding  in  any  and 
all  directions.  If  I  have  an  individual  experience  of 
an  object,  unless  that  experience  can  cease  to  be  indi- 
vidual  and  be  shared  by  someone  else,  it  is  called  an 
hallucination  or  imagination.  All  objects  which  are 


166      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

social  experiences,  common  to  many  people,  are  ob- 
jects whose  experience  for  different  individuals  has 
not  much  individuality.  Only  when  many  people  see 
some  object  in  very  nearly  the  same  form  and  with  the 
same  qualities  do  we  call  it  a  material  reality.  So 
far  as  an  experience  is  individual  it  is  limited  in  its 
scope.  Of  this  the  social  agreement  is  the  opposite. 
So  far  as  we  agree  in  our  experience  with  others  we 
are  not  having  individual  experiences.  So  long  as 
our  experiences  remain  individual,  they  can  not 
change  in  a  way  that  will  destroy  these  differences. 
The  logical  limitation  is  here  an  actual  one  if  the 
individual  is  striving  to  perpetuate  these  differences. 
By  striving  to  be  distinct  from  others,  he  must  work 
against  those  things  which  he  has  in  common  with 
them.  His  experience  will  thus  be  limited  by  his  own 
will. 

The  field  of  limitation  will  vary  .  as  the  qualities 
which  mark  the  individual  vary.  All  individuals  will 
be  concrete,  determined  and  limited  in  part.  With 
reference  to  any  of  the  categories  of  experience  which 
are  not  included  among  these  limitations,  no  general 
rule  can  be  laid  down.  A  whole  number  has  no  fixed 
or  limited  place  in  space,  but  only  in  the  number 
series.  Partial  limitation  does  not  prevent  indefinite- 
ness  in  every  other  direction  but  the  one.  For 
further  definition  of  the  individual  experience  we  have 
therefore  to  turn  to  the  closer  study  of  experience 
itself.  The  one  point  which,  in  view  of  the  contro- 
versies about  the  existence  of  God,  is  important  for 
Us,  is  the  relation  of  individual  experience  to  time. 
Experience  comes  to  us  so  far  as  other  categories  are 
concerned,  and  so  far  as  the  present  is  involved,  in  one 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         167 

mass.  So  we  speak  of  the  field  of  experience.  When 
taken  with  reference  to  the  flow  of  time,  it  is  not  so 
continuous.  There  is  the  time  span,  or  specious 
present.  Though  the  boundary  lines  may  be  dim,  we 
experience  a  difference  between  our  past  and  our 
future.  The  individual  experience  has  a  fixed  place 
in  this  stream  of  time.  It  may  entirely  fill  our  con- 
sciousness, or  it  may  share  our  attention  with  other 
experiences,  but  as  an  experience  it  must  occur  now, 
at  this  particular  hour  and  day,  or  have  occurred  at 
a  definite  time.  It  is  the  experience  of  last  week  or 
of  to-day.  When  the  waning  or  waxing  is  gradual, 
we  may  not  be  able  to  put  definite  limits  to  it,  but 
at  its  maximum,  if  it  was  clearly  in  consciousness, 
it  has  a  definite  time  place.  That  is  to  say  that  ex- 
perience is  a  stream,  and  an  individual  experience  is 
some  definite  part  of  that  stream.  Just  as  the  num- 
ber 3  has  a  fixed  place  in  its  series  of  whole  numbers, 
so  my  present  experience  of  this  room  has  a  fixed 
place  in  its  series,  the  stream  of  my  mental  life.  As 
this  stream  is  a  temporal  series,  experience  to  be  in- 
dividual must  be  limited  in  time.  It  may  extend 
over  all  time,  if  it  is  the  experience  of  an  eternal 
being,  but  it  does  so  by  being  his  experience  at  each 
moment  of  time.  It  is  like  a  series  of  1,  11,  111,  etc. 
Each  term  is  composed  of  ones,  which  form  the  series, 
but  they  do  so  only  by  forming  each  term.  So  each 
individual  experience  has  a  definite  time  place.  This 
definiteness  in  time  is  not  always  prominent,  but  if 
our  memory  is  good,  looking  back  on  it,  we  can  date 
it,  or  in  any  case  we  can  partially  date  it  as  past  or 
present.  A  thing  to  be  given  in  individual  experience 
must  therefore  be  given  definitely  in  time. 


168      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

What  is  true  of  our  perception  of  our  own  experi- 
ence holds  true  of  our  experience  of  another  indi- 
vidual. For  us  a  human  being  is  not  a  logical  indi- 
vidual simply,  such  as  a  number  or  a  star,  but  a  being 
with  whose  experience  we  may  come  in  touch.  That 
experience,  like  any  experience,  has  a  fixed  place  in 
time.  Not  in  our  time  series  is  it  to  be  found,  it  is 
true,  but  it  may  be  correlated  with  ours.  To-day 
you  are  having  such  and  such  experiences  and  I  such 
and  such  others.  Both  have  place  to-day.  To 
realise  an  experience  as  belonging  to  another  indi- 
vidual, we  must  recognise  it  first  as  being  an  indi- 
vidual experience.  There  must  be  something  in  it 
to  distinguish  it  from  our  own  experiences.  As  an 
individual  experience  partly  in  our  consciousness,  it 
has  a  definite  place  there  in  the  stream  of  time.  We 
know  when  we  first  met  or  heard  that  individual.  So 
in  the  perception  of  another  human  individual  we  give 
or  find  that  individual  in  a  definite  place  in  the  stream 
of  time.  So  far  as  human  individuality  goes,  indi- 
viduality means  definiteness  in  time.  Those  experi- 
ences which  bring  most  clearly  another  personality 
to  our  attention  thereby  fix  themselves  definitely  in 
our  life  at  a  definite  point. 

In  general,  that  which  is  extra-individual  is  the 
logical  opposite  of  the  individual.  Yet,  because  the 
same  thing  may  be  both  individual  and  extra-indi- 
vidual, a  careful  definition  is  necessary  from  the  basic 
point  of  view ;  that  is,  we  will  approach  the  definition 
of  the  extra-individual  without  reference  to  our  defini- 
tion of  individuality,  except  as  that  may  guide  us  to 
the  prominent  points.  First,  what  is  extra-individual 
is  what  is  general  or  common.  The  general  is  usually 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN          169 

defined  so  as  to  be  the  logical  opposite  of  the  indi- 
vidual. In  one  sense  extra-individual  and  general 
are  synonymous,  but  there  are  other  qualities  in  the 
extra-individual  which  the  word  "  general "  does  not 
bring  out.  But  that  word  is  important.  The  gen- 
eral is  to  be  found  in  more  than  one  experience.  It  is 
something  held  in  common  by  two  or  more  individ- 
uals. It  is  thus  a  tie  between  them.  By  it  we  may 
form  those  particular  individuals  into  a  class.  The 
general  character  of  man,  his  upright  attitude,  and 
so  forth,  make  it  possible  for  us  to  distinguish  be- 
tween mankind  and  the  lower  animals.  That  which 
is  extra-individual  is  so  because  it  is  thus  common  to 
more  than  one  individual.  Logically  the  general  ex- 
periences are  the  basis  of  all  advance.  The  common 
tie,  if  contrasted  with  other  general  experiences,  be- 
comes itself  an  individual.  Man  is  one  individual 
race  among  the  higher  animals.  The  animal  king- 
dom itself  is  an  individual  part  of  the  universe.  So 
the  extra-individual  may  become  individual.  It  is 
general,  however,  only  so  long  as  it  is  recognised  as 
something  found  in  common  in  several  experiences. 
In  relation  to  these  it  is  not  an  individual  experience. 
The  extra-individual  is  therefore  that  which  is  com- 
mon to  two  or  more  individuals.  As  the  individuals 
which  interest  us  are  experiences,  we  may  say  that 
what  is  common  or  general  in  experience  is  extra- 
individual.  It  is  the  common  tie  or  bond. 

As  a  tie  between  individuals,  the  "  general  "  partly 
defines  those  individuals.  If  their  individuality  con- 
sists simply  in  what  general  terms  apply,  and  what 
their  arrangement  is,  these  general  terms  or  qualities 
taken  together  will  completely  describe  the  individual. 


170      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

In  any  case  they  partly  describe  it.  Logically  they 
partly  determine  it.  It  is  on  the  basis  of  these  com- 
mon qualities  that  we  group  individuals  into  classes. 
On  this  account  the  general  or  class  terms  form  the 
basis,  and  give  us  the  possibility  of  conception,  and 
so,  of  reasoning.  So  far  as  it  is  general,  the  class 
term  is  free.  It  is  the  limiting  common  factor  in 
the  group.  By  use  of  it  all  that  do  not  come  under 
its  sway  are  not  influenced  by  it.  That  is,  those  in- 
dividuals which  do  not  have  this  character  are  not  re- 
lated to  other  individuals  by  it.  Its  influence  is  this 
relating  of  one  to  the  other.  The  limiting  is  not 
merely  static,  but  logically  determinative.  Without 
this  common  quality,  there  would  be  no  class  group- 
ing and  without  the  class  conception  we  would  have 
no  relation.  The  forming  of  the  relation  is  a  result, 
since  the  relation  appears  in  the  mind,  of  the  recog- 
nition of  this  common  factor.  Or  we  may  regard  the 
relation  as  existing  before  recognition  of  it  by  the 
mind,  then  the  relation  determines  the  perception  by 
us  of  its  existence,  as  we  recognise  this  common 
factor.  Whether  we  start  with  the  relation  or  with 
our  experience  of  it,  at  the  end  with  which  we  start 
we  find  logical  determination.  Either  the  relation 
brings  to  pass  the  form  of  perception  as  a  general 
quality,  or  the  common  quality  forces  us  to  conceive 
the  relation.  In  either  case  there  is  a  one-directional 
relation.  One  term  to  this  relation  is  the  logical 
explanation  or  gives  that  explanation  for  the  other 
term.  A  general  experience  is  related  to  the  indi- 
vidual experience  in  this  way.  It  is  the  string  which 
binds  them  together.  One  such  string  is  the  self,  the 
human  individual  taken  as  a  whole.  The  common 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         171 

quality  rests  here  perhaps  in  the  body,  but  wherever 
it  is,  it  shows  itself  as  a  determining  factor.  Our 
idea  of  the  individual  is  built  upon  those  experiences, 
it  is  those  experiences  bound  together.  The  type  of 
the  individual  therefore  depends  on  the  common  char- 
acter. To  our  perception  it  is  determined  by  that 
character.  General  concepts  are  thus  the  reverse  of 
static.  Taken  in  a  static  form,  the  individual  is 
fixed,  he  is  determined  as  different  from  other  indi- 
viduals. Taken  as  dynamic,  the  character  of  the 
individual  is  the  result  or  cause,  whichever  way  we 
read  the  relation,  of  the  inclusion  of  some,  and  the 
exclusion  of  other,  experiences  from  that  group  which 
we  call  the  individual  man.  The  presence  of  some 
determining  factor  marks  our  conception  of  general 
qualities  or  terms. 

To  be  determinative,  the  general  can  not  be  en- 
tirely limited.  This  we  find  is  the  case.  A  general 
term,  while  as  one  of  a  class  inclusive  of  itself  it  may 
be  partially  limited,  as  regards  the  terms  which  com- 
pose it,  can  not  be  so  limited.  If  in  a  line  the  thing 
which  marks  off  one  individual  from  another  is  posi- 
tion, or  distance  from  the  starting  point  of  the  line, 
then  the  line  itself  must  be  unlimited  in  direction.  As 
a  quality  common  to  all  the  individual  points  in  the 
line,  it  can  not  itself  have  any  individual  position  so 
far  as  distance  from  the  start  is  concerned.  It  must 
include  all  such  distances.  The  general  or  extra- 
individual  term  must  be  unlimited  in  just  those  di- 
rections where  the  individual  is  limited.  For  those 
qualities  which  are  common  to  all  human  individuals, 
there  can  not  be  limits  formed  by  the  individual 
characters  of  men.  Walking  can  not  rightly  be  lim- 


172      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

ited  in  conception  to  any  one  kind  of  walking,  but 
must  include  all  the  differing  individual  gaits.  Being 
thus  partially  unlimited,  the  general  characters  of 
men  must  be  somewhat  indefinite.  In  the  direction 
where  the  common  qualities  must  be  all  inclusive,  there 
can  be  no  boundaries.  We  must  remember  that  as 
regards  the  concrete  and  distinct  experiences  that 
make  up  our  personal  life,  personality  or  character 
is  a  general  term.  It  is  the  common  factor  in  all 
these  various  types  and  instances  of  mental  content 
and  mental  experience.  It  is,  therefore,  as  regards 
these  smaller  bits  of  experience,  unlimited.  While 
vision  must  relate  itself  to  material  facts,  and  has  to 
do  with  experience  of  the  physical  world,  and  muscle 
sensation  has  to  do  with  a  feeling  of  activity  in  that 
world,  the  personality  has  no  such  necessity  laid  upon 
it  of  relation  to  a  world  found  only  in  space.  Be- 
cause it  is  general,  it  is  not  bound  by  those  limitations 
of  partial  human  experience.  So  of  those  things 
which  are  common  to  all  human  individuals.  What 
is  human  can  not  be  limited  to  any  one  type  of  hu- 
manity. A  human  being  as  such  is  neither  black  nor 
white  nor  brown,  and  a  picture  of  him  can  not  be 
made.  In  these  directions  the  concept  of  humanity 
is  unlimited  and  hence  indefinite. 

The  mark  of  the  human  concrete  experience  is  its 
place  in  the  stream  of  time.  Each  individual  or  dis- 
tinct experience  is  such  largely,  if  not  entirely,  by 
its  having  its  particular  place  in  the  stream  of  our 
consciousness.  The  individual  personality,  since  it 
is  the  common  element  in  each  moment  of  that  stream, 
can  not  have  any  definite  place  in  it.  Human  per- 
sonality as  such  is  therefore  not  datable.  Since 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         173 

this  is  true  as  regards  the  individual  experience  it  is 
even  more  evident  when  we  take  into  account  all 
human  individuals.  A  man  can  not  bring  to  his 
mind  himself  as  non-existent  just  because  he  does  not 
give  to  his  self,  that  is  to  his  personality,  any  place 
in  the  series  of  time.  Having  no  place,  it  can  not 
lose  that  place.  It  is  an  element  common  to  all  of 
his  experience.  Only  by  reference  to  things  outside 
his  experience,  found  in  the  experience  of  other  in- 
dividuals, can  he  date  his  own  experience.  But  as  re- 
gards his  own  knowledge,  he  has  always  existed  and 
always  will  exist.  The  same  is  true  of  his  concep- 
tion of  personality  in  general.  Since  for  him  per- 
sonality has  no  time  character,  but  is  to  be  found 
in  all  time,  so  for  all,  for  human  personality  in  gen- 
eral, he  makes  the  same  deduction.  We  do  not  need 
to  be  reminded  that  this  is  the  basis  for  many  of  the 
stronger  arguments  for  immortality.  Whether  justi- 
fied or  not  depends  on  how  far  our  ideas  of  per- 
sonality hold  true  in  the  world  of  fact.  Of  the  fact 
that  we  do  conceive  personality  to  be  thus  timeless 
there  can  be  no  dispute.  If  we  are  to  set  limits  to 
humanity,  it  can  only  be  by  giving  human  person- 
ality a  place  in  another  series  in  which  it  will  be  an 
individual  episode.  As  general  and  not  individual,  it 
has  no  definite  place  in  time.  The  logically  supra  or 
extra  and  inclusive  individuality  must  have  this  in- 
definiteness  as  to  date.  To  include  experiences  of 
various  dates,  it  must  itself  be  indefinite  in  tem- 
poral place.  The  source  of  religion,  or  God,  can 
only  be  conceived  as  eternal. 

In  discussing  individuality,  we  have  referred  to  the 
human  individual,  but  have  not  considered  humanity 


174       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

as  a  whole.  This  we  must  now  do,  because  an  experi- 
ence might  be  supra-individual,  found  in  many  indi- 
viduals, and  yet  not  be  found  outside  of  humanity. 
In  defining  our  meaning  of  human,  we  have  to  define 
this  particular  one  among  the  individual  types  of 
being.  Any  individual  existence,  whether  of  what 
we  call  one  being  or  of  an  individual  class,  is  regarded 
as  individual  because  of  the  possession  of  certain 
qualities  which  other  individuals  do  not  possess. 
Man  has  to  be  defined  in  accordance  with  this,  in 
terms  of  those  characteristics  which  are  peculiar  to 
humanity.  Not  every  quality  that  man  possesses 
enters  into  this  definition.  He  has  existence,  but  so 
has  every  real  thing,  so  existence  is  not  a  thing  we 
can  use  in  our  definition.  It  is  not  a  mark  of  human 
nature,  though  always  present  in  human  beings.  In 
this  sense  it  is  not  to  be  classed  as  human.  There 
may  be  other  qualities,  which,  though  not  known  to  be 
found  in  other  beings,  yet  may  be.  We  have  there- 
fore no  right  to  be  dogmatic  in  limiting  the  sphere  of 
some  quality  found  among  men,  unless  that  quality 
is  essential  to  our  understanding  of  humanity. 
Where  its  absence  would  give  us  a  creature  unlike 
man,  and  its  presence  in  other  beings  would  make 
them  practically  men,  we  have  a  right  to  call  that 
quality  an  essential  mark  of  humanity.  There  may 
also  be  some  quality  whose  absence  is  necessary  to 
our  understanding  of  human  characters.  Its  pres- 
ence is  therefore  a  mark  of  the  non-human.  In  this 
case,  its  absence  would  not  make  us  regard  other 
beings  as  men,  unless  again  the  quality  was  so  promi- 
nent that  its  absence  is  almost  sufficient  by  itself  as 
a  mark  of  humanity.  It  is  evident  that  all  the  ex- 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         175 

perience  which  falls  to  a  man  is  not  in  this  sense 
human  experience.  Human  qualities  are  those  which 
mark  off  mankind  from  other  beings.  This  use  of 
the  term  is  necessary  if  we  are  not  to  be  misled  by 
it,  and  simply  because  an  experience  is  found  among 
men  claim  that  therefore  it  can  be  found  and  have 
its  source  nowhere  else.  We  shall  restrict  our  use 
of  the  word  human  to  those  qualities  which  are  lim- 
ited to  human  beings. 

On  the  physical  side  the  features  of  mankind  are 
such  as  to  plainly  distinguish  him  from  the  other 
types  of  animal  life.  Among  the  various  kinds  of 
physical  beings  known  to  us,  there  is  none  at  all  like 
man.  His  nearest  kin,  the  apes,  are  plainly  dis- 
tinguished. Even  the  lowest  forms  of  man  have  the 
upright  gait,  and  the  physical  characters  we  call 
human.  Where  there  comes  a  nearer  likeness  to  the 
ape  we  are  so  fixed  in  our  usage  of  the  word,  that 
what  we  dispute  is  whether  these  are  or  are  not 
really  human  beings.  Even  if  the  borderland  is 
vague,  human  characteristics  are  so  definite  that  for 
the  mass  of  mankind  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
human  beings  are  distinct  in  looks  from  all  other 
animal  life.  In  the  social  life  of  civilised  man,  which 
we  recognise  as  the  normal  life,  normal  even  for  what 
we  call  savages,  as  shown  in  some  form  of  clan  or- 
ganisation, in  the  use  of  weapons,  and  in  social  co- 
operation, we  find  features  as  distinctly  belonging 
to  man  as  does  the  form  of  his  body.  The  rudi- 
ments may  be  found  among  the  lower  animals,  but 
not  as  they  are  found  in  and  mark  off  man.  The 
ability  to  recognise  and  use  other  beings,  whether  a 
stone  or  piece  of  wood  as  a  weapon,  or  a  man  as  an 


176      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

assistant  in  accomplishing  what  he  wants,  is  dis- 
tinctive of  man.  This  holds  only  with  the  general 
class  of  physical  beings.  Cooperation  among  angels, 
if  they  exist,  is  not  in  question,  for  such  cooperation 
is  not  physical.  The  human  being  is  thus  one  among 
physical  beings,  and  marked  off  from  them  by  this 
social  cooperation.  We  may  perhaps  condense  the 
statement  to  the  form  that  one  distinguishing  mark 
of  humanity  is  its  social  life.  Not  by  gifts  of  sight 
or  hearing,  or  scent,  has  man  won  his  rule  over  the 
animal  world,  but  by  this  willingness  and  ability  to 
have  assistance  in  the  contest.  The  human  experi- 
ence, as  distinct  from  what  is  not  especially  human, 
is  therefore  preeminently  a  social  experience. 

This  social  life  is  to  be  attributed  to  man's  in- 
telligence, so  that  intelligence  may  be  said  to  dis- 
tinguish man  from  all  other  physical  beings.  Bear- 
ing in  mind  our  purpose  to  reach  some  conclusion  as 
to  the  justice  of  the  claim  of  religion  that  it  pro- 
ceeds from  an  intelligence  beyond  man,  our  princi- 
pal concern  must  be  with  the  distinctive  features  of 
the  human  intelligence  as  compared  with  the  intelli- 
gence of  possible  higher  and  non-physical  beings. 
Man's  intelligence  on  its  positive  side  is  marked  by 
what  may  be  called  the  power  of  self-control.  Some 
have  argued  that  intelligence  and  consciousness  arise 
only  when  action  is  halted  by  some  inner  conflict, 
and  that  consciousness  and  intelligence  come  in  to 
solve  the  problem  and  allow  action.  The  human 
being  is  able  to  weigh  results,  and  we  call  that  man 
the  highest  type  of  man  who  does  exactly  what  he 
intends  to  do.  There  is  a  use  of  the  word  human,  to 
excuse  the  yielding  to  emotion,  as  when  we  say  that 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         177 

some  act  is  wrong,  but  "  human,"  which  seems  to 
contradict  this.  Such  a  use,  however,  does  not  mean 
that  weakness  is  a  distinguishing  mark  of  men,  but 
only  that  it  is  usually  found  among  men.  That  use 
may  be  allowable,  but  it  is  not  what  we  are  after. 
So,  restricting  the  word  human  to  mean  that  which 
marks  man  off  from  other  beings,  we  find  this  mark 
in  the  intelligent  will,  the  conscious  judging  and  fore- 
casting of  results,  and  then  the  execution  of  what  is 
planned.  Even  our  emotions  we  seek  to  bring  under 
control,  and  the  more  man  advances,  the  more  he 
is  taught  to  control  his  failings.  The  American 
Indian  was  taught  to  suffer  in  silence,  and  we  Ameri- 
cans do  not  weep  in  public.  Man  is  forced  to  con- 
trol his  desire  for  blood  vengeance,  and  moderate 
his  anger.  This  means  that  the  subjection  of  the 
emotions  is  human.  A  being  without  emotions  is 
something  that  we  can  not  call  human.  And  those 
experiences  where  we  have  no  emotions  to  subdue, 
are  not  the  ones  we  call  typical.  Any  intelligence 
can  solve,  even  more  easily  than  we,  our  scientific 
problems  and  our  business  worries,  but  only  a  being 
with  emotions  and  with  the  desire  to  subdue  them  can 
have  the  typically  human  conflicts.  The  human  in- 
telligence in  its  positive  work  thus  rests  on  this  con- 
flict. The  absence  of  the  conflict  would  leave  us 
with  something  else  than  a  human  being. 

The  positive  side  of  intelligence  is  this  struggle. 
On  the  negative  side  we  find  the  limitations  of  sense 
perception.  This  is  expressed  by  the  psychologist 
by  saying  that  every  idea  has  as  content  only  what 
we  have  experienced.  The  human  intelligence  is  the 
intelligence  of  a  physical  being.  As  compared  with 


178      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

possible  non-physical  beings,  this  gives  it  its  dis- 
tinguishing character.  Let  the  conceptual  form  be 
what  it  will,  the  material  of  human  experience  must 
be  from  the  field  of  sense  perception,  that  is,  from  the 
material  world.  So  far  as  he  transcends  that  world, 
man  is  no  longer  a  physical  being.  To  be  human  he 
must  be  physical.  Man  is  primarily  known  as  one 
among  the  types  of  physical  life.  If  he  transcends 
the  physical  world,  therefore,  man  transcends  his 
own  humanity.  The  human  intelligence  is  the  intelli- 
gence which  is  concerned  and  is  in  touch  with  the 
physical  world.  This  is  true  both  as  regards  the 
lower  animals  and  as  regards  higher  beings.  Man's 
intelligence  makes  it  possible  for  him  to  use  fire  arms 
and  drive  off  the  wild  animals,  and  also  to  build 
houses  and  live  with  a  comfort  those  animals  do  not 
know.  As  regards  higher  beings,  man  is  limited  to 
this  physical  world  for  his  positive  experience.  Hu- 
man life  is  a  life  lived  in  the  midst  of  the  effort  to 
maintain  physical  life.  If  at  times  men  have  seemed 
to  put  their  whole  energy  into  the  effort  to  forget 
that  life,  the  mass  of  men  has  never  followed. 
Asceticism  has  remained  a  counsel  of  perfection,  for 
to  the  great  majority  of  men,  and  even  to  the  ascetic, 
human  life  is  physical.  The  limitations  of  that  in- 
telligence which  is  distinctive  of  human  life  is  there- 
fore that  it  is  bound  to  the  physical  world. 

The  typical  man  must  therefore  be  one  in  whom 
the  social  life  is  evident,  one  whose  life  contains 
physical  emotions  together  with  the  will  to  control 
them,  and  whose  intellectual  life  is  centered  on  the 
physical  existence.  To  be  able  to  make  the  assertion 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         179 

that  a  given  experience  must  be  limited  to  the  bounds 
of  human  experience  and  human  life,  that  experience 
must  show  these  qualities.  There  may  be  other  char- 
acteristics which  mark  humanity,  but  these  there 
surely  are.  No  experiences  which  do  not  show  these 
marks  can  be  with  any  assurance  limited  to  man.  If 
it  is  not  social,  it  may  be  an  experience  of  something 
kin  to  the  spirit  of  the  lower  animals,  or  what  we 
sometimes  conceive  to  be  the  impersonal  attitude  of 
the  universe.  As  the  rain  falls  on  the  just  and  on 
the  unjust,  so  disregard  of  our  fellow  human  beings 
may  be  more  fundamental  than  our  social  attitude. 
In  any  case  it  can  well  occur  in  other  beings  than 
in  men.  If  some  experience  touches  a  world  which 
is  not  physical,  it  may  be  real,  but  it  can  not  be  re- 
garded as  distinctive  of  humanity.  Whatever  non- 
physical  powers  there  may  be,  share  in  such  an  ex- 
perience. Because  man  has  it  is  no  reason  to  assume 
that  no  other  than  man  is  in  touch  with  such  a  world. 
But  the  human  individual  or  typical  superman  limits 
his  attention  to  physical  life.  Perhaps  this  is  wrong, 
and  mankind  will  grow  into  something  different  from 
what  it  is  now.  But  now,  even  for  the  religious  man, 
it  is  eat  or  starve.  So  we  start  our  religious  work 
in  the  slums  with  the  giving  of  physical  comfort,  and 
our  missions  abroad  with  medical  work.  If  we  find 
some  experience  limited  to  the  physical  world,  yet 
social  in  its  character,  and  involving  a  conflict  of  the 
emotion  and  the  will,  we  then  would  be  justified 
in  asserting  that  its  origin  must  be  within  human- 
ity. 

When  we  come  to  the  ideal  of  the  super-human, 


180      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

or  extra-human,  we  have  to  remember  that  we  are 
concerned  not  with  what  has  no  place  in  human  ex- 
perience, the  unhuman,  but  with  those  experiences 
which  do  not  bear  the  distinguishing  human  stamp. 
They  may  have  a  place  in  every  human  being,  but 
since  they  are  or  may  be  found  also  in  other  beings, 
we  can  not  rightly  designate  them  as  simply  and 
typically  human.  The  first  result  of  this  is  that 
they  will  not  have  a  necessary  connection  with  the 
human  body.  Anything  that  can  apply  only  to  man 
as  a  physical  being,  distinct  from  other  physical 
beings,  is  inevitably  limited  to  humanity ;  but  what  is 
not  so  limited  may  apply  to  other  beings.  This  pos- 
sibility of  superhuman  experiences  by  man  may,  at 
the  outset,  be  called  an  impossibility  if  we  interpret 
the  psychological  theory  that  the  contents  of  every 
experience  can  come  only  from  the  sense  world,  that 
we  can  know  only  what  we  see,  hear,  taste,  and 
touch,  to  mean  that  we  are  thereby  shut  up  to  what  is 
limited  to  man.  But  it  is  possible,  and  a  fact,  that 
we  do  experience  through  our  senses  other  beings 
than  men.  The  fact  that  within  our  world  we  make 
a  distinction,  as  we  have,  of  the  human  and  super-  or 
extra-human,  shows  that  there  is  some  difference, 
some  line  of  distinction,  which  we  recognise.  What- 
ever is  found  to  be  in  common  to  man  and  the  lower 
animals,  such  as  the  possession  of  a  heart,  can  not 
rightly  be  claimed  as  distinctly  human.  What  is 
in  man,  then,  but  does  not  refer  to  his  body  and 
physical  nature,  falls  under  this  other  category.  As 
in  man  and  also  in  other  beings  we  can  call  it  super- 
human. It  is  logically  a  larger  class  than  humanity, 
since  other  types  of  being  are  included  within  it. 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         181 

The  superhuman,  then,  will  be  without  reference  to 
man's  physical  limitations. 

The  superhuman  will  also  not  be  limited  to  man's 
social  life.  That  was,  as  we  have  seen,  the  distin- 
guishing feature  of  man  as  compared  with  the  lower 
animals.  Also,  since  the  social  life  in  question  is  a 
physical  life,  it  can  not  apply  to  any  non-physical 
beings.  We  must  not  intrude  here  the  religious  idea 
of  a  divine  society.  What  we  meant  was  simply 
human  cooperation.  What  is  superhuman  can  not 
bear  the  marks  of  this  physical  cooperation.  If  the 
superhuman  is  of  such  a  character  that  we  must  call 
it  a  social  concept,  we  must  carefully  distinguish  be- 
tween a  physical  society  and  one  based  on  some  other 
principle.  The  superhuman  must  have  the  negative 
characteristic  of  not  being  bound  to  man's  physical 
life  as  a  man  among  men.  Again  it  is  true  that  the 
superhuman  may  be  found  in  the  midst  of  this  life, 
but  in  itself  it  can  bear  no  marks  of  being  limited  to 
that  life.  Human  government,  since  it  seeks  and 
seeks  only  to  regulate  this  physical  life,  is  neces- 
sarily human,  but  the  world  of  scientific  theory,  since 
it  includes  the  world  outside  man,  is  not  to  be  classed 
as  human.  The  theory  is  of  human  origin,  but  the 
material  which  is  involved  forces  the  theory  to  pass 
the  bounds  of  humanity.  So  far  as  that  theory  is 
the  result  of  forces  outside  of  man  dictating  the 
form  of  the  theory,  it  is  superhuman.  Physical  life, 
as  common  to  all  physical  beings,  is  superhuman. 
In  beings  of  a  higher  order,  if  they  exist,  and  have 
a  social  existence,  it  is  this  reference  and  limitation 
to  the  physical  life  of  human  society  that  will  be 
absent.  The  spiritually  or  logically  superhuman, 


182      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

so  far  as  revealed  in  humanity  and  in  human  experi- 
ence, is  not  subject  to  the  limitations  of  human  physi- 
cal life  or  social  existence. 

The  superhuman  will  also  lack  the  other  dis- 
tinctively human  characteristic  of  the  inner  struggle 
between  the  will  and  the  emotions.  There  may  exist 
this  struggle  in  those  beings  which  are  not  human, 
but  if  that  struggle  is  absent,  we  know  then  that  we 
are  not  dealing  with  human  individuals.  This  strug- 
gle is  a  character  whose  presence  makes  a  man  what 
he  is.  It  is  positive  and  not  due  to  the  absence  of 
anything.  Devils  or  angels  may  equally  well  be 
caught  in  a  similar  struggle.  Only  we  know  that  if 
we  find  a  being  who  does  not  bear  the  marks  of  this 
contest  within  himself,  we  have  passed  the  bounds  of 
humanity.  Again  we  must  guard  against  the  reli- 
gious conception  of  the  true  man  as  the  man  at  peace 
in  himself.  For  human  nature  as  we  know  it,  and 
this  only  can  furnish  us  our  data,  no  such  peace  is 
found.  Man  may  win  a  peace  after  struggle,  but 
struggle  there  must  be.  If,  then,  we  find  some 
sphere  of  existence,  whether  within  man  or  not  makes 
no  difference,  which  is  of  such  a  character  that  this 
struggle  with  the  emotions  is  absent,  we  are  dealing 
with  something  which  may  be  superhuman.  It  is  not 
born  of  that  which  is  distinctive  of  man.  In  itself  it 
is  superhuman,  that  is,  it  belongs  to  that  larger  world 
outside  of  and  free  from  the  limitations  of  human  ex- 
istence. "  Larger  "  is  here  meant,  as  also  the  pre- 
fix "  super-,"  in  the  logical  sense.  Where  we  have 
a  peace  without  conflict  we  have  something  which 
is  not  the  possession  solely  of  mankind.  Such  a 
being  or  experience  brings  into  man  something  which 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         183 

had  its  origin  elsewhere  than  under  human  limita- 
tions. When  we  find  in  man  an  experience  which  is 
free  from  this  conflict,  we  know  that  we  are  in  touch 
with  this  free  world  of  the  superhuman. 

On  the  intellectual  side  the  superhuman  may  be 
marked  by  the  absence  of  the  limitation  to  the  phys- 
ical world.  Man  has  a  distinctively  human  intelli- 
gence. So  far  as  his  mind  is  free  from  human  limita- 
tions, he  has  something  which  as  before  we  may  call 
superhuman.  So  far  as  the  physical  world  goes,  the 
intelligence  which  he  shares  with  the  lower  animals 
is  thus  superhuman,  or  something  which  is  not  limited 
to  mankind.  As  physical  intelligence,  or  intelligence 
centered  on  physical  objects,  shows  itself  by  this  free- 
dom from  human  characteristics,  so  an  intelligence 
of  a  possible  non-physical  being  would  show  itself  in 
a  similar  non-reference  to  the  physical  world.  What 
is  distinctively  human  in  man's  mental  life  as  com- 
pared with  that  of  the  dog  is  found  to  be  involved 
in  man's  social  life,  which  distinguishes  man  from 
the  dog.  We  shall  find  the  dividing  line  in  intelli- 
gence between  physical  and  non-physical  beings  like- 
wise in  what  marks  their  differences  as  beings,  that 
is,  in  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  physical  life. 
If  the  experience  we  are  studying  proves  to  have 
reference  to  a  non-material  world,  then  we  can  be 
sure  that  it  is  not  the  product  of  forces  which  are 
distinctively  human.  Those  forces  may  not  at  pres- 
ent be  evident  outside  of  human  life  and  experience; 
if  they  were  we  would  not  know  it,  but  still  they  are 
directed  towards  something,  and  are  the  result  of 
something,  which  we  do  not  recognise  as  human. 
Something  which  is  essential  to  human  life  is  lacking. 


184      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

If  that  experience  has  no  necessary  relation  to  the 
other  experiences  of  our  life,  if  it  can  occur  by  itself, 
then  it  is  not  the  necessary  product  of  our  human 
life.  It  may  be  human  and  normal  to  have  this 
experience  of  a  non-material  world,  but  we  can  not 
call  that  experience  distinctively  or  peculiarly  hu- 
man. That  experience  which  refers  itself  to  a  non- 
physical  realm  must  be  explained  in  other  terms  than 
those  of  our  human  life. 

With  these  definitions  of  individuality  and  human- 
ity, we  are  more  ready  to  examine  the  claim  of  re- 
ligion that  it  is  a  relation  to  a  superhuman  object  or 
world.  As  we  examine  the  religious  experience  we 
have  to  bear  in  mind  what  we  find  to  be  the  marks  of 
individuality  and  of  the  super-individual,  and  also  of 
the  human  and  superhuman,  and  by  this  result  de- 
termine in  which  category  the  object  of  the  religious 
experience  falls.  Applying  this  test  first  in  the  case 
of  individuality,  we  have  the  contrasting  characters 
of  concreteness  and  generality.  At  first  it  would 
seem  that  many  of  the  religious  experiences  are  as 
concrete  as  any  which  men  have.  The  definite  and 
unmistakable  commands  which  come  at  times  to  the 
religious  devotee,  the  distinctness  of  the  moment  of 
conversion,  are  surely  concrete.  Not  all  religion, 
however,  as  we  saw  in  our  first  analysis,  has  this 
definiteness.  Not  every  religious  experience  is  con- 
crete. Whatever  it  is  therefore  that  gives  to  re- 
ligion its  character  as  religion,  it  is  not  the  necessity 
for  concreteness.  The  religious  element  may  rein- 
force or  show  itself  in  connection  with  definite  mo- 
ments, but  if  those  experiences  which  are  not  con- 
crete are  equally  religious,  and  we  have  assumed 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         185 

that  they  are,  then  the  religious  element  is  independ- 
ent of  whether  the  experience  is  or  is  not  concrete. 
We  have  found  that  the  religious  element  is  of  a 
general  type,  that  it  refers  to  a  source  outside  of 
itself.  It  is  this,  and  not  occurrence  at  definite 
times,  that  marks  religion.  But  even  in  the  concrete 
experiences  there  is  a  general  element.  St.  Augustine 
experienced  the  command  that  came  to  him,  and  so 
did  St.  Paul  before  him,  as  the  command  of  God.  It 
was  not  the  occurrence  of  the  definite  idea,  but  with 
that  idea  that  a  voice  was  heard,  the  conviction  that 
it  was  God  speaking,  which  brought  in  the  religious 
element.  It  was  the  presence  in  the  experience  of 
this  general  element  of  something  beyond  the  con- 
crete moment  which  makes  the  moment  of  value. 
The  experience  as  religious,  as  referring  to  some- 
thing beyond  itself,  is  therefore  general.  As  gen- 
eral, it  is  super-individual.  In  it  the  individual  ex- 
periences something  which  he  recognises  and  calls 
not-himself.  To  him  it  is  not  an  experience  of  his 
individual  self,  but  very  distinctly  of  something  else. 
As  surely  as  he  gives  any  meaning  to  the  word  in- 
dividual, he  denies  that  meaning  to  this  experience 
which  opens  another  phase  of  life.  By  its  posses- 
sion of  this  general  character,  of  having  value  be- 
yond the  concrete  moment  in  which  it  occurs,  the 
claim  of  religion  to  have  its  meaning  in  a  relation 
to  something  beyond  the  individual  experience  is  re- 
inforced. The  whole  significance  of  the  experience 
lies  in  the  fact  that  it  brings  an  experience  which 
whenever  it  occurs  refers  beyond  itself.  The  reli- 
gious element  is  this  reference,  hence  the  experience 
of  religion  is  so  far  general,  and  not  concrete. 


186       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

The  next  two  terms  which  define  the  individual  and 
the  general,  are  that  the  individual  is  determined  or 
passive,  and  the  general  determining  or  active.  Re- 
membering that  we  have  in  mind  here  logical  determi- 
nation, we  find  religion  coming  more  plainly  than  was 
the  case  with  concreteness  under  the  less  individual 
category.  It  is  the  religious  experience,  the  rela- 
tion of  the  individual  experiences  to  something  which 
explains  them,  that  marks  religion.  It  is  therefore 
experienced  as  something  which  determines  or  ex- 
plains concrete  experiences.  The  vision  of  Paul  on 
the  Damascus  Road  is  felt  to  be  brought  about  by 
God,  that  is,  it  is  explained  as  the  touching  of  the 
individual  life  by  a  power  outside  of  it.  What 
makes  this  experience  differ  from  those  in  which  the 
individual  is  completely  determined  is  that  it  is  this 
relation  to  a  something  beyond  which  brings  to  pass 
the  experience.  This  relation  is  therefore  logically 
determinative  of  the  concrete  expression  of  it.  The 
concrete  experience  is  referred  to  this  relation  to  the 
outside,  not  this  relation  to  the  experience  or  to 
something  else.  In  so  far  the  experience  of  this  re- 
lation is  an  experience  of  something  which  is  not  an 
individual.  As  we  study  this  type  of  experience  it 
becomes  an  individual  type,  but  in  relation  to  the 
momentary  experiences  it  is  general,  and  is  so  ex- 
perienced. We  have  here  then  the  experience  of  a 
relation,  not  to  a  physical  concrete  object.  A  rela- 
tion is  very  distinctly  not  an  individual  completely 
determined.  Again,  then,  we  find  the  claim  of  re- 
ligion to  be  so  far  justified.  Since  religion  is  ex- 
perienced as  a  relation,  it  is  something  which  is 
different  from  an  individual  experience,  and  its  ex- 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         187 

planation  must  be  sought  elsewhere  than  within  itself. 
That  is,  there  must  be  two  terms  and  not  merely  one, 
which  must  be  known.  As  regards  this  point,  then, 
religion  is  the  experience  of  a  superindividual  world. 
In  regard  to  the  next  point  our  first  analysis  leaves 
but  one  answer  possible.  Religion  takes  so  many 
forms  that  we  can  not  call  it  limited.  It  preserves 
its  character  as  religion  in  spite  of  all  these  differ- 
ences. Hence  it  is  not  so  limited  in  form  that  it  will 
exclude  this  difference.  A  concrete  individual  ob- 
ject, which  is  individual  from  every  point  of  view, 
can  not  thus  take  on  forms  inconsistent  with  one  an- 
other. But  religion,  varying  as  it  does,  is  equally 
readily  given  the  name  of  religion  whether  definite  or 
indefinite  in  time,  whether  with  or  without  the  emo- 
tional color.  In  these  respects  it  is  unlimited.  In 
any  given  moment  it  must  be  with  or  must  be  without, 
a  consciousness  of  time  or  of  emotion,  but  experi- 
ences of  both  types  are  equally  religious.  The  re- 
ligious element  is  one  which  is  not  definite  on  these 
points.  In  so  far,  again,  it  is  not  completely  fixed 
and  determined  as  an  individual  would  be.  In  that 
first  analysis  we  made  we  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
we  were  dealing  with  something  different  from  the 
experiences  which  come  to  us  from  our  senses.  This 
difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  religion  is  not,  as  the 
senses  are,  concerned  with  a  completely  determined 
and  limited  individual,  but  is  a  general  and  partially 
unlimited  relation.  Fixed  within  its  limits,  so  that 
we  can  fairly  easily  decide  whether  a  given  experi- 
ence is  or  is  not  religious,  yet  in  these  other  ways 
it  is  very  indefinite.  Therefore  again  we  have  the 
marks  rather  of  a  general  than  of  an  individual  ex- 


188      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

perience.  This  means  that  there  is  another  term 
to  the  relation  somewhere  which  must  be  taken  into 
account. 

One  of  the  marks  which  we  found  in  that  first 
analysis  to  which  we  have  been  referring,  was  that 
the  religious  experience  had  no  necessary  or  fixed 
temporal  character.  There  are  experiences  in  all 
of  us,  and  in  some  types  of  religion  no  others,  in 
which  this  experience  carries  with  it  no  fixed  place  in 
time.  There  is  with  some  a  conception  of  the  ideally 
religious  man  as  the  man  whose  whole  life  is  so  filled 
with  religion  that  it  marks  the  whole  stream  of  his 
life  and  consciousness  and  has  no  more  a  fixed  place 
in  that  stream  than  that  stream  has  within  itself. 
All  may  not  accept  this  as  an  ideal,  but  when  we  find 
the  religious  experience  as  it  occurs  in  one  of  its 
types  coming  rather  as  an  added  character  to  at 
least  a  part  of  the  mental  stream  than  as  an  experi- 
ence filling,  or  focusing  at,  some  one  moment  of  that 
stream,  we  find  that  again  we  are  dealing  not  with  the 
perception  or  consciousness  of  something  which  is 
fixed  in  time,  but  of  a  general  character  or  relation 
which  may  be  independent  of  time.  In  the  various 
forms  of  mysticism  this  is  very  evident.  Time  and 
change  seem  to  fall  away,  and  eternity  opens  before 
the  devotee.  As  the  Buddhist  attains  Nirvana,  he 
is  freed  from  the  recurring  round  of  rebirth.  The 
world  of  Nirvana  is  not  the  world  subject  to  time. 
The  temporal  element  is  therefore  no  necessary  part 
of  religion.  In  time,  as  in  other  respects,  it  may  be 
unlimited.  It  is  therefore  not  the  experience  which 
has  a  fixed  place  and  a  necessary  place  in  time.  It 
is  not  an  individual  experience,  as  it  is  not  the  con- 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         189 

sciousness  of  any  individual  moment  of  time.  It  has 
its  character  apart  from  any  necessity  of  referring 
to  concrete  moments.  It  does  not  bear  the  marks  of 
individuality,  but,  instead,  of  the  supra-individual. 
So  far  we  have  found  that  religion  is  not  entirely 
of  an  individual  type,  but,  in  certain  respects,  of 
a  supra-individual  type.  This  superindividuality, 
however,  is  logical,  so  that  we  still  have  before  us 
the  question  whether  the  religious  experience  is  ex- 
plainable as  human,  or  whether  it  transcends  the 
limitations  of  humanity.  As  before,  we  have  to  find 
which  of  the  opposing  terms  of  our  definitions  rightly 
includes  this  experience.  The  first  two  terms  were 
"  physical  '*  and  "  non-physical."  The  answer  here 
is  plain.  Even  though  of  necessity  appearing  in  the 
terms  of  material  life,  religion  has  always  as  an  ex- 
perience meant  something  more  than  the  form  in 
which  it  has  appeared.  The  stone  which  the  savage 
worships  means  far  more  than  a  stone.  The  experi- 
ence is  not  explicable  as  the  perception  of  the  mate- 
rial object.  Also,  as  before,  the  differing  forms 
show  that  the  religious  element  is  independent  of  its 
material  presentation.  For  great  masses  of  people 
its  significance  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  is  not  a 
revelation  of  this  physical  world,  but  of  something 
beyond.  For  the  mystic,  the  fact  that  his  experi- 
ence is  supra-individual  carries  with  it  the  lack  of 
reference  to  individual  material  objects.  The  whole 
effort  of  this  great  type  of  religion  is  to  attain  to 
an  experience  which  is  not  limited  by  the  material 
world.  Whatever  it  is  that  for  the  mystic  consti- 
tutes his  experience,  even  if  he  does  not  completely 
rid  himself  of  material  imagery,  consists  in  something 


190      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

which  the  material  form  does  not  explain.  That  par- 
ticular imagery  means  more  than  the  same  imagery 
when  occurring  in  connection  with  physical  events. 
Hence  the  experience  brings  in  an  element  which  does 
not  yield  to  the  limitations  of  those  experiences 
which  we  call  distinctively  human.  It  is  of  a  more 
general  type. 

The  second  distinctively  human  category  which  we 
found  was  that  of  reference  to  man's  social  life.  At 
first  it  would  seem  that  religion  came  closely  into  con- 
tact with  this,  and  so,  was  human.  For  the  savage, 
religion  is  inextricably  interwoven  with  his  social  life. 
It  is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  say  whether  his 
religion  is  the  foundation  of  his  family  and  tribal 
life,  or  the  tribal  life  the  explanation  for  the  social 
form  of  his  religion.  The  forms  of  Western  religion, 
especially  Christianity,  with  its  emphasis  on  the 
Kingdom  of  God  as  coming  on  earth,  in  the  hands 
of  many  to-day  bear  almost  exclusive  reference  to 
our  social  life.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  in  each  case 
it  comes  into  relation  with  man's  life  with  a  tone  of 
authority.  For  the  savage  who  continues  the  reli- 
gious customs  of  his  ancestors  because  they  did  it, 
that  is,  feels  the  weight  of  custom,  and  for  the 
modern  social  reformer  who  seeks  to  reconstruct  our 
world  in  terms  of  some  social  ideal,  we  have  equally 
an  experience  which  seeks  to  transform  the  physical 
world.  The  savage  who  seeks  aid  from  his  religion 
to  bring  rain,  and  the  modern  man  who  from  a  sense 
of  duty  to  God  and  right  enters  into  the  effort  to 
change  the  sanitary  conditions  in  our  slums,  are 
equally  bringing  to  bear  on  physical  conditions  a 
force  which  they  believe  is  stronger  than  the  physical 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         191 

forces.  They  are  appealing  to  an  experience  which 
opens  to  them  the  idea  of  another  world  in  addition 
to  that  in  which  the  sole  forces  are  the  forces  and 
results  of  man's  physical  life.  It  is  this  limitation 
to  the  physical  life  which  is  the  marked  character- 
istic of  humanity.  Religion  appears,  when  it 
touches  that  physical  life,  as  a  force  free  from  that 
limitation,  and  one  which  is  called  on  to  change  and 
even  destroy  certain  of  the  physical  influences  at 
work  on  mankind.  Religion  clearly,  even  more 
clearly  here  than  elsewhere,  bears  the  marks  of  the 
superhuman  world.  It  belongs  with  those  experi- 
ences which  are  without  the  limitations  of  our  life 
as  a  human  being.  They  are  human  experiences, 
but  they  are  the  experiences  which  man  has  of  some- 
thing which  is  beyond  humanity.  Those  experiences 
which  are  man's  experiences  of  himself,  or  of  human- 
ity, do  not  include  religion. 

What  distinguishes  humanity  perhaps  above  all 
else,  in  its  inner  life  where  real  differences  are  most 
evident,  is  the  conflict  of  will  and  emotion.  Man's 
desires  and  passions  draw  him  one  way,  while  sober 
sense  and  his  intelligence  beckon  him  another.  Man 
is  a  being  in  whom  intelligence  has  by  no  means  won 
a  complete  victory.  Hence  the  conflict  is  typical  of 
the  appearance  of  intellect,  and  also  of  the  fact  that 
it  is  not  yet  completely  dominant.  Into  this  world 
of  stress  religion  comes  as  another  disturbing  force. 
With  the  saying  of  Jesus  in  mind  that  he  came  not 
to  bring  peace  but  a  sword,  (Mt.  10:34.)  we  might 
conclude  that  religion  only  added  to  the  conflict,  and 
hence  was  typically  human.  The  religious  devotee 
again  and  again  brings  conflict  and  physical  strife 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

into  the  world  as  a  consequence  of  his  religious  be- 
lief, but  in  so  doing  he  is  sure  of  himself.  It  is  the 
fanatic  who  is  so  sure  of  the  agreement  of  his  will 
and  his  desire  that  he  will  force  it  on  others  at  the 
point  of  the  sword.  For  him  the  inner  conflict  is 
gone.  His  desires  agree  with  his  conception  of  duty. 
This  may  occur  by  the  training  of  the  desires. 
Then  the  devotee  becomes  a  man  who  desires  only 
what  is  right.  This  may  force  him  into  conflict 
with  the  forces  of  evil,  but  the  conflict  is  an  exterior 
one.  Within  himself,  even  though  he  die  a  martyr 
in  the  conflict,  there  is  peace.  For  the  savage  who 
has  this  conflict,  even  though  he  is  not  able  to  realise 
it,  religion  with  its  insistence  on  the  wisdom  of  the 
elders  of  the  tribe  and  of  his  ancestors,  with  the  com- 
pulsion of  custom,  half  or  more  than  half,  unrealised, 
his  desires  are  trained  to  wish  what  is  good  for  him 
and  for  his  tribe.  Whether  by  nature  a  warrior  or 
not,  he  can  not  live  from  childhood  in  an  atmosphere 
where  every  tribal  influence  centers  on  war  without 
desiring  to  rival  his  fellows  in  warlike  deeds.  When 
the  demand  comes  from  his  religion  for  him  to  be  a 
warrior,  his  desires  and  his  will  are  so  far  at  one 
that  he  will  submit  readily  to  often  extreme  tests  of 
his  fitness  to  fight.  So  on  a  higher  plane  religion 
trains  the  desires  to  agree  with  the  idea  of  right. 
Its  influence  where  it  touches  this  conflict  is  there- 
fore to  minimise  or  destroy  it.  It  tends  therefore 
against  this  human  characteristic.  In  some  form, 
wherever  men  seek  in  the  religious  experience  a  sense 
of  peace,  of  freedom  from  this  conflict,  it  is  plainly 
an  experience  directly  contrary  in  its  character  to 
man's  ordinary  life.  Because  it  promises  an  end  to 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         193 

the  inward  struggle,  men  turn  to  it.  In  this  it  is 
evident  as  an  experience  that  is  superhuman  in  its 
character.  It  tells  of  a  world  which  is  not  the  world 
of  human  struggle. 

The  last  test  which  we  have  to  apply  is  that  of  the 
relation  of  the  religious  intelligence  to  the  material 
world.  It  touches  that  world  in  many  places;  the 
most  important  the  one  we  have  just  mentioned,  its 
effect  on  man's  inner  conflict.  To  touch,  and  to  be 
partly  in  relation  with  a  physical  world  is,  however, 
no  proof  that  religion's  main  concern  is  with  that 
world.  It  must  touch  it,  for  we  live  in  it,  and  reli- 
gion is  our  experience.  That  this  is  necessary  pre- 
vents it  being  a  possible  criterion  of  the  experience. 
All  experiences  are  ours,  and  so  all  come  into  touch 
with  our  physical  life,  the  life  which  we  lead.  That 
does  not,  however,  prevent  them  also  being  in  touch 
with  a  life  which  is  different  from  ours.  When  we 
find  that  the  experience  is  not  explainable  as  simply 
human,  when  there  remains,  after  we  have  applied  all 
possible  explanations  derived  from  human  life,  still 
some  qualities  which  are  not  explained,  we  are  forced 
to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  relation  to  another 
world  which  will  explain  this  experience  of  ours. 
This  is  our  procedure  with  the  physical  world.  Our 
memories  we  can  largely  or  entirely  control;  we  can 
keep  an  idea  before  us,  or  banish  it,  but  with  our 
back  turned  we  can  not  see  an  object  behind  us.  In 
general,  with  our  eyes  open,  we  have  to  see  what  is  to 
be  seen.  At  least  in  normal  health,  we  can  not  see 
what  is  not  to  be  seen,  what  is  not  there.  The  phys- 
ical world  as  we  conceive  it  is  the  result  of  this  lack 
of  control.  It  is  not  due  to  a  formal  reasoning,  but 


194      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

to  the  practical  necessity  of  distinguishing  between 
those  experiences  which  are  individual  and  can  be 
controlled  and  those  experiences  of  the  individual 
which,  because  they  refer  to  a  world  beyond  the  in- 
dividual, can  not  be  so  ruled.  The  solecism,  and 
subjectivism,  and  the  ego-centric  predicament  may 
be  problems  for  the  theory  of  knowledge,  but  they 
do  not  concern  us  more  than  any  other  inquiry  after 
knowledge.  Whatever  justification  there  is  for  pos- 
iting a  physical  and  a  human  world,  there  is  the  same 
justification  for  positing  a  non-physical  and  super- 
human realm.  Thus  religion  has  the  same  rights  as 
the  natural  sciences.  More  we  do  not  need  to  claim, 
for,  once  free  from  dogmatic  denial  of  its  right  to 
accept  a  revelation  of  a  superphysical  world,  religion 
is  free  to  develop  its  scientific  account  of  that  world. 
Religion  coming  into  human  life  in  a  form  which  is 
not  the  form  of  that  human  life  points  to  a  world 
outside,  to  which  we  must  refer  it.  Free  from  the 
limitations  of  any  necessary  physical  form,  inde- 
pendent of  the  social  forces  of  man's  physical  life,  a 
pacifier  of  the  inner  conflict,  its  final  difference  is 
marked  by  the  fact  of  its  reference  to  something  be- 
yond. Whether  it  takes  its  origin  from  dreams  or 
from  imagination  (deceit  we  need  not  consider)  it 
refers  always  to  something  outside  of  human  life. 
We  do  not  need  to  accept  all  or  any  of  the  descrip- 
tions of  that  realm,  only,  from  the  savage  to  the 
mystic,  it  is  referred  to  a  world  over  which  the  human 
spirit  has  no  control.  So  by  rites  of  one  sort  or 
another,  or  by  prayer,  he  seeks  to  influence  the  spir- 
its. As  we  for  practical  reasons  differentiate  our 
experiences  of  the  outer  world  and  our  ideas  about 


HUMAN  AND  SUPERHUMAN         195 

it,  so  likewise  for  practical  reasons  we  differentiate 
our  experiences  of  the  physical  and  of  the  super- 
physical  world.  Physical  laws  do  not  hold  in  reli- 
gion, man  can  not  control  it  as  he  controls  his  own 
life  or  as  he  rules  over  the  material  universe.  Hence 
it  is  practical  experience  and  not  a  theory  which 
forces  on  him  the  one  claim  which  we  found  a  com- 
mon element  in  all  religions,  that  this  is  an  experi- 
ence of  a  superhuman  world.  Because  this  experi- 
ence falls  under  the  type,  and  has  the  marks  of  the 
superhuman,  and  lacks  those  of  the  human,  we  must 
acknowledge  that  the  claim  is  just.  So  far  the  reli- 
gious experience  is  valid.  Whatever  it  is  that  men 
worship,  it  is  at  least  superhuman. 


LECTURE  VI 
PERSONALITY 

Throughout  much  of  the  discussion  of  to-day  we 
speak  of  the  source  or  object  of  religion  without 
making  any  effort  to  define  these  terms.  Before  we 
reach  our  end  we  must  make  our  definition  of  this 
source-object  more  exact,  or  else  make  sure  that  we 
can  know  no  more  about  it  than  the  vague  fact  that 
it  exists.  This  existence  which  is  bound  to  us  by  the 
religious  experience  may  be  in  that  relation  either 
active  or  passive,  and  we  in  that  experience  may  be 
active  or  passive.  Since  no  experience  can  be  an 
experience  and  stand  still,  both  terms  of  the  relation 
can  not  be  passive.  The  alternatives  which  confront 
us  are,  therefore,  that  we  may  be  active,  and  religion 
be  an  active  pursuit  of  a  passive  object;  or  else  we 
may  be  passive,  and  religion  be  the  active  influence 
of  a  power  beyond  man  working  on  a  passive  human- 
ity; or,  finally,  both  man  and  the  superhuman 
may  be  active,  and  a  mutual  interchange  occur. 
As  we  take  these  up  in  order,  we  have  to  consider 
the  unseen  term  as  object,  as  source,  and  as  person- 
ality. 

First,  then,  we  have  to  ask  in  what  sense  we  can 
call  this  existence  behind  the  religious  experience  an 
object.  In  attempting  to  define  the  word  object  its 
uncertain  and  general  use  is  confusing ;  hence  we  can 

196 


PERSONALITY  197 

not  assume,  but  must  work  out,  a  definition.  When 
we  speak  of  an  object  we  think  first  of  material  ob- 
jects, things  we  can  see  and  feel.  The  stone  upon 
which  we  tread  is  felt  and  seen,  not  because  it  forces 
itself  on  us,  but  because  by  our  activity  we  come  into 
contact  with  it.  Though  not  under  our  control  to 
the  extent  of  allowing  us  to  put  it  out  of  existence 
or  lift  it  without  effort,  still,  unless  some  force  acts 
on  it,  it  will  not  be  lifted.  It  can  oppose  but  not 
originate  motion.  In  our  visual  world  it  has  a  cer- 
tain fixity  of  form.  Here  too  it  opposes  change. 
These  characteristics  of  an  object  we  may  take  as 
the  primary  meaning  of  the  word.  We  mean,  when 
we  call  anything  an  object,  that  it  is  relatively  in- 
active, and  also  that  it  does  not  seek  to  move,  but 
that  it  opposes  motion.  We  find  other  things  in  ex- 
istence which  meet  this  definition  besides  material 
objects;  hence  we  extend  the  use  of  the  word.  Our 
imagination  brings  us  images  over  which  we  have 
some  control,  but  yet  which,  once  in  our  mind,  tend 
to  go  their  own  way.  As  imagined  they  take  a  fixed 
form.  In  themselves  they  are  the  result  of  mental 
activity,  not  its  movement.  So  far  as  they  do  take 
a  fixed  static  form,  we  come  to  call  them  objects  of 
imagination.  Also  we  find  that  the  definition  applies 
in  the  conceptual  world.  A  square  is  a  fixed  form. 
Never  even  brought  into  existence  by  itself,  content 
to  remain  always  a  conceptual  entity,  yet  whether 
merely  conceived  or  found  in  some  real  form,  it  is 
fixed,  and  while  it  can  be  used,  as  it  is  in  geometry, 
it  can  not  be  changed.  It  is  even  more  fixed  than 
the  material  object.  In  addition  to  this  conceptual 
object,  there  is  one  further  class  which  in  ordinary 


198      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

speech  also  is  called  objective.  While  to  the  man 
himself  his  will  is  the  source  of  activity,  yet  to  an- 
other who  seeks  to  modify  that  activity  it  is  static 
and  resisting.  So  far,  too,  as  another  man  sees  in 
the  will  of  his  fellow  man  something  constant,  a 
thread  of  character  through  the  activities  of  life, 
that  character  becomes  an  object.  Something  is 
there  which  is  not  the  cause  of  movement  in  the  life  of 
the  observer,  but  which  yet  resists  his  efforts  in  cer- 
tain directions.  The  will  may  thus  itself,  for  another, 
become  an  object.  When  we  come  to  apply  to  reli- 
gion the  word  object,  we  have  to  ask  how  far  these 
passive  elements  predominate. 

The  term  which  immediately  contrasts  with  object 
is  source.  As  object  implies  rest,  so  source  implies 
motion.  We  speak  of  the  source  of  a  river  while 
the  river  is  flowing,  but  if  the  river  dries  up,  or  be- 
comes a  series  of  stagnant  pools,  the  first  pool  is 
merely  the  first  pool,  not  a  source.  The  unicellular 
organisms  are  spoken  of  as  the  source  of  physical 
life  only  by  those  who  believe  that  there  has  been  a 
development  upward  from  them.  If  there  has  been 
no  development,  then  the  unicellular  forms  are  merely 
the  lowest  in  a  static  series,  not  the  source  of  the 
rest.  The  cloud  may  be  called  the  source  of  the  rain 
only  if  the  rain  is  falling,  or  regarded  as  likely  to 
fall.  In  the  material  world  the  principal  significance 
of  the  term  is  thus  to  denote  the  presence  in  some 
object  of  a  force  which  is  active.  In  the  conceptual 
world  of  modern  geometry  we  find  this  idea  used  in 
a  peculiar  way.  A  line  is  said  in  some  definitions  to 
be  generated  by  a  moving  point.  The  point  itself 
is  an  object,  but  the  moving  point  is  the  source  of  the 


PERSONALITY  199 

line.  The  same  idea  occurs  in  the  conception  of  a 
series  of  numbers  related  in  certain  definite  ways, 
such  as  the  whole  number  series,  as  generated  by  the 
relation.  This  relation,  or  law  of  the  series,  becomes 
for  mathematics  the  source  of  the  series.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  we  here  enter  into  the  world  of  logic. 
The  law  of  the  series  is  the  relation  that  explains 
why  certain  numbers  are  included  and  certain  others 
excluded  from  the  series.  This  logical  conception  is 
spoken  of  here  in  order  to  bring  out  the  fact  that 
this  element  is  involved  in  any  use  of  the  word.  The 
cloud  is  the  source  of  the  rain  because  the  presence 
of  the  cloud  explains,  at  least  partially,  the  presence 
of  the  rain.  So  the  small  lake  or  spring  is  a  source 
of  the  river  because  by  its  overflow  it  explains  why 
we  have  a  river  there.  The  ultimate  type  to  which 
some  refer  all  ideas  of  motion  from  one  source  is  the 
human  will.  It  is  not  only  the  willful  person  who 
does  a  thing  simply  because  he  wants  to.  To  a 
certain  extent  the  will  is  always  its  own  only  justifi- 
cation. There  is  energy  there  which  must  seek  vent 
in  action.  So  the  will  becomes  a  source  of  activity. 
The  source  here  is  the  thing  which  explains  why  the 
activity  took  that  particular  direction.  The  motive 
for  the  murder  is  the  source  of  the  murder  when  it 
is  sufficient  to  account  for  the  commission  of  the 
crime.  When  we  come  to  apply  this  to  religion, 
therefore,  we  have  to  keep  in  mind  these  two  ele- 
ments. The  source  of  religion  will  be  that  which  is 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  activity  which  results  in 
the  experience. 

There  remains  the  third  alternative  to  be  defined. 
It  is  not  so  clearly  named  in  one  word.     Since  we  are 


200      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

concerned  with  will  action,  we  may  provisionally  call 
it  the  idea  of  personality.  Here  the  material  world 
fails  us,  except  by  analogy.  We  can  observe  the 
effect  of  the  presence  of  more  than  one  force  in  some 
physical  event,  but  the  forces  themselves  remain  be- 
yond our  reach.  Whether  they  move  each  other,  or 
whether  they  obstruct  each  other,  or  reinforce,  only 
through  the  object  on  which  they  act  is  it  possible 
to  say.  Still  we  can,  in  the  conceptual  world,  get  a 
start.  Where  two  forces  are  active  each  is  modified 
by  the  other.  So  far  as  we  know,  the  deflection  of 
certain  electric  vibrations  by  magnetic  influence  may 
be  such  a  direct  mutual  action.  Whether  it  is  such 
or  not,  it  will  illustrate  the  idea.  Before  either  force 
reaches  expression  in  motion,  there  is  a  combination, 
and  a  motion  different  from  what  either  of  the  forces 
alone  would  produce  is  the  result.  Neither  force 
alone  is  the  source  of  the  motion,  since  neither  taken 
alone  will  satisfactorily  explain  it.  Neither  is  either 
force  or  even  the  combination  an  object,  for  the  char- 
acter which  the  combination  has  exists  only  for  the 
moment  of  the  conjunction  of  the  two.  We  really 
have  an  object  only  with  some  such  relation  as  that 
of  the  mechanical  couple,  where  two  forces  are  re- 
lated by  the  constant  character  of  being  equal  and 
tending  in  opposite  directions.  Since  we  have  with 
two  interacting  forces  neither  source  nor  object, 
there  is  need  of  a  third  term.  What  that  should  be 
in  the  physical  world  is  not  our  concern.  Our  best 
example  of  such  interaction  comes  to  us  in  human 
experience.  Here  we  know  it  as  the  mutual  effect 
of  different  wills  or  purposes.  For  our  limited  pur- 
pose, therefore,  we  may  call  this  third  possibility 


PERSONALITY  201 

"  personality."  If  the  exterior  term  of  the  religious 
relation  is  neither  source  nor  object,  but  an  active 
force,  interacting  on  the  human  will,  we  may  call  it 
the  force  of  personality. 

To  the  possible  objection  that  such  interaction  of 
two  wills  is  impossible,  because  we  can  know  the  will 
of  another  only  by  inference,  we  would  say  that  we 
do  not  need  to  cross  the  limits  of  human  individual- 
ity. Although  I  do  not  feel  the  force  of  the  objec- 
tion, for  reasons  which  may  have  become  apparent  in 
the  definition  we  used  of  the  word  individual,  yet  we 
can  well  pass  by  the  matter  here.  Within  the  human 
individual  there  is  sufficient  evidence  of  the  inter- 
action of  will  forces  or  separate  purposes  to  serve  us 
for  our  illustration.  When  a  man  is  torn  by  con- 
flicting desires,  and  no  action,  or  an  act  unforeseen, 
results,  the  explanation  is  in  the  conflict.  Within 
the  mind  two  forces  have  been  in  partial  conflict,  and 
the  resulting  purpose,  if  one  emerges,  is  the  result 
of  this  inner  conflict.  In  many  cases  there  is  no  such 
conflict,  and  one  motive  quietly  influences  another, 
and  again  the  resulting  determination  must  be  ex- 
plained by  the  presence  of  both.  When  a  man  plans 
to  go  straight  to  a  store,  and  then,  because  of  his 
desire  to  go  also  to  another,  goes  to  the  first  by  a 
roundabout  way  which  will  lead  him  by  the  other,  his 
course  is  explainable  only  by  the  presence  of  both 
desires.  The  combination  of  the  two  was  the  source 
of  his  roundabout  path.  As  conflict  of  desires  is  one 
of  the  marks  of  human  personality,  it  seems  proper 
to  call  this  conflict,  or  in  the  more  general  case,  con- 
junction and  interaction  of  forces,  by  the  name  of 
personality.  Only  we  have  to  remember  that  we  do 


202      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

not  include  under  the  term  all  the  overbeliefs  which 
sometimes  accompany  that  word. 

In  a  certain  sense  anything  may  be  an  object. 
The  will,  or  the  individual  personality,  may  be  the 
object  of  our  study.  This  does  not  prevent  its  ac- 
tivity. Activity  itself,  as  motion  in  any  of  its  forms, 
may  also  be  an  object  of  interest.  We  may  study 
its  direction  and  the  energy  involved.  The  religious 
experience,  and  the  source  of  it,  are  the  object  of 
our  present  inquiry.  Hence  the  terms  "  object," 
"  source,"  and  "  personality  "  are  not  mutually  ex- 
clusive. Our  interest  lies  in  the  question  how  far 
any  one  of  these  terms  exhausts  the  meaning  or  na- 
ture of  the  object  we  seek  to  describe.  Bearing  this 
in  mind,  we  may  ask  for  the  fullest  meaning  which 
we  can  give  to  the  word  object  as  applied  to  an  ex- 
istence like  the  object  revealed  in  the  religious  experi- 
ence. It  may,  as  we  have  already  said,  be  active. 
The  fact  that  we  see  an  object  does  not  prevent  us 
seeing  that  object  in  motion.  We  need  concern  our- 
selves neither  with  the  old  logical  objections,  nor 
with  possible  psychological  proofs  to  the  contrary. 
Whether  able  to  arrive  at  a  logical  conception  of  a 
moving  arrow  or  not,  we  do  have  such  an  idea,  and 
are  able  to  tell  when  the  arrow  is  at  rest  and  when 
in  motion.  The  moving  arrow  is  different  as  a  per- 
ceived object  from  the  arrow  at  rest  in  the  target. 
Also  it  does  not  matter  whether  our  perception  is 
made  up  of  successive  junks  of  time  strung  together 
or  the  motion  perceived  by  a  stream  of  intelligence 
which  is  itself  in  constant  flux.  Again  our  concern 
is  only  that  we  have  such  a  perception,  and  that  the 
motion  of  the  arrow  may  so  far  become  an  object 


PERSONALITY  203 

that  we  can  calculate  its  energy,  and,  as  in  mechanics, 
build  up  a  science  entirely  on  the  basis  of  motion. 
Whatever  God  may  be  found  to  be  the  object  of  re- 
ligious perception,  need  not,  in  order  to  be  the  object 
of  that  perception,  become  a  static,  unchanging  some- 
thing unlike  all  else  we  know.  A  God  who  enters 
into  active  relations  to  man  can  as  well  as  one  who 
does  not  act  be  the  object  of  study  and  perception. 

We  may  take  as  our  subject  motion  in  some  form, 
or  activity,  but,  as  object,  that  motion  is  not  itself 
an  active  element  in  our  mind.  What  is  objective  is 
by  definition  passive.  The  motion  which  is  the  ob- 
ject of  study  in  a  system  of  mechanics  is  held  as  a 
static  idea  within  our  mind.  To  be  objectively  real 
it  must  be  thus  held.  To  a  possible  Bergsonian  ob- 
jection that  this  is  not  reality  we  have  only  the  reply 
that  whether  it  is  or  not  is  just  the  problem  under 
discussion.  In  relation  to  one  small  part  of  our  total 
experience,  that  part  which  we  call  the  religious  ex- 
perience, we  are  asking  whether  the  conception  of  its 
source  as  an  object  completely  describes  that  source. 
Just  at  this  moment  we  are  only  seeking  to  draw  out 
just  what  it  is  to  be  an  object.  That  the  course  of 
centuries  can  be  presented  to  us  within  the  page  or 
single  paragraph  no  one  can  deny.  It  is  such  pres- 
entation which  makes  those  centuries  of  the  past  an 
object  to  be  studied  without  influence  upon  us. 
Whatever  influence  they  may  have  had,  they  do  not 
exert  it  while  being  studied.  Or  if  they  do,  they 
are  then  no  longer  simply  objects  of  study,  but 
sources  of  experience.  The  artist  is  in  a  different 
mood  when  he  draws  out  the  technique  of  the  master 
by  patient  analysis  from  what  he  is  when  he  lets  the 


204?       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

influence  of  that  master  sink  in  upon  him  and  lead 
him  in  new  paths,  careless  often  of  the  old  technique. 
This  is  more  evident  in  the  case  of  the  historian. 
There  is  a  far  stretch  from  the  American  who  chroni- 
cles the  doings  of  an  Alexander  in  order  to  trace  his 
military  methods  to  the  same  man  when  he  exults  in 
the  valor  of  his  race  and  his  own  time.  His  curiosity 
or  interest  in  ancient  things  leads  him  in  the  one 
case,  while  in  the  other  the  influence  is  exerted  by  the 
deeds  themselves.  The  two  are  more  or  less  inter- 
mixed, except  perhaps  for  the  school  boy  who  studies 
under  compulsion.  For  him  Caesar  and  Cicero  are 
purely  objects,  without  influence  or  molding  power 
in  his  life.  In  themselves  they  are  indifferent  to  him, 
and  it  is  only  when  forced  to  spend  time  in  studying 
them  that  they  become  distasteful  to  him.  The  mo- 
ment he  begins  to  feel  an  influence  from  the  life  of 
these  men  of  old  they  have  ceased  to  be  simply  ob- 
jects. The  difference  is  more  plainly  marked  in  the 
differing  attitudes  of  the  scientist  and  the  farmer 
toward  plants.  To  one  interested  in  the  theories  and 
the  problems  of  plant  life  the  plant  themselves  are 
merely  objects  in  which  these  problems  arise.  For 
the  farmer  they  are  still  objects,  but  embodying  an 
entirely  new  set  of  problems.  The  plants  themselves 
do  not  influence  this  study.  They  are,  as  objects, 
passive. 

To  be  passive  means  that  an  object  is  without  in- 
fluence on  our  will.  When  the  astronomer  spends 
long  hours  in  the  study  of  the  stars,  at  which  the 
poet  looks  awhile,  and  at  which  most  men  never  look 
but  merely  glance,  the  difference  is  not  to  be  found 
in  the  stars  but  in  the  men.  The  astrologist  was  led 


PERSONALITY  205 

to  the  study  of  the  heavens  by  a  far  different  motive 
from  that  of  the  modern  astronomer.  Yet  the  heav- 
ens are  the  same  to  all.  When  some  object  arouses 
our  curiosity,  it  is  our  curiosity  and  not  the  object 
which  is  active.  At  other  times  the  same  object  has 
no  effect  upon  us.  When  the  need  of  food  forces  a 
man  to  devise  new  sources  of  nourishment,  it  is  this 
need,  and  not  the  fruit  hanging  in  view,  which  impels 
him  to  seize  it.  When  well  fed,  other  fruits  of  the 
same  kind  would  not  win  more  than  a  glance.  The 
mathematical  objects  are  plainly  passive.  It  is  not 
the  square  or  ideal  circle,  nor  even,  as  in  mechanics, 
motion  itself,  which  impels  one  towards  the  forming 
of  the  mathematical  systems.  First,  in  the  history 
of  mankind,  some  practical  need,  and  now  the  desire 
for  knowledge,  is  the  motive.  Those  centuries  past, 
so  far  as  they  merely  are  objects  of  study,  have  no 
influence  on  us  to-day.  It  requires  a  great  effort  to 
make  them  live  once  more  even  in  imagination.  They 
come  to  the  mind  with  no  motive,  nothing  in  them- 
selves to  move  us  to  action.  That  means  that  they 
are  without  influence  on  the  will.  Man  seeks  them, 
not  they  him.  As  objects  of  perception,  they  are 
what  is  seen,  not  our  motive  in  looking;  as  objects  of 
conception,  they  are  the  results  of  study,  not  the 
explanation  of  it;  as  objects  of  will,  they  are  acted 
on,  and  not  themselves  active.  This  is  true  even  of 
will  itself  when  it  becomes  an  object.  If  I  seek  to 
change  the  purpose  of  another  man,  I  study  it,  find 
out  what  its  weak  points  are,  and  I  attack  it.  As 
an  object,  it  may  resist,  but  not  itself  influence  me. 
So  long  as  it  is  merely  an  object,  it  remains  outside 
of  my  will.  To  be  more  than  this  it  must  enter  into 


206       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

my  life,  and  as  a  motive  or  influence  change  my 
actions.  But  then  it  is  no  longer  an  object.  I  may 
study  my  purposes  and  motives,  but  so  long  as  they 
are  studied  as  objects  they  are  not  influencing  me. 
This  accounts  for  the  difficulty  of  this  study  of  our 
own  intentions.  The  moment  the  intention  or  pur- 
pose becomes  strong  and  active  it  rules,  and,  ruling, 
no  longer  is  passive  and  an  object.  Whatever  can 
be  called  an  object  is  so  called  because  it  is  passive, 
and,  being  passive,  without  influence  on  the  will. 

It  might  be  regarded  as  axiomatic  that  what  was 
passive  could  not  explain  action.  Since  our  ordi- 
nary speech,  however,  does  not  recognise  experience 
as  active,  we  must  make  clear  the  consequences  of  the 
restrictions  of  the  objective  idea.  Passive  resistance 
may  explain  the  limitations  of  some  experiences. 
We  find  we  can  not  go  straight  ahead  because  of 
some  object,  a  tree  or  a  rock,  in  our  path.  But  the 
tree  which  changes  our  path  does  not  explain  why 
we  took  that  path.  Explanation,  in  this  as  in  crim- 
inal trials,  must  be  found  in  the  motive.  An  object 
is  not  a  motive.  As  object,  as  passive,  it  does  not 
originate  anything,  and  therefore  can  not  be  ap- 
pealed to  in  explanation  of  any  activity.  Experi- 
ence is  due  to  motion  of  some  sort.  To  bring  an  ob- 
ject into  the  focus  of  our  attention  there  must  be 
change.  No  one  object  is  forever  in  that  focus,  so 
that  to  bring  it  to  focus  there  must  be  this  change, 
this  coming  of  the  new  object  into  prominence,  which 
we  are  trying  to  bring  into  relation  with  the  rest  of 
life.  So  in  the  phrase  "  explanation  of  an  experi- 
ence," we  really  mean  explanation  of  the  coming  of 
this  particular  object  into  the  center  of  conscious- 


PERSONALITY  207 

ness.  This  may  be  by  some  power  in  the  experience 
itself,  as  when  an  explosion  startles  us  into  instant 
attention,  or  it  may  be  as  the  result  of  our  desire,  as 
when  we  yield  ourselves  to  day  dreams.  Both  the 
explosion  and  the  day  dream  are  objects,  but  neither 
as  object  explains  its  own  occurrence.  The  sudden- 
ness of  the  explosion,  due  to  change  somewhere,  gives 
the  scientific  explanation  of  the  one,  and  our  desire 
the  explanation  of  the  other.  The  explosion  can  not 
be  explained  unless  we  know  the  conditions  which  pre- 
ceded it,  so  our  dreams  need  to  be  related  to  the  de- 
sire which  allowed  them  life.  The  object,  which  is 
passive,  and  can  only  obstruct  change,  does  not  con- 
tain within  itself  its  own  explanation.  The  one  ex- 
ception to  this  is  when  some  experience  is  itself  an 
object.  In  such  a  case,  however,  as  with  our  will, 
both  the  explanation  and  the  experience  are  objects. 
Neither  explain  why  we  now  bring  them  into  ques- 
tion. As  objects  they  are  not  motives.  So  far  as 
the  religious  experience  brings  us  face  to  face  only 
with  an  object,  we  have  no  explanation  of  its  reason 
for  existence.  The  object  of  religious  devotion,  if 
merely  object,  passive  recipient  of  worship,  can  not 
give  us  an  explanation  of  why  we  seek  or  serve. 

The  alternative  directly  opposed  to  that  indicated 
by  the  word  object  is  what  we  have  meant  to  suggest 
by  the  word  source.  In  an  object  we  ignore  all  ac- 
tivity so  far  as  any  influence  on  us  is  concerned.  In 
a  source  we  are  interested  only  in  the  activity.  A 
source  may  be  an  object  when  that  object  is  regarded 
as  the  explanation  of  something  exterior  to  us,  and 
source  and  result  are  together  in  our  mind.  The 
source  is  then  an  object  because  of  its  lack  of  effect 


208      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

on  us.  As  source,  however,  even  when  objective,  it 
does  affect  something.  Our  interest  here  is  in  the 
sequence  of  source  and  result.  Source  is  a  general 
word,  including  mere  sequence,  as  when  we  speak  of 
the  source  of  a  river  meaning  simply  the  start  of  it, 
or  causal,  as  when  we  conceive  of  the  desire  as  the 
source  of  activity,  or  avoiding  the  theories  of  paral- 
lelism, when  we  attribute  the  explosion  to  the  intro- 
duction of  some  new  element  not  present  before.  In 
each  case  the  change  is  referred  back  to  what  we  call 
the  source.  Whether  the  source  itself  is  regarded  as 
active,  or  whether  the  motion  simply  starts  from  the 
source,  and  has  been  potentially  present  in  it,  the 
source  may  be  regarded  as  the  origin  of  the  motion. 
In  the  physical  world  the  source  may  not  be  the 
cause  of  motion,  but  only  the  object  in  which  or  on 
which  the  cause  operated.  The  source  of  an  electric 
shock  may  be  the  broken  electric  light  wire,  while  the 
cause  is  the  electricity  in  the  wire.  The  real  source 
is  then  the  electric  energy,  while  the  wire  is  only 
apparently  the  source.  In  this  use  of  the  word, 
source  and  cause  become  coincident,  except  that  the 
word  source  implies  change,  and  cause  may  apply  to 
some  static  condition.  Also  the  source  may  always 
be  the  object  of  study,  and  the  energy  resident  in  it 
observable  only  in  its  results.  To  describe  some- 
thing as  source,  then,  means  that  it  is  either  active  or 
the  residing  place  of  activity. 

When  it  is  the  source  of  an  experience  that  we  are 
considering  this  definition  becomes  more  important 
than  when  material  objects  alone  are  considered. 
In  the  physical  world  the  source  is  the  object  in 
which  the  activity  resides,  while  in  the  mental  world, 


PERSONALITY  209 

where  we  meet  activity  face  to  face,  the  source  is  the 
activity  or  is  more  closely  bound  up  with  it  than  in 
the  material  universe.  The  source  of  my  experience 
of  speaking  is  my  desire  to  speak.  The  desire  is  the 
expression  and  not  merely  the  residence  of  the  will 
power  which  results  in  the  spoken  words.  Taking  it 
roughly,  the  desire  is  the  cause  of  the  speech,  if  we 
accept  the  view  that  every  real  desire  is  an  effort  to 
do  something,  and  if  it  remains  mere  unaccomplished 
desire,  it  is  only  because  some  other  desire  proves 
stronger.  Whether  this  is  true  or  not,  the  source  of 
an  experience  is  the  desire  which  leads  to  it.  This 
desire,  when  carried  into  action,  is  what  we  call  our 
will.  I  have  the  experience  of  being  in  this  room  be- 
cause I  willed  to  come  into  it  and  to  stay  in  it.  The 
object  of  the  experience  and  the  source  are  in  this 
case  different.  The  object  is  the  room.  When  my 
desire  or  will  leads  me  here  I  find  it  as  it  is.  The 
will  or  desire  may  be  forgotten  once  I  am  here,  or  it 
may  never  have  been  a  conscious  desire,  but  in  either 
case  the  cause  of  the  change,  the  reason  for  the 
change  from  the  perception  of  the  hall  to  that  of  the 
room,  is  found  in  the  will,  whether  above  or  below  the 
threshold  of  consciousness.  When  the  source  is 
plainly  outside  of  the  will  it  must  be  one  that  can 
control  the  will.  Were  I  brought  into  this  room  tied 
hand  and  foot,  it  would  still  be  will  that  brought  me 
here,  but  this  time  the  will  of  another.  Under  the 
constraint  of  natural  forces  the  same  holds  true. 
An  earthquake  forces  itself  on  my  notice  only  because 
it  is  more  powerful  than  I.  I  can  not  escape  it  if  I 
would.  For  the  time  being  my  body  refuses  to  obey 
my  will,  because  of  the  presence  of  a  stronger  force. 


THE  &ELt6iou§ 

To  be  the  source  of  experience  is  to  be  a  force  which 
controls  the  will  of  man. 

In  the  source  of  an  experience,  since  it  is  the  occa- 
sion for  that  experience,  is  to  be  sought  the  explana- 
tion of  that  mental  state.  If  nothing  opposes  me 
"strongly  enough  to  affect  my  action,  whatever  I  will 
to  do  is  done.  The  will  is  a  sufficient  explanation  of 
the  action.  When  I  am  passively  the  object  of  an- 
other's will,  then  the  explanation  of  the  action  is  to 
be  found  solely  in  his  will  and  purpose.  When  the 
experience  is  forced  on  us  solely  by  some  natural 
force,  then  it  can  be  explained  only  by  that  force, 
and  that  force  gives  us  a  sufficient  explanation.  It 
is  not  necessary  that  we  explain  the  source  or  its 
existence.  All  that  is  now  in  question  is  that  the 
source,  whatever  may  be  its  reason  for  existence,  fur- 
nishes the  reason  for  the  experience.  When  we  find 
an  experience  which  does  not  yield  to  this  test  we  can 
be  sure  that  what  we  have  thought  to  be  its  source 
was  not  truly  or  adequately  so.  It  may  be  like  the 
source  of  a  river,  which  accounts  only  for  its  start, 
but  ignores  the  fact  that  each  tributary  has  also  a 
source.  In  such  a  case  the  entire  explanation  of  the 
volume  of  the  river  is  to  be  found  only  by  a  study 
of  all  its  sources.  Taken  together,  they  will  furnish 
a  sufficient  explanation  for  the  volume  of  water.  In 
dealing  with  our  experience  we  turn  to  the  source  to 
give  us  such  an  explanation.  As  the  source  of  the 
river  does  not  explain  its  course  later,  when  rocky 
or  gravelly  banks  impede  it,  so  the  source  of  an  ex- 
perience does  not  explain  the  objects  which  are  found 
in  it.  My  purpose  which  led  me  to  this  room  does 
not  guarantee  the  nature  of  the  room.  It  may,  in- 


PERSONALITY 

deed  will,  if  the  trip  is  a  voyage  of  discovery,  be 
equally  well  satisfied  by  any  object.  The  distinction 
between  source  and  object  holds  very  clearly.  What 
I  find,  if  before  entering  I  had  no  idea  of  what  was 
in  here,  can  not  account  for  my  coming  in.  Only 
my  curiosity  can  do  that.  Thus  the  source  and  the 
object  may  be  very  distinct.  They  also  may  be  iden- 
tical. When  I  focus  attention  on  my  purposes,  and 
strive  to  bolster  up  my  courage,  the  object  and  the 
source  are  for  the  moment  identical.  The  desire  to 
fight,  for  instance,  is  the  explanation  for  my  desire 
to  have  more  physical  courage,  that  is,  to  have  a 
stronger  desire  to  fight.  The  source  of  one  moment 
may  be  the  object  of  the  next,  or  the  object  of  this 
moment  the  source  of  the  experience  of  the  next,  but 
it  is  the  same  purpose  which  is  alternately  source 
and  object.  The  purpose  or  desire  is  the  explana- 
tion of  its  making  itself  its  own  object.  When  we 
describe  any  influence  as  the  source  of  an  experience 
we  therefore  mean  that  we  find  in  that  influence  or 
will  a  sufficient  explanation  for  the  existence  of  the 
experience.  It  accounts  for  the  activity.  While  a 
thing  merely  object  can  account  for  nothing  but  the 
contents  of  that  experience,  the  source  accounts  for 
the  having  an  experience  at  all. 

When  we  turn  to  religion  and  seek  to  apply  these 
terms  which  we  have  defined  so  as  to  seem  exclusive 
we  find  that  the  application  is  difficult.  From  the 
ordinary  point  of  view,  God  is  both  the  object  and 
the  source  of  religion.  He  is  known,  and  also  only 
in  Him  can  be  found  the  explanation  of  that  knowl- 
edge. This  use  of  the  two  terms  forces  us  to  ask  in 
some  detail  how  far  religion  allows  the  use,  and  how 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

far  it  is  completely  described,  by  either  or  both  of 
the  contrasting  terms,  "  object  "  and  "  source." 

That  the  unseen  term  of  the  religious  relation  is 
rightly  called  an   object   is  evident  at  first   sight. 
This  unseen  existence  is  the  goal  of  all  religious 
striving.     Whether  by  the  primitive  savage  with  his 
magical  rites,  or  by  the  mystic's  destruction  of  de- 
sire, as  well  as  by  the  obedience  yielded  to  the  moral 
code  as  divine,  the  unseen  is  here  reckoned  with  as 
an  object.     It  is  something  which  can  be  sought.     It 
is   something  which  can  be  in  some  degree  known. 
More  than  this,  in  our  very  first  analysis  of  religion, 
we  found  that  the  experience  was  largely  subject  to 
man's  will.     Within  limits  he  could  change  or  de- 
stroy it.     It  was  object  of  his  will,  as  well  as  of  his 
knowledge.     To  know  the  will  of  God,  so  that  it  may 
be  reckoned  with,  may  be  set  forth  as  the  purpose  of 
religion.     The  savage  wishes  to  know  how  to  influ- 
ence the  god  so  that  he  will  bring  good  hunting  or 
good  crops.     The  modern  Christian  seeks  to  know 
God  that  he  may  attain  perfect  peace.     However  the 
satisfaction  of  religion  may  be  conceived,  man  does 
put  into  it  his  human  will.     The  unseen  becomes  the 
object  of  desire.     When,  however,  we  try  to  com- 
pletely describe  religion  as   a   relation  between  the 
human  will  and  an  object  outside,  the  difficulties  be- 
gin.    The  phenomena  of  conversion,  where  a  man's 
will  is  changed  as  it  seems  at  times  in  spite  of  himself, 
points    in    another   direction.     This    object,   which, 
when  his  will  is  directed  toward  it,  lends  itself  to  his 
desires,  when  his  will  is  not  set  on  the  right  road,  re- 
fuses to  answer  to  the  summons.     Very  frequently 
the  man  who  seeks  God  believes  that  he  has  not  found 


PERSONALITY  213 

Him,  and  while  he  is  regarded  by  others  as  very  de- 
vout, himself  deplores  his  inability  to  reach  the  object 
of  his  desires.  These  two  facts  point  in  the  same 
direction.  As  at  times  the  religious  experience  comes 
without  being  sought,  so  at  others  when  sought  it  is 
not  reached.  In  the  one  case  it  appears  as  more  than 
the  man  willed  or  desired,  and  in  the  second  as  less. 
It  gives  or  withdraws  itself,  at  times  at  least,  with- 
out reference  to  man's  will.  In  this  connection  we 
must  also  take  into  account  the  fact  that  when  the 
object  of  the  religious  search  is  attained  there  comes 
a  renewed  activity.  The  religious  fanatic  will  do 
deeds  of  exertion  or  of  self-denial  which  before  his 
religious  mood  came  upon  him  he  would  not  have  at- 
tempted. The  Moslem  fanatic  who  hurls  himself  to 
death  against  modern  rifles,  or  the  reformed  seeker 
after  pleasure  who  now  undergoes  many  privations 
under  the  bidding  of  his  new  faith,  are  sufficient  proof 
that  this  object,  if  merely  an  object,  is  one  whose 
possession  has  a  very  active  influence.  That  this  is 
true  of  some  other  objects  is  no  valid  objection.  The 
conversion  to  the  search  for  knowledge  may  bring 
similar  self-denial  in  the  life  of  the  scientist.  The 
pursuit  of  knowledge  is  thereby  put  in  the  same  class 
with  religion,  and  we  have  another  illustration  of  an 
object  whose  possession  brings  new  power. 

Since  we  found  that  objectivity  meant  passivity,  it 
is  evident  that  with  an  experience  of  the  religious 
type  we  must  either  broaden  our  definition  of  objec- 
tivity, or  admit  that  the  word  does  not  completely 
describe  the  religious  object.  In  the  interest  of 
clearness,  the  latter  is  the  better  course.  So  far  as 
it  is  the  object  of  desire,  or  of  knowledge,  the  object 


214.      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

of  the  religious  experience  is  rightly  so  described. 
It  has,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  other  aspects.  As 
the  man  who  catches  a  wild  animal  and  attempts  to 
keep  him  in  activity  discovers  that  he  has  to  deal 
with  something  different  from  a  stone,  something 
which  can  do  more  than  passively  resist,  so  the  stu- 
dent of  religion  finds  that  the  object  of  religion  pos- 
sesses a  certain  activity  and  energy  of  its  own.  As 
in  the  one  case  we  say  that  we  have  to  do  with  some- 
thing alive,  so  in  the  case  of  religion  we  must  make 
use  of  some  other  category  to  complete  the  descrip- 
tion. The  unseen  term  of  the  religious  experience  is 
something  more  than  a  mere  object. 

In  applying  the  second  of  our  two  terms  we  find  a 
term  adequate  for  the  description  of  those  character- 
istics of  religion  which  do  not  fall  within  the  meaning 
of  the  word  object.  As  source,  the  unseen  term  of 
the  religious  relation  is  recognised  as  active.  It 
gives  full  value  to  the  phenomena  of  conversion. 
Recognising  that  from  the  unknown  comes  into  man's 
life  at  times  those  influences  and  forces  which  we  call 
spiritual  and  religious,  it  has  its  place  in  a  proper 
and  full  definition  of  religion.  By  the  energy  and 
activity  which  come  from  this  something  outside  of 
the  human  individual  is  to  be  explained  the  vigor  of 
the  fanatic  and  the  self-devotion  of  the  martyr  dying 
at  the  stake.  To  one  to  whom  the  power  of  reli- 
gion comes,  unlocking  a  new  source  of  strength  which 
makes  it  possible  to  endure  life  whatever  that  life 
may  be,  no  other  way  is  open  than  to  ascribe  to  this 
unseen  power  the  new  life.  As  an  explanation  of  this 
force  in  human  life,  and  also  as  an  explanation  of  its 
lack  at  times  even  when  sought,  we  can  turn  only  to 


ttiis  unseen  term  itself.  It  is  a  source  of  the  experi- 
ence. Yet,  as  from  the  beginning  of  our  enquiry, 
the  contradictory  nature  of  the  religious  facts  stands 
in  the  way  of  our  yielding  ourselves  completely  to 
this  line  of  approach,  the  unseen  term  can  not 
entirely  explain  all  the  facts.  Man,  in  the  early 
stages,  worships  what  god  he  will.  Even  in  the  midst 
of  the  dominance  of  clan  worship  among  primitive 
tribes  there  are  those  who  seek  to  worship  in  another 
way.  than  the  orthodox.  The  power  of  religion  at 
times  seems  to  express  itself  rather  in  disunion  than 
in  union.  The  modern  histories  of  religion,  in  their 
effort  to  explain  the  varying  forms  by  the  differing 
influences  at  work  on  religion  at  different  times,  move 
along  the  same  line.  Religion,  to  their  view,  is  modi- 
fied by  its  environment.  The  facts  which  we  men- 
tioned of  the  ability  of  a  man  to  reject  religion  or 
to  change  its  character  point  to  the  will  of  man  as  a 
partial  explanation  for  the  phenomena  of  religion. 
So  far  as  religion  may  be  an  object,  a  thing  sought 
or  known,  it  is  not  a  source.  Whether  there  exists 
or  can  exist  a  source  which  is  not  an  object  is  no  con- 
cern of  ours,  for  we  are  dealing  with  a  source  which 
is  object.  The  whole  effort  to  cultivate  the  devo- 
tional life  or  the  mystic  state  shows  that  in  religion 
men  exercise  their  wills.  In  their  wills,  then,  is  to  be 
sought  a  partial  explanation  of  religion.  So  far  as 
this  is  true,  the  source  of  religion  is  something  wait- 
ing to  be  found  and  known.  It  is  an  object  and 
passive. 

Thus  neither  of  the  two  terms  taken  alone  is  ade- 
quate to  describe  the  religious  object.  It  is  both 
source  and  object.  Yet  we  do  not  therefore  need  to 


216      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

reject  either.  Both  these  elements,  passivity  and  ac- 
tivity, enter  into  religion.  The  source  is  something 
which  may  be  sought,  and,  when  found,  modified,  so 
far  as  man  is  concerned,  by  man's  will.  On  the 
theological  side  this  is  the  doctrine  of  the  possibility 
of  sin.  Yet  this  object  is  itself  active,  at  times  forc- 
ing itself  on  man,  and  at  other  times  even  found  as 
the  result  of  effort,  enfusing  new  energy  into  the 
weary  and  flagging  will.  Again  referring  to  theol- 
ogy, we  have  in  this  a  certain  approximation  to  the 
doctrine  of  God's  grace.  Both  these  elements  are 
present,  and  both  must  enter  into  any  final  descrip- 
tion of  religion. 

Any  description  of  religion  which  is  at  all  com- 
plete must  be  in  terms  which  allow  for  activity  both 
by  the  human  will  and  by  the  religious  object.  It  is 
not,  however,  a  case  of  two  forces  working  on  the 
same  object,  for  the  existence  which  is  the  partial 
source  is  also  the  object  of  religion.  In  the  experi- 
ence we  have  an  object  which  partly  explains  itself, 
that  is,  is  a  source,  and  is  partly  the  object  on  which 
another  force  acts.  So  far  the  description  of  this 
object  is  not  different  from  that  of  a  physical  object 
which  is  the  source  of  energy.  The  electric  wire 
may  be  handled,  and  cut,  and  moved  where  we  will, 
yet  it  is  also  the  source  or  bearer  of  the  electric  en- 
ergy. The  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  our  object 
is  not  an  object  of  perception.  The  force  is  known 
by  its  results,  and  the  object  is  an  object  as  regards 
our  will;  we  take  it  into  account  and  will  to  change 
or  destroy  its  power  over  us,  but  we  do  not  see  it  as 
we  see  the  wire.  In  this  case,  then,  of  religion,  the 
term  object  implies  just  the  opposite  of  source. 


PERSONALITY  217 

Both  terms  are  within  the  realm  of  will  activity.  So 
far,  then,  this  situation  satisfies  our  third  possibil- 
ity, that  the  religious  object  may  be  a  personality. 
We  have  an  object  which  is  not  an  object  of  percep- 
tion, which  is  a  source  of  energy,  and  which  is  an  ob- 
ject of  desire  or  repulsion.  In  applying  this  term 
we  need  to  notice  that  the  fact  that  we  are  not  deal- 
ing with  an  object  of  perception  renders  some  cate- 
gories which  are  applicable  to  physical  objects  of  no 
use  to  us  here.  The  problem  as  to  whether  the  ob- 
ject is  simple  or  complex,  one  or  many,  is  not  a 
question  to  be  decided  by  observation.  The  unity, 
or  lack  of  it,  to  be  found  within  those  existences 
which  are  objects  of  the  will  is  of  a  different  type 
from  that  which  marks  physical  unity.  To  develop 
this  is  another  task.  Only  we  do  not  want  to  con- 
clude that  by  saying  that  our  object  satisfies  the 
definition  of  personality  we  thereby  shelve  the  prob- 
lem of  the  oneness  or  multiplicity  of  gods.  The  will 
can  and  does  include  as  one  object  things  which  are 
themselves  multiple.  An  army  is  the  object  in  the 
general's  mind  when  he  issues  his  commands,  yet  it  is 
composed  of  many  persons.  So  we  can  call  the  re- 
ligious object  a  personality,  without  jumping  to 
hasty  conclusions.  We  mean  only  that  this  non- 
perceptual  object  is  also  a  source  of  energy. 

The  other  half  of  our  definition  of  personality  is 
that  to  completely  satisfy  our  third  alternative  the 
action  must  be  mutual.  The  will  must  be  affected  by 
as  well  as  affect  the  religious  object.  The  will  must 
also  be  object  as  well  as  source.  This  is  true,  if  it 
holds  at  all,  in  a  different  sense  from  that  in  which 
it  is  correct  to  speak  of  the  will,  as  being  influenced 


218       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

by  physical  objects.  A  tool  affects  us  if,  when  we 
seek  to  use  it,  we  find  it  dull.  It  also  wakens  in  us 
desire  when  its  bright  edge  suggests  its  use,  and  we 
try  it.  In  each  of  these  cases  the  desire  already  ex- 
ists. The  activity  is  there,  and  is  only  thwarted  or 
awakened,  as  the  case  may  be,  by  the  object.  To  me, 
or  to  a  tired  mechanic,  the  tool  suggests  no  use.  To 
me,  because  I  have  had  no  former  skill  in  working 
with  it,  and  to  the  mechanic  because  he  has  seen  all 
of  it  that  he  wants.  Whether  or  not  the  appeal 
comes  depends  on  the  man.  With  religion  the  case 
is  different.  The  man  who  in  the  crisis  of  conversion 
feels  his  will  and  desires  overborne,  and  his  will 
changed,  is  always  insistent  that  the  change  came 
not  from  within  but  from  an  exterior  source.  The 
will  itself  is  changed.  The  artist  remains  an  artist 
whether  or  not  the  sight  of  a  picture  or  of  a  brush 
impels  him  to  paint,  but  the  religious  man  who  has 
experienced  conversion  is  not  the  same;  his  will  and 
desires  are  not  the  same  as  if  the  conversion  had  not 
occurred.  The  same  is  true  of  the  slower  processes 
of  religious  training.  A  child  trained  to  pray  is  not 
the  same  as  the  child  brought  up  with  no  desire  to 
pray.  That  this  is  true  also  of  secular  education 
only  puts  education  of  whatever  kind  in  the  same 
class  as  religion  in  respect  to  this  matter.  Educa- 
tion as  conversion  consists  in  training,  that  is,  chang- 
ing, the  will.  The  will  feels  the  effect  of  a  force  and 
influence  outside  of  itself.  It  is  the  object  of  that 
force.  Just  as  in  education  the  child  feels  the  effect 
of  the  influences  brought  to  bear  on  him,  so  in  reli- 
gion he  feels  the  effect  of  forces  which  act  on  him. 
This  direct  effect  of  social  forces  is  not  the  same  as 


PERSONALITY  219 

"  education  by  experience,"  though  in  some  sense  it 
is  true  that  a  man  may  be  educated  by  opposition. 
A  man  may,  in  the  presence  of  difficulties  presented 
by  nature,  conquer,  and  in  conquering  learn.  Yet  to 
do  this  there  must  be  the  will  to  conquer.  Occasions 
can  bring  to  the  front  such  a  will.  Many  of  us  have 
been  in  a  fog  on  a  mountain  and  found  our  way 
safely,  and  felt  only  pleasure  in  the  difficulties,  on  the 
same  ground  where  a  man  without  the  will  to  perse- 
vere lost  heart  and  was  lost.  So  opposition  may 
bring  out  what  there  is  in  a  man ;  it  can  not  put 
something  new  into  him.  The  mountain  doesn't  cre- 
ate but  only  rouses  in  us  the  desire  to  climb  it.  But 
what  religion  brings  is  new  life.  Thus  it  differs 
from  the  physical  object.  Religion  brings  to  bear 
power  upon  the  will.  We  have  thus  a  mutual  inter- 
action. As  the  religious  object  both  acts  and  is 
acted  on  by  the  human  will,  so  the  will  acts  and  is 
acted  on. 

This  mutual  interaction  which  we  have  been  using 
as  the  definition  of  personality  does  not  complete 
that  description.  We  did  not  need  to  define  further 
at  the  time,  but  now  that  we  are  seen  plainly  to  be 
dealing  with  a  force  acting  on  and  acted  on  by  our 
personality  it  becomes  important  to  be  more  definite. 
If  the  personality  which  is  behind  religion  is  mu- 
tually interactive  with  our  personality,  then  it  must 
be  of  the  same  general  type.  There  is  a  meeting 
point  which  is  common  to  the  two,  or  else  they  have 
everything  in  common,  for,  since  they  interact,  they 
must  meet.  Having  one  point  in  common,  they  can 
be  brought  under  one  head.  They  can  be  compared 
within  the  same  universe  of  discourse.  In  the  case 


220      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

of  religion,  however,  we  find  that  the  meeting  point 
is  the  experience.  What  we  call  the  religious  experi- 
ence is  just  the  consciousness  of  this  meeting  of  the 
force  of  our  will  and  personality  and  of  the  other 
force.  These  two  do  not  act  on  some  third  object, 
but  on  each  other.  In  the  experience  the  two  con- 
scious forces  come  into  direct  relation,  or  we  may 
put  it  that  in  coming  into  relation  these  two  forces 
come  into  consciousness.  The  relation  is  essentially 
personal.  Only  because  it  is  distinguished  as  an- 
other will,  an  inner  force  yet  not  our  own  personality, 
is  the  religious  object  referred  to  a  separate  source. 
It  is  the  special  mark  of  personality  that  it  can  thus 
come  into  immediate  relation  to  our  will.  Nature 
acts  on  us  by  rousing  in  us  certain  emotions,  of  fear 
or  curiosity.  Another  man  acts  on  us  by  the  direct 
effect  of  his  personality.  Disregarding  the  epistemo- 
logical  difficulties  of  knowing  how  his  will  exists, — 
because  after  all  we  are  convinced  that  it  does  exist, 
—  in  our  practical  dealings  with  our  fellows  we  are 
conscious  that  their  will  affects  and  is  affected  by  our 
will.  Of  a  stone  this  is  not  true,  nor  even  of  natural 
forces  such  as  electricity.  We  may  use  electricity, 
but  we  can  not  change  it.  We  may  throw  a  stone, 
but  we  can  not  direct  its  course  once  it  has  left  us. 
A  man,  though,  by  the  written  word,  or  even  only  by 
our  thought  of  what  he  might  say,  can  influence  us 
though  he  be  far  distant,  or  even  dead.  By  the 
great  leader  new  desires  are  created  and  others  killed. 
Will  acts  on  will.  So  it  is  with  religion.  The  re- 
ligious force  is  one  exercised  directly  upon  our  will. 
The  only  thing  in  human  life  to  which  it  bears  com- 
parison is  personality  and  will. 


LECTURE  VII 
A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY 

Other  characteristics  of  that  personality  which  is 
behind  religion  could  perhaps  be  deduced  from  the 
religious  experience,  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to 
consider  them  here.  The  main  points  which  we  out- 
lined as  the  most  important  for  the  proper  study  of 
religion  have  been  considered.  It  remains  for  us  to 
indicate  the  relation  of  our  conclusions  to  other 
methods  of  study.  As  our  method  has  been  the  philo- 
sophical, the  one  contrasting  with  it  is  the  scientific. 
We  have  therefore  to  ask  how  far  our  results  affect 
a  scientific  study  of  the  religious  experience. 

Before  attempting  to  bring  our  work  into  connec- 
tion with  that  of  a  science  of  religion  it  will  be  well 
to  indicate  what  it  is  that  makes  a  particular  method 
or  study  scientific.  The  first  mark  of  a  science  is 
that  it  has  reference  to  some  distinct  field.  While 
philosophy  may  analyse  the  meaning  of  existence  as 
found  in  all  existent  things,  or  of  knowledge  as  ap- 
plying to  all  things  known,  science  limits  its  en- 
quiries to  some  definite  part  of  experience  and  of 
knowledge.  Physics  deals  with  those  experiences 
which  are  the  result  of  mechanical  forces,  chemistry 
with  those  of  a  chemical  nature.  Astronomy  deals 
with  the  stars,  and  although  it  makes  use  of  both 
physics  and  chemistry,  it  is  a  distinct  science  because 

221 


222      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

its  field  is  distinct.  A  science  takes  a  concrete  ex- 
perience, one  that  is  distinctly  individual,  and  seeks 
to  explain  it.  It  takes  typical  individuals,  it  is  true, 
but  only  because  they  are  near  the  average  or 
norm.  The  abnormal  must  also  be  explained  if  the 
science  is  to  reach  its  full  extent,  but  as  variations 
from  the  type.  Each  individual  case  must  be  ac- 
counted for.  To  do  this,  a  narrow  study  of  a  small 
field  is  necessary.  General  laws  are  the  result  of 
such  a  study,  as  well  as  of  the  general  deductions  of 
philosophy,  but  they  are  of  a  different  type.  Such  a 
method  as  that  which  we  used  in  proving  the  reality 
of  the  religious  experience  would  be  out  of  place  in 
the  science  of  religion.  Science  studies  the  phenom- 
ena, not  what  people  think  of  it  or  name  it.  While 
for  philosophy  we  must  take  into  account  the  one 
who  has  the  experience,  science  so  far  as  possible 
ignores  him  and  sees  only  the  field  which  it  is  study- 
ing. One  science  is  therefore  divided  from  another 
by  the  field  in  which  it  is  working.  That  field  must 
be  distinct. 

Since  it  is  the  field  of  study  which  marks  off  one 
science  from  another,  and  science  disregards  the 
problems  of  knowledge,  it  must  be  certified  in  some 
other  way  that  what  the  scientist  is  studying  has 
some  reality.  The  type  or  kind  of  reality  which  it 
possesses  must  be  made  clearer,  that  we  may  know 
how  far  the  scientist's  work  affects  the  rest  of  ex- 
perience. The  student  of  dreams  who  to-day  would 
treat  them  as  Joseph  treated  the  dreams  of  Pharaoh 
would  not  receive  much  consideration.  Such  an  in- 
terpretation of  dreams  ascribes  to  them  a  reality 
which  we  are  not  willing  to  grant.  The  same  is  true 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       228 

of  astrology.  The  stars  are  undoubtedly  real,  but 
the  connection  which  astrology  presupposes  and  the 
experience  which  it  studies  have  not  the  same  reality. 
So  we  reject  that  science,  not  because  the  field  of  its 
work  is  not  definite,  but  because  we  deny  validity  to 
that  study.  The  relation  which  it  assumes  is  un- 
real. No  science  can  decide  this  reality  for  itself, 
for  its  attention  is  bent  entirely  on  the  field  of  its 
work,  and  hence  it  can  not  decide  how  that  field  is 
related  to  other  fields.  The  fields  may  overlap,  as 
with  physics  and  chemistry  or  astronomy,  but  as 
each  of  these  fields  is  real,  each  science  pursues  its 
work  in  the  field  of  reality.  Where  one  was  unreal, 
as  with  the  mediaeval  search  for  something  to  trans- 
mute baser  metals  into  gold,  no  overlapping  could 
give  validity  to  the  combination.  It  is  also  not  a 
question  of  the  discovery  of  new  instances  of  the 
type.  A  science  may  discover  new  electrical  phe- 
nomena, but  only  the  same  reality  is  given  to  these 
as  to  those  previously  known.  When  the  experiences 
are  of  a  new  type,  or  of  one  previously  unstudied, 
such  as  the  alleged  instances  of  telepathy,  the  in- 
stances must  be  proven  real  before  the  bar  of  general 
experience  if  the  student  is  to  be  allowed  unre- 
strained to  claim  validity  for  his  conclusions.  So 
long  as  we  deny,  or  the  world  denies,  reality  to 
telepathy,  so  long  will  the  science  of  telepathy  be  an 
outcast.  Once  granted  the  reality  of  the  experi- 
ences it  studies,  then  its  conclusions  are  at  least 
credible.  Since  anything  which  is  studied  thereby 
acquires  a  certain  reality,  if  only  in  the  mind  of  the 
student,  the  question  becomes  one  of  the  kind  of 
reality  it  possesses.  Whether  telepathy  depends  on 


2*4       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

the  imagination  of  the  man  who  tells  us  of  it,  or 
whether  it  occurs  as  he  says  it  does,  is  the  question. 
Reality  thus  becomes  an  attribute  of  relations  be- 
tween experiences,  varying  in  its  meaning  with  our 
use.  The  modern  student  of  dreams,  who  tries  to 
account  for  their  occurrence  in  the  terms  of  modern 
psychology  is  awarded  sufficient  reality  for  his  pur- 
pose, while  the  Joseph-like  interpreter  of  dreams  is 
denied  it.  In  the  latter  case  the  relation  to  events 
is  denied,  in  the  former  it  is  granted.  Before  a  sci- 
ence can  be  accepted  it  must  have  this  seal  of  ap- 
proval. In  the  acceptance  of  a  science  this  grant  of 
reality  is  included. 

Granted  to  a  science  a  distinct  field  and  a  real 
experience,  the  scientific  results  will  depend  for  their 
truth  on  the  correctness  and  value  of  the  method 
used.  For  a  science  to  be  distinct,  this  method  must 
be  distinct.  Where  there  seem  to  be  distinctions  and 
yet  the  same  method  we  really  have  the  same  science 
with  subdivisions.  The  science  of  history  is  one  sci- 
ence, even  though  it  may  for  convenience  be  divided 
into  military  and  economic.  The  method  is  the 
same.  On  the  similarity  or  the  dissimilarity  of  the 
method  depends  the  place  of  the  science  in  the  gen- 
eral field  of  scientific  knowledge.  On  this  depends 
also  the  degree  of  acceptance  to  be  given  to  its  re- 
sults. The  conclusions  of  the  historical  sciences  are 
not  accepted  in  the  field  of  biology,  but  are  of  value 
to  the  student  of  economics.  The  method  is  not  one 
chosen  arbitrarily  by  the  science,  but  one  forced  on 
it  by  the  phenomena  which  it  studies.  What  the 
method  is  can  not  be  determined  therefore  by  the 
science  itself,  for  a  method,  like  a  man,  is  unable  to 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY 

see  its  own  faults.  To  this  is  to  be  ascribed  the  long 
time  necessary  to  draw  men  away  from  astrology 
and  necromancy,  and  the  vogue  of  spiritualism  even 
in  our  own  day.  Unless  one  studies  the  method  in 
relation  to  the  whole  of  experience,  no  one  can  be 
certain  that  it  is  the  right  one.  To  have  this  assur- 
ance, philosophy  must  indicate  for  each  science  ita 
general  method. 

The  correctness  of  a  method  depends  on  its  valid- 
ity. Not  only  must  it  be  distinct,  it  must  also  be 
true.  It  is  evident  that  a  science  can  not  examine 
into  this  validity.  A  method  which  is  proper  for 
studying  rocks  or  metals  is  not  also  the  method  for 
studying  truth.  We  must  have  some  way  of  getting 
the  opinion  of  a  third  person  or  principle.  We  must 
appeal  to  the  whole  field  of  truth.  Such  a  study  of 
validity  is  made  or  implied  before  we  accept  the  con- 
clusions of  any  science.  The  experimental  method 
of  physics  is  granted  validity  because  the  phenomena 
are  such  that  by  comparison  and  trial  and  error  we 
can  arrive  at  the  truth.  Astronomy  we  accept  be- 
cause we  have  faith  in  the  methods  of  celestial  me- 
chanics, which  in  turn  depends  on  our  belief  in  mathe- 
matics. The  methods  of  the  modern  experimental 
psychology  have  been  doubted  because  some  have 
maintained  that  physiological  experiment  did  not  re- 
veal truth  in  relation  to  the  mental  life,  that  the  re- 
lations between  mental  phenomena  were  not  to  be 
discovered  by  any  apparatus.  Only  the  philosoph- 
ical study  of  consciousness  can  decide  such  a  ques- 
tion. If  a  science  is  to  be  firmly  established,  its 
method  must  have  the  seal  of  approval. 

Besides  these  limitations  of  field  and  method  which 


226      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

define  logically  the  science,  there  are  limits,  less  plain 
but  perhaps  even  more  strongly  set.  The  first  of 
these  is  the  presuppositions  of  the  science.  As  in 
mathematics  certain  principles  are  taken  as  axio- 
matic, so  in  any  science  certain  truths  about  its  field 
of  work  are  assumed  to  be  true.  Any  proof  of  them 
lies  outside  of  the  science.  Not  always  clearly  ex- 
pressed or  even  consciously  in  mind,  these  yet  set 
limits  to  the  extension  of  that  method  of  study. 
Any  natural  science  assumes  that  the  world  is  an  or- 
dered whole,  that  for  every  happening  there  is  an 
adequate  explanation.  The  historical  sciences  as- 
sume the  general  trustworthiness  of  mankind.  Only 
when  there  is  an  explanation  of  a  deviation  from  the 
truth  or  very  good  evidence  of  it  does  the  historian 
doubt.  The  modern  experimental  psychologist,  so 
far  as  he  is  simply  a  scientist,  assumes  that  the 
theory  of  psycho-physical  parallelism  is  true.  He 
takes  this  over  from  philosophy,  even  if  only  as 
a  working  hypothesis.  The  science  of  psychology 
comes  by  this  to  have  certain  limits  which  he  does 
not  dream,  or  does  nothing  more  than  dream,  of 
crossing.  Political  economy  assumes  that  men's  ac- 
tions can  be  explained  in  terms  of  their  industrial 
life.  Any  other  explanation  lies  beyond  the  reach 
of  that  science.  These  presuppositions  thus  lay 
down  practical  limits  beyond  which  the  scientist  does 
not  seek  to  go.  The  assumptions  may  be  wrong,  and 
it  may  be  that  he  should  go  beyond,  but  so  long  as 
he  believes  in  these  ideas  he  will  not  try  to  cross  the 
boundary.  These  over-beliefs  of  the  scientist  thus 
have  a  large  part  to  play.  They  must  therefore  be 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY 

examined  if  we  are  to  be  sure  of  what  are  to  be  the 
practical  limits  of  any  scientific  enquiry. 

There  is  another  limit  of  the  same  kind  which  must 
be  taken  into  account.  In  a  certain  sense  every 
science  is  a  practical  matter.  Men  go  into  it  with 
some  purpose  in  view.  That  purpose  may  not  be 
very  closely  associated  with  the  production  of  food, 
or  the  search  for  new  luxuries  to  ease  the  burden  of 
life,  but  even  the  most  detached  scientist  intends  in 
some  way  to  realise  a  purpose.  He  does  not  simply 
go  out  with  his  eyes  open,  and  wait  for  truth  to  fall 
into  his  mind  unsought.  Instead  he  seeks  the  truth 
by  the  aid  of  certain  methods,  and  he  seeks  it  in  cer- 
tain fairly  definite  directions.  At  the  least  he  is 
satisfying  his  curiosity  about  some  special  set  of 
phenomena.  For  the  mass  of  men,  however,  some- 
thing more  than  curiosity  is  necessary.  Those  in- 
quiries which  we  call  the  great  sciences,  which  are  the 
serious  work  of  men's  life,  and  whose  results  are 
taught  in  our  universities,  have  behind  them  much 
more  than  the  satisfying  of  an  idle  curiosity.  Men 
put  time  and  energy  and  wealth  into  them  because 
they  believe  that  there  will  be  some  substantial  re- 
sult, some  knowledge  which  will  affect  life.  Man 
comes  into  contact  with  the  mechanical  and  elec- 
trical forces,  and  seeks  to  know  how  they  affect  him, 
or  can  be  used  by  him.  He  seeks  by  a  knowledge  of 
geology  to  understand  the  history  of  the  world,  as 
well  as  to  plan  accurately  where  mines  should  be  dug. 
But  if  curiosity  were  the  only  purpose,  this  would 
limit  inquiry  to  what  was  new.  The  old  familiar 
lines  of  work  would  be  neglected.  So  whatever 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

might  be  the  purpose,  it  would  determine  what  would 
be  the  study  of  the  scientist.  In  determining  there- 
fore what  should  be  the  problems  of  a  science,  we 
have  to  determine  what  should  be  the  purpose  of  the 
student  in  entering  on  that  field.  By  a  comparison 
with  other  sciences,  by  a  study  of  the  meaning  of  the 
experience  which  the  science  is  to  observe,  we  can 
determine  in  advance  something  as  to  what  purpose 
is  likely  to  be  met  in  the  course  of  the  study,  and 
what  idea  it  is  that  leads  one  to  undertake  it.  These 
points  make  more  clear  what  the  actual  work  is  to  be. 
In  our  study  of  the  religious  experience  the  first 
point  that  had  a  bearing  on  this  question  of  the 
science  of  religion,  or  to  give  it  its  traditional  name, 
theology,  is  that  there  is  a  definite  and  real  field  for 
this  science.  It  must  have  become  evident  in  our 
inquiry  that  there  is  a  very  large  field  open,  which 
has  no  reference  to  history  as  such  or  to  the  organi- 
sation and  support  of  religion  as  a  financial  or 
organisation  problem.  The  data  of  religion  may  be 
the  subject  matter  of  many  sciences.  The  sacred 
writings  of  any  people  may  be  studied  with  all  the 
resources  of  literary  study  or  of  philology.  That 
there  is  a  religious  literature  does  not,  however, 
make  this  a  distinct  science.  The  writings  are  ex- 
amined and  judged  as  to  their  history  and  meaning 
as  we  would  judge  any  great  piece  of  literature.  As 
a  history  may  be  judged  as  to  its  literary  quality, 
and  as  to  its  value  and  significance  as  prose,  so  a 
religious  narrative  can  be  similarly  judged.  In 
neither  case  have  we  a  new  science.  Only  here  the 
religious  data  are  in  their  expression  the  subject 
matter  of  the  science  of  literature.  Whether  the 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       229 

given  writing  is  true  or  not  can  not  be  decided  by  the 
literary  critic,  nor  even  whether  this  particular 
form  is  normal  or  not.  The  results  of  the  critic's 
work  are  of  value  only  for  his  own  science  of  literary 
criticism.  It  is  only  the  literary  problem  he  has 
solved.  An  appreciation  of  this  would  have  pre- 
vented much  of  the  uneasiness  over  the  higher  criti- 
cism. Religion  may  also  be  made  the  subject  matter 
of  historical  study.  The  forms  and  ceremonies  of 
religion  may  be  traced  in  their  development  and 
spread.  This  they  share  with  the  history  of  any 
great  influence  or  organisation  among  mankind. 
The  problems  met  here  are  historical,  questions  of 
origin  and  type,  of  historical  cause  and  effect. 
Again  the  question  of  whether  the  given  religion  is 
the  true  religion  or  not  is  not  considered.  If  each 
succeeding  form  is  explained  historically,  the  his- 
torian has  done  his  work.  The  results  are  of  value 
for  the  theologian,  but  they  are  valuable  not  as 
theology  but  as  history.  The  history  of  religion  is 
not  a  science  of  religion,  in  spite  of  some  current 
usage,  any  more  than  a  history  of  the  development 
of  physics  is  the  same  as  the  science  of  physics.  A 
man  may  be  a  student  of  physics  without  knowing 
any  history,  and  so  a  theologian  might  be  ignorant 
of  the  development  of  religion,  and  yet  have  the  in- 
sight to  make  him  a  great  teacher  of  the  science  of 
religion.  To  the  Church  Fathers  in  general  no 
knowledge  such  as  we  have  of  the  history  of  religion 
was  given,  and  yet  their  theology  is  of  great  value 
to  us.  Only  confusion  can  result  unless  we  dis- 
tinguish as  carefully  between  the  history  and  the 
science  of  religion  as  we  are  coming  to  do  between 


230      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

the  literary  study  of  religion  and  theology.  Neither 
literary  criticism  nor  history  constitute  the  pecu- 
liar field  of  a  science  of  religion. 

Each  of  these  studies  which  we  have  considered, 
and  also  the  psychology  of  religion,  deal  with  the 
expression  of  religion.  Following  the  analogy  of 
the  natural  sciences,  there  remains  another  field  of 
effort.  Not  only  the  expression  of  what  we  have 
called  the  source-object  of  religion,  but  that  object 
itself  can  be  studied.  Physics  disregards  the  prob- 
lems of  psychology,  and  centers  its  efforts  not  on  how 
we  know  mechanical  motion  in  varying  forms,  but 
on  what  we  know.  The  expression  of  that  knowl- 
edge in  practical  life  may  be  the  basis  of  an  economic 
study,  or  perused  by  literary  critics,  but  to  the 
physicist  the  only  things  of  importance  are  the 
known  facts.  The  object  which  is  experienced  is 
his  sole  concern.  So  in  religion,  it  is  possible  to  dis- 
regard the  historical  or  literary  or  economic  ex- 
pression of  the  knowledge  of  the  religious  object, 
and  concern  ourselves  solely  with  that  object. 
Though  we  have  not  been  making  a  scientific  study, 
we  have  been  studying  the  object  which  will  be 
studied  by  a  science  of  religion.  We  found  that  that 
object,  while  not  completely  given,  was  yet  defin- 
able in  certain  ways.  It  acted  on  the  human  will  in 
a  manner  which  we  call  the  action  of  personality. 
We  can  say  very  definitely  what  things  are  not  this 
object.  It  can  not  be  material,  for  its  varying 
forms  are  contrary  to  the  nature  of  matter,  as  is  also 
its  activity.  It  can  not  be  held  within  the  bounds  of 
the  limited  human  categories,  hence  what  is  dis- 
tinctly human  can  not  belong  to  or  be  this  object. 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY 

Whatever  is  revealed  through  the  religious  experi- 
ence which  corresponds  to  this  definition  thus  fur- 
nishes a  definite  field  for  study.  If  there  is  no  such 
object,  then  there  can  be  no  science  of  religion. 
There  may  be  psychology  or  history  or  literary  or 
economic  study  of  the  religious  experience,  but  none 
of  these  are  a  science  of  that  experience,  for  none 
of  these  ask  what  it  is  that  the  experience  is  an  ex- 
perience of.  Consequently  no  psychology,  to  take 
one  of  the  possible  lines  of  approach,  can  say 
whether  religion  is  true  or  false.  Only  a  science 
which  studies  the  object,  and  ignores  the  mode  of 
revelation  of  that  object,  can  answer  such  a  question. 
Where  the  object  is  ignored,  as  it  is  in  psychology 
and  the  other  studies  of  religion,  we  can  not  say 
whether  a  given  form  of  expression  is  true  or  false. 
Thus  there  remains  a  necessary  place  for  a  study 
of  the  object  of  religion.  This  is  the  field  of  the 
science  of  religion,  ordinarily  called  theology. 

It  is  not  enough  to  define  a  field.  If  our  science  is 
to  be  real,  the  field  must  be  real,  else  our  conclusions 
will  have  no  place  in  the  real  world.  Real  means,  in 
the  first  place,  existence.  This  we  have  seen  is  true 
of  the  object  of  religion.  The  religious  experience 
is  incomplete  in  itself.  Always  referring  for  its 
origin  and  character  to  something  beyond  itself, 
it  can  be  explained  only  by  reference  to  that  unseen 
object.  Hence,  as  the  experience  undoubtedly  exists, 
we  were  forced  to  ascribe  a  logical  existence  to  the 
object.  Logically,  it  must  exist.  Practically,  also, 
this  holds  true,  for  we  find  the  object,  or  asserted 
object,  independent,  in  part,  of  the  individual  will, 
and  so  far  as  agreement  exists  as  to  its  existence,  a 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

focusing  of  the  social  will  upon  it.  As  our  definition 
of  the  existence  of  objects  was  that  they  were  the 
foci  of  individual  perceptions,  the  religious  object, 
meeting  this  definition,  wins  its  right  to  be  called  an 
existent  object.  If  there  are  not  one  but  many  ob- 
jects, a  possibility  which  we  have  not  considered,  as 
it  falls  within  the  limits  of  the  science,  and  not  of  the 
philosophy  of  religion,  then  each  object,  as  sharing 
in  this  social  focus,  becomes  and  has  the  right  to  be 
regarded  as  existent.  The  relations  between  these 
objects  and  with  the  individual  perception  become 
the  field  of  study  for  our  science.  This  field,  since 
each  term,  the  object  and  the  individual  knower,  is 
real,  is  itself  real,  so  far  as  existence  is  concerned. 
By  a  process  similar  to  those  which  have  given  rise 
to  the  conception  of  physical  objects,  and  forced  on 
mankind  recognition  of  their  existence,  so  is  the 
recognition  of  the  spiritual  object  forced  on  us.  As 
the  material  object,  the  result  of  this  process  of  con- 
ception, is  regarded  as  existent,  so  we  term  the  ob- 
ject of  the  religious  experience  to  be  an  existent 
reality,  and  the  science  which  studies  it  a  study  of 
reality. 

The  relation  which  gives  the  problems  to  a  science 
must  not  only  be  between  existent  terms,  it  must  also 
be  valid.  There  might  be  a  science  of  magic,  the 
rain  charm  and  the  rain  which  by  coincidence  follows 
are  both  real,  yet  the  science  would  not  deal  with 
reality,  for  the  relation  with  which  it  would  work 
is  not  a  valid  relation.  There  is  no  necessary  con- 
nection between  the  charm  and  the  rain.  Our  science 
of  religion  must  therefore  be  shown  to  deal  with  a 
valid  relation  if  it  is  to  be  fully  established  as  a 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY 

science.  This  is  the  significance  of  our  proof  of  the 
validity  of  the  religious  experience.  In  showing  that 
it  is  really  an  experience  of  something  beyond  itself, 
we  have  established  a  necessary  connection  such  as 
does  not  exist  between  the  rain  charm  and  the  rain. 
Because  the  claim  of  religion  to  a  source  outside  of 
itself  and  therefore  to  a  connection  with  such  a 
source  is  valid,  our  science  is  dealing  with  a  real, 
and  not  merely  an  asserted  relation.  The  field  of 
its  study  is  the  world  of  real  relations  as  well  as  of 
real  objects.  An  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  reality 
is  no  more  required  of  theology  than  it  is  of  physics. 
Whatever  we  may  mean  by  reality,  it  applies  to  this 
spirit  world  as  it  does  to  the  material  world.  What- 
ever may  be  the  inner  meaning  of  validity,  and  of 
value  in  general,  it  applies  here.  The  field  of  the- 
ology is  this  definite  part  of  the  real  and  valid  world 
of  knowledge. 

Though  possessing  a  distinct  field  for  work,  a 
science  does  not  stand  on  its  own  foundation  unless 
it  has  a  distinct  method.  While  we  have  not  devel- 
oped a  method  proper  to  the  science  of  religion,  we 
have  indicated  some  of  its  necessary  characters.  In 
the  first  place  we  found  that  it  must  be  a  formal 
method.  We  are  not  dealing  with  an  object  which 
can  be  handled  as  can  a  rock  or  even  a  man.  We 
know  of  it  only  through  its  relation  to  man  in  the 
religious  experience.  Its  existence,  even,  is  a  matter 
of  logical  deduction.  Thus  to  study  it  there  is 
necessary  a  method  which  will  be  able  to  treat  with 
such  a  formal  object.  The  ways  of  the  sciences 
which  deal  with  matter  are  not  ours.  Instead  of 
experiment,  which  may  be  called  the  typical  method 


234      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

of  natural  science,  we  are  able  to  use  only  logical 
analysis.  Theology  thus  stands  with  the  sciences  of 
history  and  ethics,  rather  than  with  the  sciences  of 
nature.  As  history  by  its  methods  studies  the  great 
movements  of  human  life  in  their  development,  and 
ethics  and  economics,  from  different  points  of  view, 
study  those  movements  in  their  inner  relations,  so 
religion  is  the  province  of  the  theologian.  No  more 
than  with  history  or  economics  is  a  method  of  experi- 
ment or  microscopic  examination  possible.  The 
principles  which  are  being  studied  can  not  be  ex- 
amined directly,  but  only  through  their  results.  As 
history  with  the  facts  before  it,  tries  to  relate  these 
facts  one  to  the  other,  so  the  theologian,  with  the 
facts  of  religion  before  him,  has  to  point  out  the 
underlying  relation  to  the  source  of  the  experience, 
and  explain  the  experience  in  terms  of  the  unseen 
source.  In  this  sense  the  science  of  religion  is  a 
formal  science. 

Theology  is  a  formal  science,  but  it  is  not  an 
a  priori  science.  Again  like  history,  and  unlike  the 
normative  sciences,  or  mathematics,  it  does  not  study 
what  should  be,  but  what  is.  Historically  this  has 
not  always  been  true  of  theology.  In  many  ages 
men  have  simply  deduced  from  their  idea  of  God 
what  must  be  his  relation  to  man,  and  then  explained 
the  religious  experience  in  these  terms.  Such  an 
a  priori  method  we  have  discarded.  Theology  must 
be  built  up  from  a  study  of  the  facts,  not  brought 
down  from  heaven  to  rule  those  facts.  The  test  of 
any  asserted  revelation  is  our  revelation  from  God, 
that  is,  the  expression  of  God  in  us.  To  study  his 
character  we  must  study  the  revelation  which  we  have. 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       235 

Our  conception  of  God  is  then  the  result  of  our 
study  of  the  facts  as  known  to  us,  a  study  not  of 
what  should  be,  but  of  what  is.  In  this  its  work  is 
not  philosophic.  In  asking  the  meaning  of  an  ex- 
perience as  we  have  been  doing,  we  have  been  laying 
down  necessary  conclusions.  In  a  sense  we  are  ask- 
ing what  must  be,  and  so,  what  should  be  to  make  this 
experience  have  the  reality  and  validity  which  it 
claims.  There  might  be  some  argument  in  favor 
of  calling  such  a  study  theology,  and  of  giving  to  the 
science  of  religion  another  name.  It  is  true  that 
the  usual  conception  of  theology  is  that  of  a  phi- 
losophy. Since,  however,  theology  has  always, 
sought  to  know  God,  to  give  all  the  information 
about  him  which  is  possible,  and  it  is  evident  that 
we  have  nearly  exhausted  the  possibilities  of  a  method 
which  depends  on  universal  agreement,  we  should 
call  theology  that  which  gives  more  information. 
To  go  further  on  the  way  to  the  truth,  we  need  a 
science  which  will  pick  out  the  truth  from  the  false- 
hood, and  be  a  more  exact  guide.  This  is  the  work 
of  the  science  of  religion,  which  therefore  has  more 
right  to  the  name  of  theology.  This  study  does  not 
ask  what  the  relation  to  God  involves,  but  what  kind 
of  a  God  will  explain  the  revelation  which  we  have. 
Theology  then  takes  its  place  among  the  a  postiori 
sciences. 

There  is  one  final  characteristic  of  our  science 
which  marks  it  off  from  history  or  ethics.  Each  of 
these  is  in  some  part  descriptive.  History  has  to 
describe  the  great  underlying  principles  of  develop- 
ment so  that  we  may  be  able  to  recognise  them. 
Ethics,  so  far  as  it  includes  morals,  must  describe 


236      THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

the  principles  of  morality.  The  same  is  true  of 
economics,  which  has  largely  to  do  with  a  description 
of  the  principles  which  actuate  mankind  in  industrial 
life.  These  historical,  ethical,  or  economic  princi- 
ples when  rightly  described  are  recognisable.  We 
can  see  the  law  of  supply  and  demand  at  work,  once 
it  is  shown  to  us.  In  religion,  however,  we  can  never 
be  shown  the  object  we  seek.  No  description  can  be 
given  which  will  be  accepted  by  any  one  else.  As 
we  may  say,  there  is  no  objectivity  to  this  object, 
nothing  which  makes  it  possible  to  describe  it.  Our 
study  would  have  to  be  entirely  explanatory.  What 
we  have  is  an  experience  which  does  not  explain  itself. 
We  find  a  conceptual  object  which  explains  it  in  its 
varying  forms.  But  we  also  find  that  we  have  no 
description  of  this  object.  We  are  in  the  world  of 
logic,  but  not  as  mathematicians,  saying  what  should 
be,  but  in  a  world  of  concepts  saying  what  must  be 
if  what  we  see  to  be  real  is  real.  Mathematics,  while 
applied  to  the  material  universe,  has  in  itself  no 
necessary  connection  with  it.  God,  on  the  other 
hand,  as  studied  in  theology,  is  known  only  through 
his  connection  with  a  part  of  that  material  universe 
that  is,  with  man.  The  methods  of  the  theologian 
are  thus  distinct ;  unlike  the  natural  sciences  because 
not  experimental,  unlike  the  normative  sciences  be- 
cause deductions  from  facts  not  from  ideals,  and 
unlike  mathematics,  in  having  an  origin  in  the  mate- 
rial world. 

The  validity  of  such  a  method  depends  on  the 
existence  of  a  relation  which  does  thus  take  its  rise  in 
the  material  universe,  or  is  known  through  that 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       237 

universe,  yet  is  not  describable  in  material  terms, 
and  lies  in  the  field  of  concepts,  where  it  is  known 
only  by  its  expression  or  relation  to  a  part  of  the 
material  world.  Such  a  condition  is  satisfied  in  the 
case  of  personality.  Individual  human  personality 
can  not  be  described  in  terms  of  objective  life,  and 
yet  has  its  expression  and  value  for  knowledge  only 
in  relation  to  this  realm  of  matter.  My  will  to 
throw  a  stone  can  not  be  really  described,  but  it  is 
expressed  only  when  the  stone  is  thrown.  We  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  for  other  reasons  than  the 
creation  of  a  method  for  theology,  that  the  object 
and  source  of  religion  is  to  be  found  in  some  super- 
human personality.  Such  a  personality  can  not  be 
really  or  fully  described  in  objective  terms  an}7  more 
than  can  our  limited  human  personality.  Yet  we 
know  this  personality  as  we  know  one  another  only 
through  its  expression  in  human  life.  Hence,  again, 
as  with  our  knowledge  of  one  another,  our  ideas  as 
to  the  character  of  this  personality  must  be  the  con- 
scious or  unconscious  result  of  the  relation  of  that 
personality  to  us.  Since  we  are  dealing  with  the 
only  type  of  reality  which  can  be  studied  by  such  a 
method  as  we  have  outlined,  that  method  is  valid. 
Because  we  are  dealing  with  personality,  the  proper 
and  valid  method  is  based  on  that  fact.  Since, 
moreover,  it  is  a  superhuman  or  formal  personality, 
it  can  not  be  described  as  can  man.  Theology  thus 
is  distinct  in  method  even  from  those  sciences  which 
study  human  personality,  for  it  must  have  a  more 
general  method.  They  can  be  in  part  descriptive, 
as  concrete,  but  since  we  know  of  no  class  to  which 


238       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

we  may  refer  this  superhuman  person,  we  can  not 
use  description.  Theology  thus  stands  entirely  by 
itself  with  a  method  purely  its  own. 

No  science  fills  entirely  the  whole  of  its  field,  nor 
uses  to  the  full  extent  its  methods.  Something  is 
neglected  that  something  else  may  be  more  fully  de- 
veloped. Within  its  field  of  work,  too,  it  is  not  only 
the  formal  logical  presuppositions  which  set  limits. 
There  is,  besides,  the  pressure  of  practical  life. 
Chemistry  turns  to  those  problems  which  have  most 
relation  to  the  practical  problems  of  life.  In  the 
same  way  theology  is  not  completely  described  in 
the  formal  terms  we^have  been  using.  The  religious 
experience  does  not  stand  by  itself,  isolated  from  the 
other  interests  of  life.  The  rich  variety  of  that  life 
finds  its  echo  in  the  manifold  forms  of  religion. 
Theology  has  to  guide  it  not  only  its  own  historic 
development,  but  the  expression  of  the  religious 
emotions  and  will,  as  well  as  of  religious  knowledge. 
The  background  of  any  theological  study  must  be 
this  varying  and  changing  religious  life.  For  the 
Church,  taking  it  as  a  whole,  the  main  interest  of 
the  religious  experience  is  not  any  increased  knowl- 
edge of  God, —  this  it  feels  it  has  already, —  but  a 
deepening  and  strengthening  of  God's  influence  on 
man.  As  back  of  the  interest  in  theology  thus 
stands  the  interests  of  the  practical  religious  life, 
theology  feels  this  influence,  and  turns  to  problems 
which  arise  from  the  complexities  of  the  world  of  re- 
ligion. The  emphasis  of  the  western  world  for  cen- 
turies on  the  doctrine  or  problem  of  human  salvation 
was  due  to  this  pressure  of  man's  anxiety  as  to  his 
fate.  The  scientific  spirit  of  our  own  age  has  re- 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       239 

suited  in  an  emphasis  on  the  life  of  God  in  himself 
as  that  life  is  revealed  to  man.  The  search  for 
knowledge,  as  in  the  Greek  world,  has  come  to  its 
own.  Whether  from  a  belief  that  man's  fate  is  not 
as  important  as  he  thought,  or  for  some  other 
reason,  the  problems  which  confront  the  theologian 
have  changed,  and  this  change  is  the  result  of  the 
change  in  the  problems  of  the  religious  life. 

Besides  the  religious  life,  theology,  since  it  deals 
with  man's  will  as  well  as  with  his  emotions,  has  to 
face  the  realm  of  man's  will  acts,  that  is,  of  morality. 
While  it  does  not  have  to  explain  morality,  and  is 
thus  distinct  from  ethics,  it  can  not  ignore  the  moral 
nature  of  man.  Where  religion  leads  to  what  ethics 
concludes  to  be  a  low  standard  of  morality,  theology 
must  take  this  into  account.  Here  again  problems 
are  set,  and  emphasis  given,  not  by  the  science  itself, 
but  by  the  world  with  part  of  which  it  has  to  do. 
The  effort  is  sometimes  made,  as  we  have  done,  to 
define  religion  in  terms  which  are  independent  of 
morality.  This,  in  the  practical  development  of  the 
science,  does  not  mean  that  we  would  ignore  morality. 
The  formal  limits  of  the  science  do  not  include  the 
moral  codes,  it  is  true,  but  no  explanation  of  re- 
ligion can  be  true  which  would  render  untrue  or  un- 
real the  moral  development  of  the  race.  Those 
things  which  man  has  won  by  great  struggle  he  will 
not  lightly  let  go.  A  theology  thus  can  not  repre- 
sent its  god  as  immoral,  as  urging  men  to  licentious- 
ness or  murder,  and  be  regarded  as  true.  Theology 
can  not  hope  to  stand  if  pitted  against  truths  which 
man  is  determined  to  hold  fast.  Therefore,  though 
it  might  conceivably  be  that  theology  could  teach 


240       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

that  religion  is  best  explained  by  an  immoral  deity, 
practically  this  could  not  happen.  Such  a  theology 
would  be  immediately  rejected,  and  if  it  gave  the 
only  explanation  of  religion,  that  is  if  religion  was 
proven  to  be  immoral  in  its  tendency,  religion  and 
theology  would  be  rejected  together.  The  only 
theology  which  men  seek  or  will  have  is  one  which 
does  not  teach  immorality.  It  might  not  be  possible 
to  have  a  theology  which  is  moral,  but  a  moral  the- 
ology or  no  theology  at  all  is  what  mankind  requires. 
Because  of  this,  theology  has  to  justify  religion  to 
man,  by  showing  that  the  power  behind  it  is  moral. 
Unless  this  can  be  done,  religion  is  not  justified  in 
the  minds  of  the  human  race.  Theology  is  therefore 
held  within  the  limits  of  morality  by  this  presuppo- 
sition. 

More  plainly  than  by  the  background  of  religion 
and  morality  is  theology  influenced  by  the  motives  of 
those  who  center  their  attention  on  it.  The  histori- 
cal development  has  been  mainly  in  response  to  the 
demands  of  a  system  by  which  the  Christian  doctrine 
might  be  easily  taught.  The  lack  of  a  theology  in 
many  religions  may  be  due  to  the  absence  of  this 
motive.  Where  the  teaching  is  mainly  concerned 
with  the  ritual  acts,  and  the  learning  of  the  correct 
formulae,  no  system  of  explanation  of  the  religious 
experience  is  required  and  so  none  is  evolved.  So 
far  as  the  need  is  felt,  it  is  met  by  the  use  of  myths 
or  fables  or  stories.  Where  the  need  of  real  ex- 
planation is  felt,  as  among  the  Hindus  and  Budd- 
hists, we  find  a  theology.  There  the  things  to  be 
taught  are  the  experiences  of  the  religious  life,  hence 
those  experiences  must  be  systematised.  From  this 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY 

comes  the  analysis  and  explanation  which  we  have 
called  the  science  of  religion.  With  Christian  the- 
ology, from  the  time  of  Origen,  and  the  great  cate- 
chetical schools,  down  to  our  own  day,  where  theology 
is  the  possession  almost  entirely  of  the  official 
teachers  of  religion,  it  has  been  the  teachers  of  re- 
ligion who  have  been  the  theologians.  This  need 
and  desire  is  still  powerful.  The  effort  to  explain 
religion  arises  from  the  desire  to  instruct  others. 
Whether  the  instruction  is  intended  to  increase  or 
decrease  religion  or  some  particular  form  of  it,  does 
not  matter.  The  effort  to  influence  others  by  in- 
struction as  to  the  true  nature  of  the  religious  life 
is  the  mainspring  of  the  interest  in  theology.  This 
search  for  a  system  which  may  be  easily  taught  has 
its  effect  on  the  science.  The  problems  considered, 
and  the  results  aimed  at,  are  those  which  the  teacher 
needs.  The  nature  of  God  is  defined  as  loving,  as 
perfect  justice,  as  omnipotent,  because  these  are  the 
qualities  which  concern  man,  and  which  the  teacher 
desires  to  impress  on  man.  In  an  outline  of  the- 
ology this  element  must  be  recognised.  The  direc- 
tion of  the  development  of  the  science  will  be  deter- 
mined very  largely  by  the  needs  of  religious  instruc- 
tion. 

Another  element  not  so  evident,  but  even  more 
powerful,  is  the  direct  influence  of  the  religious  ex- 
perience itself.  The  devotional  spirit,  as  we  call  it, 
constantly  interferes  with  the  course  of  theological 
argument.  The  man  who  takes  most  interest  in  a 
theory  of  religion  is  apt  to  be  a  religious  man.  He 
is  then  not  merely  examining  an  experience  as  an 
impartial  judge,  but  he  is  constructing  a  theory  for 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

an  experience  of  his  own  life.  He  knows  that  ex- 
perience better  than  he  does  any  theory,  even  though 
that  theory  be  his  own  deduction.  The  reality  and 
the  coloring  come  to  the  theory  from  the  devotional 
life.  The  interests  of  that  life  will  largely  deter- 
mine, therefore,  the  development  of  the  theory.  Men 
tend  to  turn  from  a  theology  which  would  put  God 
far  off,  because  that  idea  arouses  no  devotional  en- 
thusiasm. If  such  a  theology  results,  then  it  is 
neglected,  and  search  is  made  for  some  explanation 
of  religion  which  will  more  nearly  touch  the  de- 
votional life.  Even  if  false,  a  theory  of  immanence 
has  more  weight  than  one  which  would  put  a  myriad 
beings  between  the  devotee  and  his  god.  The  victory 
of  monotheism  over  polytheism,  is  not  entirely  because 
of  its  logical  correctness,  but  because  it  gives  more 
assurance  to  the  individual  believer  that  his  relation 
to  God  is  worth  while.  Where  there  are  many  gods, 
the  service  of  one  may  not  bring  any  reward,  for 
another  may  be  stronger.  So  in  times  of  crisis  we 
find  Rome  importing  a  foreign  worship  in  the  effort 
to  gain  assurance  of  help.  Where  there  is  only  one 
God,  the  faithful  worshiper  is  assured  of  help,  be- 
cause none  can  defeat  the  will  of  the  god.  We  have 
to  recognise  these  influences  in  theology.  They  do 
not  determine  any  one  theory  to  be  true,  but  they  do 
fix  the  line  of  development,  for  they  point  the  way 
along  which  the  search  is  to  be  made.  The  interests 
of  the  religious  life  thus  play  a  large  part  in  the 
development  of  a  science  of  religion. 

We  have  brought  to  an  end  the  task  to  which  we 
set  ourselves.     There  was  needed,  we  said  in  the  be- 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       243 

ginning,  a  study  of  religion  which  would  have  no  pre- 
suppositions and  nnjjhflnrjps  at  the  start  except  the 
.fact  of  the  existence  of  t%  phpjmrppna  called  the  re- 
ligious experience.  We  may  not  have  seemed  to  ac- 
complish much.  No  system  of  theology  has  resulted, 
and  the  great  differences  between  the  various  religions 
have  not  been  even  considered.  Yet  something  has 
been  done.  The  conclusions  we  have  reached  are  at 
least  as  free  as  we  could  make  them  from  assump- 
tions, unconscious  or  conscious.  We  took  the  ex- 
perience which  men  call  religion,  and  examining  it, 
found  that  there  was  enough  agreement  amid  all 
the  differences  to  justify  the  gmn^^f_the_qne_name 
religion  to  these  various  experiences.  From  this 
agreement  we  found  those  elements  which  were  com- 
mon to  all  experiences  of  religion^  If  there  were  any 
unnoticed  assumptions,  they  were  in  our  use  of  the 
general  ideas  of  truth  and  reality,  as  well  as  of 
knowledge.  As  however  religion  is  only  one  among 
man's  experiences  such  a  use  is  justifiable.  So  far 
as  religion  itself  is  concerned,  we  did  not  assume  that 
one  type  was  above  another,  or  that  one  religion  was 
at  a  higher  stage  in  its  evolution  than  some  other. 
Within  the  field  of  our  study,  all  religions  have  stood 
on  an  equality.  Also  we  have  not  sought  to  either 
exalt  or  depress  religion  above  or  below  in  impor- 
tance man's  other  activities.  Any  conclusion 
reached  depends  therefore  on  the  standing  of  the 
experience  itself,  and  its  character.  JThe  definition 
ofjhe  source  of  religion  as  personal  does  not  assume 
that  God  must  be  personal  because  personality  is  the 

rse.     Our  result,  not  de- 


pending on  any  such  evaluation  either  of  personality 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

or  of  the  source  of  religion,  has  a  validity  which 
such  popular  arguments  can  not  have.  Because  of 
the  freedom  from  assumptions,  and  the  adoption 
only  of  such  conclusions  as  the  facts  warrant,  what 
we  have  stands  on  a  firm  basis. 

Our  method,  the  study  and  analysis  of  the  ex- 
perience, and  the  deduction  from  these  facts,  gives  a 
reality  to  our  conclusions  which  does  not  belong  to 
results  which  are  based  on  deduction  purely  from 
some  other  theory.  The  analysis  which  precedes 
gives  to  the  method  a  foundation.  We  know  that 
we  are  talking  about  the  real  world,  and  not  about 
a  world  that  might  be.  We  did  not  deduce,  for  in- 
stance, the  idea  of  God's  personality  from  the  con- 
ception of  God's  perfection.  This  "is as  much  a 
matter  of  method  as  of  presupposition,  for  it  has  a 
certain  validity  which  comes  to  it  from  the  concep- 
tion of  the  ideal  of  human  existence,  even  when  not 
assumed.  Yet  it  is  then  an  idea  as  to  what  a  per- 
fect  being  must  be  if  he  exists,  not  a  description  from 
expeTienceT"  The  1>eing  or  beings  whom  we  have  de- 
fined as  personal  are  such  because  an  analysis  of  ex- 
perience reveals  them  to  be  such.  The  being  whom 
we  have  described  and  defined  may  not  be  known  ab- 
solutely to  be  perfect  and  omnipotent,  but  what  we 
do  know  is  a  valid  knowledge.  Using  only  an 
analysis  of  facts,  and  not  an  a  priori  method,  we 
give  to  our  conclusions  a  certainty  of  a  place  and 
importance  in  the  actual  world.  Since  after  all  the 
main  irnpnrta.nrp  of  ™>ligirm  in  nren's  minds  is  not 
that  it  gives  knowledge  of  God^  but  that  it  helps 
them_to  live,  now  or Jxereafter^  any  knowledge  which 
results,  if  it  is  to  have  value,  must  connect  itself 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       245 

closely    to    this    life.     Validity    thus    becomes    not 
merejvjajpatter  of  logicaj^accuracy,  but  oijpracti^ 
gal  value.     This   value,  because  we  have   kept  our 
feet  on  the  ground,  belongs  to  our  results. 

This  value  of  the  conclusions  we  have  reached, 
though  the  actual  results  are  meager,  has  enabled  us 
to  point  out  the  line  of  a  further  scientific  enquiry. 
In  the  first  place  we  have  been  able  to  /define^  the 
science  of  religion.  In  this  we  have  divided  the  field 
which  theology  has  traditionally  claimed  for  itself, 
and  may  have  seemed  to  take  from  it  its  ancient 
proud  preeminence.  Such  preeminence  as  belongs  to 
a  jtudy  of  the  ideal  it  does  to  a  certain  extent  lose. 
Instead  it  comes  to  have  value,  as  indicating  the  goal 
toward  which  man  is  looking  and  moving.  The  God 
who  is  now  its  concern  is  a  God  known  to  man,  and 
in  close  relation  to  man,  not^  being  so  far  ojf,  and 
so  much  in  the  world  of  what  might  be,  that  the  main 
problem  is  how  could  he  come  into  contact  with  man. 
In  our  study  we  start  from  that  contact,  hence  it 
is  not  a  problem  for  this  science  as  we  have  defined 
it.  Monotheism^  and  God's  perfection,  usually  as- 
sumed, are,  however,  serious  problems^  They  have 
been  such  in  the  history  of  the  development  of 
religion,  and  it  indicates  that  our  science  comes 
nearer  to  reality  when  for  it  too  they  become  im- 
portant problems.  Theology  as  thus  more  accu- 
rately defined  represents  the  interests  of  the  reli- 
gious life.  Unconsciously  to  themselves,  theologians 
have  always  been  influenced  by  their  religious  ex- 
perience. We  have  now  made  this  influence  explicit, 
and  given  it  a  rightful  place.  This  being  taken  into 
account,  errors  which  were  due  to  its  being  ignored 


246       THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

can  now  be  avoided.  Thus,  while  perhaps  we  have 
defined  theology  in  terms  less  lofty  than  those  to 
which  it  has  been  accustomed,  so  defined,  it  becomes 
a  study  whose  importance  to  man  is  evident.  J3ased 
on  man's  experience  it  tries  to  solve  the  problems  of 
this  human  life. 

To  this  source  of  religion  there  is  given  a  valid 
method  of  study.  Valid  not  only  in  the  conceptual 
world  of  perfection,  but  also  in  the  world  of  actual 
experience,  any  loss  in  logical  certainty  is  more  than 
made  up  by  a  gain  in  concreteness.  The  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  many  of  the  conclusions  of  his- 
toric theology  have  not  the  value  and  certainty 
which  is  ascribed  to  them  is  of  an  importance  which 
religious  people  can  not  afford  to  neglect.  A  senti- 
mental regret  at  the  loss  of  a  false  sense  of  security 
should  not  blind  us  to  a  very  real  gain  in  the  know- 
ledge of  our  limitations.  In  general,  one  of  two 
contrasting  methods  must  be  chosen.  If  God  is  an 
ideal,  then  we  may  deduce  from  our  ideal  certain 
qualities  necessary  to  that  conception,  or  we  may 
take  our  experience  as  it  is,  and  ask  not  what  should 
be,  but  what  is.  While  in  the  second  method  we  lose 
the  ideal  so  far  as  it  is  merely  conceived,  in  the  first 
and  traditional  method  we  lose  the  assurance  that 
what  we  conceive  has  actual  existence.  The  two 
unite  to  a  certain  extent  in  the  conception  which  we 
defined  as  that  of  personality.  The  ideal  is  here 
that  which  is  man's  will  or  which  influences  man's 
will.  The  method  which  makes  this  conclusion  valid 
takes  its  stand  in  the  experience,  which  it  finds  is  that 
of  a  personality.  The  ideal  thus  has  a  basis  and 
a  part  in  reality  which  the  mere  conception  of  the 


A  FOUNDATION  FOR  THEOLOGY       247 

perfect  can  not  give  it.  The  idea  of  Godjremains 
an  idea,  unless  it  can  be  shown  to  affect,  not  as  an 
ideal,  but  as  a  personal  power,  the_jtctuaT  worldT 
This,  since  we  have  been  asking  the  meaning  and  im- 
plications only  of  this  real  or  actual  world,  this 
the  method  which  we  have  used  makes  possible. 
Whether  God  be  one  or  many,  perfect  or  partial, 
remains  for  further  study,  but  whatever  the  results 
of  that  study  may  be,  they  will  relate  to  a  being 
whose  existence  is  already  known  and  assured. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


9May'63SSp 


'66 -12  AM 


APR  2  5 


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Berkeley 


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